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THE ROUND TABLE

A QUARTERLY REVIEW OF THE
POLITICS OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

Volume VIII

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DECEMBER 1917 TO SEPTEMBER 1918

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A QUARTERLY REVIEW OF THE
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VIII

DECEMBER 1917 TO SEPTEMBER 1918

THE GATHERING OF THE NATIONS

I. THE YEAR 1917

LOOKED at from the military point of view the year 1917 has been a serious disappointment to the Allies. At its outset they were confident that the great converging attack on the Central Powers for which they had prepared would deal a deadly blow at the enemy organisation, if it did not destroy it altogether. Yet at the end of the year the Germanic Alliance is able to point not only to a resistance to the Allies on every front, which is still quite unbroken, but to the capture of Riga and various Islands of great naval importance to Russia, and to the successful initiation of an offensive in the South which has already resulted in the complete destruction of the long and carefully elaborated defences of the Italian frontier, and which clearly has for its object the elimination of Italy as an effective military power. That this should be so is, of course, mainly attributable to the military collapse of Russia. If Russia had been able to take any effective part in the offensive this year there would have been a very different tale to tell. None the less, from a superficial view the military situation of the Allies is not very good. Russia for the moment is militarily impotent. Italy is in full retreat, having lost a considerable fraction of her army and an immense number of guns. America is not likely to be able to bring decisive offensive force to bear upon the battle front for a considerable time. France has borne the burden of the war so long that the brunt of the fighting is falling more and

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more on British troops, and the British army, largely in consequence, is now dispersed over every theatre of war. It is easy to contend in fact that if there is no weakening during this winter on the side of the Central Powers, and no regeneration on the side of the Allies, we shall be faced with something very like a stalemate in 1918. The argument that we have reached a stalemate is, indeed, the card which the enemy propagandists are most hopefully playing. By concentrating attention on the surface aspects of the military war map, by pushing into the background the political and economic as well as the profounder military aspects of the war situation as a whole, they hope to produce discouragement and weakness out of which to win a compromise peace.

This view of the situation, however, ignores the possibility that the forthcoming winter may see the military efficiency of Russia largely restored. It ignores also the significant victories in Palestine and Mesopotamia which may well mean the beginning of the break up of the allies of Germany on whose support her power and hopes now increasingly depend. It ignores too the tremendous effect which the various allied offensives and especially the steady hammer-strokes of the armies under the command of Sir Douglas Haig have had upon the German people. The heavy losses, the almost unendurable sufferings of their armies on the Western front, the unfailing regularity with which they have been driven out of one supposedly impregnable position after another by troops which a year or two ago they affected to despise, have told heavily on German confidence and German staying power. They have not succeeded in breaking down the enemy military organisation or the resisting power of his army. But they have contributed enormously to the almost overwhelming demand for peace before another fighting season begins which is now the gravest menace to the enemy morale.

Further, if we look at the map from a broader standpoint, the results of the year have been uniformly good.

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First of all there has been the Russian Revolution. For the moment the immense advantages which have followed from it in the political sphere are apt to be forgotten amid the more obvious disasters it has entailed for our military plans. But to all those who see that this war is a war for liberty, for the advance of civilisation upon the lines of democracy and the reign of law, instead of under the lowering domination of an absolutist autocracy, the Russian Revolution must always stand as the first of the great victories of the Allied Cause. Despite the fatuous speechifying of the Soviets, the organised anarchism of the Bolsheviki, and the military paralysis which seems to have settled on Russia as the fever of the Revolution has burned low, Russia to-day is fundamentally more healthy than she was a year ago, and in a position to do more for freedom than she could ever have done under the rule of Nicholas II. Nothing could have been worse than the direction of Russian policy by that noisome camarilla of traitors, maniacs and sensualists associated with the names of Stuermer, Protopopoff and Rasputin who enjoyed supreme power at the beginning of the year, and whose chief object was to save their own positions by coming to terms with the German autocracy and betraying Russia and her Allies to their foe. The Russian people are now released from the blinding influence of despotism and free to move on lines of their own choosing. And even though constructive results seem slow in appearing, so far as the war is concerned, it can only be a question of time before the reign of law is once more restored and Russia begins to emerge from the ruins of the *ancien régime* as one of the great liberal Powers of the world. As Viscount Grey has recently written : " A free Russia is a splendid increase of freedom in the world, and whatever the immediate and passing effect upon the progress of the war the future effect upon democracy in Europe and upon international relations generally must be most favourable, and of incalculable value and benefit."

But the Russian revolution had a consequence of direct

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military benefit to the Allies. Had it not been for the Revolution it is doubtful if the United States would have entered the war with the promptitude and whole-hearted enthusiasm which she has now done. For the American the war is primarily a war for the principles of democratic civilisation. President Wilson crystallised the sentiments of his countrymen in the enduring phrase, "The world must be safe for Democracy." The overthrow of Tzarism removed the last shadow of doubt as to what the war was about. So long as Russia was governed by the degraded sycophants of an absolutist court it was inevitable that those at a distance from the conflict should be tempted to cling to the ease of neutrality on the ground that there was no clear issue of principle between the two sides. The revolution in Russia revealed the war as a world-wide struggle between a free civilisation and the Kultur of militarism. And it was promptly followed by the entry into the war of the greatest of the free nations, unequalled in its wealth, its population and its industrial equipment, not on a limited issue, but with an identification with the idealist aims of the Allies which would otherwise have been impossible. If the Russian Revolution had had no other result than to bring into the war a people inspired by the ideals and enduring fortitude of Washington and Lincoln, to take the place of a nation struggling in "a new birth of freedom," it would still have been a gain.

Two other changes must be recorded. The Greeks have been definitely won for the Allies. So long as Constantine was on the throne there was grave danger that Greece might be thrown into the conflict on the side of Germanism by its King, just as Bulgaria was by Ferdinand. Not only would this have meant that the whole Balkan peninsula was handed over to despotism and embodied in the German Empire of Mittel-Europa, but that the Allied forces at Salonika might have been driven into the sea and the coasts and harbours of Greece made the bases of a fleet of submarines which must have rendered the Mediterranean

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almost impassable for the Allies. The Salonika force, supplemented by the army which the enthusiastic energy of M. Venizelos is preparing, may yet play a vital part in the war for freedom.

Finally there is the significant rallying of the neutrals to the Allied cause. One by one all the nations not actually open to German attack have either broken off relations with Germany or declared war against her. The whole of Asia, save Persia, the whole of Africa, except Abyssinia, the vast majority of the States of North and South America are now definitely on the Allied side. Though their adhesion may not have important military results, it gives the Allies much valuable shipping, and creates an economic war map which, in the long run, will be far more important than the military war map. The control of practically all the great overseas markets of foodstuffs and raw materials is now in the hands of those who have declared against Prussian Kultur. The economic weapon is not a post-war weapon. Once a true peace has been signed, there must be peace in the economic sphere no less than the military sphere if we are not to prepare for a new war. It is rather a war weapon of tremendous power. If the Allies and their associates stand firm they can compel the Germans to come to terms, whatever the military map may be, for it will only be by their leave and with their assistance that the people of Germany and her Allies can escape from the privations and economic sufferings which week by week are increasing their demand for an immediate peace.

Looking, therefore, at the year as a whole there is good ground for quiet confidence. Month by month mankind has declared more and more emphatically for the Allied cause and against German Kultur. A moral map of the world shows that only the territory dominated by Berlin stands out for militarism and autocracy. Indeed, the only support the Germans have got left is the militarism of Prussia itself. Everything else is gone. They

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have thrown humanity to the winds. They have cast honour in the dust. They have made enemies of the human race. They do not trust to themselves. Neither do they believe in the debates of the Reichstag nor in the civilian Chancellors who come and go without affecting the war situation by a fraction of an inch. The allegiance of the German people to-day is to the Moloch of war, to the Great General Staff, and the intrigues it can generate in other lands, and to nothing else. And, despite all its victories, their confidence is coming increasingly to rest, not so much on the impossible dream that they can gain a military victory over the whole world as that the military machine will save them something out of the wreck because the Allies will fail to maintain the unity and endurance which are necessary if its fatal domination is to be destroyed.

That is the present situation of the war. The issue before us is, therefore, essentially a moral issue. Have we the clear-sightedness to see how immensely preponderant are the forces on the Allied side, the understanding that to compromise with iniquity is death, the unfaltering faith that right must triumph if we endure to the end, which will give us certain and complete victory? In order to fortify ourselves in our answer let us examine once more in the light of the experience of the last three years what is at stake in the war.

II. THE STAND AT ARMAGEDDON

EVERY month that has passed since August, 1914, has brought into higher relief the irreconcilable antagonism between the two systems which are represented by the German combination on the one side and the Entente peoples on the other. It is ever becoming clearer that it is not a war of race against race, or state against state, or the German people *versus* the French or the British, but between the claims of two incompatible ideals on the minds of men.

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The Prussian Kultur is irredeemably materialist. Its desire for domination is insatiable. Its standards of value are wealth, and commercial organisation, and power as evidenced by disciplined armies and countless weapons of war, wherewith to impose its will on others. So-called idealism it fosters, but only in the sphere of theory and speculation. According to its code morality must never be allowed to interfere with the real business of conquest in trade or politics. When it comes to practical life it denies that man is a free moral agent in the political sphere. The decisions must be taken for him. Obedience to authority concentrated in the hands of the Kaiser and his chosen advisers is therefore Prussia's iron rule, and *lèse-majesté* Prussia's unpardonable sin. The logical outcome, therefore, of Prussian Kultur is the enslavement of a whole people in a relentless military machine for the supreme purpose of subjugating other peoples to its rule through the agency of war.

Few Germans can have realised all that was implicit in their own Kultur before the war. Left to themselves, the German people have been a homely and humane race, incurably docile to authority, it is true, but peaceful and good-natured. The vast majority can never have suspected the abominations which they were about to be driven to commit by the orders of their rulers and the relentlessness of the creed they professed. That creed has driven them to deny one by one every virtue which humanity has held high. It has taught that other peoples were not neighbours with whom it should be the aim of statesmanship to live in peace, but rivals and enemies who must sooner or later conquer or be conquered. From this premise it has taught that acquiescence in that combination of autocracy and conscription which handed a whole people bound hand and foot to the caprices of a military caste, and which is the foundation stone of the Prussian State, was essential to national safety. Then it went on to justify treachery and violence as the first principles of international

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conduct, doctrines practised and acclaimed by Bismarck and Frederick the Great. The success which Europe allowed these methods to have in 1864, 1866, and 1870 confirmed their hold on the German people. Filled with pride in their own militaristic civilisation, their chief energy has since been bent towards preparation for the next war. In 1887 Bismarck screwed the system of conscription up to the utmost limit compatible with the development of the industrial aspect of German national life. This was followed by the ceaseless expansion of the German Navy. As under the strain of this perpetual expansion of armaments the war-cloud grew, every resource of civilisation was harnessed in the service of destruction. The point of view from which those who really controlled the policy of Germany looked at the advance of the sciences may be seen from this quotation from the well-known book by General Bernhardt, published before the war: "The state is bound to enlist in its service all the discoveries of modern science, so far as they can be applied to warfare, since all these methods and engines of war, should they be exclusively in the hands of the enemy, would secure him a distinct superiority." So, finally, Germany became an armed camp standing ready for instant war, in a world dreaming of peace.

But the worst consequence of this militarist Kultur has been the moral depravity which it has brought in its train. We have been so frequently shocked by the revelation of fresh horrors that we have almost lost sight of their abomination. Pacific professions and diplomatic courtesies were found to have covered elaborate preparations for war far within the territory of nominally friendly neighbours. The main business of official propaganda has been to sow dissension among all the races of the earth, to corrupt the ignorant, to organise outrage and revolt. Treaties have been regarded as useful cover behind which to prepare for sudden war. Every law and instinct of humanity has been progressively violated. The initiative

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in every fresh horror added to the conduct of war has come from Germany, until the modern battlefield is a hell of which the imagination of man could not have conceived five years ago. Frightfulness, especially against the innocent and weak, has become a primary weapon in the German armoury. Compassionate consideration has been regarded as weakness and treason, because it might lessen the terror on which Germany's hopes of domination were based.

It is not only against their enemies that the gospel of militarism has been invoked. The poison gas, the liquid fire, the sinking of passengers, the bombing of open towns, have had their counterpart in the terrible demands which the Prussian machine makes upon its own subjects. Not only are they sent to slaughter by the million or driven to work as slaves in the mines and factories at home under threat of machine gun fire from their own fellows, but the Kultur in which they believe has begun to trench upon the most sacred provinces of human life. The ruthless logic which would convert human corpses into the materials with which to lubricate the vast engine of war is justified with pride by the apostles of Prussian Kultur. Professors of this same Kultur are now endeavouring to substitute the commands of state authority for the covenant of matrimony as sanctioned by the civilised world. And as a final iniquity they have succeeded in challenging that foundation of human society, the loving relations of parents and children, by organising boys, trained in a fanatical loyalty to the Emperor, as Jugendwehr, and taught to shoot down their own parents and brothers and sisters when they begin to riot for bread or for peace.

It would be difficult to conceive of any diabolism of the human mind which has not been enlisted to subserve the ends of this machine which dominates Germany and her Allies. Never in history has there been a more sinister or more world-embracing conspiracy against human morality and freedom. The full realisation of the iniquity which goes by the name of Prussian militarism is only

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beginning even now to come home to the rest of the world. Before the war the Allied peoples were blind to much of it because they shared in some degree the vices which have made the Germans the prey to Prussianism. The fact that they were politically free, and had long been conscious of the evils of a military imperialism, enabled them to resist even at cost of war the repeated attempts of Germany in 1905, 1909, 1911, and 1914 to dragoon and cajole them into subservience to its will. But their pursuit of comfort, their love of money, their indifference to what happened to the rest of the world provided they themselves were left alone to follow their own selfish ends, blinded them to the full nature of the Prussian menace and prevented them from preparing adequately against it. It has been the sacrifices of the war itself in the trenches, in the munition shops, and in the countless sorrowing homes throughout the land, which have opened people's eyes to the true nature of the conflict. They now realise, to quote Viscount Grey again, "that this terrible war is a desperate and critical struggle against something evil and intensely dangerous to moral law, to international good faith, to everything that is essential if different nations are to live together in the world in equal freedom and friendship."

The Allies to-day are fighting that honour may rule in the relations of nations, that treaties may be sacred, that brotherhood and co-operation may take the place of jealousy and rivalry, that the reign of law may supplant the balance of power, that the strong may be guided by the sense of responsibility for the backward and not by the lust for domination and power, that the true liberty which comes from unselfish social service and faithful obedience to the principle of right and justice may prevail over militarism and autocracy in the affairs of men. This is the ideal which is coming to inspire the armies and peoples of the Allies. It finds expression in the common saying that this is a war against war, that the job must be done once and for all, that there must be no premature peace

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and no next time, that compromise with Prussianism is impossible, that it is a case of victory or downfall for all we hold most dear. Amid the roar of guns and the lathes, the mud of the trenches and the monotonous toil of the offices, it is not easy to see all this clearly. Nor is it possible to discern the new lines on which society, national and international, will be constituted. But the conviction is daily gaining ground that this is truly Armageddon, a world-wide struggle for the triumph of light over darkness, and that no new order is possible until the infamous and inhuman miasma of hatred and brutality and fear, which is Prussianism, is exorcised once and for all.

III. THE BIRTH OF A NEW WORLD

IT is not possible to say when victory will be won. Its outward and visible sign will be a treaty of peace, dictated not in accordance with the decisions of the sword, but by the unchanging verdict of right and liberty—a settlement which will contain no seeds of fresh wars, as did the peace of 1870, because it will restore all the invaded peoples of Europe to independence, will liberate and unite oppressed nationalities everywhere, and so create the foundations upon which a new international order can be reared. Such a peace is not in sight yet. The same men and the same caste that plotted the war and have planned its execution are still in power in the capitals of the Central Powers, and they know that the system whereby they live can only survive if they are able to show that it is not justice but the sword which has drawn the new map of the world. For all their eloquent protestations about universal peace and disarmament they are no more ready to give practical effect to-day to the abstractions they profess than they were ready to abide by the treaties and international laws which they signed before the war. Nor will they change until

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the people of Germany or their Allies awake to the evil by which they have been enslaved. When that awakening will take place none can tell. It may come from the military triumph of the Allies. It may come, as the Russian Revolution came, from a blind revolt against the intolerable infamies and sufferings imposed on them by the Prussian machine. But, however the end may come, victory cannot follow from a compromise with Prussianism itself. Liberty and absolutism can no longer live side by side. One or the other must triumph, root and branch.

In the forthcoming winter, however, the most important conflict may well be not in the trenches but in the hearts and consciences of the individual. The enemy is fighting us quite as much behind as in front of his lines. We are entering the final testing time when only a clear grasp of principle and an unbending resolution that the world shall be saved for freedom will carry us through. It is well, therefore, to examine briefly the insidious arguments whereby our clear vision of the issues at stake may be impaired and our courage sapped.

There is, first of all, the pacifist argument. Fortunately there are few true pacifists left, at any rate in the British Commonwealth. The majority are people who, through a literal interpretation of the Bible or an inability to rise above a purely material valuation of life, believe that war, with its suffering and bloodshed and death roll, is the greatest of evils, and who persuade themselves either that Germanism is not the evil which it seems or that in some way which they cannot explain liberty will triumph if only hostilities are stopped. The out and out pacifist has usually no real understanding of what liberty means. For all his professions he would take the risk of leaving the small nations of Europe under the tyrants' heel and the stronghold of militarism untouched. He would "condone" all the iniquities of the machine, from the ravishing of Belgium to the massacre of the

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Armenians. He would welcome peace even if it meant a reversion to a state of society which is in fundamentals the same as that out of which the war itself came. He cannot see that now is the appointed time for winning liberty and peace. Nor can he appreciate the immeasurable superiority of the warrior in the trenches, who has sacrificed everything for a spiritual ideal, to the "man of peace" at home, who spends his life in pursuit of excitement, pleasure, or ease, or the wordy propagation of some fanciful creed of his own. He cannot see that the war itself is the birth-throes of that new world of which he himself dreams, in which the devilries which make peace impossible will be overcome, and freedom and justice and honesty, the conditions of peace, are secured.

The second quarter from which the attack may come from behind the lines is from among those who are so preoccupied with ideals of their own, ideals social, economic and political, that they have lost sight of the fact that their own dreams can be made real only through victory, and that victory will, in fact, bring them in its train. The social system in the British Isles, the capitalist system throughout the world, is badly in need of reconstruction. There must be a greater equalisation of status, of wealth, and of opportunity. There must be an end made of the system whereby wages are determined mainly by competition, whereby those who inherit wealth and have only lent it for industrial purposes have the right to unlimited profit from the harder work or better methods of others. Capital is entitled to legitimate reward for the risks it takes and the enterprise it shows. But it ought not to carry with it unlimited power and the right to idleness. Every citizen ought to do a full day's work for a fair day's wage, and public spirit ought to supplant private profit as the motive power from one end of the national activity to the other. But these beneficent changes cannot be introduced by a stroke of the pen. Not only will they be impossible if the Prussian military caste still rules over Mittel-Europa, and condemns

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all nations to a new rivalry in armaments as a prelude to a new war, they will come about only as the outcome of a real change of heart in all classes, and it is in the struggle for liberty in Europe that the spirit which will change the heart of society is being born. In the international sphere lasting peace will not result from the mere mechanism of arbitration or of a League of Nations, but from a substitution of the friendly desire to work for humanity for the national rivalries of the past. So in industry, it will not be from the panaceas of the advocates of the class war or the introduction of the bureaucratic paraphernalia of the socialist state that industrial peace will come, but from a change whereby rich and poor, capitalist and labour, cease to regard inordinate wealth and having no work to do as the conditions of happiness, but agree that the first duty of industry is to provide adequately for the needs of all, and that throughout industry happiness and affluence will only come from perfect work and perfect service by all. Does anyone believe that any heaven could be made out of the jealous hatreds and bitter controversies which dominated the industrial world before the war? Is it not obvious that the spirit which will transform our national life is the spirit which took men out of these conditions into the battle, and which has enabled them to find peace and contentment in greater measure than they had ever done before, though sacrificing everything that the world had to offer, at duty's call? It is out of the war, and out of victory for our cause alone, that the real reconstruction of our society will spring. The dreamers of social reform who regard the war as an interference with their hopes are not unlike the pacifists. Their real panacea for social ills is a return to the catchwords and panaceas of pre-war days, because they cannot see that not only the spirit but the very machinery of a new social order is being created hour by hour in the struggle for the freedom of mankind.

Then there are those who are appalled at the price which

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has to be paid, and who feel that nothing can justify the prolongation of the present carnage. No one with a spark of feeling can fail to shudder at the awful suffering of the modern battlefield, and the perhaps more terrible suffering in the homes far from the firing line. Nothing could justify the carrying on of the war for another hour save that to stop it now would mean an infinitely greater loss and suffering in the long run. The Prussian military machine, inspired as we have seen by doctrines which respect the laws neither of God nor man, has established an absolutist mastery over the nations they describe as their subjects and their Allies. The last vestige of independence disappeared when the Germans took over the Isonzo front. Berlin is the despot of all the inhabitants of Mittel-Europa organised from top to bottom for war. Under its direction they have challenged the world in arms. Is it conceivable that if the Allies weakened and gave them terms which did not imply the complete triumph of right and the utter defeat of their tyrannous purpose, these people would throw off the yoke after the war? The Prussian machine would claim, and claim with justice, that its promises had been fulfilled, and that under the inspiration of its militarism the German people and their Allies had proved themselves masters of the world, for the world in arms had been unable to defeat them. It would appeal once more for discipline, for armaments, for trust in their matchless wisdom and strength, and they would begin to prepare, as General von Freytag Loringhoven has just explained, to organise the vast Empire of 150,000,000 souls, in order to make a certainty of victory in the next war. If the German people are docile now, is there any reason to suppose that they will be less docile when faced by arguments such as these backed by the ruthless use of the terrible engines of destruction which have been devised in the war? There is nothing in the history of 1866 or 1870 to justify this view. And it is significant that the German minority Socialists were anxious

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for the Stockholm Conference precisely in order to tell their fellow Socialists abroad that, if the Allies did not win victory now, they would have to win it at some fiercer Armageddon in future years. If we are to avoid still worse horrors in the future, if we are to attain to a state of society in which all nations are not hourly contriving new devilries by land and air and water and under the seas with which to destroy one another, but living in amity and peace, the liberation of the world from militarist tyranny must be finished in this war, once and for all. Victory now, whatever it may cost, is the cheapest and most merciful road.

Finally, there is a still more subtle enemy, the mental and moral inertia which settles down at the end of every long struggle and which is reinforced by inability to see clearly how victory is to be won. Having made great efforts in the past, it is only too fatally easy to shrink from the fresh efforts and constant resourcefulness and adaptability which are necessary to the mastery alike of the enemy and of the circumstances of the time. The broad situation is clear. The Government of Germany and its agents are endeavouring by every means to persuade us that we have reached a stalemate, that victory is impossible for either side, and that compromise is the only alternative to the total destruction of civilisation. Nothing could be more untrue. Never have the Allies had such assets on their side. They have the whole world behind them. Is it not obvious that if the Russians and the Italians were to pull themselves together, if the British and the French continue their steadfast work, if the Americans mobilise their utmost, and the other nations of the earth were to unite in putting economic pressure on their enemies, it would not be long before the Germanic combination were in ruins at our feet? In truth, the need of the time is not to look at the advantages of the enemy, but to consider the immeasurable resources on the Allied side, and combine to bring to bear upon the autocracies of Central Europe—exhausted by four years' war, weakened by want of food,

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honeycombed by the revolutionary unrest they have propagated so industriously abroad, passionately longing for peace—a pressure which would be irresistible.

The war indeed can only now be lost by faint-heartedness. The apostles of Prussian Kultur are making frantic efforts to get a compromise peace before their own victims turn against them. They know that if the Allies are united and resolved they must be defeated utterly and for ever. If it once became clear to the Germanic peoples that, despite all its victories and all its promises, the military machine was impotent to save them, that to trust it further would simply be to inflict further suffering on themselves, and that the peace terms of the Allies involve no injustice, but ensure liberty and equality with all other nations for themselves, the dawn of the day of liberation would not be long delayed.

Our part, therefore, to-day is with a brave heart to continue steadfastly in the course on which we have started, constantly awake to new opportunities and new methods of work and service, but inflexible in our resolution to continue our battle with Prussianism by every means in our power, until it stands ruined and discredited among men. We need at this time something of the spirit with which men enlisted for service in the early days of the war. With the great majority it was no subtle calculation of chances, certainly no thought of profit, that took them into battle. The men who won the first battle of Ypres went forward and stood firm because it was their duty and because they could see no other way of fulfilling the mission which they felt laid upon themselves. If we go forward in the same spirit now, we shall obtain no less a victory. Like Moses and the Israelites, it is the simple obedience to the call of duty, the calm trust that right must triumph and wrong be worsted, that at the moment when things look most hopeless, and the cohorts of the enemy are spurring most fiercely on, the victory is most near, that will give us the courage and insight to endure until the promised land of freedom is within our sight.

THE GENESIS OF THE PRESENT SITUATION IN INDIA

IN order to make the present situation in India clear to those who have no first-hand knowledge of the country it is necessary to go back some way into the past; for the special problems presented by the India of to-day are not easily intelligible apart from some consideration of the conditions out of which they arose.

It is probably realised by most people outside India, although it is often forgotten by the modern generation of educated Indians, that Great Britain came to rule the country, not because she desired to do so, but because she was unable to do anything else. From the earliest times the instincts of the East Indian Company were in the direction of peaceful trade, not of territorial acquisition. In the welter of anarchy in which India lay throughout the eighteenth century a certain amount of territorial acquisition was a necessary concomitant to commercial existence; but the struggles with the Native powers in which the Company became involved were not only unsought, they were forced upon it in face of the almost tearful protests of the Directors. Despite all efforts to maintain a policy of non-intervention, circumstances forced the Company along a road it would fain have avoided. The policy of non-intervention eventually broke down because it was not only morally unjustifiable, as abandoning the bulk of India to disorder, but was also inconsistent both with a continuance of trade between India and Europe and with the safety of "the British Pale."

The manner in which order was by degrees established in India by the great administrators of the early

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nineteenth century is generally known. The names of Elphinstone, Munro, Outram, and many more are emblazoned in letters of gold upon the annals of the Empire. But it should be remembered that owing to the particular conditions under which their work was carried on the administrative system of British India received an image and a superscription of which the main outlines have persisted down to the present day. Quite apart from the dominant personalities of these men who first brought order where anarchy had reigned, the mere fact that this order was superimposed upon India from the outside inevitably produced a system which was not merely of the nature of paternal despotism but possessed in addition the peculiarity of requiring the paternal despots to be foreigners. The British official, whether in a district or at the headquarters of Government, found himself, metaphorically speaking, "upon a peak in Darien," arbiter of vast conflicting interests, invested with semi-autocratic powers executive, financial, and judicial: protected from the temptations of his position as much by its splendid isolation as by his own innate traditions of straightforward dealing. It is in these conditions that an explanation must be sought of the continued failure of the British administration of India to find room, despite oft-repeated promises, for a large proportion of Indian officials among that close body of more trusted servants in whose hands all control tends to be concentrated. The administrative structure was from the very first what it has still remained virtually up to the moment of writing, a system devised by foreigners and worked by foreigners. It cannot, therefore, be a matter of surprise that such attempts as were made to give effect to Clause 87 of the Charter Act of 1833,* and to subsequent enactments

* No native of the said territories, nor any natural-born subject of His Majesty resident therein, shall, by reason only of his religion, place of birth, descent, colour, or any of them, be disabled from holding any place, office, or employment under the Company.

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similar thereto, have been to the liberal-minded a stumbling-block and to the conservative foolishness. The British administrators, relying upon their own benevolence and integrity, were thereby strengthened in their belief that the destinies of India were not merely safe in their hands but had been committed to their control by Providence. They pushed on their admirable work of spreading efficiency and enlightenment, without waiting to carry along with them a sufficient body of Indian intellectual opinion. Some mentors, indeed, they had, like F. J. Shore, but these were in the main discontented men with personal grievances, whose warnings carried no weight. What these mentors had foreseen, at length came to pass. The landed classes and the aristocracy of religion, believing their privileges and their creeds to be threatened by a policy which left them out in the cold, made no attempt to check a great wave of reaction against the rapid imposition of Western ideas and Western methods upon a conservative people ill-prepared to receive them. Of this reaction the Mutiny of 1857, though confined to a relatively small portion of India and largely military on the surface, was the most prominent manifestation. The brains of that movement were a handful of men, mostly Hindus, who employed as their tools thousands of ignorant persons convinced, partly as a result of the blunders and over-confidence of the administration, that their customs and beliefs were endangered by the wholesale introduction of the new wine of the West into the age-stiffened bottles of the East.

I. THE GROWTH OF EDUCATION

THE main lesson of the Mutiny—namely, the necessity of associating the leaders of sentiment and of opinion in India with any far-reaching scheme of reform which touches the people—has never been forgotten. A further

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lesson, which could not be so clearly appreciated at the time, was the necessity of educating the people of India, not merely to render subordinate assistance in the work of administration but to understand the principles and aims of British policy. Half the troubles of the British in India have been caused by their failure to find a position of any real importance in their system for Indians equipped with a sufficiently thorough Western education to qualify them for the task of interpreting the mind of the West to the mind of the East. This has been due, in part, to the character of the education itself, which has never been consciously shaped by Government towards any clearly defined end. As soon as the Company had become "paramount in effect," the necessity had arisen of calling into existence a class of Indians possessed of a sufficient education to act as a more or less mechanical link between the administration and the people, principally in the form of supplying the clerical staff in the rapidly multiplying Government offices. With this strictly utilitarian aim had been, it is true, conjoined, in theory, the nobler one of educating, so far as possible, the vast mass of subjects committed to the charge of the Company, with the object of fitting them to appreciate the blessings of Western civilisation. As early as 1833 Macaulay had voiced this aspiration :

It may be that the public mind of India may expand under our system until it has outgrown that system : that by good government we may educate our subjects into a capacity for better government : that having become instructed in European knowledge they may, in some future age, demand European institutions. Whether such a day will ever come, I know not. But never will I attempt to avert or to retard it. Whenever it comes, it will be the proudest day in English history.

Despairing of the magnitude of the task before them, those responsible for the project of introducing Western education into India deliberately confined their efforts to the upper strata of society, hoping that by educating the

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select few some tincture of Western learning might percolate down to the masses. In which plan they were but following the drift of existing circumstances. For ages untold, learning in India had been the much-prized privilege of a class, not the common heritage of the mass. The experiment of the early educators was thus foredoomed to failure; for the Brahmin, assisted by his innate aptitude for learning, quickly secured a virtual monopoly of the prizes open to the Western-educated, to the exclusion alike of the Moslems and of his less fortunate co-religionists. It is true that so early as 1854 the Wood despatch outlined a system of education which might in time have been developed into something worthy of the term national, but before it could be put into operation came the Mutiny and the subsequent remodelling of the Army and the general work of reconstruction, the joint effect of which was not merely to swallow up any funds which might have been devoted to the general diffusion of education but also to make Government extremely reluctant to impose additional taxation for any purpose, however necessary, lest fresh trouble should be stirred up. Higher education, for which there was an effective demand upon the part of the upper strata of society, flourished at the expense of middle and primary education, the extension of which rested largely upon the efforts of a Government which did not realise the vital necessity of preventing Western learning from becoming the monopoly of a class. Further, in its mistaken desire to encourage the manufacture of graduates, Government made a University career, as vouched for by the passing of examinations, an essential preliminary to every official post worthy of consideration. But the authorities forgot that quality is at least as important in education as quantity and that these graduates would miss the primary benefit of a University education if it were not so planned as to enable them to develop their character and shape their ideals in accordance with the needs of their country. This naturally reacted disastrously upon the Universities

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themselves, since they came to be regarded first and foremost, not as instruments of social and civic enlightenment, but as artificial avenues to Government service of some kind or another. In consequence the liberalising effect of Western education even as understood in India has been narrow in scope, and has, generally speaking, done little to break down the exclusive and monopolist tendencies of the castes which have profited by it.

It is upon a realisation of these two important factors, namely, the peculiar characteristics of the Western-educated—limited numbers, caste-exclusiveness, unshaped ideals—as well as the impossibility experienced in the past of finding a real place for them in a system of administration devised by foreigners to be worked by foreigners, that a true explanation of the present situation largely depends. For this situation is nothing startling or unexpected : it is the natural culmination of a movement which has been going on for the last half-century and has acquired a tremendous momentum during the last two decades.

II. THE TRANSFER OF GOVERNMENT TO THE CROWN

FOUR years before the outbreak of the Mutiny Lord Dalhousie, then Governor-General, realised how much his hand would be strengthened in dealing with the Home authorities if he could associate himself with the opinion of a greater number of persons than those included within the close circle of his Executive Council, and largely as a result of his personal activities—so we gather from his recently published *Private Letters*—the Charter Act of 1853 empowered him to add six special members to his Executive Council for legislative purposes. The Legislative Council thus constituted was not a legislature in any ordinary sense of the term : it was the Supreme Government of India sitting in its law-making capacity : and in this connection it is significant that powers of legislation were at the same

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time withdrawn from the Provincial Governments of Madras and Bombay. Lord Dalhousie can scarcely have dreamed of the coming of a time when the "additional members" might conceivably outnumber the officials. He therefore never faced the question as to the powers of this Council in the case of difference of opinion between the Executive Council and the new body. This was to be productive of important results.

With the transfer of the Government of India from the Company to the Crown in 1858, the structure of that Government was but little altered. The Secretary of State, who now replaced the old President of the Board of Control, was in theory subjected to an effective supervision by Parliament on the one hand and to a steadying influence by the Council of India on the other. And here it may be well to mention a fact which is now in some danger of being forgotten, namely, that the Council of India was originally intended to afford a substitute for that popular opinion which, in the case of the Colonies, exercised a powerful influence upon the Secretary concerned, but which at that time was in India non-existent. Curiously enough, however, the general effect of the Act of 1858 has been to remove India far beyond the vision of the Parliament of Westminster. In the days of the Company the necessity of conducting enquiries into the manner in which it discharged its duties kept Indian affairs well within the purview of Parliament, but when India came under the government of the Crown the occasion, though not the necessity, for Parliamentary supervision was no longer forthcoming. Parliamentary interest in Indian affairs, on the one hand, was spasmodic and often ill-informed: on the other, the Council of India soon became the stronghold of caution and conservatism. The joint result was to throw all real power and all real control into the hands of the Secretary of State.

In India, as has already been stated, one of the consequences of the Mutiny was a desire on the part of the

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British administrators to carry along with them in their activities the social and intellectual leaders of the Indian people. The plan devised in Lord Dalhousie's time, of associating with the Executive Council certain special members for the purpose of law-making, was plainly capable of contributing to that end. Accordingly, by the Indian Councils Act of 1861, the Governor-General was empowered to nominate from six to twelve persons to be additional members of his Council for legislative purposes. Further, legislative powers were restored to the provinces of Madras and Bombay, and conferred upon other provinces, these powers to be exercised through Provincial Councils, containing members nominated by the Head of the Province. In practice some of these nominated members, both in the Imperial and Provincial Councils, were always Indians. It is, however, most necessary to remember that these Councils, Imperial and Provincial, were not Parliaments. They were never intended in any way to exercise control over the Executive. They were merely designed to enable the Executive to ascertain the opinion of Indian leaders upon any given measure or proposal. There was not the slightest idea of compelling the Executive to be bound by that opinion, whether in the case of the Government of India or of the Provincial Governments. As had been the case with Lord Dalhousie, the framers of the Councils Act never conceived of a time when the officials upon these Councils might be in a minority, and they never faced the question as to what the precise limits of the powers of these Councils were.

As the memory of the Age of Anarchy died out, and as India began to advance in material prosperity, the Western-educated classes, whose numbers were steadily increasing, began to have a strong sense of grievance. This was principally due to the fact that they had no adequate place found for them in the administrative structure, and the educational qualifications on which they prided themselves failed to secure for them at the hands of their British

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ruled the social recognition enjoyed by the representatives of the old Indian aristocracy who still held aloof from Western education. Further, as Macaulay had foreseen, the study of Western writers, such as Burke and Mill, naturally produced a desire for a more liberal form of government, under which—so the educated classes hoped—they would become a power in the land. Moreover, in the British Parliament, men like John Bright and Henry Fawcett were continually urging that “the natives of India should be given a fair share in the administration of their own country,” without perceiving that in order to do this a drastic remodelling of the administrative structure, such as no one, either in India or in England, would have cared to face, was absolutely essential. The activities of these English members of Parliament, from John Bright to Sir William Wedderburn, have been of the greatest possible influence in the affairs of India, for they have encouraged the Western-educated classes to voice their aspirations and clothe their grievances in the language of constitutional reform in England, so that a movement which began originally as a desire to assert class privileges, has gradually come to be regarded by themselves as a struggle from the very first between the forces of popular control on the one hand and of bureaucratic government upon the other.

III. THE BEGINNINGS OF CONGRESS

BY the beginning of the “’seventies” the growing ease of communication between one part of India and another, the increasing use of English as a *lingua franca*, and the realisation of common interests as against the European administrator had enabled the party of the Western-educated to crystallise into shape. By means of an active and violent vernacular and Indo-English press it shortly began to exercise a power out of all proportion to its numerical strength. Certain undoubted grievances were

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seized upon, and employed as the cause, rather than the occasion, of an outbreak of racial feeling. The Lancashire cotton trade's abolition of the Indian import duties in their own interest and the raising of the age limit of the Civil Service examination in such a way as to handicap Indian candidates ; the rash and provocative tone adopted by the Anglo-Indian Press over the Ilbert Bill of 1883 ; the official opposition to Lord Ripon's measures for the extension of local self-government : all these combined to produce a considerable degree of ferment in the minds of the educated. Largely as a result of the activities of Mr. Surendranath Banerjee, associations were formed in the various provinces with the object of organising the expression of grievances. This movement received some encouragement from Lord Dufferin, who, hoping to create a safety valve, persuaded the late A. O. Hume, a staunch friend to Indian constitutional aspiration, to mould it into a more regular and quasi-representative shape. Accordingly in 1885 a meeting of delegates of the Western-educated classes from all parts of India was held in Bombay. This was the beginning of the " Indian National Congress," which was intended by its projectors to form " the germ of a native Parliament," and which has since figured so prominently in the politics of India. In this movement the Mohammedans had little part. They had been invited to join, but under the leadership of the great Sir Syed Ahmed they determined, with some few exceptions, to hold aloof from all political agitation and to pin their faith to the British Government. In this determination they were influenced apparently by two considerations. The first was the relatively backward state of their community, so far as education was concerned, which they felt would put them at a disadvantage as compared with the Hindus. The second was the belief that, being in a minority, they must rely for equity of treatment more upon the authority of Government than upon the brotherly feeling of the Hindus.

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Lord Dufferin apparently had hoped that the Congress would supply in India the place of "Her Majesty's Opposition" in England, by bringing to the notice of Government the defects of official measures from the non-official point of view, and by affording an index to educated Indian opinion. He had also looked to the Congress to become the rallying point of all the more enlightened Indians who recognised that social reforms, indispensable to any real progress, had to be initiated by Indians themselves and not by alien rulers. He was not prepared for the vigorous attempt it instantly made to press the programme of the classes composing it, namely the removal of special disabilities under which they laboured, their association in ever-increasing numbers with the administration, and the remodelling of the machinery of government so that it should present an external resemblance to Western Parliamentary institutions. On such matters as these the members found themselves at one. Unfortunately on the question of social reforms profound differences very soon revealed themselves, and, after a half-hearted attempt to include it among their activities, they decided to confine themselves to political ends. Upon such vital questions as the position of women, child-marriage, the remarriage of widows, the elevation of the depressed classes, and the modification of obstructive social customs, they were hopelessly at variance among themselves. The reality of the Western education on which they based their political claims was thus put to the test and in too many cases found wanting.

The existence of the Legislative Councils, Imperial and Provincial, gave the Congress politicians, on the other hand, the opportunity of putting their political claims in the foreground. Ignoring in the first place the limited function of the Councils, and in the next place the width of the gulf which marked their own class off from the overwhelming mass of their uneducated countrymen, they regarded the existing Councils as though they were Parlia-

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ments which could by a mere mechanical modification be made responsible to an Indian electorate consisting of themselves. They urgently and continually demanded an increase of the power of these Councils and the inclusion within them of representatives of their own. They aimed at securing by degrees a preponderating weight to be used ultimately for the purpose of bringing pressure to bear upon the executive. At the same time, they had no idea of themselves becoming responsible for the administration of the country.

Their position was in some respects a strong one. They laboured under social grievances which ought to have been redressed, and they employed these grievances to further their political ambitions. They were steadily befriended by several members of the House of Commons, and could usually command a sympathetic hearing from the Liberal Party, more especially when it was in opposition. Further, the whole tendency of the age was hostile to bureaucracy and favourable to any movement which had even the appearance of leading towards self-government. Last, but not least, the powerful Indian Press was held like a sword of Damocles over the heads of those persons and parties who showed any reluctance against falling into line with the Congress propaganda. Looking back over the last fifteen years of the nineteenth century, however, we can now perceive that the Congress politicians made three grave tactical errors. In the first place, they did not avail themselves of such opportunity as was presented to them, under Lord Ripon's scheme, of acquiring practical experience in the details of local administration. They thus exposed themselves to the charge of being mere dealers in rhetoric, without administrative experience, lacking all knowledge of the practical difficulties of Indian administration. Secondly, they did not draw up a definite scheme of political progress, but allowed themselves to be hypnotised by phrases like "self-government" and "popular control." Lastly, but perhaps not least serious, they dis-

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played little capacity for putting forward a broad statesman-like programme, dealing especially with those crying evils of the Indian social system which can be cured only by Indians themselves, but frittered instead their energies and those of their supporters in Parliament over such questions as "an act of oppression in a tea garden, a gross insult offered to an Indian gentleman in a railway carriage, the malpractices of the police and the bunglings of the executive." *

On the other hand, those with whom the responsibility for the administration of India lay made serious mistakes. The great Civil Service, proudly conscious of the value of the work which it had done for the country in times past, and was still doing, failed generally to appreciate the changing spirit of the age. Relying on the one hand upon the limited numbers of the educated class, and on the other upon their lack of practical experience, its ideal was to keep the ship of state upon the traditional course, while conceding as little as possible to the new and tumultuous currents whose significance it did not appreciate. The British administrators of India, while in no way relaxing their efforts for the moral and material progress of the country, did not recognise the necessity for a corresponding development in the sphere of politics. Whilst the literature of British democracy was expounded in Indian Colleges, no organised endeavour was made to give to Indian youths the civic training or to create openings for educated Indians to acquire the experience and sense of responsibility essential to the development of democratic institutions. By testing the value of our Indian educational system by the quality rather than by the numbers of the graduates produced by it, and by training up a generation capable of grasping the true inwardness and not merely the catchwords of Western political life, by dredging deeper into the social structure and giving special encouragement to the lower castes to raise themselves by education out

* A. C. Mazumdar, *Indian National Evolution*, p. 143.

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of the slough of social despond, they might have prevented the dangerous association of constitutional propagandism and caste-interest which became a sinister feature of Indian political activity. If at the same time they had welcomed instead of viewing with distrust and dislike the association of Indians with the government of the country, whether Central or Provincial, and had in fact driven them to acquire the administrative experience they conspicuously lacked, British rulers of India might have headed the Congress party off their dangerous demand for power divorced from responsibility—the smooth way which leadeth to destruction—and have made less turbulent and dangerous the process of transition between paternal despotism and responsible government. As it was, they treated the Congress movement rather with indifference and suspicion. They emphasised the narrowness and caste-interests of the educated class, without perceiving that these very defects were at once an indictment of the foresight of their predecessors and a call to themselves to redress the mistake. They remarked the littleness and petulance which characterised many of the proceedings of the Congress, without perceiving that these defects resulted in part from the want of a guidance which it was their duty to supply. Honestly convinced that the great bureaucratic system which had grown up under their hand was the only possible form of government for India in 1890 as for India in 1820, they regarded criticism as impiety and constitutional aspirations as fundamentally incompatible with Indian conditions, instead of realising that it must always be the mission of British rulers to educate the peoples entrusted to their charge up to our own level of political development. They had lost sight of the earlier ideals of Anglo-Indian statesmen, such as Elphinstone and Munro, who looked forward with equanimity and even with pride to a future, however remote, in which we should be able to resign into the hands of the Indians themselves a trustee-

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ship faithfully discharged and always to be regarded as temporary.

But, if the British rulers of India on the spot may rightly be charged in this respect with narrowness and stubbornness, it must be borne in mind not only that they were fortified in their opposition to the Congress movement by a strong sense of their responsibility for the well-being of the vast masses and the many communities who stood outside that movement, but also that they themselves never received any guidance from British statesmanship at home. Parliament, as we have already seen, had lost its grip of Indian affairs since the periodical enquiries into the state of India had lapsed with the old East India Company's rule. The principle of *laissez-faire, laissez-aller*, which dominated both political parties in England, was held to be equally applicable to India, unless there was some definite clash between British and Indian interests; and in such cases the British Government very rarely gave anything but an example of an unimaginative and often selfish stolidity to our own people in India. Nor has any stimulus to a more broadminded sympathy with the aspirations of educated Indians or to a more tolerant attitude towards the imperfections of their countrymen been supplied by the unofficial British community in India, very few of whom have any knowledge of, or take any interest in, the people or affairs of India outside the few large cities in which they mostly congregate.

Before long came the Indian Councils Act of 1892, which plainly showed the influence of the Congress propaganda. It was an attempt at compromise between the official view of the Councils as pocket legislatures and the educated Indian view of them as embryo parliaments. As such it marks a definite parting of the ways; the first milestone on a road leading eventually to political deadlock and the strangling of executive government. While no efforts were made to enlarge the boundaries of the educated class, to provide them with any training in responsible

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government, or to lay the foundation of a future electorate to control them, the act deliberately attempted to dally with the elective idea. Mr. Gladstone, speaking in support of the measure, remarked: "While the language of the Bill cannot be said to embody the elective principle, it is very peculiar language, unless it is intended to pave the way for the adoption of that principle." The actual provisions included an increase in the size of the Councils, Imperial and Provincial; the nomination of a proportion of non-official members on the recommendation of various associations and public bodies; the privilege of interpellation, and of discussing the Budget both of the Central and Provincial Governments. In other words, it was a real concession granted to the Congress party in the hope that their ambitions would be satisfied thereby. Needless to say, it confirmed them in their ideas as to the reward attendant upon sustained political agitation, and convinced them that they had only to advance along the path they had marked out to have the Executive government at last at their mercy. Lack of any definite conception of the goal towards which we should travel, and the fatal tendency towards compromise as an object in itself and not as the means to a larger end, had allowed the progressives of India to set their feet upon this dangerous road, just as lack of foresight on the part of those who should have controlled every step now encouraged an advance along it.

IV. THE EMERGENCE OF ANARCHISM

BETWEEN the Act of 1892 and the next great measure affecting the Legislative Councils, the Minto-Morley reforms of 1909, there lies a most critical period, the history of which can only be very briefly reviewed here.

The increasing antagonism between even the moderate champions of constitutional reforms in the Congress and the British administrators gave the party of Indian reaction

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against all forms of Western influence an opportunity of grafting on to the Congress movement an agitation which was ultimately directed more or less openly against British rule itself. It had its origin in the Deccan, where the influence of the Mahratta Brahmin, who still cherished the memories of domination and conquest to which British supremacy had set a term, was still a very powerful factor. Under the cloak of Hindu orthodoxy, the Deccan reactionaries had engineered in 1891 a violent opposition to the Age of Consent Bill, *i.e.*, to a Bill raising the age for consummation of Hindu infant marriages. Out of this agitation there resulted shortly afterwards an open breach between the whole policy of Social Reform of which the more enlightened leaders of the Congress movement had been fervent advocates and the policy of political reform which was eventually to divert a large part of Western-educated India to an organised attack not only on the structure of British government in India but on the fundamental ideals for which British governance stands. The Deccan extremists more or less paralysed the Social Reform movement, but the prosecution and conviction of their leader, Mr. Tilak, for sedition in 1898 stemmed for a time the violence of the political propaganda which at that period was mainly confined to the Mahratta country.

During these years, however, there was growing up among the younger members of the class of educated or semi-educated Indians a dangerous feeling of impatience both at the inability of Congress to force the hands of Government by any constitutional form of agitation and at the scornful indifference of Government to the pleas of the moderate men who disliked revolutionary methods and were grateful for the work of past generations of Englishmen. Brought up in ever-increasing numbers under a system which provided very little intellectual discipline for their minds and hardly any training of character, still less any definite ideas of national service, the best of them found no adequate place in the administrative structure of their

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country and carried their sense of grievance to the Bar, the teaching profession, or the newspaper office, whilst many still less fortunate merely lapsed into an intellectual proletariat. Such youths fell easy victims to the insidious doctrines of political agitators. It was not difficult for the latter to turn them from the mortifications of the present to the largely fictitious glories of the past and evolve for the purpose an unhistorical Golden Age, when India was unified and strong, the civiliser of the world. Fired by these visions, a section of the educated classes rallied to the reactionary leaders and became imbued not only with a belief in the superiority of everything Indian but with a fierce antagonism to the civilisation of the West. They differed from the original Congress party not merely in their dislike of a propaganda based upon the constitutional movements of the Western world but also in their secret desire to terminate the connection with the British Empire. Events outside as well as inside India helped to promote these tendencies. The prolonged difficulties which seemed to tax to their utmost the resources of the British Empire during the South African War, the sensational victories of an Asiatic over a European Power in the Russo-Japanese War, the revolutionary movement in Russia which compelled the autocracy to surrender some of its authority to a popular assembly, the collapse of the Conservative Party in England and the advent to power of a new and much more advanced school of British liberalism, created throughout Western educated India a powerful ferment. Agitation was still further fomented when the Government of India, concentrating as usual on efficiency, challenged Indian sentiment by partitioning the unwieldy Presidency of Bengal and taking in hand for the first time the thorny problem of education. The spark was laid to the extremist train. The turbulent methods of agitation, originally taught in the Deccan, fervid appeals to racial and religious fanaticism, the demonstrative boycott of British imported goods, the mobilisation of schoolboys and students in the

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service of a lawless propaganda, the denunciation of Government and all State aided schools, spread like wildfire from the Bombay Presidency to Bengal. Anarchism, borrowed from the revolutionists in Europe, made its appearance in India. There followed a succession of murderous outrages, perpetrated upon European Government officials and even upon Indian servants of Government, which were sometimes greeted in the Indian Press as proofs of Indian virility or at least extenuated as the inevitable outcome of bureaucratic and worse than Muscovite oppression. The Extremist section attempted to capture the whole of Congress, but at that time the Moderates, under the sane and able leadership of men such as Gokhale and Ferozeshah Mehta, were sufficiently strong to make a stand. After many had become frightened at the conflagration they had helped to kindle, the conflict culminated in 1907 at the Surat session of Congress, which broke up in the utmost confusion after stormy scenes. The effect of this violent schism was to paralyse the influence of Congress, whether for good or for evil, for some years.

V. THE MORLEY-MINTO REFORMS

EVEN so stout a Radical as John Morley, who was then Secretary of State for India, found it impossible to refuse to the Indian Executive authority to enact measures of a somewhat drastic character for the repression of criminal agitation. But he realised at the same time that, if the fangs of Indian Extremism had to be forcibly drawn, it was equally necessary to remove the legitimate grievances of Moderate Western-educated opinion and to make a further attempt to give Indians a reasonable share in the conduct of public affairs. In 1909 statutory sanction was given by Parliament to a new scheme of reforms generally known as the Morley-Minto reforms, which were mainly an extension of the Indian Councils Act of 1892.

The Morley-Minto Reforms

The changes now introduced operated in three main directions. First, a form of election replaced Government nomination for a large number of seats in both the Imperial and Provincial Councils. Secondly, the aggregate number of the non-official members on all Councils was practically doubled, and in the Provincial Councils the principle of a non-official majority was conceded. Thirdly, the rights of discussion and of interpellation were freed from many of the restrictions which had been laid down in the Act of 1892. In the Resolution of November 15, 1909, the Government of India gave a summary of these changes, but they did not mention one extremely important step, the concession of community representation to the Mohammedans. Alarmed at what they considered the growing ascendancy of the Hindus over Government, the Mohammedans demanded as the price of their acquiescence in the Morley-Minto schemes that they should receive community representation in proportion not to their numbers but to their "political importance." There were some strong considerations of policy which seemed to render it expedient at the time. Recent years had shown a marked change of attitude on the part of the Mohammedan Indians. Whilst, as we have seen, they had been content at first to hold aloof from politics and to rely on their British rulers for the protection of their rights and interests, they became uneasy at the results of Hindu political agitation, which, they feared, might succeed in securing to the Hindu community an excessive measure of influence. The more educated Indians came to the conclusion that the time had arrived to try their hand also at political organisation, and the All India Moslem League was created to co-ordinate the forces of the community for political purposes. There was as yet no feeling of distrust towards British administration, and Mohammedan loyalty had held entirely aloof from all violent propaganda. The Imperial Government deemed it their primary duty to maintain a just balance between the two chief communities in India. This con-

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cession to the Mohammedans has been condemned as an anti-democratic step, and it certainly constitutes a considerable difficulty in the present endeavour to formulate schemes for conferring responsible government upon India. But Lord Morley, it must be remembered, himself stoutly repudiated the suggestion that these enlarged Councils were intended to pave the way for anything resembling Parliamentary institutions.

Altogether the authors of the 1909 reforms showed little foresight. No one apparently realised that by conferring upon the class of educated Indians, who were to be given wider admission to the Councils, increased powers of criticism without any real responsibility, the noose which had been placed round the throat of the Executive by the Councils Act of 1892 had been drawn appreciably tighter. No one raised his voice to plead the urgent necessity of broadening the electoral basis. No one dreamed of testing the capacity of the educated Indian community by laying upon them any definite responsibilities. In point of fact, the system established under the Act is an illusion. As the *Bombay Times of India* pertinently remarked in a recent leading article: "Nobody knows even to-day what is the numerical foundation behind the elected members of the Legislative Councils, so indirect is the chain of election. Before the [British] Reform Act of 1832 much play was made of pocket boroughs of twenty or thirty members. In India, one constituency electing a member to the Imperial Legislative Council numbers exactly seven, and we know of cases where the representation has been divided by agreement between two individuals." The qualifications of candidates, as well as of electors, vary widely from Province to Province, but share the common characteristic, that the election is very often a matter of mere form. Members of the Provincial Councils are returned partly by Municipal and Local Boards arranged in various groups, without any connection with or mandate from the constituencies by which these Boards are chosen,

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partly by the landholding community, which does not consider itself bound by the acts of its constituted representatives. The so-called electorates have never been known to give mandates to those who profess to represent them or to pronounce upon any course of action which these representatives may pursue. And, while at the same time the Central and Provincial Governments were more exposed to criticism than ever before, no attempt was made to enable them to meet this criticism effectually by turning over definite instalments of responsibility to their critics. As might have been foreseen, the criticism directed against Government has been purely destructive; an artificial cleavage between official and non-official, between elected and nominated members, has been introduced in every Council; and a strong anti-Government opposition has grown up in these bodies which can and does impede the transaction of business, but which has no power to put its resolutions into practice, no power to control the policy of Government, and no opportunity to acquire experience in practical administration. Further, no attempt was made to break down that spirit of over-centralisation which had of late years marked the policy of the Government of India. The Provincial Governments still remained bound hand and foot by the necessity of constant reference to the Central Government, while the latter in its turn was forced to make an ever-increasing number of references to Whitehall. Thus Lord Morley with one hand attempted to make the Provincial and Central Governments responsive to the criticism of Indians, while with the other he enforced the principle, to a degree which no previous Secretary of State had ventured to do, that the Provincial Governments were responsible to the Central Government, and the Central Government to Whitehall, in every detail of administration. The concentration of all real authority in the hands of a few high officials involved the negation of the principle of responsible government; yet in the introduction of that principle lay the one hope of escape from the

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fatal results to which the Councils Act of 1892 ought from the very first to have pointed—the slow throttling of the Executive Government at the hands of an irresponsible Legislature. The Morley-Minto reforms have brought India a long step nearer to this intolerable situation without preparing the way for the gradual introduction of self-government, on however limited a scale, which alone can provide a reasonable issue from it.

What has been the result? The history of the last eight years reveals it only too plainly. At first the Congress, discredited by the exhibition it had made of itself at Surat, seemed likely to be permanently overshadowed by the new Councils. Moreover, other movements were developing outside it. Some of the more earnest-minded amongst educated Indians, disgusted at its failure to deal effectively with the work of Social Reform, turned away from it. The Arya Somaj, a Hindu Reform Movement started half a century ago, began to appeal with added force to the awakening nationalism of the educated classes by its cry of “Back to the Vedas” as the source of all knowledge. It had never professed to draw its spiritual inspiration from the West as the Brahmo Somaj had done, and the political activities of some of its members had laid it open to suspicions of sedition. As the Punjab, where its influence is centred, always contains a good deal of inflammable material, Government had been prone to treat its whole propaganda as suspect instead of making a genuine attempt to steer into safe channels a movement fraught with great potentialities of good, especially in the domain of education, female as well as male, and the emancipation of Hindu society from the trammels of caste degradation. The Servants of India Society, founded in 1905 by the late Mr. Gokhale, himself a Mahratta Brahmin, was the most signal though by no means the only instance of a new orientation of Indian activities amongst the educated classes towards Social Service rather than politics.

Unfortunately the artificial basis upon which the Morley-

The Morley-Minto Reforms

Minto reforms had been built soon revealed itself under the test of practical experience. The expansion of Indian representation in the Councils was not followed by any visible increase of Indian control over the conduct of public affairs. For a time the spirit which underlay the granting of the reforms had its effect. Both sides seemed to display a more conciliatory temper and the relations between the official and unofficial benches in the enlarged Councils assumed a more friendly character. In many cases the influence of the non-official members was successfully exerted to secure modifications in the legislative measures of Government, though from a mistaken desire to "save their face" the Government often preferred to make concessions at private conferences with the Indian leaders rather than as the outcome of public discussion, and lost thereby a good deal of the credit which they might have secured by a more open display of their desire to meet Indian objections. On some occasions before the war the pressure of Indian opinion even deterred Local Governments from introducing legislative measures which they considered essential to public safety because they apprehended defeat at the hands of the unofficial majority in the legislative Councils. But the Indian public remained generally in ignorance of the extent to which the influence of the Indian representatives made itself felt, either for good or for evil, on Government. The bureaucracy, more secretive in India than elsewhere, had never realised the importance of guiding public opinion, or, *a fortiori*, the necessity of keeping it informed if you wish to guide it. The politicians, on the other hand, preferred to make capital out of those questions on which they failed to make any impression upon Government, though the real difficulty very often lay in the rigidity of the statutory control exercised by the Central Government over Local Governments, and by Whitehall over the Central Government. The inevitable result eventually became clear. The enlarged Indian representation appeared to have less power

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than it really enjoyed, and, having no responsibility whatever, it was free to make bids for popularity with the classes which were its only constituents. Resolutions were introduced which, if they could have carried them, the unofficial members would often have been much puzzled to put into effect, and grievances were voiced which, even when well-founded, it was frequently beyond the power of a local Government to remedy. On the other hand, the Executive was threatened with the possibility of a complete deadlock, and the concessions by which it could be averted often alarmed not merely the innate conservatism of the official world but the more conservative elements of Indian society.

Whilst the Western-educated classes were coming rapidly to the conclusion that the Morley-Minto reforms had given them the shadow rather than the substance of political power, the attitude of the official classes towards the larger question of training up the people of India towards self-government remained practically unchanged. They had Lord Morley's word for it that those reforms were not intended to pave the way for anything resembling an Indian Parliament, and they were only too ready to take their cue in this matter from the Secretary of State. In such circumstances it was not unnatural that the more ardent Indian spirits should have turned again to Congress as the real "Parliament of India" or at least of Western-educated India. Since the rupture between the Extremists and the Moderates at Surat, the former had temporarily lost their chief protagonist on that occasion, Mr. Tilak, who had been again prosecuted and convicted of sedition and was still working out his sentence in Mandalay. The Moderates, who had to some extent regained control, could claim that the Morley-Minto reforms, however inadequate, had shown the more constitutional forms of agitation for which they stood to have been not wholly ineffectual. But the Extremists still constituted a very formidable party, and at a most critical period, just after Mr. Tilak was released

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and made his reappearance in public life, the death of Mr. Gokhale and of Sir Pherozeshah Mehta removed two of the most influential and stalwart opponents of violent methods. Under the able chairmanship of Sir S. Sinha, who had sat on the Viceroy's Executive Council as its first Indian member under the Morley-Minto reforms scheme, the Extremist section were kept in bounds at the Congress Session in Bombay at the end of 1915. But twelve months later the enthusiastic reception given at the Lucknow Session to Mrs. Besant and to Mr. Tilak, who resumed his seat for the first time since Surat, showed far more clearly than the actual resolutions passed by Congress that Extreme counsels had at last succeeded in capturing the "Indian Parliament."

VI. THE EFFECTS OF THE GREAT WAR

STRANGE as it may seem, this consummation was largely a result of the great war which had then been going on for nearly two years and a half. The war had at once brought into the very forefront of public discussion the problem of the readjustment of the constitutional relations between the great component parts of the British Empire which is essential to the work of Imperial reconstruction after the war, and with it the question of India's position within the Empire. Germany had reckoned upon India proving a thorn in our flesh during the war. It was one of her many miscalculations. The despatch of a large Indian force to Europe to fight shoulder to shoulder with British and Colonial troops had not only shown that India could be a valuable source of military strength to the Empire but it had made a strong appeal to Indian imagination and raised a wave of loyalty which swept through the whole of India, and, for a short time at any rate, submerged all political dissensions. The Indian Princes vied with each other in offers of personal service and in contributions of all kinds

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to the necessities of the hour. The great land-owning classes and the fighting races of British India displayed more than their traditional devotion to the *Raj*. The Western-educated classes, and even such extremists as Mr. Tilak, rallied publicly to the cause of the Empire as the cause of freedom. Their representatives in the Imperial Council at Delhi gave an earnest of their sincerity by their treatment of the Defence of India Act. The drastic provisions of the Act were in many ways repugnant to them, but they passed it on the mere assurance of Lord Hardinge, who had won their confidence by his courageous championship of Indian interests, that it was a necessary war measure. The British public at home responded generously to these convincing demonstrations of Indian loyalty, and British Ministers solemnly pledged the Empire's gratitude without stopping to consider how their pledges would be construed in India or could be ultimately fulfilled. Then the war dragged on much longer than had been generally anticipated. The Government of India, instead of striking whilst the iron was hot, had in many ways failed to sustain and to utilise to the full the original outburst of enthusiasm, and had been afraid to impose upon the country any financial or other burden that would have brought home to all the magnitude of the struggle in which the Empire was engaged. India, to whom the war has actually brought an immense accession of material prosperity, was so sheltered from its real horrors, and such a small minority of Indians, especially amongst the Western-educated classes, had any personal ties with those who were actually fighting, that the keen edge of interest in its progress was gradually blunted.

In the Legislative Councils the Government had secured a sort of political truce by undertaking not to introduce controversial measures during the war. But discussions throughout the Empire of schemes of Imperial reconstruction after the war had opened up a large field of political speculation which Indians could hardly be expected to

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refrain from exploring. For if India, as was generally conceded, had proved herself worthy of admission into the inner councils of the Empire on a footing even approximately similar to that of the self-governing Dominions, it was obvious that the constitutional relations of the Government of India to the Imperial Government would have to be substantially modified. And how were they to be modified so as to give the Government of India, responsible only to the British Secretary of State, anything like the same standing as the Governments of the Dominions, each of them responsible to their own people? Looked at from this point of view, the question of self-government for India assumed, even in the eyes of the most conservative officials, a reality which they had hitherto been reluctant to recognise. The Indian politician had been quick to seize the value of this line of argument, and the Indian Extremist was determined to press it forthwith to its utmost consequences. For he had grown weary of self-restraint and was not sorry for the opportunity of reviving a campaign of agitation against the whole system of Indian administration. The India for which he spoke was willing to remain steadfast to the British connection in the same way as the Dominions, but like the Dominions she must be given Home Rule. And Home Rule was not merely to be an ultimate goal to be reached by carefully graduated stages. It was not to be withheld till the now illiterate millions had been trained to produce electorates capable of giving an intelligent mandate to their representatives and till administrators could be found among such representatives qualified to discharge the functions of responsible government. It was to be conceded at once and in full.

It must be admitted that circumstances for which the British lack of imagination as well as the ponderous machinery of Indian administration is in some measure responsible have favoured the growth of this agitation. Some three years have elapsed since India was promised a

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“new angle of vision.” Yet until three months ago there was no evidence to the Indian eye that anything was being done to redeem that promise. Lord Hardinge was believed to have taken home with him some scheme of reforms which he had drawn up before leaving India. Lord Chelmsford was believed to have set to work with his Council on a new scheme as soon as he reached Simla. But time passed and all this travail bore no visible fruits. Outside events also gave rise to suspicion. The rejection of the proposed Executive Council for the United Provinces at the hands of the House of Lords caused widespread irritation amongst even moderate Indians; and the rumours of schemes to hasten on Imperial federation and to give the self-governing Dominions some share in the control of Indian affairs aroused a very bitter feeling. For Indian opinion still smarted under the treatment of Indians in the Colonies, and the difficult question of Indian immigration had only recently been adjusted by a temporary compromise. The new Viceroy was very reserved and reticent, and his reserve and reticence were made the pretext for assuming that he was the reactionary nominee of a reactionary Secretary of State. No charge could be more unjust; and scarcely less unjust was the comparison, sometimes made to his disadvantage by European critics, between his position and that of Lord Durham in Canada in 1838. He had not Lord Durham’s plenary powers, and he had more than Lord Durham’s difficulties. His advisers were mostly high officials who had spent the better part of their lives in India and had therefore claim to speak with authority, but who failed to realise the determination of the Home Government, influenced by the avowedly democratic ideals for which the Allies were fighting, to introduce into the immense and complex structure of Indian administration a real element of popular control. It is plain from the Viceroy’s subsequent announcement that a scheme was framed and sent home towards the end of 1916; and from the delay which subsequently occurred the inference is

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obvious that the home authorities decided that they would like further deliberation upon it. The Imperial Government could very reasonably plead that, since its energies were concentrated on the life and death struggle in which the whole Empire was involved, it had little time to devote to a serious study of such problems as the introduction of grave constitutional changes in India. But this plea was countered by the argument that the same Imperial Government seemed to find no difficulty in sparing time for such measures as Irish Home Rule, votes for women, and a large extension of the franchise in the United Kingdom.

The long delay, whatever its causes, perplexed and alarmed even moderate Indian opinion, which no longer had any leaders capable of guiding it, and waited in vain for any comforting assurances from responsible official quarters. Moreover, it allowed the Extreme wing to set up a standard of political demands which it became more and more difficult for any Indian to decline altogether to endorse without exposing himself to the reproach that he was unpatriotic and a creature of Government. As soon as it became known that the Viceroy was engaged on elaborating a scheme of post-war reforms, nineteen Indian Members of the Imperial Legislative Council hurriedly put together and published a counter scheme of their own. Apart from such eminently reasonable clauses as the repeal of the Arms Act and the granting of commissions to Indians, the proposals of the Nineteen would give the Provincial Councils power over the Executive subject to a limited veto of the Governor of the Province, would make election to these Councils direct—although nothing definite is said about the franchise : and would give the Imperial Legislative Council an unofficial majority and control over the Central Government except in certain reserved matters. The scheme is hazy, and bears evident marks of haste, but is open to all the objections of the Minto-Morley reforms, and in an aggravated degree

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to their dangers. It is an attempt to make the Central and Provincial Governments in India dependent upon the caprice of legislatures which have no mandate from any representative electorate, which have no training in responsible government, which are completely immune from the consequences of their own mistakes. If the lessons of the past have any meaning, such a scheme would lead to a hopeless deadlock.

Even this scheme did not altogether satisfy the more ardent members of Congress. It was amplified and made more precise and peremptory in a series of Resolutions adopted by Congress at the Lucknow session in December, 1916, and simultaneously by the Moslem League, also then in session at Lucknow. In recent times an extreme section had also grown up among the Mohammedans which had captured the political organisation of the Mohammedan community. A good many Indian Mohammedans had been steadily losing faith in Government. Matters abroad, particularly the Turkish-Italian War, conjoined with the Pan-Islamic propaganda put forward by the late Sultan Abdul Hamid, had led them to suspect that Great Britain was content to let Islam "go under," and would take no active measures to protect it. Worse still, the revocation in 1911 of the Partition of Bengal, which had, on the whole, served the interests of their co-religionists, convinced them that the will of the Hindu community, as expressed by its political leaders, was about to become supreme in India. The more fiery and ambitious spirits believed that they had less to hope—or to fear—from Government than from the Congress party. In 1911 an attempt had been made to bring about a political understanding between the two communities. It had failed; but after a little time the Moslem League was reconstructed upon other lines, the new ideal of self-government suited to India taking the place of the old ideals of loyalty to the British Raj and the jealous protection of the interests of the community against Hindu

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ascendancy. Broadly speaking, since its reconstruction, the League has represented only a very small fraction of the most advanced Mohammedans of India, and its doings are disliked both by conservative country gentlemen and by the general consensus of the all-powerful leaders of religious opinion, who profoundly distrust the younger "political" Mohammedans, whose orthodoxy is in many cases open to considerable suspicion. Some of the new leaders had come into close touch with Turkey during the Balkan Wars, and when Turkey actually joined the Germanic Powers shortly after the outbreak of the great European War their organs scarcely disguised their strong pro-Turkish leanings. No sooner had the Defence of India Act been passed than Lord Hardinge caused two of the most prominent "young" Mohammedans, Mohamed Ali and Shaukat Ali, to be interned in the Punjab, and the *Comrade*, the most notorious of their newspapers, had to suspend publication. But the political machine remained under the control of the advanced section, and in the course of 1915 a definite *rapprochement* took place with the Congress party in order to present the appearance of a united body of Indian opinion whenever the promised measures of reform should be disclosed. This pact was finally sealed and acted upon at Lucknow, some concessions having been made by the Hindus to Mohammedan sentiment in regard to communal representation in order to avert any immediate and open manifestations of dissent from the less articulate but more conservative sections of the Mohammedan community.

The Resolutions of Congress and of the Moslem League invested with a certain measure of authority the Home Rule movement, which had been started even before Lord Hardinge's Viceroyalty had closed, and against which he had earnestly but vainly warned the people of India in his farewell speech to the Imperial Council at Delhi. Mrs. Besant was its fiery champion. She had acquired a wonderful influence over young India by preaching

The Genesis of the Present Situation in India with rare eloquence the moral and spiritual superiority of Indian over Western ideals and condemning the British administration of India, root and branch, as one of the worst manifestations of Western materialism. With her remarkable power of seizing the psychological moment, she had fastened on the catchword of "Home Rule for India," into which Indians could read whatever measure of reform they happened to favour, whilst it asserted the general demand of India to be mistress in her own household and to be freed from the reproach of "dependency" in any future scheme of reconstruction." She herself gave it the widest interpretation in *New India*, a newspaper whose extreme views had already drawn down upon her not only the action of Government but the censure of the High Court of Madras. The bulk of the Indian Press followed her lead. There were indeed many isolated and influential protests against an agitation which seemed inevitably bound to excite unrest and passion; but the Moderates gradually drifted for the most part with the rising tide, and the newspapers published every day long lists of fresh enrolments into the Indian Home Rule League. Even the appointment of Indian delegates to the Imperial War Conference and the extreme cordiality of their reception in London only made a temporary impression. What had they brought back with them, it was asked, beyond empty speeches? Much more potent was the effect of the Russian Revolution, which was hailed as an earnest of the doom that awaited all bureaucracies, and the Anglo-Indian bureaucracy in particular. Lord Chelmsford had, indeed, warned Indian politicians against advocating "cataclysmic changes": and his words had been echoed in slightly more emphatic form by the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab and the Governors of Bombay and Madras. Unfortunately, owing to the protraction of the correspondence between Simla and Whitehall, the Government of India was still precluded from making any positive announcement, and only later did the public learn that Lord

The Goal of British Policy

Chelmsford had invited Mr. Austen Chamberlain, then Secretary of State, to come out and judge for himself of the difficulties of the situation. Meanwhile the political tension became almost unbearable. When would Simla break its silence? The publication of the Mesopotamian Report only added to the flames, for it was not difficult to read into it a wholesale condemnation of the Indian administration. High hopes were raised by the speech of Mr. Montagu during the Mesopotamia debate a few days before his appointment to the India Office. These hopes, however, were somewhat damped by a speech of the Under-Secretary of State, Lord Islington, which indicated that the silence which had veiled the counsels of the Supreme Government was about to be broken. His pronouncement was in favour of a reform in accordance with the Australian model, foreshadowing a devolution of powers and genuine responsible government. It lacked definiteness, as might have been expected from the circumstances of its delivery; but it unhesitatingly condemned, on the soundest grounds, the reforms proposed by the Congress and Moslem League. The Home Rulers received it in the same way as they did the publication of Mr. Gokhale's political testament, which they declared to be well-meaning but entirely obsolete.

VII. THE GOAL OF BRITISH POLICY

AT last, in August, the Secretary of State was able to make the momentous pronouncement which if it had been made a year earlier and from the lips of the King-Emperor might have greatly eased the situation:

The policy of his Majesty's Government, with which the Government of India are in complete accord, is that of the increasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration, and the gradual development of self-governing institutions, with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire. They have decided that

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substantial steps in this direction should be taken as soon as possible, and that it is of the highest importance as a preliminary to considering what these steps should be that there should be a free and informal exchange of opinion between those in authority at home and in India. His Majesty's Government have accordingly decided, with his Majesty's approval, that I should accept the Viceroy's invitation to proceed to India to discuss these matters with the Viceroy and the Government of India, to consider with the Viceroy the views of local governments, and to receive with him the suggestions of representative bodies and others. I would add that progress in this policy can only be achieved by successive stages. The British Government and the Government of India, on whom the responsibility lies for the welfare and advancement of the Indian peoples, must be the judges of the time and measure of each advance, and they must be guided by the co-operation received from those upon whom new opportunities of service will thus be conferred, and by the extent to which it is found that confidence can be reposed in their sense of responsibility. Ample opportunity will be afforded for public discussion of the proposals, which will be submitted in due course to Parliament.

This announcement was at once recognised on all sides to be the most important ever made in the history of British India. In order to create a calmer atmosphere for the deliberations which were to follow Mr. Montagu's arrival in India, the Government of India deemed it prudent to order the release of Mrs. Besant and her two associates in the Madras Presidency, but they declined to release the two Mohammedans, Mohamed Ali and Shaukat Ali, until the former had signed a reasonable pledge of good behaviour during the war. This he has refused to do. These concessions, and still more the public rebuke inflicted upon Sir Michael O'Dwyer, who had been conspicuously successful in preserving tranquillity in the Punjab in times of very serious stress, for a perhaps inopportune comparison between the proofs of loyalty given by his own province and by other provinces, created some alarm and bitterness amongst Europeans. This uneasiness, coupled with the fact that the Congress have elected Mrs. Besant to the chair at the next session in Calcutta, and that the recalcitrant Mohammedan leader Mahomed Ali has been elected

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to the Presidency of the next Moslem League Session, shows the general state of unrest which pervades India at the present time.

Mr. Montagu has now reached India, and we shall not attempt to anticipate the results of his mission. We have merely endeavoured to indicate the immensely difficult nature of the task which lies before him. The policy to which the Imperial Government have pledged themselves is that it shall gradually lead India towards the appointed goal of self-government. The immense difficulties of this policy can only be appreciated by those who remember that India is a vast country, containing more than 315,000,000 inhabitants, divided into Provinces and States, each containing many millions, and divided also by differences of race, religion, caste, and by almost infinite varieties of social status. But this policy is the only policy compatible with British traditions and with the principles for which the whole British Empire is fighting at the present day. Our own history teaches us to regard responsible institutions as essential to self-government. The practical problem, then, which confronts Mr. Montagu and the British Government and Parliament is this : What steps can be taken to develop these institutions in India, without delay, but without making an advance so rapid as to lead to chaos, and at the same time to rally in support the two great classes in India whose co-operation is indispensable and who are now unfortunately divided by an undeniably wide gulf of antagonism—the British administrators and the Western-educated Indians.

VIII. CONFLICTING STANDPOINTS

ONE of the greatest difficulties of the situation is that each of these two parties claims to have the better knowledge of the real needs and interests and wishes of the vast Indian population, which is still too ignorant and inarticulate

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to give expression to them for itself. The Western-educated Indian claims recognition at our hands first and foremost because he is the product of the educational system we have ourselves introduced in India. His limitations, intellectual and moral, are largely due to the defects of that system, just as his political immaturity is largely due to our failure to provide him with opportunities of acquiring experience in administrative work and public life. Where careers have been opened up to him in the liberal professions he has often achieved great distinction—at the Bar, on the Bench, in literature, and, more recently, in certain branches of science. The Report at last published of the Public Services Commission admits, though in his opinion very inadequately, that he has already qualified for a considerably larger measure of employment in the higher branches of the administration, whilst without his assistance in the more subordinate branches the everyday work of administration could not be carried on for a day. He contends that he must instinctively be a better judge than aliens, who are, after all, birds of passage, of the needs and interests and wishes of his own fellow-countrymen and a better interpreter to them of so much of Western thought and Western civilisation as they can safely absorb without becoming denationalised. His complaint is that his own best efforts and best intentions are constantly thwarted by the rigid conservatism and aloofness of the European, official and unofficial, wrapped up in the superiority of race and traditions. He admits that he may not be able to discharge with the European's efficiency the legislative or administrative responsibilities for which he has hitherto been denied the necessary training, but he protests against being kept altogether out of the water until he has learnt to swim, especially when there is so little disposition ever to teach him how to do it. What he lacks in the way of efficiency he alone, he argues, can supply in the way of sympathy with and understanding of his own people. When it is objected

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that he represents only a very small minority of Indians and forms, indeed, a class widely divided from the vast majority of his fellow-countrymen, and that the democratic institutions for which he clamours are unsuited to the traditions and customs of his country, he replies that in every country the impulse towards democratic institutions has come in the first instance from small minorities and has equally been regarded at first as subversive and revolutionary. If again it is objected that the moderate and reasonable views he expresses are not the views of the more ambitious politicians who profess to be the accredited interpreters of Western-educated India, that there are many amongst them whose aims are more or less openly antagonistic to all the ideals for which British rule stands, and are directed in reality not to the establishment of democratic institutions but to the maintenance of caste monopoly and other evils inherent in the Hindu social system, and that in the political arena he seems incapable of asserting himself against these dangerous and reactionary elements, his reply is once more that he has never received the support and encouragement which he had a right to expect from his European mentors, and that it is often their indifference or worse that has largely helped to raise a spirit of revolt against all forms of Western influence.

The case for the British administrator can be still more easily stated. Britain has never sent out a finer body of public servants, take them all in all, than those who have in the course of a few generations rescued India from anarchy, secured peace for her at home and abroad, maintained equal justice amidst jealous and often hostile communities and creeds, established a new standard of tolerance and integrity, and raised the whole of India to a higher plane of material prosperity and of moral and intellectual development. They spend the best part of their lives in an exile which cuts them off from most of the amenities of social existence at home and often involves the more or less prolonged sacrifice of the happiest family ties. Those

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especially whose work lies chiefly in the remote rural districts, far away from the few cities in which European conditions of life to some extent prevail, are brought daily into the very closest contact with the people; and because of their absolute detachment from the prejudices and passions and material interests by which Indian society, like all other societies, is largely swayed, they enjoy the confidence of the people often in a higher degree than Indian officials whose detachment can never be so complete. Their task has been to administer well and to do the best in their power for the welfare of the population committed to their charge. The Englishman, as a rule, sticks to his own job. The British administrator's job has been to administer, and he has only recently been told, and never till a few weeks ago definitely and authoritatively, that it is also his job to train up a nation on democratic lines and to instil into them the principles of civic duty as such duty is understood in Western countries. No doubt there are British administrators in India whose innate conservatism, coupled with the narrowness which long years of routine and of official superiority are apt to breed, revolts against any transfer of power to, or any recognition of equality with, the people of the country they have spent their lives in ruling with unquestioned but, as they at least conceive it, paternal authority. The conditions of bureaucratic rule have inevitably tended to produce an autocratic temper. But it is not merely in obedience to that temper that they shrink from any changes that would weaken the administration. The best of them at least have a strong sense of their responsibilities as guardians and protectors of the simple and ignorant masses committed to their care. They may be inclined to judge the Western-educated class of Indians too harshly and to identify them too closely with the type that dominates Congress, but the form in which the question of yielding to the Congress clamour for political power and the Congress abuse of the British system of administration presents itself to their minds is

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by no means an entirely selfish one. "Are we justified," they ask, "in transferring our responsibilities for the welfare and good government of such a large section of the human race to an infinitesimal minority which has hitherto shown so little disposition to grapple any of the difficult problems with the solution of which the happiness and progress of the overwhelming majority of their own race are bound up, though, because themselves belonging to the same stock and the same social system, it would have been much easier for them to deal with those problems than it is for alien rulers like ourselves? Those problems arise out of the social system which is known as Hinduism—for Hinduism is much more a social than a religious system. Western-educated Indians will not openly deny its evils—the iron-bound principle of caste, which in spite of many concessions in non-essentials to modern exigencies of convenience remains almost untouched in all essentials and, above all, in the fundamental laws of inter-marriage, the social outlawry of scores of millions of the lower castes, labelled and treated as 'untouchable,' infant-marriage, the prohibition of the re-marriage of widows, which, especially in the case of child-widows, condemns them to a lifetime of misery and semi-servitude, the appalling infantile mortality, largely due to the prevalence of barbarous superstitions, the economic waste resulting from lavish expenditure, often at the cost of life-long indebtedness, upon marriages and funerals, and so forth and so forth. How many of the Western-educated Indians who have thrown themselves into political agitation against the tyranny of the British bureaucracy have ever raised a finger to free their own fellow-countrymen from the tyranny of those social evils? At one time—some thirty years ago—social reform did find many enthusiastic supporters amongst the best class of Western-educated Indians, but the gradual disappearance of men of that type may be said almost to coincide with the growth of political agitation. There have been and there still are

The Genesis of the Present Situation in India some notable and admirable exceptions, but they are not to be found amongst the men who have most influence in the present Home Rule movement. It is on these grounds—moral rather than political—that we challenge for the present the claim put forward by the small Western-educated minority to be allowed to determine at their own discretion the present and the future of the Indian masses, for whose real welfare they have so far shown so little zeal.”

This is perhaps the most forcible of the British administrator's arguments, and it is a thoroughly honest one. Another is that the Western-educated Indians are mainly drawn from the towns and from a narrow circle of professional classes in the towns. They cannot therefore speak on behalf of and still less control the destinies of a vast population, overwhelmingly agricultural, of whose interests they have hitherto shown themselves both ignorant and careless and from whom the very education which constitutes their main title to consideration has tended to separate and estrange them. The landowning gentry and the peasantry have so far scarcely been touched by this political agitation. The peasantry know little or nothing of its existence. The landowners fear it, for, having themselves for the most part kept aloof from modern education, and shrinking instinctively from the limelight of political controversies and electioneering competitions, they feel themselves hopelessly handicapped in a struggle that threatens with extinction their traditional prestige and authority as well as their material interests.

IX. THE NECESSITY OF UNION AND CO-OPERATION

WE have tried to set forth dispassionately both points of view, that of the moderate but progressive Western-educated Indian and that of the earnest but conservative British administrator. They both deserve consideration,

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for they may be taken to represent the best elements on both sides—elements which might have been brought together at an earlier stage had British statesmanship not lacked vision and which it cannot be beyond the wit of British statesmanship to bring together even now. The need is urgent. For it is only the union of the best Indian and the best European elements in India that can break down the forces of reactionary obstruction on the one side and of revolutionary destruction on the other which equally spell disaster in the end.

Indian Extremism, whether inspired by distorted ideals of Nationalism, or caste ascendancy, or racial hatred, is only the Indian incarnation of the spirit of anarchism which has brought Russia to the verge of ruin and jeopardised her new-born freedom, which is brooding over Ireland and threatens to blast all reasonable schemes of Irish Home Rule, which is undermining the vital forces of Italian resistance to the foreign foe, and which is creeping, less successfully and more silently, into many other countries. It seeks to render government of any kind impossible, and it is democracy's worst enemy because it is democracy gone mad and its mania is a suicidal mania.

Scarcely less dangerous is the spirit of bureaucratic negation, impervious to all changing influences, seeing only the difficulties and dangers which every change involves, and preferring to take the risk of stopping the clock lest it should happen to go too fast. Doubly dangerous is such a spirit in a country where the bureaucracy is an alien one, and therefore less quick to note or more prone to distrust any signs of impending change. Though it proceeds in India much more from a conservative habit of mind and an invincible belief in the abiding excellence of traditional methods than from less worthy considerations of self-interest, it has tended to stultify our educational policy, to petrify our administrative system, and to concentrate energy on the maintenance of present efficiency, instead of devoting it to the development of the

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larger self-governing capacities of the people. The unofficial Englishman, and especially the leaders of the great European merchant communities, have also much to learn if they are to give in return for the wealth they draw from India the intelligent sympathy and the example of civic duty and social goodwill, together with practical assistance in the promotion of Indian commerce and industry, which Indians may well expect from them. In the same way the great Indian landlords and the influential landowning classes must learn that they cannot hope to preserve their position or their prestige if they continue to hold themselves aloof from the responsibilities of public life and from the discipline of higher education.

A clear-cut ideal has now been set up—the development of responsible government in India—which should kindle the enthusiasm and revive the courage of all genuinely patriotic and public-spirited Indians and should stimulate all Europeans to new and higher endeavour. The attainment of that ideal can only be secured by the hearty co-operation of all Europeans and of all Indians who realise the value of India to the Empire and of the Empire to India. It will involve on both sides the sacrifice of many prejudices and predilections. Indian social reform will have to go hand in hand with political reform, gradual emancipation from the social bondage of inherited customs and superstitions with gradual emancipation from foreign political and administrative tutelage. With the European the old notion of efficiency as an end in itself must give place to the conception of educational training as the preparation for self-government. The great bureaucratic machine which has been elaborated by generations of foreigners in India must be so modified as to fall in with this conception. There must be the devolution of certain powers from Whitehall to Simla, of many powers from Simla to the Provinces, of some powers from the Provinces to Indian bodies representing an Indian electorate. This electorate cannot now be evolved by any system of education

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in the narrow sense of the word. There is no time. The criterion of literacy must be abandoned if the electors are to represent more than a fraction of Indian society. At the same time the British must forthwith attempt what they might long ago have accomplished—the extension of Western education far beyond the limits of the hereditary literary castes. But above all things, the responsibility which is placed upon this electorate must be real and within its limits effectual.

The British people is now face to face with the biggest experiment in the creation of responsible government which the world has ever seen—the introduction of practical self-government into a continent containing a sixth part of the human race. Whatever plan the Imperial Government may adopt in taking the first steps towards that goal, the British people may count on the loyalty of the public services in giving effect to it. But, whilst it rests chiefly with the Indians themselves to make or mar its success, it lays upon the British people a great responsibility. Let them remember the duty they owe to India as their predecessors remembered it from the days of Burke to the days of Bright, and let them insist upon a revival of the old healthy system of periodical grand inquests by Parliament, which shall systematically subject the progress of the Great Experiment to the most searching, the most impartial, the most conscientious investigation.

AMERICA'S PART IN THE WAR

WITH every increase in the interdependence of the modern world it has become more and more difficult to localise armed conflicts. To-day every war has potentially the widest ramifications. At the outbreak of the Great War very few foresaw its vast extension, and even fewer perceived the fact that it would bring within the range of possible settlement the greater part of those political questions that were producing unrest. In Europe every question arising from thwarted, suppressed, and exploited nationalities has been cast into the seething crucible. Furthermore, the searching rays of life at white heat have been focussed upon the political and social mal-adjustments within the State and reforms are being insistently demanded and, in many notable instances, have even already been effected. Outside of Europe, in Asia and in Africa, the future of hundreds of millions of politically backward people is being determined on the plains and hills of France and in the fields and marshes of Russia.

When the United States entered the war it was the earnest hope of the most influential leaders of American opinion, and especially of those who instinctively recoiled from the inherent brutality of war and who, though advocating the resort to force, yet deplored its grievous necessity, that these widespread problems would in great measure be settled in accordance with the most progressive principles. In addition, they looked forward with confidence to the establishment of some supernational authority that would effectively prevent the recurrence of such a

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disaster by keeping all future aggressors in check. The compensation for the harrowing sacrifices of the present generation was to be a future world redistributed according to the general wishes of its component peoples and providing full security for those that sought progress along the paths of peace.

It is now some six months since the United States has become one of the belligerents. The radiant hopes of the sanguine days when the Russian Revolution was being inaugurated—before its unavoidable, and presumably passing, military drawbacks were plainly discernable—have by no means been abandoned. They are still widely, if not universally, cherished. But it is being increasingly recognised that their realisation is not immediately at hand and that much hard work remains to be done if the confident expectations of the spring of 1917 are to be made real.

America's declaration of war was not predominantly due to universal, or even to very general, indignation at Germany's contemptuous invasion of American rights, but was largely the result of an ever-firmer conviction on the part of an intellectual minority that the world would become an unbearable place for all its free peoples unless the political ideals and moral code of Prussianism were utterly discredited by the failure that can come from defeat alone. Thus the attitude towards the war was distinctly rational rather than emotional, and it still remains such, in spite of much subsequent evidence of heinous and malevolent misconduct on the part of Germany. While there is plenty of earnest determination there is but little excited enthusiasm. Towards Germany the temper is rather one of cool abhorrence than of hot hatred. The war was, and still is, not popular in an active sense. It was an unwelcome burden that was reluctantly assumed because there was no alternative course if America was to remain at all true to her traditions. But accompanying this reluctance is a firm resolution to carry the burden through to the end. Just as war itself has become so largely scientific and

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mechanical, so America is preparing for her part in it with the same systematic method, with the same absence of dramatic flourish, with which the engineer plans his railroad or canal in some distant land. It is a big task—one of incalculable size—that must at all costs be accomplished. There is no joy in doing it, but there is resolute dedication to the purpose of freeing the self-governing peoples of the world from the danger of involuntary subjection to autocratic force.

It is in this methodical manner that the United States is preparing to add its potentially great weight to the Entente cause. The available resources in men and material are enormous, but they were at the outset almost completely unorganised for war purposes. Yet, in the first six months of belligerency, a veritable revolution has been systematically effected. Including contracts and authorisations, Congress appropriated for war purposes the stupendous and unprecedented sum of over twenty billion dollars. Seven of these billions, it is true, are for loans to America's Allies, but the remainder is all for America's part in the war. With these funds a large Army is being created, the Navy is being increased, merchantmen on a vast scale are being built, and in countless other ways the potential strength of the United States is being mobilised. Congress deserves a full measure of praise both for its grants without stint and for the unwonted absence of party spirit during its sessions.

When war was declared the strength of the regular Army was 126,000 men and that of the National Guard about 180,000. In six months this small force had been expanded to one million and a half men, of whom it is expected that about one million will be available for service in Europe during 1918. In addition, 640 million dollars have been appropriated for the future air fleet and contracts have already been let for 20,000 aeroplanes. At the same time the Navy has effectively armed and manned American merchantmen for protection against the German sub-

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marines. In so far as new construction is concerned, especial attention is being given to a rapid increase in the number of destroyers and to improvement in their type and speed; 350 million dollars is being devoted to this special purpose alone.

In connection with purely military measures the time factor was not crucial. There was no actual peril of invasion to be forestalled, nor was the Western front in Europe at all endangered. Hence, it would have been folly to have thrown hastily prepared men into the field against veterans. But the element of speed was vital when it came to the problem of completing merchant vessels to offset the ravages of submarine and mine and the normal wastage by the elements. The delay in this construction was most deplorable. The trouble has now been rectified, but the time lost can never be regained, and this may prove costly. Towards the end of September, the British Controller of Shipping stated :

It is of the utmost importance that the United States should realise that the shortage of shipping is the most vital fact in the present situation, and that the building of merchant ships is of the utmost importance. The question the United States must face is whether, on the basis of the shipbuilding preparations she is now making, it will be possible for her to send any substantial force to France next spring without such a drain on the world's shipping as will subtract just as much from the fighting strength of the other Allies as her own forces will add.

In this connection Sir Joseph Maclay further correctly pointed out that the programme of the United States should be to outbuild the tonnage destroyed by the submarines, even if this means, he added, "the building of six million tons a year." Although the United States Shipping Board has been very energetic, it is doubtful if this maximum of production can be quickly reached. According to an official statement of September 26, the United States had available on that date $3\frac{1}{2}$ million tons

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of shipping, including that commandeered and requisitioned from German and Austrian owners. As the vessels then under construction amounted to nearly 6 million tons, it is expected that by the end of 1918 the merchant fleet will aggregate somewhat over 9 million tons. This is exclusive of the supplementary programme of the Emergency Fleet Corporation, which in time will provide several more million tons. These ambitious plans are certainly not too great for the country's industrial capacity. But opposed to their speedy realisation are serious obstacles, some of which are also retarding the general economic mobilisation. Labour is both scarce and restless and, furthermore, consumption and production are far from being on a war basis.

Skilled labour is in urgent demand and it is becoming a serious problem to procure an adequate supply of workmen for the shipyards. Moreover, strikes are of quite frequent occurrence. In general, however, labour is cordially supporting the war. The American Federation of Labour, under the skilful leadership of Mr. Samuel Gompers, is actively co-operating with the Government. Disaffection is, however, being fomented by the Industrial Workers of the World, whose paramount aim is to aggravate every industrial disturbance so as to disintegrate the modern State. Opposition in labour circles is also being produced by the Socialist Party's doctrinaire attribution of the war's outbreak to the universal dominion of capitalistic imperialism throughout the world. Both of these organisations are largely in the control of men of alien tongue and origin and their direct and indirect opposition to the war is widening the breach between them and their colleagues of English-speaking traditions. Even under normal conditions the socialistic strength is small and its former influence has been considerably lessened by a secession of an important English-speaking minority, among whom are John Spargo, Charles Edward Russell and William English Walling. This is but one of the many instances of the

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war's polarisation of deeply ingrained racial and national instincts.

Washington is proceeding vigorously, and perhaps somewhat intolerantly, against the socialists and has refused the privilege of the mails to all papers directly or indirectly opposing the effective conduct of the war. For instance, allegations that the Government is controlled by Wall Street, by the munition manufacturers or by any special interest, bring them under the ban. Even more drastic action has been taken against the Industrial Workers of the World because, in their case especially, there was some ground for suspecting that German money was aiding the agitation. But, entirely apart from such extraneous disturbing influences, there is substantial reason for a considerable measure of unrest. In some instances wages have risen extravagantly since 1914; in others they have lagged behind. The cost of living, however, has increased immoderately for all. Those whose wages have not risen proportionately are naturally discontented and their dissatisfaction is intensified by the knowledge that the producer of raw materials and the manufacturer have been and still are making inordinate profits. In addition, Labour feels its power and some of the leaders are adroitly and selfishly taking advantage of the emergency arising from the shortage of workmen to secure conditions and wages that greatly increase the burden of the war both to the United States and to the Allies.

This scarcity is primarily due to the fact that consumption in the United States is not as yet on a war basis. The war cannot be so real to Americans as it is to those immediately within its range, and the economy campaign has so far not produced widespread results. The American people are notorious for their extravagance. The Secretary of Agriculture, Mr. Houston, has given his official sanction to an estimate that edibles to the value of more than 700 million dollars were annually wasted in American kitchens. This normal extravagance was further fomented by the two

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years of fabulous prosperity preceding the entrance into the war. Retrenchment is no easy matter unless the compelling necessity is very actually present. To some extent, the financial disturbance is forcing a readjustment ; but, in general, with the exception of food conservation, there has been comparatively little voluntary thrift. Despite the general scarcity of coal, the streets of New York are resplendent with myriads of electric lights and the consumption of gasoline by motor-cars for purposes of recreation is on a stupendous scale. An immoderately large proportion of labour is engaged in the production of luxuries.

In many respects this is unfortunate. Every decrease in the demand for non-essentials releases man-power for the production of war material. It lessens the cost of the war both to the United States and to the Allies. Widespread economy such as prevails in England would make possible the speedy completion of a ship-building programme far larger than the one under way. In another connection also the comparative failure to save on a large scale is proving somewhat harmful. It is a commonplace of war finance that the savings of the people are the most advantageous fund for the absorption of Government loans. Least satisfactory are those subscribers who borrow the money to pay for their bonds, for this process leads to an expansion of loans and to credit inflation. The huge Government issues cannot, however, be entirely covered by savings since the thrift campaign has so far had only moderate success. Hence, a considerable portion of the bonds will have to be taken by subscribers who must borrow money in order to do so.

Unfortunately, in very many instances, their ability, and also their inclination, to borrow money have been greatly lessened by serious financial disturbances. Prices of securities have declined most rapidly and there is marked lack of confidence in the financial future. To some extent this distrust is due to the so-called conscription of

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wealth. For war purposes additional taxes—in the main on excess profits and incomes—amounting to $2\frac{1}{2}$ billion dollars annually have been imposed and their effect and incidence is still a matter of conjecture. But, in greater measure, the disturbance is due to the fact that the credit of the railroads has been seriously undermined. Wages and materials have risen far out of proportion to rates, and the Interstate Commerce Commission is apparently loath to grant the desired relief. As a consequence, the investor believes that his property is faced either with bankruptcy or with Governmental expropriation at an unfair price. This is pre-eminently a domestic problem, but it has its effect on the war, not only in that it hampers the flotation of Government loans, but also in that it makes impossible a highly necessary expansion of transportation facilities. There is no question that all the money needed will in the end be raised, but unnecessary difficulties have been created by this gratuitous disturbance of credit during a time of exceptional prosperity.

The delay in ship-building, the scarcity of labour and its dislocation, the meagre success of the economy campaign, and the disturbed financial situation are unfortunate, but not ominous, facts in a situation that is on the whole full of promise. The catalogue of real accomplishment both in military preparations and in economic mobilisation is actually most impressive. In six months a markedly individualistic economic system has been nationalised and brought under Governmental control. The prices of foodstuffs and of fuel have been regulated and those of basic commodities, like copper and steel, have been determined by voluntary agreement between the Government and the manufacturer. In addition, a strict control over exports has been established so as to prevent supplies from reaching Germany through Holland and Scandinavia. The building of ships, the purchasing of supplies, the limitation of prices, the control of exports, of railroad transportation and of foodstuffs—to mention only the most conspicuous

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measures adopted to adjust the nation's economic life to war purposes—have meant a vast expansion of the Executive's activities. Board upon board had to be created to carry into effect the enlarged functions of the Government, with the result that the national administrative system has assumed a distinctly new character. In place of the ordinary functionary in his rut of routine, business men and financiers accustomed to large enterprises, students of public affairs and experts are conspicuous in directing the Government's new activities.

The question that is naturally uppermost in all thoughts is how America's resources in men and material can best be used to bring the war to a successful conclusion. Public opinion is far from clear on this point. The two really outstanding uncertainties are disconcerting and render impossible a confident judgment. On the one hand, there is the doubt as to whether Russia will be able to reorganise her partly demoralised army so that an unequivocal military decision may be possible in 1918. On the other, there is the unknown extent to which Germany's man-power is failing and her supplies of foodstuffs and warlike materials are being exhausted. These uncertainties give rise to interminable discussions. But, in general, the United States is not counting upon either contingency, be it a German collapse, a Russian revival—one, both, or neither. The preparations are for a war of indefinite duration, for whose successful conduct America has assumed unlimited obligations including, if necessary, the full development of her potential war strength. In official circles at Washington the possible termination of the war is put five years hence.

From this it is evident that the talk of peace in America is far less real than was that in Europe last summer and autumn. This is but natural. The long-suffering peoples of Great Britain and France had been buoyed up with the confident expectation of a military decision during 1917. The Russian disorganisation deferred this hope, but the inevitable result was considerable disappointment, which was

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aggravated by the fact that no perfectly clear light was visible ahead. In addition, these people had gone through three years of sacrifice. In the United States, the fresh belligerent just girding up his loins for the fray, these factors did not enter. While there is the keen desire of a pacific people for peace, there is full support for Mr. Wilson's position that the future peace must be equitable and enduring. The insistent demand is for a good peace, nor for mere peace in itself.

It cannot be sufficiently emphasised that the determining factor in American foreign policy, and pre-eminently so during time of war, is the official attitude of the President. America's conception of patriotism demands that in this respect at least public opinion be quite malleable and take the White House impress. Hence President Wilson's attitude towards the future peace is of supreme importance. In comparison with it the real views of Congress—whatever they may be—are of an insignificance that those accustomed to the executive responsibility of the parliamentary system can with difficulty realise. Even less important is the voice of the Press when once the Administration has taken an official stand. In fact, nearly all the important dailies are heartily supporting the President. However insidious be some journals of demagogic tendencies, however clamant be others of the socialistic creed or of the pacifist temper, however fine-spun be the criticisms of those of the secluded intellectual type, they count for comparatively little. Mr. Wilson cannot voluntarily swerve from his clearly-defined course without self-stultification. As in all things human, the personal factor cannot be ignored. Hence it is highly important to understand the President's policy.

On May 27, 1916, in his original general endorsement of "The League to Enforce Peace" programme, Mr. Wilson enunciated the following fundamental propositions: first, every people have a right to choose the sovereignty under which they shall live; second, the small States have the same right to their sovereignty and territorial integrity as

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have the great States ; and third, " the world has a right to be free from every disturbance of its peace that has its origin in aggression and disregard of the rights of peoples and nations." These are the cardinal principles of the President's code of public right, and they have determined his subsequent conduct, as well as his conception of the nature of a stable peace.

Six months later, in December of 1916, at the time of the abortive peace manœuvre of Germany, Mr. Wilson officially stated that the United States was prepared to enter a League of Nations to safeguard these rights and the general peace of the world. Furthermore, a few weeks thereafter, in his notable address to the Senate of January 22, 1917, he declared that America's willingness to enter such a " concert of power " for the purpose of guaranteeing peace and justice throughout the world was contingent upon the terms of peace, for the settlement that is made must be worth guaranteeing and preserving. Such a peace, he maintained with buoyant optimism, must not leave a legacy of resentment. It must be based upon a recognition of the equality of the rights of all States, great and small. And, finally, such a peace must be based upon the principle of the consent of the governed. " No right anywhere exists to hand people about from potentate to potentate as if they were property." Furthermore, after referring to the general recognition of the necessity of re-establishing a united, independent, and autonomous Poland, he enunciated the comprehensive doctrine that " henceforth inviolable security of life, of worship, and of industrial and social development should be guaranteed to all peoples who have lived hitherto under the power of Governments devoted to a faith and purpose hostile to their own." In addition, President Wilson pointed out the necessity of unimpeded access by all to the highways of the sea, which must be free " in practically all circumstances for the use of mankind " ; and he further stated that there must be a limitation of armaments, both military and naval.

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Hard upon this eirenicon followed Germany's defiant removal of all restrictions on her submarine campaign and America's entrance into the war. On April 2, 1917, the President explicitly defined the reasons for this momentous step. The object of the United States, he declared, "is to vindicate the principle of peace and justice in the life of the world as against selfish and autocratic power, and to set up amongst the really free and self-governed peoples of the world such a concert of purpose and action as will henceforth ensure the observance of these principles." He likewise drew a clear distinction, wisely perhaps in view of the German-American element in the United States, but unquestionably too sharply, between the German people and their autocratic Government, whom alone he held responsible for the war and the long-continued policy of aggression, intrigue and espionage that preceded it.

Two months later, after the Russian Revolutionary Government had explicitly announced as a basis for the future peace the rigid formula of "no annexations and no indemnities," Mr. Wilson categorically proclaimed America's disapproval of the negative programme of a mere restoration of the *status quo ante* from which, he contended, "this iniquitous war issued forth." He insisted upon the necessity of effective readjustments in order to do away with the wrongs of the old *régime*. These changes, however, must be based upon the following liberal principles :

No people must be forced under a sovereignty under which it does not wish to live. No territory must change hands except for the purpose of securing those who inhabit it a fair chance of life and liberty. No indemnities must be insisted on except those that constitute payment for manifest wrongs done. No readjustments of power must be made except such as will tend to secure the future peace of the world and the future welfare and happiness of its peoples.

This summary recapitulation shows clearly that President Wilson has in mind well-defined principles of public

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right to which the future map of the world must conform if a stable peace is to be established and, if then, on this basis, an effective superstate authority is to be established. These principles were reaffirmed with considerable clarity and with some important amplifications in Secretary Lansing's reply to the Curia's plea for peace published on August 15, 1917. This answer cannot be comprehended unless the Vatican proposals are kept clearly in mind. Pope Benedict's expressed object was to hasten the advent of a peace "just and lasting—stable and honourable to all." To this end he made various concrete proposals. The general remedial ones were the substitution of moral right for the force of arms, a radical diminution of armaments, compulsory international arbitration, and "the true freedom and community of the seas." As to the material damages sustained by the belligerents, he urged the general principle of complete and reciprocal condonation, with the possible exception of certain unspecified cases that "would be deliberated upon with justice and equity." More concretely, the Pope proposed the complete evacuation of Belgium and France and also the restitution of the German colonies. All other questions at issue—specifically, Alsace-Lorraine, *Italia Irredenta*, Armenia, the Balkans, the ancient Kingdom of Poland—should, in his opinion, be left to negotiation in the hope that, "in consideration of the immense advantages of a durable peace with disarmament," they would be settled equitably and justly in accordance with the aspirations of the peoples immediately concerned.

Apart from its expedients to prevent a recurrence of the cataclysm, what was proposed was apparently a return to the *status quo ante*, but it was really far less than this. The basis of the peace was to be merely a qualified *uti possidetis*, for the pious wish as to the disputed occupied territories, such as Poland and the Balkans, was far from giving the slightest assurance that the proposed peace would not mean an enormous increase in power to the Central

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Empires and consequently their unquestioned hegemony over Europe. *Beati possidentes* have a very marked advantage in negotiation and one which the votaries of organised power are not likely to abandon voluntarily. No one conversant with political realities could have failed to perceive this.

As this proposal was diametrically at variance with President Wilson's Note to Russia, it was a foregone conclusion that he would point out its inadequacy and that he would lay especial stress upon the fact that it was futile to expect the existing Government of Germany to treat in a conciliatory spirit the various questions left to adjustment. In a carefully worded reply to the Pope, under date of August 27, Secretary Lansing pointed out that it would be folly to take the proposed path if in fact it did not lead to the desired goal of a stable and enduring peace. The object of this war, it was maintained, is to deliver the free peoples of the world from the menace of a militaristic and irresponsible Government imbued with the ambition to dominate the world and heedless of treaty obligations and international honour. "This power is not the German people. It is the ruthless master of the German people." To make peace with this power on the Pontifical basis would, it was further contended, involve :

a recuperation of its strength and a renewal of its policy ; would make it necessary to create a permanent hostile combination of nations against the German people, who are its instruments, and would result in abandoning the new-born Russia to the intrigue, the manifold subtle interference, and the certain counter-revolution which would be attempted by all the malign influences to which the German Government has of late accustomed the world. Can peace be based upon a restitution of its power or upon any word of honour it could pledge in a treaty of settlement and accommodation ?

In the spirit of Mr. Wilson's address to the Senate of January 22, the Note then discussed the essential bases of a durable peace. The settlement, it was argued, can have

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no permanence if founded either upon political and economic restrictions meant to benefit some nations and to cripple others, or upon vindictive actions of any kind. Though the American people had suffered intolerable wrongs at German hands, it was pointed out that they desired no reprisals upon the German people, believing that peace should rest upon

the rights of peoples, great or small, weak or powerful—their equal right to freedom and security and self-government, and to a participation upon fair terms in the economic opportunities of the world—the German people, of course, included, *if they will accept equality, and not seek domination.*

The words italicized by the writer are among the most significant ones of the entire Note, for they emphasise the crux of the international situation. After this solemn warning to the German people, Secretary Lansing reaffirmed the disinterestedness of the United States in the war and again declared that “punitive damages, the dismemberment of empires, the establishment of selfish and exclusive economic leagues” were not the proper foundations for an enduring peace. We cannot, he concluded, take the word of the present rulers of Germany unless explicitly supported by the will and purpose of the German people, for “without such guarantees, treaties of settlement, agreements for disarmament, covenants to set up arbitration in the place of force, territorial adjustments, reconstitution of small nations, if made with the German Government, no man, no nation, could now depend on.”

The Note contains some delphic phrases and its meaning is far from perspicuous. Evidently, one of its main purposes was to drive a wedge between the German people and their Government and to strengthen the liberal and disaffected elements inside the enemy's lines. It was the natural sequel to the distinction between the German people and their Government made in Mr. Wilson's War Message, and the amplification was probably suggested by

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the two parallel statements made by Mr. Lloyd George on June 29 at Glasgow and on July 21 at Queen's Hall, London. On the latter occasion, in answer to Chancellor Michaelis's maiden speech, he said :

What manner of Government they choose to rule over them is entirely the business of the German people themselves ; but what manner of Government we can trust to make peace with is our business. Democracy is in itself a guarantee of peace, and if you cannot get it in Germany, then we must secure other guarantees as a substitute.

This appeal over the head of the Government to the people themselves is diplomacy of a new and democratic type. It is strategy of considerable danger in that its effect might possibly be to unify the German nation in the face of such interference in its domestic affairs. Time alone can tell. This danger, however, was considerably lessened by the fact that the American Note to the Pope contained a positive assurance to the German people that no merely punitive damages would be imposed and that there was no intention to dismember Germany. The phrase, "dismemberment of empires," presumably does not debar the retrocession of Alsace-Lorraine ; nor is it probable that it was meant to apply either to Austria-Hungary or to Turkey, since the United States is not actually at war with them and hence was not likely to bring these questions into its diplomatic correspondence. This, however, is problematical. Similarly, the reference to "selfish and exclusive economic leagues" is somewhat enigmatic. The natural inference is that it referred primarily to the *Mitteleuropa* project and only secondarily to the resulting defensive measures planned at the Paris Economic Conference. Patently, a world divided into two hostile economic leagues would not be in a state of stable equilibrium. The tendency to a renewal of the armed conflict would be strong and possibly irresistible. Finally, in the background of the entire Note is the scarcely veiled comminatory reference to the fundamental economic fact,

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whose importance is being increasingly realised in Germany, that the economic reconstruction of the Central Empires is absolutely dependent upon the Allies, since they not only control the great bulk of the essential raw materials, but also command the seas that give access to them. In general, it was made clear to the German people that if they secured control of their irresponsible Government, gave conclusive evidence of good faith, and abandoned all ideas of domination, better terms of peace would be granted ; but that, if the existing system with its doctrines of aggression and ascendancy persisted, peace was still in the distant future and Germany's economic rehabilitation would not only be embarrassed but thwarted. It was Mr. Balfour's alternative of a free and loyal Germany, or one powerless to do evil.

That the malign spirit of Prussianism cannot be exorcised by pious wishes and that defeat and failure alone will discredit the cult of force is becoming more and more the firm conviction of Americans. Thus Mr. Wilson himself, on October 8, insisted that the war should end only when Germany is beaten and the rule of autocracy and might is superseded by the ideals of democracy. All talk of an early peace before Germany is defeated, he added, is one of the evidences of misdirected thought and should not cloud the vision of those who understand that the United States is fighting now for the same ideals of democracy and freedom that have always actuated the nation. On this point the two living ex-Presidents, though not of Mr. Wilson's political party, are in complete accord with him. On September 26, at Montreal, Mr. W. H. Taft said :

The Allies cannot concede peace until they conquer it. When they do so, it will be permanent. Otherwise they fail. . . . He who proposes peace now either does not see the stake for which the Allies are fighting, or wishes the German military autocracy still to control the destinies of all of us as to peace or war.

With characteristic aversion from half-measures, Colonel

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Roosevelt has gone even further. Adopting to the full the doctrines of Chéradame and other champions of "*la victoire intégrale*," he asserted on October 5 :

The only peace that will make the world safe for democracy is a peace based upon the complete overthrow of Germany and the dissolution of Austria and Turkey.

In this very connection it should be especially noted that the entire programme of a future League of Nations depends upon a conclusive Allied victory. With six of the eight Great Powers and a large number of secondary States allied against the Central European combination, the war has most distinctly assumed the aspect of the enforcement of a decree of the projected World Concert. Were Germany and her satellites able to defy this world-wide combination, the proposed League would patently be the most unseaworthy of ships of State. It would be wrecked before it left the ways. As Mr. Taft, the head of the unofficial organisation spreading the League gospel, has stated :

This war is now being fought by the Allies as a League to enforce Peace. Unless they compel it by victory, they do not enforce it.

That unfortunate phrase, "peace without victory," no longer arouses any enthusiasm and is being discreetly ignored. In so far as it means a negotiated peace between unbeaten equals, it rings the premature doom of President Wilson's inclusive League to ensure justice and peace. To the extent, however, that it does not preclude a victorious war, but merely "a militaristic peace" with punitive and vindictive damages imposed upon the vanquished, it still represents American policy.

Events during the war, and more particularly the State Department's disclosures of Germany's criminal intrigues in America, have engendered so deep a distrust of the German Government's good faith that but scant attention

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was paid to the answers of the Central Empires to the Vatican's peace proposals. Germany's most belated adhesion to a programme of compulsory arbitration and diminution of armaments based upon a conception of international right seemed to be not even a death-bed conversion, but merely an insincere attempt to secure such favourable territorial terms as would render feasible a renewed trial for world domination under more advantageous conditions. The reservation of "the vital interest of the German Empire and people" and the significant allusion to the war-map in the concluding phrase, "the situation in Europe," especially aroused suspicion. If these protestations were merely an attempt to beguile the Entente into an inadequate settlement, they failed signally in America.

Public opinion strongly supports the Administration's stand. With their characteristic common sense, the American people realise that Germany is still unbeaten, that the paramount duty is to defeat her, and that nothing is to be gained by a premature definition of the details of a peace settlement whose attainment entirely depends upon the combined effects of future military and economic pressure. There is inevitably opposition in various quarters. As in England, there is a group of intellectuals who uphold the war, but are so over-anxious for its speedy termination that they refuse to face fundamental facts. Remote from the realities of life, they urge the necessity of a negotiated peace that will leave no rancour anywhere. Largely because they want to, they believe in the possibility of Germany's sudden conversion from the time-honoured tenets of Prussianism, and hence they over-estimate every bit of evidence tending towards such an ultimate consummation. In contradistinction to the parallel British group, which magnifies the venial sins of its country into heinous crimes, some of these intellectuals are prone to be complacently nationalistic and to emphasise the faults of other Governments, even though they be America's associates

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in the great enterprise of making the world safe for its peace-loving peoples. Similarly, some of the extreme pacifists continue to advocate the speedy termination of the war, disregarding entirely the effect of its inconclusive issue upon human liberty. Some of the Socialists, in their anti-national internationalism, are likewise using the familiar catch-words of a "capitalistic war." Under the surface also German intrigue is still subtly active. All these various elements are, however, largely impotent. The American people are far from tolerant of internal opposition in the face of the enemy. One is loath to think of the fate of any American citizen who presumed, for instance, at this juncture to go behind his own Government's back and appeal to the peoples of neutral States to do what they could to stop the war at once. In 1863, during the Civil War, a prominent politician, C. L. Vallandigham—the rough prototype of E. E. Hale's famous "man without a country"—urged the futility of further slaughter, the immediate stoppage of the war and the reconciliation of the combatants, and, in general, opposed the war policy of the North. He was illegally tried and convicted by a military tribunal, and his sentence was commuted by President Lincoln to banishment, which was executed by escorting him within the enemy lines. Although the present crisis is far less concretely acute, such intolerance is becoming increasingly apparent, and there is a marked tendency to characterise all opposition to the Government's policy as not only unpatriotic, but traitorous and seditious. In overcoming such obstruction, the national and local authorities, and even academic bodies, have proceeded to far greater lengths than in England. Newspapers have been suppressed, pacifist meetings have been forbidden, and dissentient college professors have been dismissed. Apart from the broad question, whether freedom of speech has not been excessively infringed, even after making full allowance for the exigencies of war times, this has had the unfortunate result that it has

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somewhat retarded the educational process that results from an effective answer to error.

The small minority that openly or surreptitiously opposes the war is driven by this very fact into an attitude verging on condonation of Germany and of unsympathetic and carping criticism towards their own country's Allies. Hence in combating what are generally deemed to be their disloyal utterances, the average American tends to become the sturdy champion of America's associates. Any attack upon the Allies is necessarily an indirect attack upon the United States. Thus a very influential organisation of recent formation, the League for National Unity, has adopted the following fundamental principle :

It is not a time for old prejudices or academic discussion as to past differences. . . . We, therefore, deprecate the exaggeration of old national prejudices—often stimulated by German propaganda—and nothing is more important than the clear understanding that those who in this crisis attack our present Allies attack America.

The Government has taken the same stand. Postmaster-General Burleson, upon whom broad authority over the Press has been conferred, has officially declared that he "will not permit the publication or circulation of anything hampering the war's prosecution or attacking improperly our Allies."

As most of the insinuations and criticisms have been directed against England, there has in reaction resulted a far more sympathetic feeling towards that country and a more generous appreciation of the splendid part she has played in the war. As a consequence of this and of the co-operation demanded by the war, the traditional feeling towards England is rapidly changing. There still remain sporadic vestiges of the inherited suspicion. The distrust crops out in odd quarters, but it is probably most frequent among the minor politicians who cannot readily over-night abandon the jejune oratorical device of twisting the lion's

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tail. But a new tradition is steadily developing. Many an American, who only a year ago regarded England as the inherited foe, now looks upon her as the natural Ally.

This is not the place to analyse those intangible forces that produce national sympathies and dislikes. It is easy to praise or to blame, but it is always difficult to understand; and men generally prefer the facile to the arduous road. The root of most national antipathies lies in ignorance. In considerable part, the inherited prejudice against England that pervaded wide circles of the so-called "plain people" of America was due to the grossly prejudiced character of the history taught in the elementary and secondary schools*

An interesting illustration of this and of the clarifying effect of association in a common cause is afforded by the following remark, made by the author of one of the most popular books of war experiences. Sergeant A. G. Empey, an American who had served in the British Army, told his fellow-citizens after returning from the front:

We don't understand England over here. I was raised in Virginia and brought up on McGuffey's *Reader*, and I had the same opinion of England that a Minute-man † or a Sinn Feiner would have; but I found Tommy Atkins the squarest man that ever drew breath.

The defective unscientific character of very many of the history text books used in the lower grades of American schools is freely admitted by all competent authorities. The pernicious effects of this early training are widespread. For the youthful impressions harden into stub-

* Charles Altschul, *The American Revolution in our School Text Books* (Doran, New York, 1917). In this timely volume the passages dealing with the American Revolution in the text books used in a large number of schools in the United States are quoted *verbatim*.

† In 1775, in preparation for the impending revolt in Massachusetts against British authority, a special section of the militia, known as "Minute-men," was formed. They were under orders to be ready for service at a moment's notice.

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born convictions that condition conduct throughout life. Some initial steps have been taken to remedy this admitted evil. Similarly, a number of Americans who believe firmly that not only the peaceful development of their own country, but also the welfare of the world in general, is dependent upon close relations between all the English-speaking peoples, are endeavouring—singly and in groups—to spread an accurate knowledge of Anglo-American relations in the past. The scientific historians of recent decades have been unduly secluded, and too little of their labour research has reached the broad public. To rectify this is usually a slow process, especially in days of peace when the past arouses no keen general interest. It is an almost hopeless task when the will is opposed to conviction. But, at the present propitious moment, the reverse is more and more frequently the case. This promises well for that mutual understanding upon which effective co-operation must be based. Day by day it is becoming clearer that the English-speaking peoples are the mainstay of the coalition against Teutonic aggression, that upon their future close association depends the effectiveness of any future League of Nations, and that their vast economic and financial resources must be used jointly to rehabilitate a world that has gone through untold misery in ridding itself of the menace of Prussianism.

New York. October, 1917.

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NONE of the outstanding personalities of the war has made a stronger impression on the sentiment and imagination of the British peoples than General Smuts. And the reason is to be found not so much in his remarkable combination of talents, not so much in his record of achievement in the field and in council, as in the simple fact that only sixteen years ago he was fighting against the British Commonwealth and now he is fighting for it. Like his colleague and brother-in-arms, General Botha, he is at once a champion of the ideals on which the British Commonwealth now rests and a living proof of their rightness and power. "Freedom," he said himself at the Guildhall, "like wisdom, is justified of her children"; and history can show no swifter nor more striking instance of the operation of that rule than the results of applying to the two Boer Republics, almost on the morrow of their defeat and annexation, the doctrine of colonial self-government initiated by Lord Durham and his little school of Radical Imperialists nearly eighty years ago.

There is a special interest, therefore, in the series of public speeches in which General Smuts during his stay in this country has set forth with an eloquent simplicity the principles of his political creed. The first of these principles is freedom and the second is unity. No one has a better claim to speak of freedom than the man who, not long since, fought long and desperately for the independence of his people and is now engaged in a still longer and more

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desperate struggle for the independence of all peoples. And no one has a better claim to speak of unity than the man who took so great a part in building on the ashes of the old disastrous race-feud in South Africa the framework of a united nation ; and who, in the early days of this war, was forced to take the field against a misguided section of his own people in order that the work accomplished at the Union might not be undone and South Africa plunged again in internecine strife. General Smuts's life, in fact, has been a record of active service for both those ideals : he knows from the hard realities of his own personal experience that both must be sought together, that either indeed is unattainable without the other : and it is both ideals that he has preached to his fellow-citizens in this country. Thus, on the one hand, he has from the first insisted that freedom is the object and inspiration of this war—freedom from the perpetual menace of Prussian militarism. Freedom, again, he has reminded us, is the very life-blood of the British Commonwealth, without which it has never prospered in the past and can never prosper in the future. At the meetings of the Imperial War Conference none of his colleagues from overseas laid more emphasis than he did on the necessity for fully recognising the principle of autonomy in the self-governing nations of the British Commonwealth. None of them, on the other hand, supported more warmly the proposal for the regular institution of an Imperial Cabinet for the unified control of foreign policy. While he pleaded for the full freedom of the Dominions to develop and control their national life he pleaded also that they must stand united in their relations with the outer world, and that some constitutional machinery must be devised for keeping them together. It is unity, similarly, that he calls for from the people of this country as the one thing needed above all other things for the successful prosecution of the war. And it is with the same idea of unity that he advocates the establishment of a League of Nations. For the rationale of the League of Nations is to replace inter-

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State conflict by inter-State co-operation ; it rests on the idea of the unity of mankind and the hope of its ultimate embodiment in the political organisation of the world as against the doctrine of perpetual schism and inevitable war.

In the sphere of political thought at the present time nothing could be more opportune than General Smuts's reminder of the interrelation between the two ideals. The prolongation of the war is putting an increasing strain on the political structure of all the belligerent States : in one of them the old structure has been overthrown and no stable fabric has as yet been erected to take its place ; and from Russia the whisper of Revolution has run through Europe. In the field of ideas, as well as in the field of action, democracy is on its trial ; it is not only by their energy and endurance in the conduct of the war that the democratic peoples have now to prove their faith, but also by the steadiness and breadth of their political opinions. And this applies particularly, perhaps, to the democracies of the British Commonwealth and the American Republic. For theirs is the oldest and strongest tradition of self-government : it is their common heritage from England, the mother of freedom : and Europe now looks to them, as it once looked to England, for the proof that freedom and unity are not irreconcilable.

The British and American democracies have so far stood the test. The American people have followed President Wilson's lead with a unity and cohesion which have justified the most confident expectations of their friends and allies ; and the war has brought to the peoples of the British Commonwealth a stronger sense of unity than they ever possessed before. Nor is there any danger that American or British citizens will allow the ideal of unity to eclipse the ideal of freedom ; to suffer, for example, the perpetuation in peace time of the curtailments of individual liberty imposed on them by the necessities of war. The danger, such as it is, lies rather the other way. Of

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the two ideals unity is the more difficult to attain and to preserve in a democratic State ; and, in this country at any rate, it is the desire for unity more than the desire for freedom that has been weakened by the strain of war. The definition and discussion of the issues at stake have naturally thrown the emphasis on freedom. Men's minds are everywhere in reaction against the negation of freedom implied in the precepts and practices of Prussian militarism ; and, inevitably perhaps, the balance of thought has tended to swing over to the opposite extreme. In its most illogical form this tendency reveals itself in the occasional assumption that, because some German ideals are false and vicious, the world has nothing at all to learn from Germany. It is sometimes argued, similarly, that, because the German Government has perverted some vital function of civilised society, that function is itself unnecessary, if not positively harmful. The brutality of Prussian discipline, for instance, seems to encourage the belief that discipline is intrinsically a bad thing. And the same reasoning is applied to the State itself. Because the Prussian rulers of Germany have formed an irresponsible and immoral conception of the State and drilled their subjects to accept it, it is asserted that the existence of the State is in itself a danger to freedom and that it is at the best a piece of political machinery, not indeed to be dispensed with, but not to be regarded as the supreme form of association among men, whose legitimate claims override those of every other social organism when they conflict with them. The fallacy in all such reasoning is obvious enough. In theory and in practice the democratic State is wholly different from the Prussian-German State. It is not something detached from and potentially hostile to its citizens : it *is* its citizens organised as a single political community ; and its actions are the expression of their communal will. Thus it is the embodiment, and the only possible embodiment at the present stage of civilisation, of both the ideals. It is the only body which contains *all* the members of the community what-

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ever their class or race or faith. It is the only power which has authority to settle in the last resort the disputes that may arise between the individuals or the groups within it. Only through the State can unity be attained. And only through the State can freedom be attained. Except as a member of a State no man is really free. Freedom of movement, free expression of thought, the enjoyment of life itself, are only guaranteed by the protection of law; and law is but the instrument through which the democratic State gives effect to the prevailing sense of right and justice among its members. To maintain and extend the reign of law is indeed the whole purpose of the democratic State.

These facts are commonplace; and yet they are all too frequently neglected in current political thought. Both in this country and in the United States there is an increasing volume of what may be described as anti-State philosophising. It is pointed out quite truly that the old theory of the sovereign independence of the State in the sphere of its external relations has been steadily and inevitably giving way to the necessity of interdependence between States: but it is also prophesied that in the new era after the war State sovereignty will have to be "scrapped" in internal affairs as well. It is even proposed that "class, trade and professional associations" should "compete with the State for the loyalty of its citizens" and that the future development of democracy should be along the line of "co-operative" or "concurrent" allegiance.* Such proposals seem the more strange in that they are not novel. It was the doctrine of "concurrent allegiance," the theory that the citizen of one of the component States owed no higher loyalty to the United States as a whole than to his own particular State, that led to the American Civil War. And, once they are translated from theory into action, those ideas are just as dangerous to-day. *Si monumentum quaeris, circumspice.* On those ideas rests

* E.g., *New Republic* (New York), April 14 and September 15, 1917.

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the theory that a single class is justified in setting its own claims on a level with the claims of the whole community ; and from that it is but a short step to discarding the machinery the State provides for the redress of its grievances, and even to enforcing its will, if it can, upon the rest of the community by other means. It was in obedience to such arguments that organised Labour in Australia attempted this autumn to paralyse the government of the country by a series of strikes in the very midst of the war.* From those ideas, again, springs the doctrine that the Socialists of every State should be loyal to the *Internationale*, even when its decisions conflict with those of their own State. This doctrine is indeed repudiated by moderate Socialist opinion ; but it lies at the root of the pacifist agitation in Italy which is believed to account for the attitude of those regiments whose defection in the face of the enemy precipitated the recent military disaster. But the most obvious and terrible example is that of Russia. Under the old *régime* the peoples of the Russian Empire were united but not free. They were held together by the chains of despotism. And now they have broken that iron bond without as yet attaining freedom. For there can be no freedom in a world of anarchy and civil strife : there can be no freedom without unity. And the unity of the Russian peoples has been destroyed, for the time being at any rate, by the influence of those same disintegrating ideas in their most extreme form. Denied education, denied all means of acquiring political experience, a large part of the Russian peoples have fallen victims to the Maximalist doctrinaires who, having discredited and dissolved the reign of law by preaching the creed that every man should be a law unto himself, are now trying to save the situation by forcibly overriding the will of every other party in the State, and establishing their own supreme power by a *coup d'état*. They have set the Russian Revolution on the road which leads through anarchy to a new tyranny—that of

* See the Australian article in this issue.

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the Terror ; and unless all the forces in the country which stand for unity can combine and defeat them the last state of Russia will be worse than the first.

But it is not enough to recognise in such events as these the danger of political theories which lay all the stress on freedom and none at all on unity. The prevalence of such theories in old-established democracies is not a passing incident, nor wholly caused by the reactions of the war. It is largely due to a widespread discontent with the achievements of democracy, a discontent that was strong enough before the war and will be stronger after it. And, when all has been said in favour of the democratic State, it must be frankly admitted that, as at present organised, it is by no means a creature of perfection. Wise men do not discard an instrument which performs, however imperfectly, a vital function of civilised life without a sure belief in their ability to replace it with a better : but neither do they rest contented with its imperfections and make no effort to remedy them. And it is well to remember how wide is the scope for improvement. The democratic State, after all, is a very recent creation in modern history. In a sense, it has not yet been created ; it is still an only half-developed organism, an ideal half-realised. In this country, so far from having attained its final shape, it is at the present moment passing through one of its periodical phases of sudden and rapid growth. The forms of government on which it rests are undergoing drastic changes. The basis of the whole structure—the voting-power of the people—is to be vastly widened by the Franchise Bill now running its course through Parliament : and the Reform Bill of 1917 will not be the end of a process of expansion which only began with the Reform Bill of 1832. And if the scope of the people's voting-power has not yet attained its full development, still less has its quality. The capacity to vote wisely rests on education ; and on the heels of the Franchise Bill is to follow an Education Bill to widen and improve a system of public education which has only

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existed for less than fifty years. It is the same with the machine which gives effect to voting-power—Parliament itself. Proposals are now being discussed for the reform of the House of Lords : and the House of Commons is confronted not only with the necessity of devolving some of its over-numerous duties on to other bodies but also with far-reaching changes in the character of its *personnel*. The recent decision of organised Labour to constitute a national party * and to contest a much larger number of seats at the next election than heretofore is likely to mean a great increase in its representation. It is to be hoped, moreover, that, in all parties after the war, membership of the House of Commons will be regarded far more earnestly than heretofore as public service of the highest order, demanding the deepest sense of vocation and the best gifts of intellect and character the community can provide.

These are but a few examples of the countless possibilities of change and growth in the existing body and spirit of the democratic State. They suffice, however, to demonstrate the absurdity of regarding it as effete and out of date, as a political instrument which has been given a fair trial and has proved a failure. But they also serve to remind its supporters of the long task that awaits them. Not till the democratic State is fully developed and scientifically organised, not till the sense of responsibility on which its moral power rests is fully awakened in its citizens, can the final answer be given to those who depreciate its value and seek to undermine its authority.

The foregoing considerations may be applied *mutatis mutandis* to all democratic States ; but there is one particular aspect of the problem of the interrelation between freedom and unity which concerns only those States which are not “national,” but “multi-national” or “supernational,” and of which the British Commonwealth is the most remarkable example. Nowhere is that prevailing

* See the United Kingdom article, p. 154.

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tendency to disregard the proper balance between the two ideals more marked than in the treatment, both in thought and in action, of the problem of nationality. And here again the primary reason is clear enough. The course of the war and the issues it has raised have thrown a special weight on the ideal of national freedom. Never does the spirit of nationality burn so brightly as when it is challenged and overridden ; and, just as it was brought to life by the tyranny of Napoleon, so it has won a new power throughout the world from the attempts of Prussian militarism to destroy it. It pervades and stimulates the purpose of the Allied peoples. If the war is regarded in general terms as a war for freedom, it is regarded in particular as a war for the freedom of small nations.

Up to a point the emphasis thus laid on freedom has been as salutary in regard to the question of nationality as in regard to the more general problems discussed above, and it was perhaps more needed. It has reminded a generation who had forgotten Mazzini that a nation has a right to preserve and develop its character and traditions, its language and religion and ancestral ways of life ; that, if this measure of freedom is denied to it by a despotic Government, it has a right to attain it, if it can, by achieving its political independence ; and that, if in the past its people have been torn apart by force of arms and divided up among despotic Governments to satisfy their craving for aggrandisement, it has a right to recover, if it can, its political unity. Thus the civilised world recognises and affirms more clearly than it did four years ago the claim of the Poles to reconstitute their ancient State, of Alsace-Lorraine to be restored to France, of the subject peoples of the Austro-Hungarian and Turkish Empires to attain the liberty so far refused to them by establishing their independence or uniting themselves with their fellow-nationals in neighbouring States.

But to recognise a right of national "self-determination" in those cases is one thing : to assert that that right

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is *absolute*—or, in other words, that a nation is entitled to political independence as a sovereign State if it desires it whatever the circumstances—is quite another. No political rights are absolute; and with a nation, as with an individual, the right to freedom is only the converse of the duty of service, and is only valid because and in so far as it is through freedom alone that the nation can do its own appointed work for the welfare of humanity. “Nationality is sacred to me,” said Mazzini, “because I see in it the instrument of labour for the good and progress of all men.” And again: “A nation is a living task, *her life is not her own*, but a force and function in the universal Providential scheme.” But Mazzini’s stern code of duty is forgotten by those nationalists who think of freedom only and regard complete political independence as the right of every nation which does not possess it, whatever the character of the State of which it forms a part. They make no distinction in the matter between autocratic and democratic super-national States. They prefer the same claim for the constituent nations of the British Commonwealth, for instance, as for those of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

This is but another example of the tendency to exalt the ideal of freedom at the cost of the ideal of unity; and again its unhappy fruits are to be seen in the actual course of events. Once more the clearest warning comes from Russia. The complete suppression of national liberty was an inevitable feature of the absolutist *régime*; and inevitably the Revolution brought with it a strong wave of nationalist feeling. But instead of waiting and working for a Federal Commonwealth which could combine the domestic freedom of each national division of the Russian State with the unity of the whole, the impatient extremists of Finland and the Ukraine have demanded separation, and by thus promoting disunion and chaos have not only jeopardised their own freedom as well as that of all the peoples of Russia,

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but injured also the cause of freedom throughout the world.*

Nor is the British Commonwealth by any means immune from this reckless and self-regarding nationalism. In Ireland and South Africa it has already produced rebellions, easily suppressed indeed, but leaving behind their disastrous legacy of hatred and distrust. And its disciples are still preaching the same doctrine. The attitude of Sinn Fein is still frankly separatist. Its leaders are demanding at this moment the establishment of an Irish Republic as an independent sovereign State. And General Hertzog is still laying down the constitutional theory that the people of South Africa have an "unassailable right" to maintain neutrality in any war in which the rest of the British Commonwealth may be engaged—a theory which, if once it were put in practice, would mean the separation of South Africa from the Commonwealth.† The same tendency is to be found, though less marked perhaps and less dangerous, among French Canadian nationalists. M. Bourassa, for instance, deplores that his English fellow-Canadians have lost "what was once an exclusively Canadian patriotism" and that "Canada is now merely regarded as one of the component parts of a great whole, the British Empire."‡

Such a widespread nationalist agitation would suggest to an uninstructed observer that nationality was as unfree in the British Commonwealth as in the German or Austro-Hungarian or Turkish Empires; whereas, in truth, freedom of national development in all its wealth and variety is one of the basic principles on which the British Commonwealth of Nations rests. Irishmen, Dutch South Africans, French Canadians are as free to cherish and preserve their

* The possibilities of separatist movements in Asiatic Russia are discussed in the article in this issue entitled "Turkey, Russia and Islam."

† E.g., Speech at Stellenbosch, May 11, 1917. See THE ROUND TABLE, No. 28, p. 821. See also the Republican movement described in the South African article in this issue.

‡ *Conscription* (articles in *Le Devoir*, republished and translated), p. 24.

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national characteristics—their laws and customs, their faith and tongue—as any of their English fellow-citizens. Except in Ireland, moreover, they possess the full measure of local self-government ; and the British Government has pledged its assent to any political status for Ireland within the British Commonwealth on which the Irish Convention can agree. But the extremists are not content with their local or domestic freedom. They wish to stand by themselves in the world, not free nations merely, as they can all be within the boundaries of a commonwealth of nations, but independent States, free to arm and in the last resort to fight not only against foreign peoples but also against those who are now their fellow-citizens.

The position of Ireland is clearly different in this respect from that of the Dominions. For the Irish people are represented together with the people of the United Kingdom—and indeed more fully—in the Parliament which controls the foreign policy of the Commonwealth. And to the vast majority of British citizens the Sinn Fein claim seems as empty and illegitimate as it is unreasonable. An independent Ireland could enjoy no real freedom in its foreign relations without the protection of the British or some other fleet : nor could it justify its independence by rendering through it any better service to humanity. Its weakness would endanger the security of Great Britain and the whole Commonwealth : and it would directly injure the cause of peace and freedom throughout the world by thus impairing the strength of the strongest Power that defends it. It might be said, in fact, that Sinn Fein is fighting not so much for freedom as against unity ; and if *Myself alone* is not the noblest watchword for an individual, *Ourselves alone* is little better for a nation.

The recent history of Europe provides a pertinent example of the interdependence of freedom and unity in the contrast between Switzerland and Belgium. If the peoples of French, German and Italian origin in Switzerland

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had not bound themselves so fast together into a single State—so fast in fact as to acquire a sense of a single nationality—but had set themselves up as little independent national States, they would long ago have suffered Belgium's fate. And Belgium herself might have escaped it if only she could have maintained her union with Holland. The Congress of the Great Powers at Vienna deliberately united Belgium and Holland in order to make the Low Countries the strongest possible bulwark of the peace of Europe. They thus attained a unity, which had it been preserved, might well have saved Belgium from the disaster of 1914. But unhappily it proved to be unity without freedom. The misguided attempt of King William to force the Belgian people into the mould of Dutch nationality by handicapping their language and attacking their religion drove them to assert their independence; and the Powers, recognising that an effective union of the Low Countries was now impossible, confirmed its dissolution.

Such historical lessons apply not only to the case of Ireland, but also to that of the Dominions. The peoples of the Dominions are in a different position from that of the Irish people because they have not hitherto enjoyed any effective share in the control of foreign policy. But, since it is not impossible to make good that deficiency in the scope of their freedom without destroying the unity of the Commonwealth as a whole, those nationalists who make the sovereign independence of the Dominions their ideal are no better justified than the followers of Sinn Fein. How better could the peoples of the Dominions perform "their function in the universal Providential scheme," how better serve the cause of peace and justice among all mankind, by breaking up a system which maintains the reign of law over a quarter of the world? Extreme nationalists would do well to remember the common-sense plea against the dissolution of the United States made by that great American from whose deep and enduring wisdom the forces of freedom have more than once drawn inspira-

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tion during the course of the present war. "We cannot remove our respective sections from each other," said Lincoln in 1861, "nor build an impassable wall between them. A husband and wife may be divorced, and go out of the presence and beyond the reach of each other; but the different parts of our country cannot do this. They cannot but remain face to face, and intercourse, either amicable or hostile, must continue between them. Is it possible, then, to make that intercourse more advantageous or more satisfactory after separation than before? Can aliens make treaties easier than friends can make laws? Can treaties be more faithfully enforced between aliens than laws can among friends?"

It is true that Lincoln had in mind the immediate physical contiguity of the American States; but the force of his argument is not lost because the nations of the British Commonwealth are sundered by the sea. Through the triumphs of science the world has shrunk immeasurably since Lincoln's day and is shrinking still; and the war itself has proved that no peoples now, in any corner of the globe, can keep themselves in their economic and political relations "beyond the presence and out of the reach of each other." Nor are the possibilities of political organisation any more exhausted than the possibilities of applied science. Only those who regard the capacities of the democratic State as already proved and discredited can doubt that its structure can be expanded and its principles adapted to include a commonwealth of many nations. But the constitutional framework of unity is a secondary question. A way will be found to embody the ideal if the ideal itself is not undervalued and abandoned. And to abandon the ideal of a super-national democratic State and to exalt in its stead the ideal of isolated self-regarding nationalism is to set back the political progress of humanity. Everyone now recognises that the chief crux in world politics, the chief obstacle to world peace, lies in the rivalry of independent nations who have no effective means of settling

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their disputes save war. The institution of a world-wide commonwealth, free and yet united, wherein five nations can settle their disputes by means of law instead of force, is a living proof that the obstacle is not insuperable and points the way to overcome it. England once saved Europe by her example : by its example the British Commonwealth may help to save the world.

It is the belief that the free peoples of the world are fighting to inaugurate a new era for humanity that inspires them to "dedicate their lives, their fortunes, everything they are, everything they have" to destroy for ever the power and prestige of military despotism. But despotism is not the only enemy to peace and good-will among men ; and those golden hopes of the future will quickly fade if the free peoples, in their revulsion from despotism, forget, as they are now being tempted to forget, that, as it is only by unity that this war for freedom can be won, so it is on the ideal of unity as well as the ideal of freedom that the peace of a new age must rest.

TURKEY, RUSSIA AND ISLAM

AMONG the Western democracies public interest in the Russian Revolution is primarily concerned with European Russia. Attention is concentrated on the naval and military operations along the European front, on the nationalist agitation in Finland and the Ukraine, or on political developments at Petrograd. For most men the Russian horizon, so to speak, is bounded by a line drawn from Archangel through Moscow to the Black Sea. Beyond that all is vague and remote and out-of-mind. But it should not be forgotten that the Russian, like the British, Empire is more than a European State. It occupies about a sixth of the land surface of the globe, and contains about a tenth of its population. Clearly, then, a crisis which, if the worst came to the worst, might mean the disruption of so vast a political system is not limited in its importance to the affairs of Europe, nor even to the immediate issues of this world-war. Peace in Europe must prove a transient blessing without peace in Asia ; and there can be no real peace in Asia as long as the political future of the peoples of the Russian Empire, in all their diversity of race and tongue and standards of civilisation, remains uncertain.

Similarly, it is not in Europe only that the enemies of Russia and of freedom are striving to hinder by all means in their power the consolidation of the new-born Russian democracy. While the German Government plans for herself a glaxis of vassal States, and fosters anarchist and separatist movements in European Russia, the military

Sketch Map of CENTRAL ASIA

English Miles
0 100 200 300 400 500 600

Chief railways ———— Inter-state boundaries ————



The Pan-Turanian Movement

oligarchs of Turkey, apt pupils of their Prussian masters, are cherishing yet wider ambitions of aggrandisement. They mean to reverse the historic rôles. Russia is now to be the "Sick Man"; and just as autocratic Russia once freed the Slav and Christian peoples in the Balkans from Turkish tyranny, so now they dream of "freeing" the Turkish-speaking and Mohammedan peoples from democratic Russia. How serious these aspirations are and how dangerous they might become in the disastrous event of a complete breakdown of order and cohesion within the Russian Empire will be made clear by a brief examination of Turkish policy and especially of that factor in it which is known as the Pan-Turanian movement.

I. THE PAN-TURANIAN MOVEMENT

TURAN is a Persian word. In Persian mediæval poetry it means the steppes and deserts of Central Asia, in contrast to the settled country of Iran or Persia. The "people of Turan" are the nomads of many different languages and races who constantly overran Persia from the north-east, till the Russians pacified Central Asia half a century ago. It was with little regard, therefore, for its precise origin that European philologists appropriated the name *Turanian* for the languages of north-eastern Europe and Asia which are "agglutinative" in structure, in contrast to the Indo-European family. It was really a negative term—a provisional label for an unexplored mass.

The work of exploration was first taken up seriously by the Magyars, who speak one of these agglutinative languages (of the Ugro-Finnic group) and have always felt themselves isolated among the Latin, Slavonic, and Teutonic speaking peoples of Europe. A mediæval Hungarian monk once made a pilgrimage eastward to discover his lost kinsmen, and lighted upon the Bashkirs of the

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Ural region; and during the present war Magyar professors are said to have conducted a propaganda among Russian prisoners of war belonging to easterly Finnish tribes, to prove to them that the Magyars are their brethren and Buda-Pest their cultural home. It was the same idea that led the famous Hungarian *savant*, Vambéry, to undertake his travels and researches among the Turkish-speaking peoples of Central Asia, but the main field of Magyar Pan-Turanianism lay nearer home. When the Magyar struggle for independence in 1849 was crushed by the combined Austro-Russian armies, many leading Magyar refugees had found an asylum in Constantinople; and in 1867 these exiles returned to Hungary and became a power in the newly constituted Dual Monarchy. During the Balkan upheavals of 1875-8 the Magyars were violently pro-Ottoman, and a deputation of Magyar students presented a sword of honour to the Sultan during the Serbo-Turkish War.

This Magyar-Ottoman *rapprochement* was not really racial but political. Magyar Pan-Turanianism, in fact, was following in the wake of Russian Pan-Slavism. When the Russians remembered their kinship with the Balkan Slavs and this movement took on a political form, the Magyars looked about for "Turanian" anti-Slav allies, and found them, naturally enough, in Russia's ancient enemies—the Turks. Thus the *rapprochement* between Buda-Pest and Constantinople was manifestly political. It did not really rest on a common consciousness of "Turanianism," but on a common hostility to certain Slavonic States. The same political motives have led to the acceptance of the Turanian label in Bulgaria since Czar Ferdinand's intervention against Serbia and Russia in the European War. Yet the Bulgars are as much Slavs as any other Slavonic-speaking people, and owe their existence as an independent State to Pan-Slav sentiment. The original founders of Bulgaria, thirteen centuries ago, were, it is true, "Turanian" nomads from the steppes;

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but they have left far less trace on the Slavs upon whom they imposed themselves in the Balkan Peninsula than the Normans have left on the people of England. Modern Bulgaria is a Slavonic State which has played for its own hand in defiance of Pan-Slav sentiment and wishes for new sentimental catchwords that conform with its *Realpolitik*.

Thus Pan-Turanianism, in its origin, is both artificial and European. The Osmanlis did not extract it for themselves from Persian literature (though they study Persian as we study the Greek and Latin classics); it was offered to them from Europe, and they have not been the wooers, but the wooed. The Osmanli has no genuine sentiment for the Bulgar or the Magyar, who are both ex-subjects of his, like the Serb and the Greek. If supposed self-interest induces the Bulgar and the Magyar to fight his battles, to subscribe to his loans, to give his young men technical instruction, and to supply him with machinery, he will take full advantage of their services. But he feels no more kinship with them than with the other Christian nations of Europe; * and his principal object in this war is to rid the Ottoman Empire of external European influences, whether these are "Central" or "Entente," "Turanian" or "Teutonic."

A trained philologist may be conscious of some unity of structure in all Turanian languages as contrasted with the Indo-European family, but to the uninitiated Osmanli there is no visible relation between his own language, which belongs to the Turkish group, and Magyar, which is Ugro-Finnic. On the other hand, the relation of the various Turkish dialects to one another is obvious to anyone. It can be seen on the map in the names of rivers,

* This is true even of the Turkish doctrinaire Pan-Turanians, as may be seen from the following quotation from Tekin Alp: "It is a matter of congratulation that the *rapprochement* between Magyars and Turks is being so well received here. . . . Yet the Turk's national idea cannot be the race theory, because the latter is really nothing but a Utopian dream."

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mountains, and towns. The Turkish-speaking peoples stretch from Turkey-in-Europe through Anatolia, Trans-Caucasia, Northern Persia and Afghanistan, to Russian Central Asia and Chinese Turkestan, and, in a more broken chain, round the northern shores of the Black Sea, through Bulgaria, Dobrudja, Crimea, the Volga provinces and Siberia, to the neighbourhood of the Arctic Ocean. They cover an even more extensive though less compact area than the Slavs, and the different Turkish dialects are at least as closely related as the different Slavonic languages. Their kinship strikes the ear. It was only natural, therefore, that as soon as the Ottoman Turks became linguistically conscious of their nationality, they should become conscious at the same time of their affinities with other Turkish-speaking peoples, just as the national revival of the separate Slavonic populations produced a common sense of Pan-Slavism among them.

Pan-Turanianism, then, in the sense of a Pan-Turkish movement originating among the Ottoman Turks, is part and parcel of Ottoman Turkish nationalism, and can only be understood in relation to it.

II. THE RISE OF TURKISH NATIONALISM

THE consciousness of nationality, like the word "Pan-Turanian," has come to the Osmanlis from Europe. The Ottoman Empire began as the very opposite of a national State. It is not called after any people who inhabit it, but after the prince who founded it—Osman. It is true that Osman and his tribe were Turks, but they were only one out of a dozen Turkish States in Anatolia, and their Turkish neighbours were their worst rivals and enemies. They built up their power by conquests in Europe. Their best taxpayers were Christian subjects, their standing army

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Christian converts, their most loyal supporters apostate Albanians and Slavs, who changed their religion but kept their language. Till a century ago the Turkish nationality contributed practically nothing to the Ottoman State except the literary and official language of the governing classes, and that language was so diluted with Persian and Arabic that it had little left in common with the vulgar Turkish of the Anatolian peasantry. The bulk of Anatolia was a comparatively late acquisition of the Empire. It was a neglected region, to a large extent practically independent, under local feudal chiefs.

During the last century, however, Anatolia has taken the place of the Balkan Peninsula as the "home country" of the Ottoman Empire; for while the Balkan provinces have been breaking away, the Asiatic provinces have been brought more and more under central control. The same Sultan who lost Greece broke the power of the feudal aristocracy in Anatolia and Kurdistan. The process of disintegration in Europe reached its climax in the Balkan War of 1912-3; the process of centralisation in Asia Minor has been completed by the Committee of Union and Progress since the treaty of Bukarest, and especially since Turkey's entry into the European War.

The most significant change has been in the composition of the Ottoman Army. The Janissaries, a hereditary professional army descended from forced Christian converts of all races, were destroyed in 1826. The modern Turkish Army is organised on the nineteenth century European basis of conscription from the civil population. Down to 1908 the conscripts were nominally drawn from the whole Mohammedan population of the Empire, and since the Revolution Christians and Jews have been made liable as well. But the Government never got hold of the nomads and mountaineers; the settled Arab population was not good military material nor easily mobilised on the most threatened frontiers, which till the present war were those in Europe. Both before and after 1908 the Mohammedan

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Turkish-speaking Anatolian peasantry have been the staple of the Ottoman conscript army—its most amenable recruits and its toughest soldiers—and the Anatolian upper classes have more and more supplied the centralised Empire with its officers and officials. Thus, when the conscious Turkish national movement began, the Ottoman State was already resting on a practical foundation of Turkish nationality.

The cultivation of national consciousness by the Ottoman Turks was partly an imitation of older nationalist movements in Europe and partly the spontaneous product of similar conditions. Like most European nationalisms it started by being cultural rather than political. The first nationalist society was founded at Salonika in 1909, in the comparatively free atmosphere that prevailed during the first three years after the Young Turk Revolution. The founder of this society was a provincial notable—one Ziya Bey, of Diarbekir, who had come up to attend a Congress of the Committee of Union and Progress. Diarbekir is a Turkish enclave in Kurdish and Armenian territory, and it is characteristic of nationalist movements that their most fanatical leaders come from the debatable borderlands.

Ziya Bey's group started a campaign to purge the literary Ottoman language of its Arabic and Persian borrowings, and to replace these by old Turkish words which had never been admitted into Ottoman literature. This might seem a fantastic aim, for it is only through the adoption of foreign words, idioms and rhythms that Turkish has been given literary form at all. Yet submerged languages in Europe have been revived under circumstances of almost equal difficulty, and this "Pure Turkish" movement claims to have had complete success. The Turkish writers of the traditional school were routed, and the use of Arabic was even attacked in the ecclesiastical field. The Nationalists wished to translate the Koran, Friday Sermon, and Khutba (Prayer for the Caliph) into Turkish, and to remove the Arabic texts from the walls of Turkish mosques ; but they

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had to drop this part of their programme, which was far in advance of ordinary Turkish opinion.

This phase of Turkish Nationalism lasted from 1909 to the Balkan War of 1912-13. It was a doctrinaire imitation of the linguistic Nationalism of Europe, impossibilist and unpolitical. The chief source of information about it is a book on *The Turkish and Pan-Turkish Ideal*, by Tekin Alp,* a pseudonym which is believed to cover the name of a certain Salonika Jew.† This is a good illustration of the artificial origins of the movement, and it throws some light also on its prospects of success. For the Salonika Jews are inseparable from the Committee of Union and Progress, and one of their number would hardly have taken up Pan-Turanianism so strongly unless he thought it had found favour in the eyes of the Committee. Tekin Alp evidently feels it politic to identify himself with the Nationalism of the ruling race in Turkey, as the Jews in Hungary have identified themselves with Magyarisation. But his book has to be used with caution; for though it has been written since the Committee of Union and Progress have taken up the Pan-Turanian idea, it is impossible to tell how much (if any) of its contents represent their policy. On the whole it is safer to take "Tekin Alp" as representing the doctrinaire school of Ziya Bey, and to judge the Pan-Turanianism of the Committee solely on the evidence of their political actions since the Balkan War.

The Balkan War made Pan-Turanianism practical politics. The shock of that disaster penetrated to wider circles than had been affected by the academic movement of the previous years, and seems to have kindled a genuine desire for national regeneration among all educated Turks. A number of societies, with local branches in Anatolia, the Caucasus and Turkestan, were founded to promote education, physical culture, the emancipation of women, and other

* Published in German by Kiepenheuer, Weimar, 1915.

† By residence only and not by race, to judge by his fore-name. His residence in Macedonia is proved by allusions in the book itself, where he actually calls himself a Macedonian.

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really constructive aims ; and from this time onwards the Government lent its support. The Ministry of Aukaf or Religious Endowments has made grants out of its enormous funds for the multiplication of national schools ; there has been a scheme for reforming the Medressés—the reactionary Mohammedan ecclesiastical seminaries ; and during the present war the Government has challenged the whole existing ecclesiastical order by sweeping legal reforms which will bring much of the former domain of the Sheriat (Sacred Law) under the civil jurisdiction. The Sheikh-ul-Islam resigned over this, but he was and remained an active “Unionist,” and the *fait accompli* was accepted by his successor. It is possible that both were acting in collusion with the Government—calculating that this formal protest would be a safety-valve for discontent among the humbler members of the ecclesiastical body.*

All these activities were inspirations from Europe, like the crusade for a pure Turkish language, but they were of a much sounder kind. The Osmanlis seem to have been impressed by the example of the Balkan States, which had built up their strength by internal reforms till they were able to beat Turkey in war. Unfortunately they also borrowed from Europe another idea—irredentism.

“Observers,” Tekin Alp writes, “who like myself are Macedonians and like myself had ample opportunity of gaining an intimate knowledge of the irredentist propaganda of the Bulgars, Greeks, Serbs and Vlachs, are able to judge the significance of this national ideal, and how sweet and inspiring it is to go through the greatest dangers for such a cause”—and he proceeds to sketch the life history of several young Macedonian Christians who, before the Balkan War, had sacrificed everything to work for their national unification. This may, of course, simply represent Tekin Alp’s personal philosophy, but it is probably true that the Balkan War did influence such public opinion as

* See *Zwei Kriegsjahre in Konstantinopel*, by Harry Stuermer, ex-correspondent of the *Kölnische Zeitung* (Payot et Cie., Lausanne).

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exists in Turkey in this direction. During the century ending in the years 1912-13 the centre of gravity of Turkey had actually shifted from Europe to Anatolia. After 1913 there was a corresponding change in the national consciousness. The Turkish nation abandoned the tradition of being a dominant race in Europe, resolved to develop its own latent possibilities in Anatolia, and conceived the ambition of making up for lost alien subjects by attracting to itself the scattered branches of the Turkish race outside the Ottoman frontiers.

III. THE POLICY OF THE COMMITTEE OF UNION AND PROGRESS

IRREDENTISM gave a new significance to the linguistic reforms of the Ziya Bey Group, for the Ottoman literary language, relieved of its special Arabic and Persian borrowings and reinforced by an eclectic pure-Turkish vocabulary, might become a *lingua franca* for all who spoke the various living Turkish dialects. The Pan-Turanian movement was thus advancing on to purely political ground, and at that point it was taken up by the Committee of Union and Progress.

The Committee were not Nationalists to begin with, chiefly because they ignored the nationality problems of the Ottoman Empire. Their primary aim was to maintain the integrity of the Empire, especially in Europe, and in this they agreed with Abd-ul-Hamid and all previous rulers of Turkey. They only differed as to the means; for, while Abd-ul-Hamid believed in despotism at home and a balance of jealousy among the European Powers, the Committee held that Turkey's best safeguard was internal strength, and the best source of strength political liberty. Their ideas of liberty were drawn from the French Revolution. "Liberty, Equality and Fraternity" would be proclaimed, all inhabitants of the Empire would rally to

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the State as free Ottoman citizens—just as Picards and Marseillais and Alsatians rallied to the French Republic after 1789—and the question of Nationality would solve itself.

This actually happened for the first six weeks after the proclamation of the Constitution in 1908. Men of all creeds and races embraced each other in the streets. But then they drew apart again and considered how they might turn the new *régime* to their own advantage. The Balkan nationalities rejected the offer of a liberal Turkey altogether, and determined to take the first opportunity of completing their own unity and independence at Turkey's expense. Others, like the Arabs, the Armenians, and the Constantinopolitan and Anatolian Greeks, recognised that secession was impossible, but took measures to defend their own national individuality within the Ottoman State. The Arabs formed the main opposition in the new Parliament; the Armenians also wished for decentralisation, though they co-operated in Parliament with the Committee. The Committee found, in fine, that the Turks were the only element in the Empire that was not opposed to centralisation and had no political ideal incompatible with the Ottoman State idea. They therefore fell back upon their Turkish nationality, and came to think of Turkification as the natural means of achieving their ends. After the Balkan War they incorporated Turkification in their programme, but it is important to examine precisely what place they gave it.

It has been shown above that the Turkish version of Pan-Turanianism contains two general ideas: to purify and strengthen the Turkish Nationality within the Ottoman Empire, and to link up the Ottoman Turks with the other Turks in the world. These objects were first pursued in the cultural sphere by Ziya Bey's private group of "Intellectuals" and were promoted by peaceful propaganda. After 1913 they took on a political form and were incorporated in the pro-

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gramme of the Committee of Union and Progress. But while for Ziya Bey's followers Pan-Turanianism was an end in itself, for the Committee it is only an instrument. They will not give up movements that conflict with it, like Pan-Islamism, if these movements can still serve their turn, and they will not persist in it indefinitely in circumstances where it does not pay, as it is not paying at present in Syria, Mesopotamia and Arabia.

The contrast between academic Pan-Turanianism and the Pan-Turanianism of the Committee of Union and Progress* can be drawn with precision.

The first aim of the Ziya Bey group was to purge the *Turkish language and culture* from foreign (*i.e.*, chiefly *Arabic*) influences. They were ready to violate some of the strongest prejudices of Islam for the sake of carrying this aim to its logical conclusion. The first aim of the Committee is to purge the *Turkish State* from foreign (*i.e.*, chiefly *European*) influences: extra-territoriality of foreign subjects, foreign control of Ottoman finance, railways, raw materials, and education. The doctrinaires dared to defy Islam; the Committee are far too prudent to defy Islam, but they have defied Europe. When the Concert of Europe broke down, they intervened in the war and denounced the Capitulations. And in 1916 they passed a "language ordinance" making the use of Turkish compulsory, after a year's delay, for banks, newspapers, trams, railways, steamship companies, book-keeping of private firms, and all business of a remotely public or legal character.†

Secondly, the doctrinaires proposed to strengthen the

* Of course some C.U.P. leaders have taken up Pan-Turanianism in its academic form. Dr. Nazim, for instance, is said to have been converted by a book he borrowed from the French Consul-General at Salonika, *Introduction à l'Histoire de l'Asie: Turcs et Mongols à 1405*, by M. Léon Cahun, a French *savant*, whose thesis it is that the "Turaniens" were a brilliant race ruined by the adoption of Islamic culture. But Dr. Nazim was always a doctrinaire, and since the Balkan War he has not been one of the dominating personalities in the C.U.P.

† The stringency of the original draft was afterwards somewhat relaxed in the passage of the Bill through the Senate.

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Turkish nationality in Anatolia by education and social reform. The Committee's method has been to exterminate the non-Turkish nationalities scattered through the country—first the Armenians and latterly the Greeks—and to give their lands and houses to "Muhajirs" (Mohammedan refugees from the provinces lost in 1912-13, partly Turks, but partly Slavs from the Balkan peninsula and Greek-speaking Mohammedans from Crete). Another motive for the atrocities has been to make the war popular among the Turkish population by sating it with Armenian plunder—a purely temporary and opportunist aim—and they were also an appeal to that reactionary spirit of Mohammedan fanaticism against which the doctrinaires have declared war.

Thirdly, Tekin Alp seeks to change the political ideal of the Ottoman Turk from Imperialism to Irredentism—from ruling over alien Christian nationalities in Europe to "liberating" kindred Turkish populations in Russia and Central Asia. For the Committee it is rather a quantitative problem. In the Balkan War they lost territory, population and military prestige on their European frontiers. In the European War they hope to compensate or even out-balance these losses by corresponding gains in Asia and Africa; and here appears a fourth motive for the Armenian massacres, for the Armenians are an alien block separating the Ottoman Turks of Anatolia from the Azerbaijanis of Northern Persia and Russian Trans-Caucasia.

It is clear from the foregoing analysis that Pan-Turanianism is not the only weapon used by the exponents of Turkish aggrandisement. They possess another and an older weapon in Pan-Islamism. And in nothing is the opportunism of the Committee of Union and Progress more evident than in their attempt to use them both together. For, as has been shown above, the two creeds conflict. If Pan-Islamism were really a religious doctrine it would not be so incompatible with Pan-Turanianism as it is. But just as Pan-Turanianism is not really a racial

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movement, so Pan-Islamism is not really a religious movement. Both of them are political programmes for increasing the power of the Ottoman Empire abroad—rivals in the same field.

Most of the religious revivalism in Islam during the nineteenth century has been definitely anti-Ottoman. The Wahabis of Nejd and the Mahdists of the Egyptian Sudan both regarded the Turks as little better than Franks and Infidels ; the Senussi retired to the Libyan desert to escape the contamination of Stambul. It is noteworthy that the supporters of all these movements were Arabs, were uncivilised, and were independent, by force of arms, of either Ottoman or European control. The Ottoman doctrine of Pan-Islamism appealed, on the other hand, to settled, civilised Mohammedan populations under the government of European Powers like Britain, France, and Russia. These populations had seen enough of European institutions to wish for them themselves. They aspired to become self-governing nations playing an independent part in international politics, and they admired Turkey because they believed her to be a Mohammedan State which already realised their ideal. They were not sufficiently well-informed to see through Turkey's European masquerade to the weakness and corruption underneath ; they only saw in Turkey a model of what they hoped themselves to become, an existing guarantee for the political future of the peoples of Islam. For Islam is theoretically a political as well as a religious society. The Caliph is the temporal ruler of all good Mohammedans, as well as their religious head. It is true that this political unity broke down within a century of Mohammed's death, and has never been fully restored. But if the Caliph cannot exercise this universal power, the best alternative is that he should be an independent sovereign, powerful enough to make his wishes felt by the other sovereign Governments of the world, and this condition is fulfilled by the Sultan-Caliph at Constantinople ; for the Ottoman Empire is the strongest and most

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enduring Mohammedan State there has been since the fall of the Abbasids.

The possibilities of political propaganda on these lines were perceived and cleverly exploited by Abd-ul-Hamid. The Ottoman strategic railway from Damascus to Medina, largely built out of the contributions of the Faithful from foreign countries, is a good example of his diplomacy ; and this policy has been continued by the Committee of Union and Progress. In Tripoli, for instance, before the Italian conquest, the Ottoman Government was regarded by the natives as an irksome foreign oppression, but Enver Bey succeeded in winning over native sympathies ; the Libyan Arab now looks on the Turk as his natural ally against the European invader ; and even the Senussi have made common cause with him during the European war. It will be seen presently how the same policy has been developed in Asia.

Now this Pan-Islamic propaganda would be crippled at once by a logical following-out of the Pan-Turanian idea. If the Ottoman Empire is not an Islamic Great Power but a Turkish National State, and if Turkish Nationalism and Islam are ultimately irreconcilable, then the special ties which link the Mohammedan populations of other States to Turkey are broken. There is no more salvation for them in Turkey than in the British Empire or Russia or France, and the Committee of Union and Progress have no more claim on them than their established Governments. The Committee are well aware of this, and have avoided committing themselves openly to the Pan-Turanian creed where it is in flagrant contradiction to the Pan-Islamic. The Allies have laid hold of anti-Islamic and anti-Arab declarations by Pan-Turanian writers and acts of tyranny and repression by officials of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Arab provinces, and these have served excellently as anti-Turkish propaganda in the Arab world. But it would be difficult to convict the Committee, as a party or a government, of a Pan-Turanian programme which would discredit their Pan-Islamic professions.

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The policy of the Committee, in fact, is to exploit both movements at once. While they find Pan-Islamism the more useful of the two abroad, it is clear that they set more store by Pan-Turanianism at home. Their object being to convert the Ottoman Empire into a highly organised militaristic State on the German pattern, they naturally find a more appropriate basis in common language than in common religion; and the following passage occurs in a resolution passed at the Congress of the Committee of Union and Progress in October, 1911:—

“The character of the Empire must be Mohammedan, and respect must be secured for Mohammedan institutions and traditions. Other nationalities must be denied the right of organisation, for decentralisation and autonomy are treason to the Turkish Empire. The nationalities are a negligible quantity. They can keep their religion but not their language. The propagation of the Turkish language is a sovereign means of confirming the Mohammedan supremacy and assimilating the other elements.”

This smooth assertion of contradictory principles is an excellent example of the Committee's attempt to blend the two ideas in their internal policy. It also reveals on which they lay more stress. The suggestion that the subject nationalities “may keep their religion but not their native language” is a complete reversal of the traditional policy of the early Ottoman conquerors, who allowed the Albanian and Bosnian nobility to keep not only their language but their estates when once they had accepted the Mohammedan faith.

IV. TURKISH POLICY IN PERSIA AND AFGHANISTAN

SUCH, in outline, is the double-edged policy adopted by the present rulers of Turkey for the consolidation of the Turkish State and the extension of its dominion or its

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influence beyond its existing bounds. It may now be considered how this policy is operating in Central Asia.

The Eastern frontier of the Turkish Empire is separated from the Indian frontier of the British Empire by the two independent States of Persia and Afghanistan. The inhabitants of both are almost wholly Mohammedan and in the northern districts of both there is a considerable Turkish-speaking population. The migrations from the Asiatic midlands, between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries A.D., which carried Turkish-speaking tribes to Anatolia, the Caucasus and Eastern Europe, deposited them also in the provinces of Persia north of the Central Desert, especially in the most north-westerly province, Azerbaijan. Similarly, the provinces of Afghanistan between the Hindu-Kush and the Oxus are occupied by a predominantly Turkish population. They were once independent Turkish (Uzbek) Khanates, like Khiva and Bokhara, and they were only annexed by Afghanistan during the years 1850-9.

These Turkish-speaking peoples provide an obvious opening for the propaganda of the Pan-Turanian school, and in Persia, at any rate, its exponents have been quick to seize it. But there are serious obstacles in their path. The Turkish-speakers of Persia have at present no consciousness of Turkish nationality. They are separated from their neighbours in Turkey by sectarian differences; they are Shias, like the Persians, not Sunnis, like the Anatolian Turks. Moreover, as Tekin Alp himself admits, they still write letters in Persian and read Persian newspapers. But the chief obstacle to the spread of a Pan-Turkish Nationalist movement is the existence of a Persian Nationalist movement, of which, as it happens, Tabriz, the capital of Azerbaijan, has been the centre. Yet the Pan-Turanian doctrinaires are not discouraged by these difficulties. Tekin Alp proposes to give the Azerbaijanis a "Turkish soul"; and he tries to prove that this happy consummation would increase the internal strength of

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Persia. As a matter of fact, it would divide and weaken it. The forces of Persian Nationalism would be split asunder, and the Persians proper would be driven into hostility towards the Ottoman Empire.

The Committee of Union and Progress show no signs of committing such a blunder. Neither in Persia nor in Afghanistan, where the school of Tekin Alp might aspire to rouse the Uzbeks also to a sense of Turkish nationality, are they likely to press the Pan-Turanian aspect of their policy. Here, as in North Africa, their political instrument is rather Pan-Islamism. They pose as the liberators of Mohammedan States caught in the toils of British or Russian "imperialism," as the standard-bearers of the "Holy War" proclaimed in the name of the Caliph by the Sheikh-ul-Islam in October, 1914. They have suggested a Triple Alliance of Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan based on the principle of political independence for Islamic States. In the districts of Western Persia which they invaded they succeeded in persuading the Persian Nationalists to give them armed support; and they sent a mission to the Amir of Afghanistan which seriously embarrassed him in his neutrality. If this Pan-Islamic propaganda has so far borne little fruit, if the "Holy War" has proved a fiasco, it is mainly because Turkey has on the whole suffered military defeat. For the mainspring of Pan-Islamism, the presupposition of Turkey's championship of other Mohammedan peoples, is the prestige of the Ottoman armies. If those armies had marched victoriously into Tiflis, Cairo and Teheran, or if the Allies had never threatened Constantinople and captured Baghdad, Pan-Islamism might have produced far-reaching military and political results. And, even now, it is by no means bankrupt.

It was because it offered the wider possibilities of Ottoman aggrandisement that the Committee of Union and Progress have thus adopted the Pan-Islamic policy in Persia. But, if it finally fails, if it becomes clear that they cannot overthrow the Anglo-Russian *régime* and replace it

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by an Ottoman hegemony, they can fall back upon Pan-Turanianism and play for the smaller prize. They can try to detach from Persia her Turkish-speaking peoples and especially the Azerbaijanis, just across their eastern frontier. The Osmanlis have always coveted Azerbaijan; they occupied it more than once during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; in the winter of 1914-15 they overran it for a few weeks as an incident in their Caucasian offensive; and their designs upon the province might conceivably be assisted by domestic developments in Persia. If the Persian Nationalists came into power, they might adopt a chauvinistic policy, as Nationalists have all too often done in multi-national States. In that case the Azerbaijanis might be roused at last to the consciousness of being Turks and might desire to cut themselves loose politically from Persia. But they might not turn in the first instance to the Ottoman Empire. While Azerbaijan borders on Turkey to the west, it borders on Russia to the north; and across the Russian frontier dwell the Tatars of the Caucasus, who belonged to Persia, like the Azerbaijanis, before the Russian annexation, and are closer to them in every way than to the Armenians and the Kurds across the Turkish frontier. It may be said, in fact, that the political destiny of the Azerbaijanis and the Caucasian Tatars will ultimately be the same. They are bound in the end to gravitate in the same direction; and whether it will be westwards or northwards depends on the fate of Russia.

V. THE MOHAMMEDANS AND TURKS IN RUSSIA

IT is from the uncertainties of the future of Russia, as was suggested at the beginning of this article, that the leaders of the Pan-Turkish movement can weave their most ambitious dreams. For within the Russian State there is a far greater Mohammedan population and a far greater Turkish-speaking population than in the Ottoman

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State. The number of Mohammedans in Russia may be estimated at something under twenty millions; and of these over sixteen millions speak Turkish, whereas the Turkish-speaking population of the Ottoman Empire is not more than eight millions. A vast field is thus opened in Russia for Pan-Turanian or Pan-Islamic exploitation.

The Mohammedans of Russia are distributed in large but not contiguous groups between the central plain of European Russia and the fringes of the mountain frontier of Northern India. The first of these groups, in geographical order, is that of the Tatars of Kazan, who live along the middle course of the Volga between Nizhni Novgorod (which is only some 250 miles east of Moscow) and Samara. Their centre is Kazan, where the river makes its great bend from east to south. They constitute an almost isolated enclave, surrounded by Great Russians on the west and Finnish tribes* on the north and south. Beyond the Urals, in Western Siberia, there is another group of Tatars, some fifty thousand strong, around Tobolsk; and southwards, where the Volga joins the Caspian Sea, are the Tatars of Astrakhan. The Tatars of Kazan and Astrakhan together number about one million and a half. West and south again come the Tatars of the Crimea (under 200,000) and the Mohammedans of the Caucasus (about 2,500,000 Tatars and 1,500,000 others), cut off from each other and from the rest of the Russian Mohammedans by a broad belt of Ukrainians, Russians, Germans and Kal-mucks, while nothing but the Black Sea and an artificial land-frontier divide them from the Mohammedans of Turkey and of Persia. But by far the largest Mohammedan district in Russia is that which stretches from the south-east corner of Europe for fifteen hundred miles across Central Asia. First come the Chuvashes on the fringes of

* Nominally Christian, virtually still Pagan, possessing no culture of their own, and capable of being assimilated by Tatars or Russians—whichever gain the final ascendancy in this region.

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the Volga plain, and the Bashkirs of the Urals ; next, on the great midland steppe, the flourishing tribal confederacy of the Kirghiz, and among the Trans-Caspian oases a dwindling remnant of Turkmens ; and beyond these again the Turks of Russian Turkestan and the dependent States of Khiva and Bokhara—in sum, a body of about twelve million Mohammedans, occupying an almost unbroken area between the Volga and the Caspian on the west, the line of the Trans-Siberian railway on the north, and the frontiers of Persia, Afghanistan and the Chinese Empire on the south and east.

With the exception, then, of this Central Asiatic mass, which is itself broken up by belts of desert, the Mohammedans of Russia possess no geographical unity. They are only linked together by the great strategic lines of communication constructed by the Russian Government—the Trans-Siberian, Orenburg-Tashkend, and Trans-Caspian railways. And even the political unity which their common inclusion in the Russian Empire gives them is somewhat superficial. For the different Moslem populations have been incorporated in Russia at widely different dates—the Volga and Siberian Tatars in the sixteenth century ; the Crimean Tatars not till 1783 ; the Moslems of the Caucasus between 1783 and 1868 ; the Kirghiz in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries ; the Uzbeg Khanates (Bokhara, Khiva, and Khokand *) between 1868 and 1876 ; the Turkmens of Trans-Caspia between 1873 and 1886. And these historical differences are reflected in differences of administration. Kazan, for example, lies in the heart of modern Russia, and has long been in possession of ordinary Russian civil institutions ; the Caucasus has been a vice-royalty containing some civil governments and some military provinces, but not endowed with “zemstvos” ; Trans-Caspia and Turkestan have been under military administration ; Khiva and Bokhara have never been

* Khokand was annexed by Russia in 1876, and made into the Province of Ferghana.

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administered directly by Russia, their status being similar to that of the Native States in India.

Thus the Mohammedans of Russia are divided politically as well as geographically, and the two systems of grouping do not coincide. Yet another and a more important cross-division is created by their differences of culture.

In the first place, the Russian Mohammedans are not all of one sect. Central Asia and the Volga are more or less uniformly Sunni; but in the Caucasus there is an important Shia element in those districts which belonged to Persia before the Russian conquest, and the Caucasian Mohammedans have so far been partitioned between two rival religious primates, the Sunni Mufti and the Shia Sheikh-ul-Islam; while even among the Sunnis there has been no All-Russian ecclesiastical organisation. The Sunni community in the Caucasus, like the Shia, has been kept in isolation. The "Mohammedan Ecclesiastical Court" of Orenburg,* an official organ of the Russian Government, has exercised jurisdiction over the Mohammedans of European Russia (in the administrative sense); but the Crimea and the former territories of Lithuania were excluded, and its authority has not extended over Central Asia. In some Central Asiatic districts—for example, the Province of Siemirichensk—the local Mohammedan ecclesiastical institutions appear to have been suppressed by Russia, while, on the other hand, the Khanates of Khiva and Bokhara have naturally retained ecclesiastical as well as political autonomy.

Secondly, there are profound social and economic diversities between different sections of the Mohammedan population.

In the upper basins of the Syr-Darya and Amu-Darya † the population is sedentary and comparatively dense. During the last fifty years the Russians have done much

* Its actual seat is Ufa.

† The Arabs call this district "Mawera-al-Nahr"—"the country beyond the River (Amu-Darya)."

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to meet the need of irrigation, and have successfully fostered the cultivation of cotton.* There are large urban centres—Tashkend, for example, the capital of Turkestan and the ninth largest city in the Russian Empire—and ancient seats of Middle-Eastern culture, pre-Islamic and Islamic, like Bokhara and Samarkand. This region, in fact, belongs to the ancient civilisation of the East. It is analogous to India. As in India, European rule has been imposed on it from outside at a relatively recent date; and it is separated from the rest of the Russian Empire by a zone of deserts and steppes, as India is separated from the rest of the British Empire by the sea.

The Turkmens of the Trans-Caspian oases and the Kirghiz of the steppes, on the other hand, are still mainly pastoral nomads; their Mohammedanism is a comparatively recent acquisition, and sits lightly upon them; and, possessing no ancient culture of their own, they are distinctly more susceptible than the first group to "Russification." The Bashkirs of the Urals and the Chuvashes of the Volga fringe, who are in a transition stage between nomadism and agriculture, are still more amenable to Russian influence. And, further west and north, the process of "Russification" is far advanced. The Tatars of the Crimea, Astrakhan, Kazan, and Tobolsk have been practically assimilated, socially and economically, by Russia. They might almost be defined as Russians professing the Mohammedan religion; and they stand at the opposite pole to that first far south-eastern group who are Asiatics under Russian rule.

The Mohammedans of the Caucasus, finally, are sharply divided amongst themselves. There are mountain tribes as wild as any on the North-West Frontier of India and only held down by military force. There is a Moham-

* In Chinese Turkestan, on the contrary, where European organisation has not yet come to the rescue, agriculture is fighting a losing battle against wind and sand.

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medan agricultural peasantry in the Trans-Caucasian steppes. And a Mohammedan working class and *bourgeoisie* are growing up in the oil-fields of Baku. Baku itself is a typical product of the European economic enterprise which has followed in the wake of Russia's territorial expansion. Beside the ancient walls and Oriental bazaars of the old Tatar town lie the wide streets, the public buildings, the shops and the business offices and the private residences of a prosperous modern city of the west. Its population has grown as rapidly as its trade. It is linked by railways with mid-Russia and with the Black Sea. From its port the steamers cross the Caspian to the railhead for Merv and Bokhara and Khokand or to the main entry into Persia by the Russian-built road from Resht to Teheran.

Thirdly, there is the division of language.

Over a million of the Russian Mohammedans belong to indigenous tribes of the Caucasus, speaking a variety of tongues ; another million and a half, scattered through the Caucasus and the settled regions of Central Asia, speak Iranian dialects ; the remainder, more than 16,000,000 in all, speak Turkish. But, while this vast Turkish-speaking element gives the Russian Mohammedans a certain predominant colour, its unifying effect is diminished by the existence of dialectical differences, which, heightening and also heightened by differences of culture and history, break them up into three main groups gravitating towards three distinct poles.

(i.) The centre for the Tatars of the Caucasus is Baku. They speak the same dialect as the Turkish-speaking population of the Persian province of Azerbaijan, and nearly the same as the Ottoman Turks of Anatolia. The Tatar Press at Baku employs the literary Ottoman language of Constantinople, which is Anatolian Turk diluted with Arabic and Persian. The dialect of the Crimean Tatars is also closely related to Osmanli and Azerbaijani, and there is considerable intercourse between the Crimea and Baku.

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(ii.) The Tatars of Kazan, Astrakhan, and Tobolsk, with the Chuvashes and Bashkirs, are centred on Kazan. For the peoples of this group Turkish is, in the main, an adopted language. The Bashkirs and Chuvashes were originally Finnish-speaking tribes. The Tatars of Kazan, Astrakhan, and Tobolsk are a hybrid race, with Mongol conquerors imposed from above and Christian slaves introduced from below. The genuine Turkish element in them is small, and Kazan was Mohammedan in religion before it became Turkish in speech. The Tatar Khanate of Kazan was the direct successor of the Ugro-Finnic Kingdom of Bolghari or "White Bulgaria," and the "White Bulgarians" were converted to Islam in the tenth century, about fifty years before the Ukrainians and Russians were converted to Orthodox Christianity.

Kazan is thus an ancient Mohammedan, though a comparatively recent Turkish-speaking, centre. Its Islamic culture, which declined after its incorporation in Russia, has notably revived within the last generation. This revival is said to have begun in 1886, when two elementary school-teachers were imported from Constantinople. From that time onwards schools were founded and students sent to Mohammedan universities abroad; but the great impetus came from the Russian Revolution of 1905, which struck off some of the shackles from the non-Russian languages in Russia and obtained a measure of freedom for the Press. Thus, whereas before 1905 the Volga-Ural Tatars had their Korans printed for them in Russian printing-works, since 1905 a dozen large printing businesses are said to have been started by the Tatars in Kazan, Orenburg and Ufa, where books are printed in Arabic for markets as distant as Egypt, the Hejaz, India, and the Dutch East Indies. In the same centres, it is said, between twenty and thirty weekly and daily newspapers have been established, printed for the Tatars themselves in their own Turkish dialect.

(iii.) The Turkish-speaking Mohammedans settled in

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the upper Syr-Darya and Amu-Darya basins are diverse in origin and blood; but they all speak the Chagatai dialect. Chagatai Turkish (or Eastern Turkish) differs widely from the Osmanli-Azerbaijani (or Western Turkish) dialects. Some of the commonest roots and suffixes are used with quite different meanings in the two groups, and each developed into a literary language on independent lines. Literary Chagatai has borrowed much less than literary Osmanli from Persian and Arabic. Famous books have been written in it—the Memoirs of Baber the Moghul in the sixteenth century, and Abu'l Ghazi's history in the seventeenth—and the literary tradition has never died out. Such Turkish newspapers as have yet been started in Tashkend and other cities of the Amu-Darya-Syr-Darya region are published in the Chagatai dialect, and it is unlikely to give way either to Osmanli or to Kazan Tatar.

The Kirghiz of the steppes and the Turkmens of the Trans-Caspian oases have yet to be dealt with, and they occupy a somewhat indeterminate position. As far as the Kirghiz tribesmen are developing any desire for culture and education, they appear to be gravitating north-westward towards the Kazan group rather than south-eastward towards the Chagatai group. The Turkmens, on the other hand, whose dialect belongs to the same "Western Turkish" group as that of the Caucasian Tatars, the Osmanlis of Anatolia and the Azerbaijanis, are drawn by their geographical position towards the Chagatai group.

The Mohammedans of the Russian Empire are thus split up by a number of cross-divisions, geographical, social or economic, and linguistic or cultural; and none of the groupings coincide.

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VI. THE POLITICAL ATTITUDE OF THE RUSSIAN MOHAMMEDANS

THUS vast and thus varied is the Mohammedan population in the Russian Empire. What, it may now be asked, is its political attitude? and what possibilities does it offer to the ambitions of the Turkish Government?

In the days before the war Russia would scarcely be regarded as a very promising field for Pan-Islamic or Pan-Turanian propaganda. It is true that nearly all the Mohammedan peoples now included in the Empire offered a determined resistance to the Russian conquest; but, once the conquest had been completed, revolt and even unrest were rare. In general the Russian Mohammedans have been loyal, conservative, and somewhat narrow in their political outlook. Their lack of organisation, moreover, has prevented them from overcoming their manifold divisions, from strengthening the consciousness of common ties and interests, or from attaining political influence as a united body. Stronger in numbers than any other non-Russian group, with the possible exception of the Ukrainians, they have been politically as weak as the weakest. The "Russian Mohammedan Party" only dates from 1905 and had no more than nine representatives in the last Duma.

Nevertheless, the Pan-Islamic propaganda, started by Abd-ul-Hamid and carried on by the Committee of Union and Progress, was not wholly unsuccessful among the Russian Mohammedans. Its authors possessed one peculiar advantage. Mohammedan pilgrims to the Hejaz from almost all parts of Russia used habitually in peace-time to take steamer at Batum or Odessa and pass through the Black Sea Straits. A visit to Constantinople was a natural incident in their journey and the Ottoman Government knew how to exploit it to good effect. By such means they succeeded at any rate in widening the political horizon of

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the Russian Mohammedans. It was significant that when the Balkan War broke out, a number of the latter went to Constantinople to help their Ottoman co-religionists in their adversity.

How limited, however, were the effects of the Pan-Islamic movement in Russia was revealed by the sterner test of the present war. The Russian like the Indian Mohammedans were not shaken in their political allegiance by Turkey's alliance with the enemies of the Russian and the British Empires. An insignificant Mohammedan tribe of Georgian nationality, the Adshars, joined the Turks when they invaded the Batum district for a moment in the winter of 1914-5; but the revolt did not spread. In 1916 there was a rebellion of a more serious kind in Turkestan, but that was directly caused by a decree of the Czar, dated June 25 of that year, ordering the industrial conscription of the Mohammedans of Central Asia and Siberia, who are exempt from military service.* This misguided policy has been reversed since the Revolution, and with the removal of the cause the unrest has abated. It had no wide political meaning nor any bearing on the issues of the war. In fact, a Turkestan division had been taking an active part in the operations against the Turks, which resulted in the capture of Erzerum and Trebizond, only a few months before the Turkestan peasantry were driven into rebellion by the Czar's decree.

But the whole situation has been transformed by the Revolution. The political future of the Russian Mohammedans as of all their fellow-countrymen is in the melting-pot. And from the eventual outcome the cause of Turkish aggrandisement stands to gain or to lose far more than it could have gained or lost from the war alone.

A precise and detailed analysis of recent developments in Russia is impossible, but the main effects of the

* The rescript had an unfortunate precedent in the action of the Committee of Union and Progress, who drafted their Christian conscripts into labour battalions as a preliminary to their massacre.

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Revolution on the Russian Mohammedans up to the present are clear. Like almost every other class or group in Russia they welcomed the downfall of the Romanoff régime. Sympathetic revolts against the absolutism of the Khans occurred in the distant "Native States" of Khiva and Bokhara. And the Mohammedans shared also in the general sentiment of Equality and Fraternity which sprang from the consciousness of a common Liberty. In many places there were scenes of fraternisation recalling those in Turkey during the first weeks after the Revolution of 1908. On the second Sunday of the Revolution (March 25, 1917) the Tatars of Tiflis marched in procession through the streets, were greeted by the Armenians and Georgians, and were followed by a procession of soldiers from the Caucasus Army. The Congress of the Mohammedan Daghestanis met simultaneously with the Congress of the Terek Cossacks, whose profession it had been to chastise the Daghestanis for the last three hundred years; and the two assemblies decided to combine into one. The Mohammedan Congress at Baku at the end of April was inaugurated by the Sunni Mufti and the Shia Sheikh-ul-Islam embracing one another in public.

But in Russia in 1917, as in Turkey in 1908, the merging of old divisions in a universal sentiment of brotherhood was a transient phase. The various groupings, reacting from the centralisation of the absolutist system, began to think more of their own national or sectional freedom than of the freedom of all Russia, and this "particularist" tendency was inevitably strengthened by the instability of the Revolutionary Government. The growing uncertainty of the political future awakened throughout Russia, in individuals and local communities and national groups, the instinct of self-preservation. And the Russian Mohammedans, like other groups, recognised the need of looking after themselves. To that end the first essential was organisation, in which, as has been noticed, they had hitherto been so deficient, and a series of conferences were

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arranged without delay. The Pan-Caucasian Mohammedan Congress met at Baku on April 28, the Mohammedan Women's Conference at Orenburg during the same month, the All-Russian Mohammedan Congress at Moscow on May 14, and the Mohammedan Military Congress at Kazan at the beginning of August. To consolidate and carry on the work of organisation the Moscow Congress appointed an all-Russian Mohammedan Council. It is too early yet to prophesy the failure or success of these efforts; but political organisation is a more difficult task for a group so widespread and so diverse as the Mohammedans than for any other group in Russia.*

A second and no less important tendency has shown itself among the Russian Mohammedans since the Revolution. Together with a quickened sense of internal unity has developed a warmer sympathy with Mohammedans abroad.

The fact that the Mohammedans throughout the world have been falling into political subjection more and more rapidly during the last hundred years was always the chief weapon in the armoury of the Pan-Islamic propagandists. The French protectorate over Morocco and the Anglo-Russian agreement in Persia left Turkey the one really independent Mohammedan State; and, as the fortunes of the war developed, Turkey itself seemed to be threatened with dismemberment. But the Russian Revolution seemed in two respects to mean the turning of the tide. In the first place it gave to the Mohammedans in Russia a potential political equality with their fellow-citizens such as they had never before and nowhere else enjoyed except in a Mohammedan State. And, secondly, the Revolution was regarded as a challenge to "imperialism" all the world over. By contrast with the ideals of the new Russia the precepts and practices of other States containing dependent and particularly Mohammedan peoples were conceived as more

* *E.g.*, the delegates to the Congress at Moscow were obliged to conduct their proceedings in the Russian language for want of any common medium of their own.

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or less despotic and corrupt. Thus the Provisional Government's renunciation of the old Russian ambition to annex Constantinople and of the old Russian policy of interference in the internal affairs of Persia was greeted by the Russian Mohammedans as the inauguration of a new era of political freedom for Islam.

The development of these ideas may be illustrated by a few significant examples.

The Moscow Conference in May 1917 defined the formula of "the self-determination of nationalities" as applying to Europe, Asia and Africa, and demanded that "all treaties founded on the partition or occupation of any territory in Europe, Asia or Africa should be cancelled at once."

In the second week of July the Executive Committee of the All-Russian Mohammedan Council published in the Russian Press an open letter to M. Tereschenko, protesting against the proclamation by Italy of her protectorate over Albania :

The fate of Albania is a new illustration of European robbery in the history of imperialism, and again the victim is a mainly Mohammedan people. . . .

Your dubious and indecisive attitude towards the Albanian problem rouses suspicion and doubt among the Mohammedans of Russia, particularly in consequence of those bitter experiences of centuries past during which the Mohammedans all the world over have learnt the meaning of what is called European justice. . . .

These declarations may have little practical weight, but they reveal the opinions and aspirations of a large body of Russian Mohammedans. Less representative but more startling is the following extract from the *Turmush*, a Tatar paper of Kazan. In August last it published a rumour that the Turks had recaptured Bagdad and Kut, and took occasion to attack both the Arab movement and British policy in the East :

The expulsion of the British troops from the Jeziré by the

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Turks has upset British policy in the East and compelled the British Cabinet to resign.

It is most desirable for England, which already dominates the world, to swallow this delicious morsel too. England is vitally interested in keeping the Jeziré in her hands . . . and concentrated all her colonial forces in this region . . . but the colonial troops were unable to resist the Turkish troops.

This new defeat is likely to cost England dear. It will strengthen the political position of Turkey in Europe and in the East . . . and will be a powerful factor in the downfall of England's Eastern policy. It is very probable that it will react throughout the East—in India and Egypt in particular.

This is an echo straight from Constantinople, and if it is heard in Kazan at the heart of European Russia, it must be sounding still louder in Baku, Tashkend and Bokhara.

VII. THE PROSPECTS OF TURKISH IRREDENTISM.

THESE developments in Russia have doubtless raised the expectations of the exponents of Ottoman aggrandisement. The "liberation" of the Turkish-speaking peoples of Russia has been the frankly confessed ambition of the Pan-Turanian school. The "break-up" of Russia is the presupposition of Tekin Alp's irredentist programme; but, writing before the Russian Revolution, he only contemplates its achievement as the result of action from without by the armies of Turkey and the Central Powers. It would seem now to depend mainly on the internal development of Russia whether or not the political reunion of the scattered branches of the Turkish race shall emerge from the realm of dreams and become—what it is not at present—a practical possibility.

The potentialities of the future are different in the different groups; but the determining factor may possibly be the attitude of the Tatars of Kazan. The other Turkish-speaking groups in Russia incline at present to follow their lead, and it has been mentioned already how in the last few years their printing

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presses have spread their influence widely throughout the Mohammedan world. Pan-Islamic propaganda has had some effect on them. They contributed Red Crescent workers and relief funds to the help sent to Constantinople in the Balkan War ; and the quotation given above from a Kazan newspaper shows how sensitive their sympathies have become with Mohammedans abroad. They are not likely, on the other hand, unless circumstances compel them, to give these sympathies a political form, nor will they readily acknowledge the irredentist claims of the Pan-Turanian doctrinaires. They have been under Russian government for more than three hundred years, and the barrier between Islam and Christianity has been broken down more successfully here than anywhere else in the world. The Kazan Tatars are prosperous and educated. Geography and material interests bind them to Russia, and they have a conservative temperament which would disincline them to break away violently from a State under which they have lived for so long. They naturally objected to the Czarist *régime*, and in particular to its policy towards the non-Russian nationalities. Before the Revolution their point of view was roughly that of the Cadets.* But in the present situation they will agree neither with the anti-nationality policy for which the Cadets are coming to stand, nor with the extreme separatism of the Finns and Ukrainians, which would leave them isolated, by independent and probably chauvinistic States, from the Tatars of the Crimea and the Caucasus. They are almost certain to declare for the programme of national autonomy within a federal Russian Republic ; for if Russia is successfully reorganised on this basis, they have a brilliant future before them as the possible leaders of the Turkish-speaking element in a democratic State containing a considerable majority of the Turkish-speaking populations of the world.

* In internal policy, that is. In foreign policy they are violently opposed to the acquisition of Constantinople by Russia, which the Cadets desire.

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In this event Ottoman Irredentism will collapse. The rallying point of Pan-Turanianism will be not Constantinople but Kazan, and so far from the Anatolian Turks attracting the Tatars into the Ottoman Empire, the Tatars of Russia will attract the Anatolian Turks.

This very desirable solution is chiefly endangered by the possibility of a Russian reaction. A movement now in Russia for centralised military government and the repression of nationalities, leading in all probability to civil war, might produce among the nationalities a *sauve qui peut*, in which the Tatars would be carried away. They would then turn for support to the Ottoman Empire, and Ottoman Irredentism might gain the day, with disastrous results to the civilised world.

The Tatars of the Crimea and Western Siberia will follow the lead of Kazan. The Tatars of the Caucasus are also under the influence of Kazan, but, on the other hand, they have been under Russian government less than a century; they live close to the Ottoman frontier; they have adopted Ottoman-Turkish as their literary (*i.e.*, newspaper) language; and they have a strong interest in common with the Anatolian Turks in their fear and hatred of the Armenians. In 1905 there was a racial war between the Tatars and Armenians in the Caucasus, and on the whole the Armenians had the best of it.

When Enver Bey launched his disastrous invasion of the Caucasus in the winter of 1914-5, the Committee of Union and Progress sent out propagandists to follow the troops and drew up a scheme for partitioning the Caucasus and part of Turkish Armenia into autonomous Tatar, Georgian, and Armenian national States under Ottoman suzerainty. They tried, unsuccessfully, to persuade the Ottoman Armenians to co-operate with them in this scheme. It was completely frustrated, of course, by the defeat of the invasion. The Ottoman armies never reached the Tatar districts of the Caucasus, and the only Russian subjects

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who sided with them were, as has been mentioned, the little tribe of the Adshars.

Since the Russian Revolution the idea of national autonomy for the Caucasus and the occupied districts of Ottoman Armenia has been revived, but this time on the basis of federalism under Russia instead of Turkey. Tatars, Georgians, and Armenians are already wrangling over the delimitation of the national frontiers, and it is noticeable that, whereas formerly the Tatars and Georgians tended to combine against the more vigorous and progressive Armenians, there is now a Georgian-Armenian *rapprochement*, while relations between Georgians and Tatars are strained because both are claiming the Adshars of the Batum district and the Lazes of the Ottoman Vilayet of Trebizond—the Georgians on the ground of race, the Tatars of religion. This, however, may only be a passing phase; and in the land question, which is as important in the Caucasus as the demarcation of national boundaries, the old grouping of Georgian and Tatar *versus* Armenian is appearing again.

The Tatars of the Caucasus are backward and paralysed by their sectarian division into Shias and Sunnis. If there is a government in Russia liberal enough to grant national autonomy, and strong enough to do justice between the various national claims, they will remain loyal to Russia; and in that case it may be predicted that Baku will in the end supersede Kazan as a political centre for the Turkish-speaking populations of Russia, and perhaps ultimately for all the Turks in the world. Kazan leads at present in virtue of its older culture, but Baku, with its oilfields, has a greater industrial future; and while Kazan is on the periphery of the Turkish world, Baku lies at its middle point. Round it in a circle and in easy communication with it are Kazan and the Crimea, Anatolia and Azerbaijân, and, linked by the Trans-Caspian railway, the Central Asiatic *bloc*. At the moment, too, the Baku Tatars seem to have produced stronger personalities among their leaders than the Tatars of Kazan. But the prospects of Baku

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depend upon the achievement of Russian federalism. If there is chaos or repression in Russia, the Tatars of the Caucasus will certainly turn to the Ottoman Empire. They could easily be incorporated in it ; for they are almost in touch geographically with the Anatolian Turks, have accepted their literary language, and have not yet outdistanced them in culture. In this event they would vegetate as an outlying province of the Ottoman Empire, and the brilliant prospects of economic and cultural development at Baku would be abruptly overshadowed and fade steadily away.

What, lastly, are the prospects in Central Asia ? The news from that south-eastern corner of the Russian Empire since the Revolution is scanty but bad. Khiva has extorted a constitution from her Khan and elected a parliament ; but in Bokhara the Russian Resident was anti-revolutionary, and with his help a reactionary movement has prevailed. The reactionaries—who appear to be a league of merchants, officials and mollahs—are stirring up religious fanaticism and claiming that the whole of the Chagatai area should be incorporated in the Bokharan State. The Constitution-alists are powerless, and the unrest is spreading across the Afghan and Persian borders.

The situation is equally serious at Tashkend. The Workmen and Soldiers' Committee, representing the tiny Russian colony, is in open conflict with the native Mohammedan population, and, before the last disturbances at Petrograd, the Provisional Government was on the point of sending an army there to bring both parties to order.

It is impossible to predict how the situation will develop ; but one assumption can safely be made. If Russia were to fall to pieces, Central Asia would be the first fragment to break away. It is part of the Orient, far more aloof in spirit from Western civilisation than the Mohammedan and Turkish-speaking districts of European Russia. Cut the Orenburg-Tashkend and Trans-Caspian railways, and it is isolated from Russia by a difficult belt of steppe and

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desert. In the nineteenth century it took the Czardom twenty years to traverse this belt and conquer the provinces beyond it. If in a moment of chaos they were lost, Russia would need to regain all her strength and solidity before she could attempt to recover them.

It is in Central Asia, then, that the uncertainties of Russia's fate open up the widest opportunities for Ottoman irredentism. The district fits in geographically with those Ottoman designs in Persia and Afghanistan to which reference was made in an earlier part of this article. And Pan-Turanianism and Pan-Islamism do not there conflict with each other as in Persia and Afghanistan. The whole population of Russian Central Asia is Turkish: the whole population is Sunni. If the authority of the Russian Government were to disappear in Central Asia, there can be little doubt that Ottoman diplomacy would strive to create there a powerful Turkish-Islamic State, to be added as a fourth member to the projected alliance of Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan. If, on the other hand, Russia surmounts her present difficulties, preserves her unity, and retains those distant provinces within the Russian Commonwealth, then their religious and national sentiment will gravitate towards Baku and Kazan and away from Constantinople.

This is, roughly, the relation in which Russia, Turkey and Islam stand to one another. Our analysis cannot be complete, for, as anyone who reads this article will realise, the situation is changing from moment to moment, and the future is obscure. But the possibilities can be grouped broadly into two alternatives—a constructive and a destructive solution.

The issue depends chiefly on Russia, for the great experiment she is making is bound to affect the destinies of the world. If she transforms herself from an autocratic empire into a commonwealth of nations, if she secures both liberty and unity for all who live within her borders, she will

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have solved a problem that confronts us all. And just as in that western fringe of Russia which absorbs so much of our attention a solution in this sense would have a beneficent influence on the Balkans and Central Europe, so, in the Russian hinterland towards the east, the reconciliation of the Turkish-speaking and other Mohammedan populations would inaugurate a better future for Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, and the whole of the Middle East. The British Commonwealth, as a society with a vast Mohammedan membership, would welcome this improvement in the condition of so important a part of the Islamic world, and we should also gain by it as regards our political interests as a State. What better neighbour could we wish for India than a democratic Russian Federation? Or what happier substitute could be found for the ancient rivalry of Russia and Britain in Asia than that we should advance together along the same liberal road?

But if Russia were to break down the outlook would be grave. Unity and reconciliation would break down with her; vast regions between the Indian frontier and Europe would return to chaos; and the initiative there would pass into Ottoman hands. Wielding the weapons of Pan-Turanism and Pan-Islamism, according to expediency, the Committee of Union and Progress would set religion against religion and race against race. We know their work, for we have seen it during the war in the economic ruin of the Ottoman Empire and the campaign of extermination waged against its Armenian, Greek and Arab inhabitants. With Germany to back them, they would extend their operations into the Russian hinterland and the Middle East, and the British Commonwealth would be left single-handed to stem the devastating tide of their aggression.

Turkey, Russia and Islam

STATISTICAL TABLE OF TURKISH-SPEAKING POPULATIONS.*

Yakuts	250,000	
Kazan (and Astrakhan) Tatars	1,500,000	
West Siberian Tatars	50,000†	
Crimean Tatars	200,000—	
<hr/>		
Total in Western Russia and Siberia		2,000,000
Tatars in the Caucasus		2,000,000 +
Bashkirs and Chuvashes	2,400,000	
Kirghiz	4,692,000	
Turkmens	290,000	
Other tribes in Russian Central Asiatic provinces (mostly sedentary)	2,772,000	
Tatars of Altai	?	
Sedentary Turkish population of Khiva and Bokhara	1,000,000	
Nomadic Turkish population of Khiva and Bokhara	500,000	
Turkish population of Chinese Turkestan	1,000,000 +	
<hr/>		
Total in Central Asiatic Area		13,000,000±
Ottoman Empire (Constantinople and Anatolia)		8,000,000—
Persia, Afghanistan, and lost Ottoman provinces in Europe		2,000,000±
<hr/>		
Total Turks in the World		27,000,000±
<hr/>		
Turks in the Russian Empire	16,000,000 +	
Turks in the Ottoman Empire	8,000,000—	
Turks under other Governments	3,000,000±	
<hr/>		
Total Turks in the World		27,000,000±

* Statistics can only be given in round numbers. Russia is the only country inhabited by Turks where there has been an official census, and even in Russia the last (and first) census was in 1897. The figures here given for Russia consist of estimates made in 1911 on the basis of the census of 1897. The rest of the figures are more conjectural still.

† Not including about 100,000 semi-Tatarised aliens (mostly Ugro-Finnish).

NOTE.—In 1909 the Mohammedan Ecclesiastical Court of Orenburg, an official body which, under the old Régime, exercised authority over the Mohammedans of the Russian Empire, excluding the Caucasus, Crimea and Central Asiatic provinces, and which, among other duties, kept a record of births and deaths, estimated the number of Mohammedans under its jurisdiction at 5,283,618. This is more than a million in excess of the figures given above for the Kazan, Astrakhan, and West Siberian Tatars, Chuvashes and Bashkirs combined. The difference is probably to be accounted for by the inclusion of certain sections of the Kirghiz, whose territory is reckoned administratively as part of European Russia.

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I. THE OUTLOOK FOR RECONSTRUCTION

The Country and the Government

THE last three months have been a relatively uneventful period in the domestic history of the war. After the Russian disappointment in the summer the country realised that a speedy end of the war was not to be expected, and the Italian disaster, coming on the heels of the Russian, has found men's minds steeled equally against despondency and disillusionment. Whatever successes the Germans may achieve in lesser theatres, confidence in our ultimate victory remains undimmed, and the memory of the Napoleonic parallel, when even America was, for a time, against us, makes men ashamed of the very thought of discouragement. It is true that confidence is still to a large extent instinctive and uninstructed. We are still so used to thinking on old-fashioned military lines, in terms of armies and war-maps, that the real leverage of victory—the concentration of the world's economic power and resources in the hands of the Allies—escapes men's notice; and statements such as that of General Smuts, that we have substantially won the war already, left the general public, who cannot see the siege of Central Europe through German eyes, puzzled and a little indignant. But if the plain man cannot understand the higher strategy of the war, or see in our command over the supply of such humdrum things as cotton, wool, silk, jute, rubber,

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oil-seeds, hides, phosphates, copper and nickel the equivalents, and far more than the equivalents, of the German command over Central and South-Eastern Europe, he is becoming increasingly alive to the ideal aspects and possibilities of the struggle. The adhesion of the United States to our cause is everywhere felt to be the grand event of the year. The sense that the New World, where democracy has not been challenged for a century, is making ready to vindicate the cause of freedom in the Old, not only steadies our purpose in the present but keeps alive our highest hopes for the settlement.

The temper of the nation is, indeed, more set and steady than at any previous period in the war. Pacifism, which still commands a small handful of members in the House of Commons, is so little in evidence in the country as to have passed out of sight as an element of controversy at bye-elections. In recent contests in London and Manchester agreement on the main question before the country was taken for granted. Discussion turned on matters of local and domestic interest, such as food prices and air-policy, and, in Manchester more particularly, on the issues of social reconstruction after the war. The election of Mr. Ben Tillett, the dockers' leader, and a strong supporter of the war, by a substantial majority against a somewhat colourless Coalition candidate, is a significant indication of the way in which the war has broken up the ruts of our political system and set men's minds moving to seek a new orientation and more courageous policies. A ferment of thought is at work, both in the army and in the civil population, of which we shall not realise the full scope till the enlarged body of voters chooses its leaders and records its opinions at the election after the war.

The Government still retains the confidence of the country. It is generally recognised that it is the best Government under the circumstances, and it is felt, inside the House of Commons and out of it, that its

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displacement would be hailed as a disaster to the whole Alliance. General Smuts, in particular, has achieved a unique personal position in the country, and his speeches in South Wales and elsewhere have been consistently successful in expounding the war policy of the Government and interpreting the feeling of the British people. The country is also beginning to appreciate better the hitherto enigmatic personality of Lord Milner: his handling of various recent questions, in which issues of personal freedom and social policy were involved, together with his association in office with General Smuts, have done something to destroy the legend that had grown up in wide circles about his name.

Nevertheless, it cannot be said that the Government, as a whole, has fulfilled either the hopes or the pledges of its early days in the field of domestic policy. Indispensable abroad, it is in imminent danger of missing the tide of opportunity at home. Its promised reforms are proving laggards. The Education Bill, so loudly trumpeted beforehand, has been put off till next session, in spite of the urgent need of passing it in time to make proper preparations for its coming into force immediately on the end of the war, when the condition of the labour market will facilitate the industrial readjustments which it involves. As Mr. Fisher, who has staked his reputation on the achievement of education reform, still remains in office, it may be assumed that the Bill will not be dropped. Its postponement on the plea of lack of parliamentary time is due partly to the pressure of vested interests and partly to the hostility of the local Education Authorities to some administrative changes proposed in relatively minor clauses of the Bill. That the Government should have yielded to such influences shows how little it understands the nature of the forces at work in the country. A similar fate has overtaken the urgently needed measure for the establishment of a Ministry of Health, on which Lord Rhondda, during his short term at the Local Govern-

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ment Board, had fixed his hopes. In this case the impediment arises partly from the claims of competing departments—besides the Local Government Board, the Insurance Commissioners, the Board of Education, the Ministry of Pensions, and the Home Office, amongst others, are involved—and partly from the necessity of reconciling outside influences, among whom the industrial insurance interest is one of the chief. But here, again, difficulty should have been the spur to opportunity. No department or vested interest would consciously, at this moment, set itself against a measure known to be needed for the saving of English lives. The delay in meeting a case which has been proved up to the hilt is due purely to want of imagination; and it is not creditable to the Government that it should have acquiesced in it. A third disappointment has been the Government's failure to proceed with the scheme for the State purchase of the liquor traffic. Here, again, action is overdue, and will be far more difficult if postponed till after the war. No doubt, in all these cases, congestion of business, as usual, affords an explanation of the delay. But it does not justify it in the eyes of the country.

The Trades Union Congress

In the last issue of *THE ROUND TABLE* reference was made to the crisis which arose over the question of the Stockholm Conference. The story must be briefly concluded. At the Labour Party Conference on August 21 the decision to be represented at Stockholm, made at the previous Conference on August 10, was reaffirmed, but by a very narrow majority, the miners on this occasion casting their vote on the other side. This left the Labour Party divided into two almost equal parties on the subject, and made it impossible to apply pressure to the Government to rescind its decision not to grant passports. A few days

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later, on August 28 and 29, the Inter-Allied Socialist Conference, planned in Petrograd in the spring by M. Vandervelde, M. Thomas, and Mr. Henderson as the necessary preliminary to any full international gathering, assembled in London. Russia, Belgium, France, Portugal, Greece, and South Africa were represented. No detailed report of the proceedings was published, but the general result of the two days' deliberations was very disappointing. Mr. Henderson, indeed, went so far as to speak of it as "lamentable." The fact that no decision could be come to against the vote of any one country made success improbable from the outset, and the differences of opinion among the delegations of individual countries added to the confusion. The Conference began by setting up two committees, one to report on the Stockholm Conference and the other on the war aims of the Allies. The first, whilst agreeing that passports, if asked for, ought to be granted, failed to agree as to the advisability of holding the Conference at all. The second prepared a number of divergent reports which made it clear that there was no possibility of agreement. The British Labour Party's draft peace-terms were therefore not endorsed.

After this sharp reminder of the difficulties involved in international action, it became clear that the Stockholm Conference could serve no useful purpose ; and the way was paved for an agreement between the two sections of opinion inside the British movement. The Trade Union Congress which met at Blackpool on September 3rd provided a useful opportunity for healing the temporary difference. The following extract from the report of the Parliamentary Committee, which was carried by an overwhelming majority, gives the substance of the compromise arrived at :

In view of the divergence of opinion, we have come to the conclusion that a conference at Stockholm at the present moment could not be successful, and in the light of all the circumstances we make the following recommendations :—

1. We recommend that the Parliamentary Committee attempt in

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every possible way to secure general agreement of aim among the working classes of the allied nations, as, in our opinion, this is a fundamental condition of a successful international conference.

2. We are strongly of opinion that an international Labour and Socialist conference would be of the greatest service, and is a necessary preliminary to the conclusion of a lasting and democratic peace, and we recommend that the Trades Union Congress Parliamentary Committee be empowered to assist to arrange and take part in such a conference.

3. We think that the participation of the Trades Union Congress should be subject to the conditions outlined in recommendation (1) and to the further condition that the voting should be by nationalities, sectional bodies within nationalities to be governed by the majority of that nationality, or alternatively that each section should be given voting powers according to the number of persons actually represented.

It will be noted that the Conference which it is proposed to hold at some future date is not to be a Socialist but a "Labour and Socialist" gathering, and that the participation of the British Trade Union movement is contingent upon the abolition of the system by which Socialist societies of insignificant membership have enjoyed a voting power out of all proportion to their representation of national or working-class feeling. Here for the moment the matter rests. But it was clear from Mr. Henderson's speech on the subject to the Congress and from the enthusiasm with which it was received that the recommendation on the subject of the holding of a future conference is not regarded by him or by British working-class feeling as a mere pious opinion. When the situation admits of it, Stockholm or its equivalent will be heard of again.

Amongst the other proceedings of the Congress, which is assuming more and more significance in the public mind year by year, the most important were the discussions on the subject of the Whitley Report, food prices, the question of craft *versus* industrial unionism, the demobilisation of women workers, and Free Trade. The recommendations of the Whitley Report were explained by Mr. Smillie and Mr. Clynes, and in the discussion which ensued the only

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serious opposition to its proposals came from Mr. Hodges, of the South Wales Miners, who desired that "the Trade Union Movement" should "work out its own industrial future." Representatives of the General Workers, the Dock and Riverside Workers, the Shop Assistants, and the Pottery Workers spoke in support of the proposals, which were referred to the Parliamentary Committee for any necessary action. On the question of food prices strong feeling was manifested, especially on the question of the alleged waste through delay in transport. The issue between the craft and industrial unions came up in the form of a report on the negotiations between the National Union of Railwaymen and various unions open to craftsmen working on the railways. It appeared that, thanks to the mediation of the Parliamentary Committee, an agreement had almost been reached. The one outstanding point of difference was whether men employed in a railway shop and desiring to join a Union should be allocated to the Union by a Joint Committee of the Unions concerned or left free to decide for themselves which Union they should join. The treatment of this thorny question by the Congress showed much self-restraint and statesmanship on both sides.

The resolution on the subject of female labour after the war, which was passed unanimously, is of sufficient importance to bear quotation, since the matter is one on which the public is anxiously waiting for guidance, and the policy embodied in it is understood to represent an agreement between the women's organisations and the Congress Parliamentary Committee :

This Congress, believing that when peace comes the problem of women's labour will be primarily one of the organisation of labour rather than one of surplus of labour to be absorbed, calls upon the Government Departments concerned to adopt the following recommendations as measures calculated to minimise distress and the involuntary unemployment of women :—

(a) Reorganisation of the whole system of unemployment

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insurance to secure that (1) it shall apply to all workers, provision being made to allow those Trade Unions already making satisfactory arrangements against unemployment to contract out; (2) it shall be non-contributory as far as workers receiving less than a living wage are concerned; and (3) it shall provide a sufficient benefit to enable the worker to live at a decent standard during the time of unemployment.

(b) General inquiry beforehand as to firms which will require workers to put in hand private work on the cessation of war work. Such information to be distributed through the Employment Exchanges and Trade Unions with a view to having the workers informed before they finish their engagement as war workers. At the same time, all war workers and women substitutes to be supplied with forms, which they may fill up as to their desires for future employment.

(c) In all Government factories and controlled establishments reasonable period of notice, or wages in lieu of notice, to be given. In the case of workers who have left their homes to take up employment railway fares to be paid through the Employment Exchanges.

(d) Workers in munition and other trades in which there has been excessive overtime to have four weeks' furlough, with full pay, in order to recruit their strength.

(e) The use of the new Government factories as centres of production of a national kind, steadying the labour market by providing additional employment when necessary, and also being used experimentally for trying better methods of using labour for the advantage of the workers.

(f) Provision of training, with maintenance, for women who cannot find employment in their own trades, to equip them for new occupations.

A few words must be added about one other resolution of the Congress, that reaffirming its belief in Free Trade as "the broadest and surest foundation for world-prosperity and international peace in the future" and rebutting "protective duties" as "unjust in incidence and economically unsound, subsidising capital at the expense of labour." This was passed by a majority of nine to one. The general opinion of the delegates was probably most pithily expressed by Mr. T. Shaw, of the Weavers, when he remarked:

I am aware that the war has taught us we are an island and that

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we cannot altogether go back to the old condition of affairs ; but are we to protect certain industries or are we to say, " these things are vital to the nation and the nation shall make and use them " ?

The Labour Outlook

Since the Congress took place, in the first week in September, there has been a distinct improvement in the general situation. " We have at this moment," said one of the best-informed of the Labour members in the House of Commons on November 6, " a much better atmosphere, in which there is far less industrial tension than there was some time back." The chances of a real " reconstruction " after the war, which were seriously endangered in the summer, are now much brighter, and practical schemes of reform are assured of a better hearing on both sides. The change is mainly due to the efforts that have been made to understand the ordinary workman's point of view. The Reports of the Industrial Unrest Commissioners have been of the greatest service, and the administrative action taken centrally and locally to deal with the serious grievances revealed by them has undoubtedly borne good fruit. It is true that progress has in some cases been slow. Inexplicable delay due to " departmental difficulties " has, for instance, arisen in remedying the horrible housing conditions at Barrow : but, on a general view, the authorities may be said to have awakened—none too soon—to the serious position into which matters were drifting. In a very businesslike speech in the House of Lords on November 7 Lord Milner gave a *résumé* of the Government action taken on the Commission's reports. Some of the matters he instances may seem of minor importance, but it must be remembered that the cumulative effect of single grievances is often more provocative of discontent, as it is also more difficult to trace to its source, than a single substantial abuse. The £1 maximum weekly award under the Workmen's Compensation Act has been raised to meet the increased cost of living. The legitimate grievance of

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skilled supervisors and other workmen on time-rates, who were in many cases receiving considerably less than the unskilled piece workers whom they supervised, has been met by a $12\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. bonus. This directly affects between 200,000 and 300,000 men, and must inevitably be extended to other classes of workers not directly under the Ministry of Munitions. It must indeed be remarked in passing that the order granting the increase was evidently not fully considered beforehand in all its bearings, and affords a striking example of the urgent need for the establishment of a single authority for dealing with labour matters. Again, in response to another recommendation, the local Pensions Committee have had their freedom of action enlarged in dealing with cases of men discharged from the Army and the bureaucratic control of the Central Authority has been relaxed. Further, as a result of the passing of the Corn Production Act, agricultural wages have been raised to a minimum of 25s., to which in some parts of the country they had not yet attained, and an Agricultural Wages Board, containing representatives of the Unions concerned, has already been constituted. This, of course, will react in various ways upon the position of other wage-earners and their families. A more active cause of discontent has been removed by the abolition of the leaving certificate system, which tied the movements of workers employed under the Munitions Act. It was anticipated that the restoration of freedom of movement, which came into force on October 15, would lead to a considerable migration of labour, but the Under-Secretary for the Ministry of Munitions was able to state on November 6 that the movement so far had been "comparatively slight," far slighter indeed than was anticipated. The successful carrying through of this rather hazardous reform must be attributed not simply to the granting of the $12\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. bonus but to what Mr. Anderson, a Labour member who has in the past been the Department's severest critic, termed the "courage and a certain quality of imagina-

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tion brought to the task of dealing with labour questions " by the new Minister of Munitions, Mr. Winston Churchill. It must, however, unfortunately, be added that the action of the Department has been nullified in a few cases by private leaving-certificate arrangements between employers.

Two other recent reforms may also be mentioned here. One is the establishment by the Ministry of Labour of Local Committees in connection with the work of the Labour Exchanges, so as to counteract their excessively bureaucratic character and to enable them to regain some of the popularity which they had undoubtedly forfeited. The committees will be composed of representatives of employers and workpeople, in equal numbers, nominated by local associations, together with a small number of additional members nominated direct by the Minister. They will be entrusted "with the widest functions of advice and guidance in connection with the working of the exchanges" that are consistent with the responsibility of the Minister to Parliament. It is to be hoped that this is not intended to preclude them from exercising some measure of executive power, as a purely advisory status will not meet the widespread feeling in response to which they have been created. As the exchanges will be the instrument through which employment will be secured for soldiers, sailors, and munition workers on demobilisation, the importance of the work which will fall to the committees can hardly be overestimated. Another long-standing reform has been carried through by the organisation, under Sir Auckland Geddes, of the new Ministry of National Service and the transference to it from the War Office of the machinery of recruiting and medical examination. The whole question of man-power has thus, at last, been put into civilian hands and on to a scientific basis, and the demands of the army will in future be treated in exactly the same way as those of the Ministry of Munitions and the Board of Agriculture. The new Minister took early

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occasion to disclaim his intention of introducing industrial conscription, which he declared, "apart from the complete taking over by the State of all enterprises," to be "absolutely impossible." It is, however, still felt, especially in labour circles in close touch with the Department, that the transformation from a military to a civilian personnel and method of working remains far from complete. The new Minister's speeches have created a favourable impression; but he has a difficult piece of work before him in the coming months, and it is indispensable that he should be able to allay all suspicions as to the outlook and intentions of his Department.

Much has, therefore, been achieved in straightening out the tangles of social and industrial administration: but one potent source of trouble still remains—the multiplicity of Government Departments and authorities dealing with industrial questions. There is still a needless amount of overlapping and friction between the Ministry of Munitions, the Admiralty, the War Office, the Home Office, the Ministry of Labour, and the numerous other Boards and Controllers who have a hand in the matter. It is only necessary to refer to the recent action of the Coal Controller in offering the Miners' Federation an advance of 1s. 6d. a day for adults and 9d. a day for youths, and its effect upon the minds of other less fortunate classes of workers. Some fixed standard or principle in wages policy is still as urgently needed as ever. Both for this and for other reasons the time would seem to be ripe for the establishment of a single authority, a Ministry of Labour, or, rather, of Industry, which would constitute the sole channel of State action in industrial questions and devise appropriate means for keeping in touch with the recognised associations and representatives of employers and workpeople. We have passed beyond the period of inquisitorial State action and bureaucratic control. What is needed is a form of departmental organisation better qualified to guide and stimulate the corporate

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spirit and the self-governing associations that are fast springing up in the industrial field.

The Whitley Councils.

This reflection leads naturally on to the most important and far-reaching domestic event of the quarter, the acceptance by the Government of the Whitley Report as an integral part of its policy in the field of industrial reconstruction. The Report, some account of which was given in the last issue of *THE ROUND TABLE*, was submitted in the course of the summer to numerous employers' associations and Trade Unions, over a hundred in all, for their considered opinion. Its proposals excited great interest and some time necessarily elapsed before full replies were available. By October, however, it was possible to tabulate them. Taken as a whole, the answers, especially from the Trade Unions, but also from the bulk of the employers' associations, were, in the words of Lord Milner, "overwhelmingly in favour of the adoption of something on the lines of the suggestion in the Report." Press comments were equally favourable. As a result, the Government felt emboldened to proceed with the scheme, and on October 20 the Minister of Labour addressed a circular to the principal Employers' Associations and Trade Unions informing them of the Government's adoption of the Report. In the course of a document which may well be regarded as historic, the Minister stated that the Government were very anxious that Joint Standing Industrial Councils on the lines proposed in the Report should be established in all the well-organised industries with as little delay as possible, and added that the Councils would be recognised as the "official standing Consultative Committees to the Government on all future questions affecting the industries which they represent," and would be "the normal channel through which the opinion and

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experience of an industry will be sought on all questions with which the industry is concerned." At the same time it was made clear that the Government were anxious not to impose any "cast-iron" mode of organisation on the industries from above. The Councils are to be "independent bodies electing their own officers and free to determine their own functions and procedure with reference to the peculiar needs of each trade." They are to be "autonomous bodies" and their establishment will, in fact, "make possible a larger degree of self-government in industry than exists to-day." They will, it is expected, in most cases be established on the basis of existing organisations.

There is no time to be lost if the Councils are to be in working order in time to deal with the problems which it is intended to submit to them at the close of the war, amongst which the circular specifies "the demobilisation of the Forces, the resettlement of munition workers in civil industries, apprenticeship (especially where interrupted by war service), the training and employment of disabled soldiers, and the control of raw materials."

Fortunately, however, steps had already been taken, even before the publication of the Report, in some of the industries which lend themselves most easily to the proposed mode of organisation, amongst which the building and pottery trades may be mentioned; and the stimulus of example, so much more persuasive than Government exhortations, is therefore already being exerted. It is too early to report progress, but it is already clear that, high as are the hopes excited, their realisation will not be easy. In some important trades, such as shipbuilding, the existence of a number of craft unions cutting across industrial divisions makes it difficult to organise the labour side of the representation. The difficulty of a multiplicity of organisations is in some cases even more marked on the employers' side. Their associations are often ill-devised for the purpose in view and are both incomplete and overlapping.

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Another difficulty is presented by the case of the clerical staff, which is still in most cases unorganised and, in a time of rising prices, has not unnaturally suffered considerable hardship in consequence. One result of the adoption of the Report will be to draw the attention of salaried workers to the importance and desirability of organisation, which they have too often in the past considered as beneath their dignity. A still greater difficulty arising out of the voluntary character of the Councils' membership is that which will be presented by employers and workpeople who prefer to remain unorganised and refuse to be bound by the decisions of the Council of their industry. Compulsory membership, either of a Trade Union or an Employers' Association, is contrary to British practice and would destroy the character of the organisations concerned. It may, however, be found desirable for the Government to give binding force to any decision arrived at by three-quarters of the membership of each section of the Council.

Still, when all the difficulties have been measured, the adoption of the Report by the Government is a momentous event in the ordering of British life. It lays firm the foundations of the new industrial order which the country expects to see after the war—and upon a basis of absolute equality between the two chief partners in the industrial process, management and labour. Henceforward the Trade Unions, the self-governing associations which embody the corporate spirit of the industrial working class, will enjoy a status and responsibility equal to the organisations of what has so long been, in the workman's eyes, "the master class," and it is for them to rise to the height of the new opportunity. "The real solution" of the industrial question "is to be found," as Lord Selborne truly said in the House of Lords on November 7, "in an increase of the strength of the Trade Union organisation: in the recognition and acceptance of their *status*, and the assumption and acknowledgment by them of their responsibility." When one

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remembers that only four years ago the managing directorates of one of the largest of our national services, the railways, almost unanimously refused to recognise the existence of the men's union, one can measure the distance which we have travelled, in our social relations and social thinking, under the stress of war. Discipline at the front depends on confidence; and on confidence alone, not on arbitrary command, the working of our social system must rest. Englishmen understand no other way. The working class, which has saved the country on the battlefield, has now at home, as Lord Salisbury said at the close of a frank and eloquent speech to his fellow-peers, "to work out its own salvation. They will," as he said, "make many mistakes. Very likely they will adversely affect the property of many of your lordships. All these things are small matters. I earnestly hope that they will believe in us. I am quite sure that in the long run their good sense will prevail. But whatever happens, we intend to trust them, my lords, and I believe that they will return the trust."

It is the voice of the old England speaking to the new; and to an appeal made in that spirit there can be but one answer.

The Reorganisation of the Labour Party.

Meanwhile the Franchise Bill is making steady progress through Parliament, and is expected to become law by Christmas. It will add some eight million electors, men and women, to the voters' roll. The influx of so many new voters, whose opinions no one can foresee, together with the improved arrangements for the holding of elections, will entirely alter the conditions and atmosphere of our political system, and the party organisations are beginning to adjust themselves to the new situation. By far the most important step taken in this way has been the action of the Executive of the Labour Party in drafting a new

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constitution for the Party, which will be submitted to the Annual Conference at Nottingham on January 23. Hitherto the Labour Party has not been, in the strict sense, a national party. It has had no individual membership or rank and file of its own, but has been governed by its three constituent elements—the Trade Unions and other working-class associations, the Independent Labour Party, and the Fabian Society. It is now proposed to enrol individual members, who will be attached to local Labour Parties in the various constituencies, so that the Party will in future consist both of affiliated societies (including Trade Unions, Socialist Societies, Co-operative Societies, and Trades Councils), and of individual men and women “who subscribe to the constitution and programme of the party,” and are enrolled in its local branches. The governing body of the reconstituted party will be the Party Conference. This will be composed of representatives of both sides of the movement. Trade Unions and other affiliated societies will be entitled to send one delegate for each thousand members on which fees are paid, the fees amounting to a yearly 2d. per member, with a minimum of 30s. Each local Labour Party will be entitled to a single member, or in constituencies returning two members, to two. Local Labour Party delegates may be either men or women, but an additional woman delegate may be appointed whenever the membership of the women’s section exceeds five hundred. Candidates for Parliament will be chosen by the local Labour Parties in co-operation with the National Executive, whose sanction will be required in all cases. They will receive assistance from the Party funds on the basis of £1 per 1,000 electors in Borough constituencies and £1 15s. per 1,000 electors in County Divisions.

These arrangements are chiefly of interest as showing the way in which the new Party proposes to deal with difficulties which have, in some cases, hitherto proved insuperable to the older Parties; and the very publicity

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and straightforwardness of the arrangements proposed will probably attract many electors who have hitherto regarded Party activities as a matter for cliques and wire-pullers. On the other hand, the continued reliance of the Party on Trade Union contributions, inevitable though it doubtless is, cannot be regarded as satisfactory: for with the best intentions in the world the outlook of a Trade Union cannot be national in the broadest sense any more than that of some of the "Trade" influences which have exercised undue dominance over the older Parties. The time may come when all our Parties will be exclusively controlled by a rank-and-file political membership.

But the new constitution is chiefly interesting because of its statement of objects, which explicitly extends the meaning of "labour" to include brain workers. The clause in question is best quoted in full:

"To secure for the producers by hand or by brain the full fruits of their industry, and the most equitable distribution thereof that may be possible, upon the basis of the common ownership of the means of production and the best obtainable system of popular administration and control of each industry or service."

It will be observed that the formula adopted is not Socialistic in the ordinary sense of that term. "Common" ownership does not necessarily mean State or public ownership. The words are, indeed, so vague as to cover a large part of the business organisation of the country at the present time. Their adoption is doubtless intended to enable the co-operative movement to link its fortunes more closely with the Labour Party.

Two further clauses are worth noting. One, significantly headed "Inter-Dominion," speaks of co-operation "with the Labour organisations in the Dominions and Dependencies . . . to take common action for the promotion of a higher standard of social and economic life for the working population of the respective countries."

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The other deals with common action in the international sphere with Labour organisations in other countries "for the maintenance of Freedom and Peace . . . and for such International Legislation as may be practicable."

A few words must also be said about another interesting political development—the movement among co-operators towards the formation of a Co-operative Political Party. The Co-operative Movement, although it has hitherto kept out of politics, has a powerful and widespread influence. The distributive societies number some three and a half million members, of whom 2,000,000 are already Parliamentary voters, and their turnover last year was £121,000,000, to which £70,000,000 must be added from the Co-operative Wholesale and the hundred productive societies. How far the new movement towards political action will go it is still too early to say. What has brought it to a head is an accumulation of grievances against the authorities, of which the imposition of the excess profits tax and the threat of an income tax on their "dividends" (which really, in the vast majority of cases, represent savings) is the chief. There is also a feeling that the movement has been prejudiced in the allotment of sugar supplies, and has been unduly omitted from various Committees and Commissions, whilst their employees have often been unfairly treated by the military at tribunals. If the new Party is actually brought into being it will not formally attach itself to any existing Party, but it would naturally work in close touch with the Labour organisation in the constituencies chosen for its candidatures.

Food Control.

These activities suggest a subject on which a brief concluding statement must be made—the progress of Food Control. The policy of Lord Rhondda, described

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in the last issue of *THE ROUND TABLE*, by which supplies are controlled and profits fixed at every stage, has been rapidly extended during the last three months, and, on the whole, with conspicuous success. Control now extends right from the field of production to the shop counter in the case of all the principal foods—*i.e.*, bread, flour, meat, potatoes, sugar, tea, bacon, butter, and cheese. It has also been applied to such subsidiary foods as peas, beans, and pulse; rice, sago, tapioca; and oat and maize products. In all these cases “profiteering”—that is, the taking of undue profits—has been eliminated, and what is regarded by the Department as a fair remuneration is paid for services rendered. Food producers and sellers have, in other words, become practically Government agents working on a fixed commission. Thanks to this system, which is one of the real administrative successes of the war, and to the subsidised loaf, the average price of all the principal foodstuffs fell from 105·6 per cent. above the 1914 level on September 1 to 97·3 on October 1. By November 1, however, partly owing to developments of policy in connection with European neutrals, over which the Department had no control, it had again risen to 106, the chief increases being in tea, salt butter, bacon and eggs. The detailed execution of the Department’s policy still requires closer attention. It is one thing to fix prices and another to make sure that the available supplies are put on the market. Much vigilance and pertinacity will be required to prevent the holding up of stores by wholesalers and the innumerable possibilities of evasion by retailers, especially in the poorer districts. The Department is necessarily working short-handed and without an adequate supply of inspectors; but for that very reason offenders, when discovered, should be all the more severely punished. The comparative leniency of some of the fines recently inflicted by magistrates, especially in rural districts, has excited very unfavourable comment.

Meanwhile shopping, especially in working-class dis-

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tricts, remains a fine art. The shortage of shipping, though it has touched bottom, is very serious. The world-shortage of cereals, meats, and fats, and the increasing needs of our European Allies, are more serious still. In spite of the co-operation of the United States the outlook is critical and there is every need for economy and self-denial. We seem likely to see a considerable extension of communal kitchens and possibly of rationing, which has hitherto only been applied to sugar and coal. But now that the need is better understood there can be no doubt that, if only the scales are held evenly as between different sections of the population, the country will prove equal to the emergency.

II. DEVELOPMENTS IN IRELAND

AT the time of the last Irish article the Convention held the centre of the stage in Irish politics. In a sense it may be said still to do so. Everyone is aware of its importance and looks forward to its conclusions ; but the charm of novelty has worn off, and the secrecy which still veils the proceedings allows the public interest little to feed upon. Meanwhile outside events of a more or less sensational character have on more than one occasion threatened to make all the Convention's work ineffective. It is natural that this fact should lead to recriminations. There is, perhaps, no charge so darkly damaging or so easily made in these days as that of conspiring to wreck the Convention. There are those who suggest—and they are not confined to the chosen orators of the Nationalist Party—that a deliberate intention exists in high official quarters to bring about this result by "Hidden Hand" methods. Others charge Sinn Fein with darker intentions than the silent contempt with which it professes to regard the Convention. These are matters which must be left to speculation, of which there is no lack in Ireland. It will suffice here to record the actual facts.

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The death of Thomas Ashe was the culminating event of a series of clashes between the Irish Executive and the Sinn Feiners. Meetings had been proclaimed, arms seized and many persons arrested for such offences as drilling, carrying weapons or uttering incitements to rebellion in speeches. Among those arrested in this way were a group of men well known as leaders, most of whom had already been imprisoned at Lewes on the charge of complicity in the rising of Easter Week. A hunger strike was begun at Cork, and the prisoners were then brought to Dublin and lodged in Mountjoy Prison, presumably in order that they might be under the supervision of the highest authorities. They proceeded, as is shown by the evidence at the inquest, to organise a committee and to appoint leaders, as was done at Lewes, and to continue the hunger strike. Forcible feeding was resorted to with tragic results in the case of Thomas Ashe. The verdict found by the jury was probably a fairly accurate reflection of public feeling.

But, apart from details which stand out from the rest because of their sensational characteristics, the policy of both sides remains the same. The extremists continue to hold their meetings, wear their uniforms, and carry out military operations. The Government continue to arrest in some cases, to proclaim some meetings, and to turn a blind eye in other cases. As a consequence they lay themselves open to attacks on the one hand for acting in a provocative manner, on the other for being weak-kneed. Supporters of Sinn Fein claim that the Executive is trying to terrorise them; the Nationalist Party supports this allegation by the statement that the "Castle" is implicated in a plot to break up the Convention. Unionists on the other hand—as represented by the *Irish Times* and the *Northern Whig*—have announced that Mr. Duke's weakness makes his recall imperative. The average citizen cannot help being struck by the fact that to be sufficiently strong to impress the public seems to be a guarantee against

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being arrested. It is certainly hard to discover any justification for a policy which allows Mr. De Valera to be at large while others are arrested for seditious speeches, or which contemplates with equanimity the spectacle of an imposing quasi-military funeral conducted in the capital city, while it sends a force of police to arrest boy scouts belonging to the same organisation for drilling in a field in the country.

Whatever may be the ultimate political fate of this country, stable conditions are impossible so long as the present system of government continues, together with the fluctuating policy which it seems inevitably to pursue. The fluctuation has not failed to have its effect on the Convention. The news of Ashe's death, announced during the visit to Cork (where hostile elements were already very much in evidence) had roused some members to a considerable state of excitement; the concessions made in respect of his funeral had a correspondingly exasperating effect on others. In the same way the rumour which gained credence at one time that Mr. De Valera had been arrested threatened the peace of the Convention and even of the country, while the failure to interfere with him at all made Ulster members deeply distrustful. Truly, the science of constitution-making must be a hard one to practise in the atmosphere in which Ireland lives to-day.

It is doubly reassuring to find that in spite of all disturbances the Convention continues to maintain harmony and to make progress. Once only has the veil been lifted—when on the last day of the Session in Cork Sir Horace Plunkett was able in a speech made for publication to report that the stage of general discussion had been brought to an end and that various schemes would now be submitted to a committee for drafting purposes. This marks real and substantial progress, and we must be content to wait patiently until another stage is safely reached.

Two further complications in the situation have to be considered. The first is the beginning of the Parliamentary

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Session, the second the holding of the Sinn Fein Convention in Dublin. The former event may be considered something of a disaster from the Irish point of view. If the leaders of the Irish parties who represent them in the Convention could have been persuaded to issue an inverted "whip" to the members of their party urging them to stay away from Parliament they would thereby have done the country a great service. Nothing could have been lost, for Parliament will take no action on Irish matters until the Convention comes to an end. As this drastic measure was not carried out we have been driven back on the old unrealities—the stage armies causing infinite smoke with their blank cartridges, confusing the people, with no hope of practical results. In two debates the Irish parties, which seemed likely to compose their differences under the shelter of the Convention, have relapsed into their old attitudes. The admission of the Irish question into the Representation of the People Bill first revived party strife. Mr. Redmond was bound to claim the benefits of a wider franchise for Ireland, because the Sinn Feiners had said in the country that he dared not do so, as the wider franchise would be fatal to his party. But once he put forward the claim that Ireland should be included in the Bill, it was inevitable that the Ulstermen should demand redistribution. So the party fight was joined once more. The only method of averting it would have been for the Government to refuse absolutely to entertain the idea of Ireland being included in any part of the Bill, on the ground that it did not propose to make any changes in the system of representation in Ireland, however beneficial and however overdue, until the Convention had reported.

Mr. Redmond's motion of censure on the Irish Executive also contributed something to party bitterness, and, on the whole, it is a matter of congratulation that it passed off so smoothly as it did. This was perhaps due to a universal sense of the unreality of the debate. In general

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it may be said that there is a very widespread feeling of resentment throughout Ireland at the reopening of the Parliamentary combat—a fact which is perhaps the best augury for the future of the Convention.

The two-day meeting of the Sinn Fein Convention deserves more attention. This was probably the first occasion in history when a large number of delegates have been known to assemble in an open and orderly manner in the Mansion House of a capital city for the avowed purpose of framing a constitution which would enable them to overthrow the Government under whose auspices, so to speak (for the police were on duty at the door), they met. Cynical people expected, and enemies confidently looked forward to, a split such as has marred so many Irish movements. Indeed, there were some threatenings of this in Madame Markievicz's attack on Professor McNeill; but the danger was averted, and in the election of officers and committee all parties achieved representation. The retirement of Mr. Arthur Griffiths from the presidency in favour of Mr. De Valera showed the quality of diplomacy at work. The main business done, besides the elections, was the adoption of a constitution and a scheme of organisation which gives to what was hitherto a chaotic body of feeling a definite political system. This result, while obviously a step forward on the part of Sinn Fein, may also be considered a hopeful sign in so far as it forces the leaders both to announce a constructive policy and to consider carefully and in a rational manner the policies of other parties—including that of the Convention. As a matter of fact, it appears that various schemes which are at present before the Convention were discussed at some length by the rival body (which points to a certain amount of leakage somewhere), and, although they were naturally not approved, the fact of their discussion reveals a significant and satisfactory tendency.

The policy of the Sinn Fein Convention was somewhat vague in outline, but quite definite in purpose. Briefly

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stated, the intention is to get rid of English government and English influence and to obtain international recognition of Ireland as an independent State. Once this objective is achieved, the people of Ireland are to be left free to adopt whatever form of government they think best. The question of physical force seemed to be a somewhat delicate one and provoked some difference of opinion; an academic resolution was finally passed which practically amounted to a statement that all good Sinn Feiners ought to be prepared to risk their lives for their principles if called upon to do so.

The declaration that "any and every means" should be used to expel England drew a protest from two priests, who wished to put in a limiting clause. Mr. De Valera met this objection by affirming that the members might be trusted to confine themselves to ethical and legitimate proceedings. Perhaps the most remarkable part of the whole meeting was the rendering of a financial statement showing the amount spent on the various elections, on salaries, travelling expenses, printing, etc. The total funds accounted for were less than £5,000, and a balance of £1,000 was carried forward—a result which should cause envy to many an administrator. The statement was made, in refutation of the charges of "German money," that every penny of this fund was collected in Ireland. It would be interesting, however, to know how much was spent simultaneously on the same objects by bodies technically different, such as the Irish Republican Brotherhood; it is in the interrelation of these bodies that the mystery of the present Irish situation lies.

The economic position continues grave. The appointment of an Irish Food Control Committee—and a very good one at that—is a welcome though belated advance. At present most of its work has been confined to the discovery of the many iniquities which exist, and the Ministry of Food appears most reluctant to give it the powers which it must have to make it effective. Meanwhile a milk

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famine in Dublin has been narrowly averted, and at the time of writing serious industrial disturbances, including a bakers' strike, are threatening us. These and similar matters must be reserved for separate treatment.

Dublin. November, 1917.

CANADA

THE UNION GOVERNMENT

SINCE the last issue of THE ROUND TABLE Canada has undergone a political revolution. Just when the prospects of a Union Government seemed hopeless, the negotiations between Sir Robert Borden and the Western Liberal leaders were quietly resumed. Indeed, there is reason to think that the negotiations were never wholly abandoned. It was difficult to make headway under the immediate shadow of the Western Liberal Convention. In early August this great gathering of Western Liberals assembled at Winnipeg. It was expected that the leadership of Sir Wilfred Laurier would be repudiated and resolutions in favour of conscription and union government adopted. Instead, the position of the veteran Liberal leader was endorsed, and a war resolution accepted which carefully evaded any declaration for or against the draft. An amendment to the resolution, declaring that, if necessary, reinforcements for the army should be secured by compulsion, was rejected by an overwhelming majority. Devotion to Sir Wilfrid Laurier and confidence in his wisdom and patriotism were expressed by the chief spokesmen for the Convention, while the Borden Administration was described as incapable and corrupt, the agent of corporate interests and the ally and champion of Eastern protectionists.

Following the Convention the Western Liberal leaders announced that they could not enter a coalition under

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Sir Robert Borden, but that they were in favour of a national as distinguished from a party Government, and would take office under Sir George Foster, Sir William Mulock, Sir Adam Beck or Hon. Lyman P. Duff. Sir William Mulock, now Chief Justice of Ontario, was a member of the Laurier Government; Mr. Duff was active in the Liberal party of British Columbia before he was appointed to the Supreme Court of Canada, where he has achieved a position of exceptional distinction and authority. Sir George Foster and Sir Adam Beck are Conservatives of reputation and standing in Canadian affairs. It has to be said, however, that none of these four names excited the imagination of the country or by contrast gave force to the demand for the Prime Minister's removal. This is a tribute to the Conservative leader rather than a reflection upon the nominees of the Western Liberal group. Sir Robert, however, called a caucus of the Conservative parliamentary party and offered to resign in favour of Sir George Foster. Foster himself firmly opposed the resignation, as did all his associates in caucus. Indeed, the occasion will be memorable in Canadian parliamentary history. Not only was there complete unanimity in the declaration of allegiance to the Prime Minister, but there were striking manifestations of affection and confidence. It was made clear that, if the Liberals would not enter a Union Government under Sir Robert Borden, there could be no union. The Prime Minister was authorised by caucus to continue the negotiations in complete assurance that he would have their undivided support as leader of a national Government or a Conservative Government, but with equal assurance that, as he had borne the heavy burden of war from the beginning and had sought with great patience and persistence to effect a coalition with the Liberal party, Conservatives would have no other leader nor support coalition under any other leader.

It is understood that most of the Western Liberal leaders did not differ greatly from the Conservative caucus.

They believed that Sir Robert Borden was the necessary and inevitable head of any national Government. Only a fringe of Liberal support for such a Government could be obtained, and therefore, if a majority of the constituencies were to be carried, the Conservative party must not be divided. The Western leaders, however, doubted if they could hold their followers against Sir Wilfrid Laurier, particularly in consideration of the fresh pledges to party registered at the Winnipeg Convention. For this reason they hesitated, took counsel with their followers, and smoothed the way to decision. Finally, national overcame personal, party, and provincial considerations, and coalition was effected.

It may be, too, that delay was prudent and in the interests of union. There is reason to think that outside of Quebec and Ontario the official Liberal organisations will be carried by the federal unionists to the support of the new Government. In other words, in the impending election the Liberal Governments of Nova Scotia, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta and British Columbia will co-operate with the Unionist leaders at Ottawa instead of with Sir Wilfrid Laurier or his successor if the official Liberal party continues to oppose conscription and coalition. In Ontario Sir Wilfrid still controls the Liberal organisation, while Quebec is divided between Liberals and Nationalists.

Apart from the Prime Minister there is an equal representation of Conservatives and Liberals in the Union Cabinet. The Liberal side is strong in political genius, experience and capacity. It is believed that when the Western leaders decided to coalesce they required an equal division of portfolios and the inclusion of representative Liberals from the older provinces. Hence the admission of Mr. N. W. Rowell, Liberal leader in the Legislature of Ontario, Hon. A. K. Maclean, Premier of Nova Scotia, and Mr. F. B. Carvell, of New Brunswick. Hon. C. C. Ballantyne, of Montreal, Major-General Mewburn, who becomes Minister of Militia, and Hon. Hugh Guthrie,

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of South Wellington, also belonged to the Liberal party, but they were chosen by the Prime Minister before coalition was arranged. The West gives Hon. A. L. Sifton, Premier of Alberta, Hon. J. A. Calder, of Saskatchewan, and Hon. T. A. Crerar, of Manitoba. There is no more capable public man in the West than Mr. Calder. He has a clear head, a resolute temper, and the skill of a politician with the prescience of a statesman. No one has done more than Mr. Calder to give Liberalism its ascendancy in the Western Provinces ; and, when all is said, that ascendancy rests upon solid achievements. It is believed that throughout the long negotiations for coalition Mr. Calder was distrusted by many of the lesser Conservative politicians, but possessed from the first the confidence of the Prime Minister. He was never evasive nor arrogant, but he had a clear comprehension of the position of himself and his Western associates and of what coalition involved ; and he held himself in hand until he was convinced that the real objects of union would be achieved. Mr. Crerar is said to have statesmanlike qualities and a natural genius for administration. But the remarkable fact in connection with his acceptance of the office of Minister of Agriculture is that he is one of the most trusted leaders of the organised grain growers. The formidable body which he represents is committed to low tariff, closer trade relations with the United States, an immediate increase in the British preference to 50 per cent., and ultimate free trade between Canada and the mother country. As to fiscal policy Mr. Calder and Mr. Sifton are probably in substantial agreement with the grain growers. All are suspicious of the "Eastern Interests" and concerned for a greater recognition of the demands of Western Canada in federal legislation. It is assumed that they did not enter coalition without some understanding of the disposition of the Prime Minister towards Western conditions and Western problems. How far this understanding goes has not been disclosed. It may not be fully disclosed until peace comes.

It is no secret that Sir Robert Borden has been greatly concerned to remove causes of suspicion and difference between East and West, and aside altogether from the immediate supreme issue of war he would rejoice in this union with Western leaders as clearing the way to reconciliation between the newer and older provinces and complete and enduring national unity.

There is a glowing prospect that in the flame of war we shall burn up many old grievances and forge stronger bonds of union between all sections of the Dominion. It can hardly be doubted that, when leaders trusted by Western Radicals sit round a common table with leaders trusted by Eastern Conservatives, differences can be adjusted and harmonised in the common interest. There are the roots of national patriotism in all those who have joined the new Government, otherwise coalition could not have been accomplished. For the moment, indeed, Quebec is isolated as never before since Confederation ; but this is not so much the result of deliberate design as of the conditions which have developed. In the Union Cabinet there are only two French Ministers, and these have less political experience and less authority than most of their colleagues. But they have courage and patriotism, and in the years to come they will have an honourable reputation in Canadian history. It is certain that the Prime Minister has a sincere regard for the French people of Canada, and deplores their attitude towards the war and the Government. As the *Vancouver Daily Province* has said, the grave defect in the Union Cabinet is the under-representation of Quebec. But the public men of Quebec declined to co-operate in the course which Canada must pursue in loyalty to the decimated regiments in the trenches and in obedience to the supreme obligation which lies upon every free nation to restore freedom in Europe and to sustain the elementary rights of civilisation. The composition of the Union Government, however, guarantees that the constitutional privileges of Quebec will not be

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circumscribed, nor the electoral campaign disfigured by inflammatory appeals to racial and sectarian prejudices. Here also is a gain for national harmony and unity; for patriots looked with apprehension to a contest in which denunciation of Quebec would be the chief appeal for support in the English provinces.

Already there are indications that the best minds of the French province are gravely concerned over the situation, and it is conceivable that there may yet be a revolt against the influences which have separated its people from their English-speaking fellow-citizens in this crisis of destiny for Canada and the Empire. It must be remembered that throughout the war Sir Robert Borden himself has treated Quebec with great consideration. He has had nothing but praise for the valour of the French regiments. He has never uttered an angry or provocative sentence. Whatever may develop, he has nothing to withdraw, and sooner or later Quebec will understand and perhaps not be ungrateful. Mr. Rowell, Mr. Maclean, Mr. Carvell, and the Western Liberal leaders have shown equal reticence in references to Quebec if equal firmness in urging the duty of Canada to reinforce the army and prosecute the war with continuous vigour until victory is achieved. Indeed, the Liberal delegation in the Government has had the confidence of Quebec to a degree which it denied to the Conservative leader, although he too deserved what has been so firmly withheld. There is assurance, therefore, that Quebec will not be defamed; and possibly, when the election is over, Sir Robert Borden will be able to say as Lincoln said from the window in the White House on the night of his re-election to the Presidency:

It has long been a grave question whether any Government not too strong for the liberties of its people can be strong enough to maintain its own existence in great emergencies. On this point the present rebellion brought our republic to a severe test, and a Presidential election occurring in regular course during the rebellion added not a little to the strain. If the loyal people united were put

to the utmost of their strength by the rebellion, must they not fail when divided and partially paralysed by a political war among themselves ? But the election was a necessity. We cannot have free government without elections ; and if the rebellion could force us to forego or postpone a national election, it might fairly claim to have already conquered and ruined us. The strife of the election is but human nature practically applied to the facts of the case. What has occurred in this case must ever recur in similar cases. Human nature will not change. In any future great national trial, compared with the men of this, we shall have as weak and as strong, as silly and as wise, as bad and as good. Let us, therefore, study the incidents of this, as philosophy to learn wisdom from, and none of them as wrongs to be avenged. But the election, along with its incidents and undesirable strife, has done good too. It has demonstrated that a people's Government can sustain a national election in the midst of a great civil war. Until now it has not been known to the world that this was a possibility. It shows, also, how sound and strong we are. . . . But the rebellion continues ; and, now that the election is over, may not all having a common interest reunite in a common effort to save our common country ?

It cannot be doubted that the electoral outlook for the Government was improved by the franchise measures adopted towards the close of the session of Parliament. There was substantial agreement upon the details of the Act, which gives votes to the Canadian Expeditionary Forces and to Canadian nurses in military hospitals in France and England. Certain of its provisions were opposed, but not with much heat or energy. It was argued, for example, that a ballot which required the men in the trenches to choose between "Government" and "Opposition" involved a decision upon party programmes rather than upon the merits of individual candidates. The Government held, however, that it was impossible for the soldiers to have knowledge of the candidates in 234 constituencies and that to require voting for individual candidates could only result in uncertainty and confusion. There was objection also to the proposal to enfranchise men who were not residents of Canada when they enlisted, and to empower the Government to determine the particular constituencies to which

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such votes should be assigned. Manifestly in closely divided constituencies the result could be decided by a judicious distribution of these ballots. If over the whole country the parties ran nearly even, it is conceivable that the ballots of non-residents could be so allocated as to decide the election in favour of the Government. As a concession to the Opposition it was finally determined that non-residents should vote at the places in Canada where they enlisted. In support of the proposal to enfranchise non-residents it was insisted that men who were willing to fight for Canada should have the right to vote for Canada. During the first months of the war many British subjects living in the United States joined the oversea regiments, particularly those recruited in the Western Provinces. Many of these have served in the trenches long enough to qualify for the franchise. It was not convenient, however, to consider the period of service any more than it was thought necessary to insist that minors should be disfranchised. The Government contended that all men on active service with the Canadian forces should vote and, except as regards non-residents, the Opposition agreed. The time of voting in the army will extend over twenty-seven days in order that the troops, however situated, may have full opportunity to cast their ballots. Naturally, as a result of this arrangement, there will be serious delay in tabulating the vote in many constituencies. The Government made all necessary concessions to the Opposition in the endeavour to establish joint control of the election machinery and to guard against personation and other possible electoral improprieties.

There were far more radical differences of opinion in Parliament over the War-Time Election Act. It was only by the free application of closure that the measure was adopted ; but, however the Act itself may be regarded, this procedure was apparently approved in the country. It will be remembered that power to curtail debate was taken by the Government in 1912 when the proposal to

build Dreadnoughts for the Imperial Navy was subjected to desperate and continuous obstruction. In four subsequent sessions, however, closure was never applied. It is doubtful if it would have been used during the recent session if Parliament had not been on the verge of dissolution. The Government suspected that, unless closure were applied, the Opposition would obstruct the passage of the Election Act until October 7, when Parliament would expire by effluxion. There was vigorous resistance, but no such stormy scenes and dramatic incidents as characterised the memorable struggle over the Dreadnoughts. Moreover, as has been said, the country was seemingly impressed by the value of closure as a method of checking the interminable loquacity for which the Canadian Parliament is distinguished. It is likely that in the future closure will be used more freely, and perhaps any evils that may follow will be more than offset by a partial eradication of the abuses which have flourished under the old rules of procedure.

The War Time Election Act, so repugnant to the Opposition, disfranchises Mennonites and Doukhobors who came to Canada under guarantees that they would be relieved from military service, as also all natives of enemy countries who have lived less than fifteen years in the Dominion. It is estimated that under these provisions 35,000 natives of enemy countries will be debarred from voting. These reside chiefly in the Western provinces, and are mainly Germans and Austrians. The German communities of the older provinces will be only slightly affected. Nor will the Germans and Austrians on the Prairies be completely disfranchised. According to the quinquennial census of the Prairie provinces just issued 21·4 per cent. of the population of Saskatchewan, 13·21 per cent. of the population of Alberta, and 12 per cent. of the population of Manitoba are of German or Austrian origin. Moreover, in the three Prairie provinces, of the males between the ages of 20 and 34 there are 169,685 of Canadian and British

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origin and 111,304 of other stock. Thus the males of British origin exceed those of other origin by only 58,381, while there have enlisted from the three Western provinces 105,000, of whom at least 90 per cent. are between the ages of 20 and 34 and chiefly of British origin.

The proposal to disfranchise natives of enemy countries who have been less than fifteen years in Canada was denounced by the Opposition as a violation of the word of the Crown and the honour of the State, as a recrudescence of Krugerism, as making British citizenship "a scrap of paper," as comparable only to the Prussian spirit revealed in the attack on Belgium. The champions of the Government sought to create the impression that the Liberal attitude was explained by the expectation of alien support. They argued that Germans affected by the proposal, even though naturalised, were not relieved from the obligations of German citizenship. They held that to permit those of doubtful loyalty or those embarrassed by a double loyalty to affect the policy of Canada when its very existence as a free country was threatened would verge upon treason and disloyalty. It must be said, however, that these arguments were not supported by many conscriptionist Liberals in Parliament nor by Liberal journals whose attitude to the war is beyond suspicion. In the Commons and in the Senate little support could have been secured, outside the regular ministerialists, for any proposal to disfranchise those of any race or nationality who had acquired citizenship before the war and who during its continuance have been orderly and submissive to authority.

The Opposition also resisted the proposal to give votes to the widows, wives, mothers and sisters of soldiers. It was argued that many women who had devoted themselves to relief and patriotic movements had a clear if not equal right to the franchise, and that injustice would be done if these were excluded. It was pointed out that in Ontario, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta and British Columbia, where equal suffrage has been established and where hitherto

the provincial lists of voters had governed in federal elections, many women would actually be disfranchised. Therefore either the provincial lists should be adopted or all women should vote. But on behalf of the Government it was contended "that the Act was a war measure and that the object was to recognise the suffering and sacrifice of those women upon whom the consequences of war fell most heavily. Parliament had never extended the suffrage to women in federal elections. The Act, therefore, enfranchised thousands of women and disfranchised none." The Prime Minister intimated that, if the Government should be sustained, all women would receive the franchise when peace was restored, but the immediate purpose was to give votes only to women whose fathers, husbands or brothers were in uniform, and for this exceptional reason deserved special consideration. Under closure the Act substantially as introduced by the Government was adopted. It is remarkable that many leaders among women suffragists and the most influential women's organisations have expressed approval of the Government's action in consideration of the sacrifices entailed upon many households, the fact of war, and the necessity for adequate expression of the forces favourable to its vigorous prosecution.

It is estimated that by the War Time Election Act 500,000 women have been enfranchised. The households from which men have enlisted will have power at the polls three times greater than will be exercised by those from which none have gone or which had none to go. Moreover, if the provincial lists had been adopted, all women, whether in favour of the war or not, whether for or against conscription, would have voted. As it is, in the provinces which have equal suffrage, as in those which have not, only the women who have relatives in the war can go to the polls. It has been suggested that the passage of this legislation assured the return of the Borden Government and explains the final acceptance of coalition by the Western Liberal leaders. Possibly, if a Union Government had been

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organised during the session of Parliament, such action would not have been taken. Even the Western Liberals in Parliament who gave their votes for conscription could not be convinced that any measure of disfranchisement was wise or necessary. The facts, however, do not necessarily support the view that the Liberal leaders were coerced into coalition. It would rather seem that by the passage of the measure coalition was made more difficult for public men in the West who depend for support upon many racial elements and have maintained a sympathetic attitude towards the non-English population. The truth is that the Liberal leaders who have entered the coalition have been actuated by high motives. It is only ungenerous and mischievous to question their sincerity or their patriotism. They have taken office under a leader to whose general public policy they were opposed, have estranged many devoted followers, and have forsaken a leader who commands the affection of associates and the respect of opponents however strongly they may divide on public policy. Sir Wilfrid Laurier approaches his 77th birthday. It is believed that Mr. Carvell or Mr. Rowell would have succeeded to the leadership of the Liberal party. Sir Wilfrid's resignation was said to be under consideration while the Liberal conscriptionists were engaged in the conference which resulted in coalition. Men who rise to this conception of public duty are far removed from the common rank of time servers and self-seekers. They redeem politics and honour democracy.

There is, no doubt, a sullen feeling among the patronage element in both the old parties, but the masses of the people reveal a temper as sound, disinterested, and patriotic as animated the Conservative leaders who made union possible and the Liberal leaders who set aside differences and prejudices in order to unify and strengthen the nation for the supreme crisis in its history. No one has stated the significance of what has been accomplished more clearly and strongly than Sir Clifford Sifton, who

was himself instrumental in achieving the result. Its meaning, he says, is that the Coalition Government will undoubtedly carry the country at the approaching general election ; that the Military Service Act will be vigorously enforced ; that we shall be able, if necessary, to send our fifth division to the front and take the field with five full divisions and abundant reinforcements to keep them up to strength, no matter how long the war lasts ; and that Canada has asserted its ability to pull itself together in the face of an emergency and assert its national will to stand by its allies in full strength to the end. With characteristic courage and doggedness Sir Wilfrid Laurier seems to have resolved to retain the leadership of the Liberal Party and make conscription the chief issue in the election. He will not, however, agree to repeal the Military Service Act, as the Nationalists and the more irreconcilable Liberals of Quebec demand. This may expose him to attack by the Nationalists ; for Mr. Bourassa is not reconciled to the Liberal leader even by his resistance to the draft or by the schism among English-speaking Liberals. There is little prospect, however, that the Coalition Government can be defeated or that any group from Quebec can hold the balance of power in the next Parliament.

Canada. October, 1917.

AUSTRALIA

I. THE LABOUR PARTY IN DEFEAT

THE Federal elections in May resulted in the most crushing defeat for the Labour Party that any political party has sustained since the establishment of Federal Government in Australia. The loss of every Senate seat and a complete victory for the Government in the House of Representatives contests revealed the deep distrust which had been excited throughout the country by the ill-concealed disloyalty of one section of the party and the weakness of its leaders. In the new Parliament the party is not sufficiently numerous in either House to affect seriously the shaping of policy, whilst its personnel shows what an irremediable loss the party suffered when it expelled Mr. Hughes and his colleagues. By that act, as an election poster put it, the Labour Party "blew out its brains."

From the point of view of those who recognise that the Labour Party has done good work and has much that is salutary in its ideals, the disconcerting fact is that its present system of organisation and control gives no promise of improvement. The groups who really "run" the party frankly dislike men of outstanding personality, as their press organs have frequently proclaimed. An Australian Labour member must not be in any sense vigorously independent to his selection committee. The extreme section of the party, which has captured its machinery, is bent on driving the principle of complete control to the utmost limits. Mr. Arthur Rae, an ex-Senator, has

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described in the Sydney *Worker* the methods by which the "industrial section for securing Labour solidarity" conducts its operations. It will be seen from this that, "no matter what new facts or arguments may be adduced," the machine grinds out its mechanical purpose with automatic thoroughness. The "extreme section" is to control the Labour Conferences; the Conferences are to control the Labour members of Parliament. The italicised phrases in Mr. Arthur Rae's description make the process clear :

Now as to the methods of the industrial section for securing Labour solidarity.

They have a code of rules of their own; issue a badge of membership; charge affiliation fees to leagues and unions; elect an executive of their own; issue an annual report; have a printed form of pledge, which all delegates must sign; draw up an election list or ticket of their own members only to fill the position of president, vice-presidents, or secretary of the whole Labour movement of the State; also the New South Wales members of the Federal executive, and the six delegates to the Inter-State Labour Conference, and even the returning officer and the two scrutineers to conduct the elections. Furthermore, they discussed the Conference business paper, and whatever they decided to support or oppose every delegate on the "section" was pledged to vote solidly upon in Conference, *no matter what new facts or arguments might be adduced.* The "section" also has a rule that its members must vote in threes—that is, each member must show his ballot-paper after voting to two others; and *every candidate of the "section" for any office in the movement must sign an undated resignation and leave it in the hands of the "section" to hand in when dissatisfied with his conduct.*

Unless this complete subordination of the Labour Party to the commands of a few aggressive and not always very responsible persons be broken, the present Opposition in Parliament is likely to remain an opposition for a very long time, and to be as weak in personal ability as it is at present. Machines can manufacture automata, but men fit to govern are not produced in that way. Quite apart from errors of policy and distrust generated by unpatriotic

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action, a political party cannot with impunity expose itself to public derision by killing out the qualities in its representatives that are most needed in public men.

The tactics which have been pursued since the elections have afforded ample evidence that the lessons of defeat were not well learnt. The Victorian State Labour Conference in July passed an assortment of mutually contradictory resolutions dealing with the war and many other things; one of them favouring "the establishment of international arbitration to *finally* settle international disputes"; whilst a second expressed the view that, "though international arbitration may reduce the numbers of wars, lasting peace can only be won by the union of the working people of the world to overthrow the capitalist system"; and a third favoured the expansion of the existing machinery for international arbitration "to embrace a concert of Europe, ultimately merging into a world-wide Parliament." An inclination to pass any resolution if filled with phrases familiarised by frequent repetition in Labour newspapers was even more characteristic of this Conference than of its predecessors. By 112 votes to 52 the Conference favoured the "total abolition of compulsory military training," and urged that "the compulsory training clauses be deleted from the Defence Act." So that the party wirepullers, who have done their utmost to prevent Australia from fully exerting herself to defend the Empire, would also destroy the means whereby alone this country is able to equip itself for self-defence. An indication of the real disposition of the "advanced section" towards the war was revealed by a resolution passed by the Melbourne Trades Hall Council on July 19, which demanded that Labour members of Parliament should "refuse to assist in recruiting." The president of the Trades Hall Council and the seconder of the resolution were fined under the War Precautions Act at the Melbourne City Police Court on August 14 for prejudicing recruiting. The Labour members referred to have, in the best of cases

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rendered a minimum of service in that direction, whilst some have been openly hostile to efforts to secure enlistments. These various symptoms of the spirit actuating the small groups of men who have control of the wires by which the Labour movement is manipulated, both in its political and industrial phases, indicate that the chastisement inflicted by the electors at the polls has taught them little. Mr. Hughes has uttered the warning that "the unions are being led to destruction." They are still in the hands of men who, if in danger of falling over a precipice, would pass resolutions against the law of gravitation as the wicked work of capitalist exploiters.

The Labour Party under its present regime is still so far political as to be anxious to have office and a majority in Parliament. But the predominance of the "industrial" section stands for a readiness to resort to direct action for the attainment of any of its ends, an increasing belief in the efficacy of these methods as compared with political methods, and a disposition to use the strike in one form or another as a means of maintaining power in the hands of "class conscious" organised labour, whatever government is in office. The prevalence of such doctrines was bound to lead to an increase in the interruptions of industry and to menace the whole commercial and industrial activities of the country.

II. THE GREAT STRIKE IN SYDNEY

AT the time of writing (August 24, 1917) New South Wales is in the throes of an industrial upheaval which threatens to assume the scale and importance of the great Maritime Strike of 1890. Traffic and industry in other States have already been seriously affected, even to the extent of holding up transports and other essential war services. The Commonwealth Government has therefore become deeply concerned in the dispute, though the main struggle,

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in fact and principle, is between the Government of New South Wales and the Trade Unions. The true issue is fundamental ; it is no passing phase, no sudden eruption.

The trouble ostensibly arose through the introduction by the Railways Commissioners of a card system of recording particulars of times and jobs into the State tramway and railway workshops. The men stigmatised this action as an attempt at "speeding-up," and after a few days of restless discussion, the Commissioners declining to withdraw the system, the men delivered a 24-hours' "ultimatum," on the expiry of which (August 2) they came out on strike. The trouble so far involved nearly five thousand men. The unions formed a "Defence Committee," invested with very full powers. Three days later the Committee called out all men in the railway and tramway departments, and declared "black" all coal in the service of the Railways Commissioners. The great majority of men came out, though enough remained to enable the Government, with higher officials and volunteers, to maintain a very restricted but exceedingly useful service. A week after the beginning of the strike the Sydney wharf labourers resolved, by mass meeting, to join the strikers, and the coal miners also ceased work. On the tenth day the seamen and firemen employed on coastal and inter-State steamers came out. The slaughtermen and several minor unions have since been added, while all unions have refused to handle goods declared "black," including wheat, flour and all other goods seeking transport by rail or sea. After much deliberation the large ferry employees' unions and a few others have resolved to remain at work "until called out by the Defence Committee." The total number of men on strike is estimated to be about 75,000.

The attitude of the Government and the Commissioners has been firm throughout. On the eve of the strike those authorities offered (1) "That if, in three months, it could be shown before a public inquiry that the card system was

unjust, it would be revised.” (2) “That every man should, each day if so desired, inspect and initial his card relating to the previous day’s work.” As regards the second part of the offer it should be explained that a very general impression prevailed amongst the men that the foreman would fill in the individual cards without giving the men concerned an opportunity to check the details. The men refused this offer, proposing instead (1) That the Railways Commissioners revert to the position as on June 1. (2) “That the Government appoint a Royal Commission of Inquiry into the subject matter of the trouble, consisting of representatives of the Unions and of the Railways Commissioners.” (3) “That the men return to work upon the granting of this.”

In subsequent negotiations the Government has declined to vary its terms. The men have submitted only slight variations of theirs, except for an extraordinarily disingenuous offer to submit the alternatives to a ballot of the unions, both sides to be bound by the result. Meanwhile the Government, by proclamation and otherwise, has roundly denounced the strike as an organised rebellion against constituted authority, without a shadow of a real grievance, and inspired by disloyal leaders and I.W.W. (Independent Workers of the World) influence. It announced that all men in its service who did not return to work a week after striking would be dismissed and lose all the rights and privileges of their positions. The dismissal was formally pronounced in due course. A train and tram service sufficient for minimum public needs has been maintained, and some 2,500 volunteers, mainly from the country, are established in an encampment, being utilised mainly for wharf labour. There is little doubt that, with the numbers of men who have returned to work—though the actual figures are uncertain—and the volunteers, the community’s chief requirements can be met, in spite of inconvenience, for an indefinite period. This situation is largely the result of the sympathy of the general public with

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the Government, and the readiness with which the men of the country districts have come to the city to do the work of the strikers. The Federal and State Governments are co-operating to secure the loading of transports and the passage of food supplies. A Bill has been rushed through the State Parliament to enable the mines to be worked by recruited labour. The cancellation of the registration of several unions on strike has been granted in the Arbitration Court. Three of the strike leaders have been arrested for conspiracy to incite public servants to withdraw from their employment. It is now rumoured that in a few days the Unions' Defence Committee will appeal to the unions in all other States to cease work in sympathy with their comrades in New South Wales.

As to the merits and demerits of the original cause of dispute—namely, the card system—little need be said. The actual form of card introduced appears to differ very little from the time sheets in operation in the Government and many private workshops. Moreover, it does not of itself entail speeding-up; in that respect everything depends upon the spirit and method of its administration. However, the men are quite convinced that it is merely an instalment of the complete “Americanisation” of their work.

Public feeling runs strongly against the men, because it is held that the cause of the strike is in itself trifling; and that, even if it were not so, every expedient of conciliation should have been exhausted before such drastic steps were taken during the continuance of the great war. It will be seen that a very thin line divides the proposals of the Government from those of the unions. The Government insists on resumption of work while the card system is on trial. The men ask for suspension of the card system until an inquiry has been held. There is much talk amongst the unions of the implacability of the Government, but they do not sufficiently realise that for the Government to give way is to present the appearance of weakness in the control

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of its business and inevitably to bring upon itself a future crop of stoppages. The coal strike of last year ended in a victory for the men. It has been followed, not by industrial peace, but by more strikes and disputes than have occurred in any similar period for many years. In the present crisis the men do not realise what it would mean to the Government to yield on a point which seems to them comparatively unimportant.

There is, however, much more behind this strike than its immediate cause. It is not an isolated outbreak, but rather a culmination of a series of developments of the past two years. Some of these were dealt with in *THE ROUND TABLE* for December, 1916, under "Industrial Unrest in Australia." A few may be specially mentioned: (1) The rise in the cost of living. (2) The failure of Arbitration Courts and Wages Boards to fulfil the somewhat extravagant anticipations of the workers. (3) The success of the campaign against conscription, which gave extremists in the Political Labour League an exaggerated sense of power. (4) The rise to power of the extremist section in the political Labour movement, which it now dominates to the virtual exclusion of all others. (5) The trial and conviction of twelve members of the I.W.W. on charges of sedition and arson. (6) The invasion of Australia by advocates of the philosophy of violence, mainly as members or representatives of the I.W.W.

The defeat of the Labour Party at the recent elections had only a slightly depressing effect upon its spirit; and it is a reasonable surmise that the present strike movement is deliberately designed as an effort to defeat the Government in the industrial field.

Developments are taking place every day: the trouble may extend to other States of the Commonwealth; and for many reasons it is preferable at this particular stage to do little more than place the bare facts before the reader.

The Strikes in Victoria

III. THE STRIKES IN VICTORIA

ON July 30, prior to the date of the outbreak of the railway strike in Sydney, the wharf labourers in Victoria had refused to handle foodstuffs for export unless it was shown that they were intended for war purposes. This action was taken as a protest against alleged "profiteering," and with the idea that it would have the effect of forcing the price of foodstuffs down to the level that existed before the war. Though the wharf labourers' original decision was that they would not load foodstuffs, they were advised that if they partly loaded a vessel with merchandise and then refused to complete the loading (either with foodstuffs or any other cargo) they would render themselves liable as strikers under the penal provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act. They accordingly decided not to commence loading at all, with the idea of protecting themselves from any possible legal proceedings if they refused to load foodstuffs only.

On August 7 the Prime Minister received a deputation from the Melbourne Trades Hall of delegates who wished to place before him the views of the unions regarding the high cost of living. While Mr. Hughes promised to place the views of the deputation before the Government, he dealt at length with the position created by the raising of wages and the increased cost of production, and with the disastrous effects on industry of the repeated stoppages of work on the part of the wharf labourers. Two days later the question of the increase in price of certain staple commodities was referred by the Government for immediate enquiry to the Inter-State Commission.

Though there was a partial and temporary resumption of work by the wharf labourers, on the following day an entirely new element was introduced. It had been customary for the wharf labourers in Melbourne seeking work

to muster at certain places—called “picking-up points”—adjacent to the wharves where the particular vessels were due, pay beginning from the time the men were engaged. The men now demanded that one particular place, situated at a considerable distance from some of the wharves, should be the sole “picking-up” locality. If this question had been the only one with which the shipping companies had to deal, the solution might not perhaps have been a matter of great difficulty. There were, however, the other problems of the men’s attitude on the cost-of-living question and the extension of the New South Wales strike, the latter event in itself promising to disorganise the whole of the shipping trade. In commenting on this development and on the extension in Victoria of the Sydney strike the Prime Minister stated that the wharf labourers had thrown off all disguise and had lent themselves to a conspiracy against the general community.

While these troubles were developing in Victoria, the strike of the shunters and gantry hands in Newcastle and other parts of New South Wales, who stopped work in sympathy with the railway and tramway men early in August, made it impossible for vessels in that State to be supplied with coal, so that the inter-State and coastal steamship services were immediately dislocated. The transport trade was further interrupted through the action of the railway men in the northern parts of Queensland, who ceased work owing to their dissatisfaction with the result of a State award under which certain increases in wages were not made retrospective. After being out on strike for three weeks these men decided by ballot on August 28 to resume work.

In the meantime there had been various minor extensions of the strike in Victoria. On August 14 certain stevedore labourers, who had hitherto expressed their willingness to work while the wharf labourers were on strike, refused to start unless they were granted an increase of pay over and above the rate provided for by an award of the

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Federal Court. On the following day the watchmen employed at the wheat stacks near Melbourne and men engaged on shifting wheat at Murrayville went on strike, while the coal-lumpers employed at the Naval Depot at Williamstown declared the coal "black." On August 15 and 16 the crews of certain vessels in Melbourne gave 24 hours' notice of their intention to leave their ships. This individual action was taken with the object of protecting the officials of the union and the union's funds from the penalties of the Federal Arbitration Act. The men claimed that they were not on strike, but had only relinquished individually their positions by giving notice as prescribed by the award under which they were working. A large number of carters and drivers and of timber workers have also ceased work as they refuse to touch cargo that has been handled by non-unionists. On August 17 wharf labourers at Geelong refused to resume loading, and on about the same date the coal miners in Victoria ceased work.

In other States also there were various stoppages of work. On August 13 the wharf labourers at Brisbane went out on strike in sympathy with the movement in the southern States. On the same date the platelayers at the head of the eastern section of the transcontinental railway stopped work because they were refused pay for three days' work lost through a recent dispute, while the wharf labourers at Fremantle refused to load flour on the pretext that "it might reach Germany." On August 20 the miners at Broken Hill, to the number of 6,000, decided to join the ranks of the strikers. Tasmania is thus the only State to which the strike has not yet actively extended.

The dislocation of the shipping industry and the cutting off of supplies of coal from Newcastle soon began to affect others than those directly concerned. Many carters and drivers were thrown out of work, while employers in various manufacturing industries were compelled to dismiss a

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number of hands owing to the disastrous effect of the stoppage of shipping on inter-State trade.

The attitude of the Federal Government to the strikers is reflected in a statement made by the Prime Minister on August 10, when he appealed to the common sense and loyalty of the trade unionists of Australia. "I believe," Mr. Hughes said, "that at the bottom of this is the aftermath of the 5th of May (*i.e.* the date of the Federal elections, when the official Labour Party was defeated). It is an attempt . . . to take the control of the country out of the hands of the Government. . . . The citizens may rest assured that the Government will most certainly not permit irresponsible persons to usurp its functions, but will exhaust all the resources at its disposal to carry on the work of the country and to enable Australia to do its duty in this great war." Four days later the Federal Government issued a proclamation declaring that the upheaval was due to "wild extremists and secret agents of Germany" and appealing to the trade unionists to repudiate by word and deed the policy of the "disloyal, reckless men who are responsible for the present state of affairs." The men were asked to return to work within 24 hours, and warning was given that any person who attempted to interfere or dissuade or influence loyal citizens from carrying on the work of the country would be dealt with promptly and effectually. On August 15 regulations were issued under the War Precautions Act imposing a penalty upon anyone interfering with the discharge or loading of shipping, and providing for the safeguarding of wharves and ships. Though pressed to do so by deputations from the Melbourne Trades Hall, Mr. Hughes refused to grant Federal intervention with a view to settling the strike, on the grounds that the matter in dispute is between the New South Wales Government and its employees, that he is not prepared to intervene unless both parties agree, and that the New South Wales Government is not prepared to accept Federal intervention.

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The efforts made by the Federal and State Governments to deal with the situation arising out of the strike have met with a large measure of success. A central National Service Bureau has been established in Melbourne, with branches in other towns and States, and several thousand "free" workers have already been enrolled and put to work. In all cases men engaged through these bureaux are being paid the award rates in force. The Federal Government has, moreover, appointed a committee of the Cabinet to deal with all matters arising out of the strike, while the State Government has appointed a similar committee to deal with the Victorian situation.

A considerable amount of criticism has been levelled against the Federal Arbitration system by reason of the inability of the Court to deal with the present crisis. Mr. Justice Higgins, the President of the Court, has pointed out that the root of the trouble is in New South Wales, and that there are two reasons which render the intervention of the Court impossible. One is that the Court cannot, under the Federal constitution, deal with the relations of State railway servants and their employers. The other is that the main dispute does not extend beyond one State. The strikes of the waterside workers and seamen are not on account of any dispute with their employers about any "industrial matter"; these men are in dispute with the Government either with respect to the card system in the railway workshops, in so far as the strikers are sympathetic, or with respect to an economic matter, in so far as the strikers are concerned with the cost of living. In an application by the steamship owners to strike out of the award the "preference" clause which provides that no member of the Waterside Workers' Federation shall be required to work along with any person who is not a member of the Federation, the President has taken the view that there was in Melbourne and Sydney a cessation of work on the part of the members of the Federation in combination, as a means of bringing pressure to bear,

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indirectly and in some remote manner, on the New South Wales Railways Commissioners, so as to force them to withdraw the card system. He has accordingly ordered that the preference clause be struck out unless the men return to work within a week. The Federal Government has carried a regulation under the War Precautions Act empowering the Governor-General in Council to deregister any union the members of which cease work. Deregistration will deprive the union of all the benefits conferred by any existing award of an arbitration court. In view of the grave situation created by the refusal of the wharf labourers at Port Pirie in South Australia to handle coke required in the making of munitions, the Prime Minister has applied for cancellation of the registration of the Waterside Workers' Federation.

Though it is stated that large numbers of the railway and tramway men are returning to work in Sydney, it is unwise at the present stage to speculate as to the future course of the strikes.

Australia. August, 1917.

POSTSCRIPT.

THE New South Wales railway strike collapsed during the month of September, the men returning to work under the card system and accepting the Government's terms. One by one the other unions followed suit, the coal-miners last of all; and by the end of October the strike movement was at an end throughout the Commonwealth. The Governments primarily concerned made no concessions to the demands made by any of the unions.

SOUTH AFRICA

THE REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA.

DURING the past year a remarkable development has taken place in South African politics by the definite adoption by the Nationalist Party of the policy of independence for South Africa. The first announcement of this policy undoubtedly came as an unwelcome surprise to many people of both races, and, as was to be expected in the present time of tense feeling, brought with it a recrudescence of dormant or, at any rate, quiescent racial antipathies. It was, however, a natural and logical outcome of the movement which led to the secession of General Hertzog and his followers from General Botha and to the ultimate formation of the Nationalist Party.

It may, perhaps, be remembered that nearly five years ago General Hertzog left the Botha Ministry, or, as his friends say, was driven out of the Ministry, because of the incompatibility with the Government policy of the views which he held and expressed on the relations of South Africa to the Empire. The German war menace was already a cloud on the horizon and the question of what the position of South Africa would be in the event of war had already begun to occupy attention. General Hertzog came out as the spokesman of the view that the true attitude of South Africa in such a war would be one of neutrality, and this idea of neutrality became a centre of controversy in the Press and on public platforms. General Botha definitely pronounced against it, and it then became

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clear that a definite separation between him and the champions of the other view within his party was only a matter of time. Other causes no doubt contributed to the decisive step. The unsettling effects of the establishment of Union, the abolition of the old seats of Government which the people had been accustomed to regard as peculiarly their own and the removal of Government and Parliament to Pretoria and Cape Town, the economic and political isolation of the Orange Free State, perhaps even—as the public is apt to suspect on such occasions—the conflicting ambitions of political leaders—all these are causes to which the historian may trace in greater or less degree the events which happened.

But the ostensible cause of the secession was the real or, at any rate, the predominating one—the dissatisfaction of a section of the people with the position of South Africa as a Dominion of the Empire. It was not at first avowedly a separation movement, though no doubt most of the enthusiasm behind it came from men who had never at heart accepted the British connection and were ready to welcome any opposition to it. Ostensibly, however, it began by accepting the position of partnership in the British Empire, but demanding that Imperial interests should not be allowed to overshadow or prejudice those of South Africa. “South Africa first” was the shibboleth by which it was sought to distinguish those who were accounted as the true patriots from those who had been contaminated by Imperialist or, as it is called, “jingo” influence. This was interpreted as meaning that South African statesmen should disregard any obligation attaching to the British connection as soon as it involved any conflict with what seemed to be the interests of South Africa as a separate unit, but should acquiesce in the connection so long as there was no risk of conflict between the two.

At first, as has been said, and ostensibly, this was the attitude towards the Imperial connection adopted by

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political leaders who formed the Nationalist Party. It was even included in the statement of principles adopted by the party on its formation. Article 4 of the Programme of Principles of the Nationalist Party reads as follows :

It unequivocally accepts the Position of the Union in regard to its Connection with the United Kingdom resting as it does on the Good Faith of Two Nations, and it is convinced that the Maintenance of good Relations between the Union of South Africa and the United Kingdom depends upon the scrupulous Avoidance of any Measure whereby the political Freedom of the People of the Union is in any way curtailed or hampered, or whereby any of the Liberties of the Country and its Government are withdrawn from the immediate Jurisdiction or Control of the People of the Union.

It was, however, obvious that the party could not rest there, because the theory of Imperial relations under which South Africa would take any benefits which might come from its membership in the Empire while repudiating any obligations arising from it was too much of a sham to live even in the soil of South African politics. The outbreak of war gave the final push towards clearness and sincerity.

There can be little doubt that disaffection to the British flag in South Africa was one of the contingencies on which the German Government counted in the event of war with the British Empire. It is probable that its agents, official and unofficial, did what they could to turn the eyes of the disaffected towards the rising power of Germany as the instrument of Providence from which the overgrown and decadent British Empire would receive its mortal stroke. But it is not necessary to ascribe to direct German activity in the shape of influence or money either the rebellion of 1914 or the present separatist campaign. Direct encouragement of this sort or a promise of it may have been at work in isolated instances, but the soil was so ready for the growth of disaffection that a seed dropped from anywhere was sure to grow.

The outbreak of war gave definite form to the somewhat

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vague sentiments of dissatisfaction with the British connection on which the Nationalist Party first took form. It seemed as if the long-expected day of reckoning for the British Empire had now dawned. As one of the Nationalist leaders said, the war "brought a message to the hearts of all true Africanders." The opening moves, the seemingly irresistible attack of the German hosts, the evident absence in England not only of efficient preparation for the war but even of adequate grasp of its real significance, the obvious attempts of the Press to conceal awkward facts and minimise the gravity of the military situation, all confirmed the enemies of the Empire in their belief that its last hour had come. When, therefore, General Botha's Government decided to take an active part in the war by sending an expedition against the German colony of South-West Africa, all the forces and influences opposed to any participation by South Africa in the war and hostile to the cause of the Empire and its Allies came to a head, and the country drifted into civil war or, as it is commonly called, "rebellion."

From the military point of view the "rebellion" can hardly be taken seriously, but as a political event its significance can hardly be overestimated. It at once gave definite shape to the differences between the Nationalists and the Government and burned them into the hearts of the people. The old republican flag was raised again, and though those who tried after the suppression of the rebellion to justify or condone it described it as merely an "armed protest" against the Government's war policy, there can be no doubt that what inspired most of the leaders and many of those who took part in it was the hope of recovering independence and restoring the old republics. The suppression of the rebellion left that ideal stronger than it was before, and though the Nationalist Party (which justified and even glorified the rebellion) had necessarily at first to disavow the revolutionary aims of the rebel leaders while it was endeavouring to minimise their

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offence and obtain an amnesty, yet as soon as that immediate object had been obtained it was just as necessarily driven to the public adoption of the republican ideal as an object to be attained by political and constitutional paths.

The war has been the occasion rather than the cause of this development, though it has undoubtedly brought to activity feelings and ideals which might otherwise have smouldered long. At the same time it has made the propagation of such doctrines much more dangerous to the peace of the community. Even in normal times we are still too near the days of the Anglo-Boer War for it to be possible to advocate a policy of independence for South Africa without raising anew all the bitterness of the conflict which closed at Vereeniging in 1902. But these times are not normal. Even here the strain of the great struggle is keenly felt. Many have suffered bereavement or have their nearest relatives or best friends in daily peril at the front. Many more who have not the same personal stake at hazard are stirred to their depths by the daily reports of the ebb and flow of battle. There they feel that the supreme issues are at stake for the people to which they belong and for its ideals and the great political fabric which through generations of struggle and achievement it has built up. For these the propagation at such a time of doctrines of independence for South Africa, accompanied, as it too often is, by manifestations of ill-concealed sympathy with the cause of our enemies, seems to be nothing short of treason, and rouses passions which will not be kept within the ordinary bounds of civil order. For this reason the Nationalist leaders who are responsible for spreading their propaganda at the present time are literally playing with fire. Recognising this, the Federal Council of the Nationalist Party at its meeting in July last recommended that their members should refrain from urging their doctrines during the war, and some of their leaders—among them General Hertzog—have so far followed this counsel. On others, however, it has had no visible effect.

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The form which the movement has taken since it came out into the open as an acknowledged plank in the programme of a professedly peaceful and constitutional party is almost comically "correct." It professes to found itself on the declarations of Mr. Lloyd George and President Wilson as to the objects for which the Allies are fighting. From these it selects those which suit its purpose with the same adroitness and disregard of the higher verities as a smart lawyer selects for the consideration of a jury facts which seem to support the case for which he is pleading. Having proved from the utterances of the statesmen named that the objects for which the Allies are fighting are the protection of small nations and the rights of peoples to decide what shall be their form of government, the Nationalist leaders conclude that they have established an irresistible case against the Empire before the post-war tribunal of the nations for the granting of independence to South Africa, or at least for the restoration of the republics in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. The latter object—restoration of the old republics—is asked for on the principle—sound enough in a court of law—that you must not ask for more than your cause of action will support. It is fairly certain that if it were offered now it would be rejected by a large majority of the people. It would mean for one thing the breaking up of the Union, which, after all, only a very small number of people would like to see. But besides that, even if a Transvaal republic could be brought back from the grave of the past, it would, unless the old restricted franchise is also to be restored, be a very different place from the old republic of 1889. To-day in the Transvaal Provincial Council the Witwatersrand and Pretoria between them return a majority of the members, and so they would in any republican Chamber which was based on a fair franchise. Such a state of things, needless to say, would make no appeal to those whose political outlook rests on keeping alive the sentiments of 1899-1902, and whose national ideals are those of the

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voortrekkers. Still it seems to be thought that if on the logic of the case the post-war tribunal of the nations is constrained to declare in favour of the restoration of the two republics it may, if convinced that this in itself is not practicable, be led farther, *ut res magis valeat quam pereat*, to pronounce in favour of the granting of independence to the whole of the Union.

Such is what may be called the formal basis on which is rested the case which is now being put forward by the Nationalist leaders for the establishment in the Union of an independent republican government. That is intended, of course, to satisfy the lawyers, the constitutionalists—to show that nothing is being asked for which does not follow logically, at any rate by implication, from the accepted declarations of the leaders of the Allied Powers. What better guarantee of constitutional respectability could be asked for by the most exacting British patriot? But for the mass of the people something more substantial or, at any rate, less academic is required. For them there is first the appeal to the sentiment of independence deeply rooted in the Boer people for which many of them fought and suffered. Then there is the demonstration of the material loss which South Africa suffers from her interests being always subordinated to those of the Empire. The recent negotiations between the Imperial Government and the Union Government for the purchase of the wool clip have been seized on with avidity and proclaimed by every Nationalist editor and speaker as a convincing illustration of what they call the economic subjection of South Africa. Perhaps it would not be an exaggeration to say that since the rebellion nothing has touched the feelings of the farming community so much as what is known as “the wool question”; it is certainly not overstating the case to say that nothing has cost the Government so much political support. That is partly the fault of the Government itself, for it has been anything but happy in its manner of presenting its case to those with whom it had

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to deal, but much more it is due to the fact that this particular incident came just when the Nationalist leaders were looking for an object lesson of their favourite theme that the connection of South Africa with the Empire means invariably the subjection of South African interests, economic and other, to those of an outside Power. The wool question came to them as if it had been specially contrived for their purpose and the country has rung with it from one end to the other.

The price offered by the Imperial Government is 55 per cent. above the pre-war prices of 1913-14, but this is considerably below the prices at which last year's clip were sold by the farmers, and having once tasted prices two or three times as high as those of 1913-14 they naturally look coldly on a drop to a 55 per cent. increase. The fact that a large portion of last year's clip is still cumbering the warehouses of the ports for want of ships to take it away and that the prospects of moving the new clip are even more uncertain does not trouble the farmer as long as speculative buyers are prepared to offer him something like the old inflated price—as apparently, in some districts at any rate, is still being done. In these circumstances it is not difficult to persuade him that the Imperial Government is using its control of shipping in forcing him to sell his wool much under market price—in fact, that his wool is being commandeered by the Botha Government for the use of their friends in London, to whom the poor South African farmer is offered as a sacrifice. If South Africa were an independent country, so the Nationalists say, its wool would have access to what they call the open market, and would be bought by America and Japan at about twice the price which the Imperial Government is offering. But, as South Africa is a British Dominion, the Imperial Government is taking the wool at its own price by a sort of economic conscription, relying on its control of shipping to prevent any rival buyers from getting their purchases removed. This fiction of an “open market” to which the wool of

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South Africa would have free access if only South Africa were not part of the British Empire, and therefore compelled to sell its wool at whatever price the Imperial Government chooses to pay, may seem ludicrous to those who can look impartially at the facts, but it is one which has taken a strong hold on the mind of the South African farmers, and is eagerly fostered by those who find in it a most effective instrument for driving home their doctrine of independence.

Though some of the incidents associated with the entry of this movement upon the public stage may seem to suggest comic opera rather than serious politics, it would be a mistake to underestimate the significance of it and the dangers which its propagation may entail in the present condition of the country. To understand its significance one must look behind the speeches and arguments of the leaders, which are often only so much window dressing, to the sentiments, the traditions, and the economic condition of the people to whom they really appeal. If we look at these we shall find much to explain both the rise of the movement and its spread. When we further consider the far-reaching effects of the war in breaking down old restraints and traditions, the spectacle of the Russian revolution in which, as if by magic, a great people seems to have passed from the extremest autocracy to the most unrestrained freedom, it is easy to understand that we have here in South Africa a soil in which any plant which promises to grow up into independence and the restoration of the republic will readily take root.

Whether the movement will survive the end of the war if, as we assume, the end is a decisive victory for the Allies, is a question which at present is not easy to answer. That the republican sentiment will remain is certain. It will remain and be cherished as it is now even by many who are not prepared to see South Africa, at her present stage of development, cut herself off from the British Empire. It is equally certain that there will remain a section of the

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people who, on the question of imperial relations, will hold strongly to the narrowly "National" view. They will represent the view that South Africa should avoid anything that tends to establish closer relations with the other members of the British Commonwealth, or to bring about a common policy, and should aim at isolation from all imperial organisation and ultimately at independence. But after the Empire has emerged victorious from its present trial, and when the feelings which the war has created or revived here have had time to die down, it is probable that the independence movement will lose much of its present vigour. People will be able to look calmly at the practical difficulties which would face South Africa in breaking away from the protection of the British commonwealth of nations. Her geographical position and national resources have always hitherto entailed her dependence on the European Power which commanded the sea. Her European population, barely adequate to maintain itself in competition with the native and coloured races around it, is certainly in no position to defend her coasts. Considerations such as these are either overlooked altogether, in the stress of feeling evoked by the war, or they are waved aside by the easy assumption that after the war an era of universal peace is to dawn and the stronger nation will no longer desire or be allowed to impose its will upon the weaker. It is probable, however, that for some time at any rate, after the war, international relations will not be such as to justify that confidence or such as to lead responsible statesmen to think the time opportune for a country such as South Africa to exchange its present position for one in which it will be entirely responsible for its own defence.

Even if this forecast is correct, however, it does not justify the conclusion that nothing need be done to meet the movement now.

The first reaction caused by the public adoption by the Nationalist Party of the republican propaganda took the form of spasmodic efforts in different parts of the country

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to form constitutional parties or organisations which should unite persons irrespective of party in defence of the constitution. These efforts, as might have been expected, attracted little public support. Then a demand arose, or rather, perhaps, an expectation, in certain quarters that General Botha should form a Coalition Government from his own party and the Unionists to carry the country through the period of the war. The Unionist leader made it clear that he was prepared to consider any proposal in this direction which might be made by the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister, however, at his party Congress has definitely and emphatically declared that he will have nothing to do with coalition in any form. That means that he will endeavour to carry on the Government without a majority in the House of Assembly, relying on the support of the Unionists, in the hope that after the war the prestige of success will rally to his side a strong-enough party to give him a clear majority without embarrassing alliances.

Since the above was written there have been clear indications that what has been referred to as the practical aspect of the situation has already made itself felt. The Nationalist party has been holding its Congresses in the Cape, the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, and at each of them, though of course the cause of independence and the republic was not abandoned, the prevailing attitude was that of disavowing any active propaganda at the present time, and the adoption of academic resolutions about the ultimate freedom of South Africa and the right of peoples to decide their own destiny. Independence and a republic for South Africa will continue to be an aspiration with many, and a passion with some, but they are not likely for a long time to come to be a question of practical politics.

South Africa. October, 1917.

NEW ZEALAND

I. MINISTERS AND THE WAR CONFERENCE

THE War Conference of the Empire is now a thing of the past. Our delegates have long since returned to New Zealand from the Mother Country, bringing with them their sheaves in the shape of municipal and other honours. They have also brought back—what many people in this Dominion have been anxiously awaiting—a full account of their doings at the War Conference (and elsewhere) during their prolonged absence from New Zealand.

The Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance were away from the Dominion for fully ten months—from August, 1916, until June, 1917. Many important and difficult questions relating to the war had perforce to be decided in their absence by the acting Prime Minister (Sir James Allen) and his remaining colleagues. During that time, for example, Conscription was gradually brought into full working order and a dangerous coal strike had to be settled. Mr. Massey, and Sir Joseph Ward also, were blamed by the unthinking public for deserting their posts at a time of national stress, and their visit to England was by some held up to derision as a species of glorified picnic at the expense of the taxpayers of New Zealand.

The loudest complaints against our Imperial envoys were three in number: that they should have gone to England at all at such a time, that they should have stayed away so long, and that Sir Joseph Ward should have accom-

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panied the Prime Minister on his mission. The truth, of course, is that no one of these complaints was well founded. To deal with them in their order: As was clearly pointed out in these pages so far back as in December, 1915,* it was even then deemed eminently desirable that one or more of our Ministers should proceed to London and there ascertain from His Majesty's Government how New Zealand could best help in ending the war and framing the conditions of peace. This we have no reason to doubt our delegates have done to the best of their ability. In the second place, it was through no fault of our Ministers that they were detained so long in England. They left the Dominion in August, 1916, and had actually arranged to leave England at the end of December. A few weeks earlier the Asquith Government fell. The "National" Ministry was formed early in December, and one of the first acts of the new Administration was to summon a War Conference of the Empire to meet in London at the earliest possible date in 1917. Our Ministers promptly and properly cancelled their arrangements for returning to the Dominion, and attended the meetings of the War Conference. Mr. Hughes could not be present at this Conference on behalf of Australia, which in itself was a national misfortune. It would have been little short of a disaster if New Zealand also had not been represented—thus leaving Australasia without a voice at the first meeting of the Supreme Executive Council of the British Empire. The third count of the popular indictment also fails. Ill-natured people here have said, and are saying: What occasion was there for the Minister of Finance to go to England? Could not the Prime Minister alone adequately represent New Zealand? These people forget that Sir Joseph Ward, besides being Finance Minister in our National Ministry, remains also the Leader of the late Opposition—the head of the "Liberal" party in this Dominion. It has frequently been demonstrated,

* ROUND TABLE, No. 21, pp. 190-1.

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in THE ROUND TABLE and elsewhere, that it would be of great importance to have present at the Imperial War Conference, not only a Minister of the party in power, but also a representative of the Opposition, from each of the Dominions, so as to ensure so far as possible some continuity in the future foreign policy of the outposts of our Empire. We congratulate Mr. Massey and Sir Joseph Ward on having been able in person to achieve this desirable result on behalf of New Zealand.

Mr. Massey and his colleague landed at Auckland on June 25th, 1917. The opening of Parliament took place at Wellington on the 28th. In the Governor-General's speech at the opening ceremony, the attendance of our Ministers at the War Conference was succinctly referred to as follows :

At the invitation of the Imperial Government responsible statesmen of the Dominions and of India met recently in England to confer on the present difficulties *and future constitution* of the Great Empire to which we belong. The attendance of our Prime Minister and Minister of Finance at this Imperial Conference has enabled them to obtain information of value to my Government and to this Dominion.

The presence of my Ministers with the Responsible Ministers of other Dominions at meetings of the War Cabinet was an event remarkable in our history. It indicates the recognition by the Imperial Government of the growth of the Dominions, the responsibilities of Empire, and *the right of the Dominions to representation* when issues vital to their safety and interests may be under consideration.

I have been glad within the last two days to welcome home my two Ministers and their families, and am confident you will find the course of your deliberations simplified and facilitated by the experience they have gained, not only in Great Britain, but at the seat of war on the Western front.

These paragraphs from the Governor-General's speech would appear, on the whole, to give a fair presentment of the Imperial Mission of our two Ministers, although it may with deference be suggested that His Excellency has somewhat magnified their office in respect of the two points underlined above.

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On June 29th Sir James Allen cordially welcomed the Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance on their return to the House of Representatives, and it was arranged that the two returning envoys should give the House an account of their stewardship a few days later. On July 3rd, accordingly, Mr. Massey and Sir Joseph Ward in turn addressed an expectant House at great length on the various aspects of their Imperial Mission. Before dealing with their actual work at the Conference itself they both laid stress on the efforts they had made at home on behalf of the producers of this Dominion, and it was quite apparent from their statements that ample justice had been done by our representatives—to their own constituents, at all events—in the way of securing good prices and shipping facilities for New Zealand produce. They also gave a very pleasing report of the welfare of our New Zealand soldiers, both in England and on the Western front. Having thus cleared the ground, our delegates went on to the most important and interesting part of their promised statement—an account of their doings at the War Conference itself. We may say at once that to the average man in New Zealand that account (as reported in Hansard) appears diffuse and difficult to understand. No doubt this may in part be explained by the obvious necessity for reticence as to what took place at the War Cabinet as distinguished from the War Conference. But some at least of the proceedings of our delegates at the War Conference itself (as narrated by themselves) seem hard to reconcile with their position and duties thereat.

For example, Sir Joseph Ward tells us in his statement to the House how he made it clear at the Conference that the people of this Dominion for the future would *claim as a right* to share with Great Britain in the control of the foreign policy of the Empire, on the ground that our services and sacrifices during the war had entitled us thereto. That he should have preferred such a claim at this time came to us with a shock of surprise. To begin

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with, surely such a claim did not come within the scope of the business of the War Conference at all. It certainly cannot be brought within the terms of the invitation to attend that Conference. It does not affect in any way the prosecution of the war, or the possible terms of peace, or any problem immediately arising therefrom. Further, we are quite sure that neither of our delegates held any mandate from the Parliament or the people of New Zealand to put forward such a claim at any time or place, or on any ground, however adequate. It is not a little difficult for an ordinary citizen of New Zealand to understand how this untimely demand came to be made by Sir Joseph Ward on behalf of the Dominion and yet without its authority. But this does not end the matter. Sir Joseph in his *apologia* then goes on further to develop his "claim" briefly as follows: (a) No doubt money will be required from each Dominion for its share of the cost incidental to this control of foreign policy; but (b) the finances of each Dominion must not be dealt with by any Parliament outside that Dominion; and finally (c) no Dominion must yield any part of the full powers of self-government that it at present possesses. Truly this is hard and novel doctrine! What does it all amount to when resolved into its elements? It means in effect that Great Britain is to surrender to the Dominions an undefined share of its existing and real autonomy, while the Dominions are to part with none of theirs. It means, further, that Great Britain is in the first instance to bear the whole cost of the foreign policy of the Empire, while each Dominion may or may not afterwards refund its proportionate share, according to the mere good pleasure of its Parliament for the time being. Apart from these considerations, it is difficult to reconcile the claim to the retention of the "full powers of self-government" at present supposed to be enjoyed by the Dominions (and of which they are to surrender no shred) with the practical experience of the war. Not only are the Dominions in

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constitutional law at all times dependent upon and subordinate to the will of the Imperial Parliament, but we are now in many essential respects controlled and, in fact, governed by the Imperial Parliament. The British Government has commandeered our produce. It has taken away our ocean-going steamers and diverted many of them to our competitors in South America. It declared war, and will make peace (along with its Allies) on its own initiative. In New Zealand now we are living not under our own statute law, but under War Regulations in effect dictated by the Imperial authorities. And all this is as it should be, for there *must* be one body responsible for the conduct of foreign affairs and of the war, and that body (for all our talk of "Dominion autonomy") is, and remains, the Imperial Government. To carry the matter one stage further, it may not yet be clear to our politicians, but it has already become apparent to many of their fellow-citizens, that if the people of the Dominions are to share in the government of the Empire they must bear their personal share of its obligations, and further that there must be one elected body (responsible to all of them) charged with foreign relations and the making of war and peace. If that body is really to govern the Empire, it must have three powers—Legislation, Administration and Taxation. If it lacks any one of these three, it will really be impotent.

The foregoing comments apart, we have no doubt that our delegates did good work at the Conference, that their work in time will bear precious fruit, and that the citizens of this Dominion will ultimately derive lasting benefit through being represented as they were at the War Conference of 1917. The mere discussion in public and private of the claim (thus prematurely advanced) by our delegates for a share in the foreign policy of the Empire has done much to stimulate and even to educate the public mind here on the subject. Nay, we believe that the "plain man" in New Zealand, who has thought out the

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matter for himself, has come to sounder conclusions than many of the politicians. Unlike some of our rulers, he is not so much concerned with the privileges as with the responsibilities of Empire. He is gradually coming to understand that in Imperial affairs as in local concerns he can have no rights apart from corresponding duties, that for him there can be no representation without taxation.

It is beginning also to dawn upon many of us that to this vexed question of our "right" to share in Imperial governance there is a previous question. Are we in these Dominions yet fitted for Imperial rule? Are we prepared, are we in any true sense ready, to take up our share of the "White Man's Burden"? Can the Dominions, for example, fairly claim at present to take any part in ruling the great Dependencies? That question almost answers itself. Our only outward and visible effort in this direction so far has been—the passing of stringent anti-Asiatic legislation! Of the effect of that legislation on India we have had a recent and timely reminder from a casual visitor to this Dominion. Sir Henry Richards, Chief Justice of the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, gave a brief address to the New Zealand Club at Wellington on June 12th, 1917. In the course of his remarks Sir Henry Richards made it very clear to his hearers (amongst whom were two Ministers of the Crown) that educated Indians had most decided objections to any Imperial Constitution in which the Colonies were to be given any voice in Indian matters. He quoted a native friend of his as saying: "The very notion of allowing the Dominions to have one word to say in our affairs is unthinkable. They are the people who refuse to allow Indians to land in their countries."

The truth about the whole matter is that it is too early in the day for anyone as yet to dogmatise as to the true nature of the constitutional changes that we promise ourselves after the war. So far we have not had either the knowledge

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or the leisure to realise the full import of any such changes upon the people of the Dominions. All that we know, all that we can thoroughly grasp at present, is the outstanding fact that Indian and Dominion representatives have for the first time sat together as equal partners in the Imperial Cabinet. In view of our knowledge of that inspiring fact, we should be content to repeat and endorse the eloquent words of Sir Robert Borden : " It is not for me to prophesy as to the future significance of these pregnant events ; but those who have given thought and energy to every effort for the full constitutional development of the oversea nations may be pardoned for believing that they discern therein the birth of a new and greater Imperial Commonwealth."

II. THE THIRD WAR BUDGET

THE Minister of Finance (Sir Joseph Ward) introduced his third War Budget on August 1st and is generally considered to have acquitted himself exceedingly well. It is true that the " Dominion " describes it as " a staggering Budget "—language at which anybody familiar with the colossal burdens cheerfully shouldered by the British taxpayer can only smile ; while, on the other hand, Labour, eager for " the conscription of wealth," laments the introduction of " another compromise Budget." But between these two extremes the average common sense of the country recognises that under much more difficult conditions than those of last year the Finance Minister has introduced a much better Budget.

A good general idea of the effect of the war upon our finances is given by the following table showing the revenue, the expenditure and the amount of the public debt during the three last complete financial years of peace and the three subsequent years, and also as estimated for the current year :

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<i>As at March 31.</i>	<i>Revenue.</i>	<i>Expenditure.</i>	<i>Public Debt.</i>
1912	11,061,161	10,340,368	82,193,310
1913	11,734,271	11,082,038	87,457,121
1914	12,229,661	11,825,864	91,689,835
1915	12,451,945	12,379,803	96,644,455
1916	14,510,137	12,493,107	105,957,433
1917	18,367,547	14,058,770	125,572,515
1918	17,262,800	16,082,702	150,322,515
(estimated)			

Thus during 1916-17 we had increased our revenue by £6,137,886, or by 50 per cent., as compared with the last year of peace, while the public debt had been increased by £33,882,680, or 37 per cent. The war was, of course, in each case the chief cause. A year ago Sir Joseph Ward estimated that the war would shortly be costing us over £1,000,000 a month; the present rate of expenditure is, he tells us, £1,900,000 a month. Last year he raised £16,000,000 for war purposes, of which £11,000,000 was locally subscribed. He now asks for authority to raise £24,000,000 for the purposes of the war. Our total war expenditure to June 30th last was £28,439,912, and the Minister estimates that by June 30th, 1918, it will have reached £50,000,000.

Of the £3,857,410 additional revenue raised last year no less than £2,870,007 came from the income-tax, customs with an increase of nearly half a million providing the next largest contribution. The trebling of the proceeds of the income-tax was the result of two changes, both of which, though the placing of the main burden upon the land and income commended itself to public opinion, were widely condemned. A war profits tax had been expected and promised, but when an excess profits tax appeared which was levied indiscriminately on all increases of income, whether or not the war had been a contributing cause, there was much disappointment. A 90 per cent. tax on real war profits would have given far greater satisfaction than the 45 per cent. actually imposed on profits which

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more often than not owed nothing to the war but had even been hindered by it.

Much less defensible was the proposal to increase a scientifically graduated income-tax by a uniform 1s. in the £, which was a direct inversion of the ordinary principle of graduation since it operated with special severity on the lower taxable incomes, representing a 150 per cent. increase at this end of the scale and tapering off to less than 40 per cent. at the other. The reduction of the increase to 6d. on incomes below £900 reduced the scope of the absurdity but did not alter its essence.

Both these anomalies are now removed. The excess profits tax is frankly abandoned as inequitable in its incidence and inadequate in its results. At the same time the experience of England, Canada and other countries is cited to prove that "the difficulties of ascertaining exactly the actual profits resulting from the war were almost insuperable." Incomes are to bear about £340,000 more than they did last year and land about £500,000 more, and in each case the result is to be arrived at not by grafting anomalies on to the graduated system existing before the war but by replacing it with a more scientific and uniform system. The principle of progressive graduation is to be applied throughout. The existing exemptions of £300 in the case of income and of £500 in the case of land, the unimproved value being in the latter case the criterion both for exemption and taxation, are retained. The income-tax will reach its maximum on an income of £6,400 and the land tax on an unimproved value of £192,000. The rates and the estimated proceeds of the new taxation are summarised as follows :—

	<i>Minimum</i>		<i>Maximum</i>		<i>Estimated</i>
	<i>Rate.</i>		<i>Rate.</i>		<i>Receipts.</i>
	s.	d.	s.	d.	£
Land Tax	0	1½	0	10½	1,250,000
Ordinary Income-tax	0	6	3	0	1,600,000
Special War Tax . .	0	9	4	6	3,000,000
					<hr/> 5,850,000

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Other features of the Budget are the rejection of the proposals of the National Efficiency Board for restricting the importation during the war of certain luxuries on the ground that we cannot afford the loss of revenue involved ; the imposition of an amusement tax on the lines of that imposed in Great Britain by the Finance (New Duties) Act, 1916, from which £80,000 is expected ; and an increase of the customs and excise duties on tea, beer, spirits, champagne, cigars, cigarettes, silks, satins, velvets, plushes and imitation silks, which is estimated to produce £275,000. The last of these estimates is, however, admittedly uncertain. "The Customs revenue for the present financial year is most difficult to estimate," says the Finance Minister. "The difficulties of transport, risks of loss, high freights and restrictions upon the exportation of many classes of goods from Great Britain make it impossible to measure with any degree of accuracy the volume of trade which will reach New Zealand while the war continues." Last year the Customs revenue was £3,849,675, exceeding the estimate by more than half a million and beating all previous records. The causes were the great appreciation of the values of goods subject to *ad valorem* duties and the increase of imports following on a check during the previous year. The immense increase in the value of our exports made this appreciation of imported articles easy to bear. The necessities of Europe have brought an unexampled prosperity to our producing industries. Our exports, which in the last calendar year before the war were valued at £22,986,722, had risen in 1916 to £33,286,937—an advance of nearly 50 per cent. The storage of shipping, which has accumulated more than 3,000,000 carcasses of mutton and beef in our ports and more cheese than there is storage for, is now threatening a check to this unnatural prosperity.

Progress of Compulsory Service

III. PROGRESS OF COMPULSORY SERVICE

WHEN Mr. Massey and Sir Joseph Ward reached London less than a year ago the Military Service Act which had been passed during the session of 1916 had not been put into operation, and they were hoping that the necessity would not arise. They returned to Wellington on June 26 to find that the ninth ballot under the Act was in progress ; that in addition to thousands of volunteers more than 10,000 men had cheerfully answered to the compulsory call ; that the exhaustion of the First Division had been so nearly reached that it had been found advisable to abolish voluntary enlistment from this Division except that men not yet of military age were to be allowed a month in which to volunteer after reaching that age ; and that the country was calmly contemplating the extension of the call to the Second Division of married men in the course of a few months. Great indeed had been the revolution peacefully wrought in the ways of this democracy during the ten months' absence of the Prime Minister and his colleague, and they were handsome in their acknowledgment of the credit due to Sir James Allen for the great responsibilities which as Acting Prime Minister and Minister of Defence he had courageously and successfully discharged. Unfortunately, however, it cannot be said that they have been altogether judicious in the help they have since given him in his task. Replying on July 6 to a deputation of protests against the curtailment of the railway services which has been carried out in order to release more men for the front, Sir Joseph Ward said : " The only thing that passes through my mind is that we shall have to consider how much further this country can go in sending men at all. . . . The time will come—I cannot say when—when it may not be possible to let any more men go." Mr. Massey, who was also present at the inter-

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view, spoke to the same effect. He also said, however, that, while he was in England, the authorities made a special appeal to him for more men at the beginning of the year ; and that, if we were going to win the war within a reasonable time, then it would only be by a tremendous effort on the part of every country in the Empire.

Despite this qualification the interview had an unfortunate effect in suggesting the possibility of a reversal of the declared policy of the Dominion in regard to reinforcements. Sincere but weak-kneed patriots in both Houses were not slow to take the hint and improve upon it by urging that New Zealand could best serve the Empire by concentrating on the production of food and that the limit of her capacity to export fighting men without injury to this more important function was rapidly approaching or had already been reached. Talk of this kind came as a severe shock to men who had paid little heed to the handful of anti-Imperialists anxious to see the Dominion leave the war alone, but had been pleased to see some of the ring-leaders put under lock and key for speeches or writings of a seditious tendency or calculated to interfere with recruiting. So far as the two Ministers were concerned the public was glad to find that they had evidently spoken without full deliberation or consultation with their colleagues ; for the mind of the Government as promptly declared in answer to the Parliamentary critics above mentioned by Sir James Allen and Sir Francis Bell, and subsequently by Mr. Massey himself, left nothing to be desired.

Speaking in the House of Representatives, Sir James Allen said that we should be false to our pledges to the Empire, false to ourselves, false to our men in the trenches, and false to those who have fallen if we failed to keep the main bodies of the Expeditionary Force fully reinforced. Excluding the Samoan Force, we had, he said, sent about 74,000 men to the front, and there were 10,000 more in training ; there had been over 26,000 casualties, and 7,500 of the men who had gone overseas would never see New

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Zealand again. "The spirit of these men," said Sir James Allen, "whose bodies lie in many places of the globe call to us to-day, 'Keep up the main bodies to their full strength until the war is won.' " To a Socialist interjector, who suggested that this policy might "bleed New Zealand white," the Minister replied :

"Bleed New Zealand white," says someone. Sir, if we were to lose this war would not New Zealand bleed to death? It would be a worse bleeding than the bleeding that will take place even by the sacrifice of our sons.

After a glowing tribute to the balloted men as having "played the game" in camp and as "actuated by the same spirit as the volunteers, though mostly weighted by heavier responsibilities," Sir James Allen disposed of the shabby plea that the United States would settle the business in a fine passage :

If they had 5,000,000 of men I, as a New Zealander, would be ashamed if we were to ask the Mother Country to permit us to withdraw our men from their mates of the British and French Armies who are fighting with them for the honour of New Zealand and the glory of the Empire, and to secure peace, justice and righteousness after the war. I want our men to be in at the finish, and I say it is their duty to be there when the last stage is enacted in the horrible drama which is taking place to-day.

In the Legislative Council, Sir Francis Bell, the Leader of the Council, was roused to a pitch of eloquence rarely equalled in that assembly by the plea of an eminent run-holder, supported by an ex-High Commissioner, for the export of sheep instead of men. After quoting the message dispatched by the Governor to His Majesty at the beginning of the war declaring New Zealand's readiness "to make any sacrifice to maintain her heritage and her birthright," and the terms of the declaration of "inflexible determination" to carry on the war which had been

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twice passed unanimously by both Houses of Parliament, Sir Francis Bell proceeded :

Yes, sir, "ny sacrifice" and "inflexible resolution"—but when the point has arrived that something of our convenience and comfort is to be sacrificed, the determination of the Hon. Mr. Ormond and the Hon. Sir William Hall Jones becomes flexible at once. . . . Any sacrifice of someone else; no sacrifice of convenience or comfort of ourselves. . . . Well, sir, at all events I who speak here am solemnly bound by those engagements that I have read. If our promise is no longer to be the measure of our obligation, then let some other men dishonour our word and the promise that we have made. We were the first country—the first dominion of the Empire—to enter upon German soil. We have that to our credit. Shall we be the first to quit, and have that to our lasting dishonour and disgrace? And, sir, the third anniversary is approaching. Are those who have spoken prepared to seal a message of shame, or will the honourable gentlemen on the third anniversary move an amendment to the twice-repeated resolution? Shall we not again say that our determination is inflexible, or shall we admit that it is flexible, and that our time for abandonment has come, and that we have had enough?

Mr. Massey has since roused the cheers of a public meeting by the blunt declaration that we cannot leave our men at the front in the lurch and that we are not going to do it. The patriotism of the country, which had been feeling very sorry for itself, has now quite recovered, and is no longer haunted by the fear of dishonouring the immortal memory of Anzac.

Sir James Allen made a further statement on the subject on August 7 when he informed the House that he had received a telegram from the Imperial Government to say that New Zealand might reduce its reinforcements from 15 to 12 per cent., which will mean a reduction of the four-weekly drafts from about 2,400 to 1,920. The announcement has been received with general satisfaction. The only ground for uneasiness was the possibility that the Army Council had not had quite the same free hand in the

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matter as it had certainly had hitherto. The position was thus summed up by the *Evening Post* on August 8 :

One is, therefore, compelled to regard the result with a doubtful mind and mingled feelings. If the message from the War Office was inspired by purely military considerations, the alleviation of the Dominion's burden without prejudice to the men in the field is a matter for unmixed congratulation. If, on the other hand, the alleviation is the outcome of political wirepulling, if our own Government has engineered it by way of compromise with those who were prepared to see the country violate its pledges because other parts of the Empire had failed in their duty, the result is to be deeply deplored. If Sir James Allen's stubborn patriotism argues against the second alternative, his failure to produce the whole correspondence suggests an unpleasant doubt. So far, at any rate, as he is personally concerned, one may feel absolutely certain that he has done the best that the circumstances allowed.

New Zealand. August, 1917.

THE VICTORY THAT WILL END WAR

PERHAPS the most significant development of the past winter has been the growth of the sentiment that this war is in essence a war against militarism in all its forms, in the common phrase a war against war, and that somehow or other the outcome must be such as will provide effective guarantees against another such war in the future. The dominant feeling to-day among all nations which have seriously felt the war is that there is far more at stake than the attainment of the limited objects with which they entered it, and that nothing can compensate them for the sacrifices they have made, save that thereby mankind should be freed for ever from liability to the appalling catastrophe of the past three years.

This sentiment has found expression partly in an ill-considered pacificism, to which we will return later, and partly in a number of practical schemes for the prevention of war. All these schemes may be broadly grouped into one of two categories. The first includes those which in one form or other can be classed as proposals for the constitution of the League of Nations. The second includes those which have emerged from the Russian revolution, and which may be briefly summarised as peace without annexations on the basis of the self-determination of all peoples together with a universal revolution establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat as against the capitalist and bourgeois classes. In view of the approach of the time when practical negotia-

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tions about peace will be initiated and of the necessity of avoiding unwise decisions at that time, it is important to examine how far these ideas will really contribute towards the establishment of universal peace.

I. THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

THE idea underlying the formation of a League of Nations is that if all the chief nations of the world bind themselves together into a league, the members of which will mutually guarantee not only to respect the rights of the others but to combine against any Power which attempts to infringe those rights, this will be an adequate security against war. The detailed proposals vary from those which rely upon universal disarmament, the establishment of arbitration treaties as the method of settling disputes, and the use of economic weapons in order to enforce decisions, to those which would confer upon a standing council of the League the sole right to raise armies and manufacture munitions of war, and so provide the League itself with ample power with which to uphold its authority. All schemes for the constitution of a League of Nations, however, have one common characteristic. The League would depend for its success upon the representatives of the sovereign States which formed the League and which would presumably consist of at least a majority of those States, reaching an agreement in regard to international problems, which the members of the League would then combine to give effect to and enforce. None of the schemes proposes the unification of the world into a single Commonwealth of Nations with a central authority authorised to frame laws which would be binding on all individuals from one end of the earth to the other and possessed of the supreme power necessary to enforce these laws. They presumably do not do so because their advo-

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cates recognise that with the present strength of national feeling in the world, and the wide differences between races and in degrees of civilisation, it would obviously be impossible to create any body whose decisions on the most vital problems would be considered binding by the national Parliaments. Under existing circumstances the only short road towards the unification of the world would be the German road—the victory of Prussia over all other nations.

The growth in popularity of the general idea symbolised by the League of Nations is one of the most hopeful signs of the times. For the League of Nations implies a recognition of the essential fact that the peoples of the world are essentially members of one family and that war between them is as immoral and unnecessary as civil war. Unless, indeed, nationalism comes to terms with internationalism—in the common acceptance of the principle of the Commonwealth—there is no hope for the future of the human race. The proposal to create a League of Nations recognises that the days when the diplomacy of all nations sought the maintenance of the balance of power as its cardinal object must be left behind. The doctrine of the balance of power implies that every nation has only to think of itself and enters into diplomatic arrangements not for any constructive purpose but simply to ensure itself against being tyrannised over by its neighbours by force of arms. The idea of the League of Nations is that the true basis of international policy ought to be the association of all the progressive nations for the constructive purpose of protecting national rights and of enforcing respect for international law over the whole world. The balance of power, indeed, assumes that nations must by the law of their being be in constant jealous rivalry and conflict with one another ; the League of Nations assumes that they are essentially friendly neighbours and that what is principally necessary for the prevention of war is the creation of proper machinery for deliberation and concerted action. The one is a Prussian, the other is a

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democratic idea. Finally, the machinery of the League whereby the statesmen and Parliamentary representatives of all nations would meet and discuss international problems face to face, as frequently and with as much publicity as possible, cannot fail to contribute both to the elimination of misunderstandings, hatreds and jealousies between nations, but to the realisation of the fact that international problems can only be handled by looking at them from the point of view of the world as a single whole. The most urgent need of the moment indeed is the swallowing up of national provincialism in the sense that no nation can gain peace for itself except by securing peace and justice and liberty for all nations. In so far, therefore, as the League of Nations will bring into being a system whereby international problems are discussed by the representatives of the nations meeting one another at regular Conferences, instead of through the old-fashioned and secret machinery of diplomatic procedure under which the leaders of the nations practically never met at all, it will immensely contribute towards peace.

It is important, however, to realise clearly the essential limitations of the League of Nations idea. For the chief danger to it is that it should become discredited through its inability to live up to the expectations which have been formed of it. It can never do what many of its advocates think it can do. It can never be in itself a guarantee against war or against those international wrongs which lead to war. No system of organisation can free nations from the efforts and sacrifice which are necessary if justice and freedom, which are the conditions of peace, are to be made secure in this still imperfect human world. Inside the State peace reigns because the community has established through the machinery of legislature, executive, and judiciary an elaborate system whereby there are practical securities for the rights of all and practical redress for wrong. These securities exist because every citizen is subject to the law, pays the taxes necessary to finance the police and

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the administration, and is liable in the last resort to be called upon to serve in person in order to vindicate the law. It is exactly the same in the outside world. For reasons already given, it is not yet practical politics to think of uniting all nations into one State under one Parliament and one police system. The nations, therefore, will have to do the best they can in the meanwhile with the much less efficient machinery of the League of Nations. No League, however, will relieve them of the practical burden of maintaining law and order in the international sphere, if they are to enjoy lasting peace. No League of Nations can exorcise those divergencies of interest, those genuine conflicts of opinion, those differences in ideals, which agitate progressive mankind, whether within the State or international sphere. There are bound to be problems coming up for settlement, problems connected with colour or race or power, which will be quite as difficult of settlement as any in the past. The only difference will be that while within the State such questions are settled by the judgment of the majority as to what is right, expressed in law, in the international sphere the decision as to what is the right settlement, and the enforcing of respect for the decisions when arrived at, will have to be effected by the more difficult process of agreement and common action among a number of separate Powers. Though the formation of a League of Nations will make the solution of international problems without war easier than it has been in the past, it will not relieve the progressive nations in the least of the obligation of being adequately prepared in whatever way may be necessary to enforce respect for the laws or treaties which govern the world. What the League of Nations will really do will not be to produce a magic millennium, but to bring home to the leading peoples the fact that they can no longer live unto themselves alone, but that they have to shoulder together the burden of maintaining law and order between nations throughout the world.

It is well, too, to realise how difficult a task the creation

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of an effective League of Nations is likely to be, for it is only by facing the difficulties from the outset that we shall overcome them. History is full of earlier failures. The most conspicuous example is that of the Concert of Europe. This was brought into being at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, when all the Great Powers undertook to respect and enforce the Vienna settlement as the basis of the law of Europe and to meet from time to time to agree upon the modifications of that settlement which from time to time might be necessary. This Concert, however, gradually weakened owing to the divergence of view between the autocratic Powers of Eastern Europe and the democratic Powers of Western Europe as to whether and when the Concert should interfere with the affairs of the various States of Europe. The former were always for intervention, ostensibly in order to put an end to anarchy, in reality to prevent the progress of democracy and to bolster up monarchical rule. The latter were against it, not merely because they had more sympathy for democracy, but because they were mainly absorbed in their own affairs. The Concert received its death-blow from Prussia when Bismarck transformed the map of Europe by war between 1864 and 1871 without even summoning a conference of the Powers to endorse or even to be notified of the changes. Its obsequies were read in 1908 when the Kaiser sent his shining armour ultimatum to Russia and refused to allow the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which involved the abrogation of the treaty of 1878, to be discussed by a conference of the Powers signatory of that treaty. This history shows how an earlier league to enforce peace broke down because the members could not reach an agreement as to how they were to deal jointly with the problems with which they had to deal, and because various Powers when they thought themselves strong enough to do so insisted on settling disputed questions by force in accordance with their own views while the rest acquiesced rather than risk war.

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The experience of this war is an instructive commentary on the value of treaties as security for international rights. The war began because the Central Powers decided to destroy the independence of one of the smaller nations of Europe, refused to allow the questions involved to be discussed by a conference of the Great Powers, and insisted on settling it in their own way by an act of war. When Europe refused to submit to this outrage the immediate outcome was the tearing up of the treaty guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium, which was the bulwark which previous generations had erected in order to protect Europe against the establishment of a tyranny over Europe. So much for the value of treaties signed by autocratic Powers. Three years later there was another repudiation; this time by the representatives of extreme democracy. If ever there was a case in which a treaty ought to have been good security it was the treaty of September, 1914, which united the nations of Europe in a league of self-defence against the attacks of the most highly organised and the most ruthless military tyranny that the world has ever seen. Yet Russia had scarcely become a republic when, for reasons which may have been good or bad, she repudiated all her obligations to her allies and initiated separate negotiations for peace with the common enemy of human freedom.

It is obvious, indeed, that neither leagues nor treaties can, in themselves, be a sufficient security for universal peace. If we place excessive reliance upon them we shall simply again relapse into the position in which the free nations found themselves before the war through trusting to written agreements drawn up at The Hague and elsewhere, instead of taking the practical steps which would make it impossible for selfish Powers to think of repudiating international right with impunity and success. The real security for peace will always be the determination backed by appropriate preparation among a sufficient number of peoples that right and not might shall prevail in the world. What matters most, therefore, is the fostering of the spirit

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that the maintenance of the reign of right and justice in the world is a primary concern of every nation, and that all nations must be prepared to act at any time in order to defend it. Once that spirit is there the machinery necessary to make it effective will soon come into being. But to build machinery without the spirit which alone can make it work successfully is to court certain disappointment, and to set back and not to promote the cause of universal peace.

II. THE BOLSHEVIK PANACEAS

FROM the Russian revolution have emerged a somewhat different set of ideas. The revolutionaries rely not upon establishing machinery for the peaceable adjustment of international questions, but upon a reconstruction of society which will so liberate and transform human nature that these great wars of State against State will be no more. The Bolshevik preaches that peoples have no quarrels with one another, and that it is governments and aristocracies and capitalists, perpetually seeking for power or profit for themselves, who mislead the peoples through their control over the Press and the machinery of government, and goad them into supporting their own selfish ambitions by means of war. In consequence they affirm that if every people were left perfectly free to determine its own allegiance and form of government, and if the authority of the bourgeois or possessing classes were overthrown, and the proletariat (soldiers, workmen and peasants) took control into their own hands, the real causes of war—the jealousies and intrigues and ambitions of politicians, aristocrats and capitalists—would have been destroyed, and universal peace would reign.

There is some truth in the fundamental Bolshevik diagnosis. All the Allies can see how true it has been of the German Government and the German people. They do not see, perhaps, that in some measure, though in

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greatly lesser measure, it has been true of themselves. In so far as the Bolshevik ideal recognises the essential solidarity of humanity and repudiates the belief that because peoples have national individualities they must therefore inevitably forget their own brotherhood as human beings and regard one another with perpetual jealousy and suspicion, it is destroying one of the great causes of war and paving the way for lasting peace. Further, inasmuch as it stands for trust in the people as against the system whereby high politics and foreign affairs are regarded as the exclusive privilege of the learned few or of those who inherit noble blood or privileged position—it is setting up another safeguard against the possibility of wars for profit or ambition. Finally because the doctrine of self-determination implies that no nation ought to govern another in defiance of its wishes or with the purpose of exploiting it and imposing upon it its own language and Kultur, it is helping to establish a principle whose universal acceptance is essential to lasting peace.

The revolutionary propaganda, therefore, is of value in so far as it represents a robust faith in the essential reasonableness and capacity of all peoples, and recognises that the establishment of universal peace can only come with the growth of a sense of their brotherhood amongst all peoples. But these ideas are quite inadequate in themselves to secure lasting peace, and they are bound up with other doctrines which are fatal to peace.

Self-determination, if carried to its logical conclusion, can only end in an almost universal free fight. It is no less than the application of anarchy to international affairs. The first difficulty that presents itself is as to the method of determining the limits of a nation or a people. If Ireland is to be allowed to self-determine itself out of the United Kingdom why should not Ulster self-determine itself out of Ireland? And if that right is conceded, how are you going to decide peaceably the boundary between the two, in view of the fact that every attempt at settlement

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in the past has broken down on the question of whether or not Tyrone and Fermanagh are to be included in greater or lesser Ireland. Further, according to this theory, why should not Quebec secede from Canada and the Orange Free State from the Union of South Africa? Why should not Cornwall or Wales set up on their own, with tariffs and armies and ambassadors and the other paraphernalia of independent sovereignty complete? How, indeed, is self-determination to be reconciled with the action of Lincoln and the American majority in fighting a four years' civil war, in order to prevent the Southern States from self-determining themselves out of the Union? Self-determination has much to recommend it as the method of settling the issues at stake in a war which has arisen out of the attempt of nations to tyrannise over their neighbours. But if it were accepted as an absolute right whatever the circumstances, it would simply mean the break up of every State in the world and constant war between minorities and majorities everywhere as to whether or not they should be allowed to separate. Further, so far from diminishing war, it would immensely multiply it. We have already seen that the cure for war is progress towards the unity of all nations in a Commonwealth of Nations. Universal self-determination, however, would only mean the arming of an immense number of small States in self-protection—a system which is bound to end in the gradual establishment of a despotic tyranny by one nation or of a combination of several nations over all the rest.

The second mistake of the revolutionary propagandists is that mankind is going to benefit from the inauguration of the class war. The world is not going to gain universal peace by substituting a civil war for a foreign war. It is quite true that we shall never yet secure peace in the international sphere until we get stability and order within the State. But the class war is not the road to internal order and peace. The need for drastic remedies for the present inequalities in the distribution of wealth, for the

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grinding poverty at one end of the scale, and the excessive wealth at the other, is beyond question. There is much to be said for the establishment of a more communal type of society, and for far-reaching reforms in the methods of conducting industry. But no stable society can be founded on the basis of the war of class against class. To begin with, the doctrine of the class war is founded on the fallacy that it is possible to divide a community into two clearly marked categories—the bourgeois and the people. The distinction breaks down immediately under examination. There are all sorts of other lines which cut athwart this so-called economic line, those of religion, race, education, art, occupation, the *esprit de corps* of great national services, and so forth. Further, vast numbers of working men who invest their savings are in reality capitalists, while many of the so-called governing or bourgeois classes in receipt of salaries are not. The economic line is one of the important lines of cleavage in society, but it has not the supreme importance that the advocates of the class war believe. The fact that it has become so important of late is largely due to the growth of the delusion that happiness comes from material possessions and material power and that capitalists and militarists are in some measure happier than their neighbours.

The Bolsheviks labour under another delusion. Like most of the revolutionaries who have preceded them, they assume that a contented and orderly society can be created by persecuting and driving away all those who possess knowledge, talent, and experience in the business of administration, and substituting for them the ignorant, the illiterate and the inexperienced. Every attempt to conduct national life on this basis has broken down in the past through the failure of the proletariat to maintain a tolerably competent government, as it is now manifestly breaking down in Russia.

Finally, the Bolsheviks are inspired, hardly less than their Prussian adversaries, with the gospel of Kultur and the

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doctrine of blood and iron. They seek, as do the Germans to impose their social theories on their own countrymen, in defiance of constitutional right, justice and equity, and at the point of the machine-gun and the bayonet. They are no less bent on imposing them on their neighbours and the rest of the world. They are not really democrats, they do not really care for justice or freedom. They only represent the autocratic instinct in a new guise.

While, therefore, the Russian revolutionaries have brought certain vital ideas to the front, the common bond of humanity which unites all races and peoples in one great brotherhood and the impossibility of any lasting peace on the basis of the domination of one race by another, they have not solved the problem. We shall gain universal peace neither from the triumph of autocracy, as the Prussians believe, nor from the triumph of anarchic revolution, as the Bolsheviks believe, but only from the steady progress of democracy—government in the interest, and subject to the control, of all the governed. Peace and progress inside the State come from the unselfish co-operation of all classes in promoting the social well-being, from the recognition by the people of their responsibility for their own governments, and from the constitutional responsibility of those governments to all their people, whatever their class or station. Peace—international peace—will similarly only come from the establishment everywhere of stable, well-governed democracies, which will desire to impose neither their domination nor their doctrines on their neighbours, but will combine effectively to secure justice and freedom and the reign of law for all nations, whether great or small.

III. THE VICTORY OF RIGHT ESSENTIAL TO LASTING PEACE

FROM the foregoing it is evident that there is no short and easy road to universal peace. The fundamental causes of war are to be found in the fact that there is little

Victory of Right essential to Lasting Peace

effective consciousness of the real unity of the world, that mankind is divided into a vast number of nations, races, and peoples, each of whom is almost wholly concentrated on its own affairs, recognising but the smallest obligation to help its neighbours, and entertaining all sorts of ignorant, domineering and covetous ideas about them. In consequence, instead of combining to maintain the reign of an international law which will secure to all nations their just rights, they have slipped into the habit of regarding one another not as friends and neighbours, but as enemies and rivals from which they have to protect themselves by armaments and war. Various attempts have been made in the past to remedy this state of affairs so as to cure its inevitable consequence, constant war. The first attempt was the creation of the Roman Empire, whereby practically all the civilised world was united through a common citizenship to the Roman Empire and the universal enforcement of its system of law. The second attempt was that of mediæval Christendom, when the Pope and the Emperor endeavoured to establish an universal authority which would enable the one to arbitrate in disputes between nations and dynasties and the other to enforce the judgments. The failure of the third attempt, the concert of Europe, has already been described. Despite all the triumphs of modern invention and the linking up of all peoples through the telegraph and the Press, mankind was perhaps never so divided by jealousies and ambitions, national and racial, as it was in August, 1914. Only through the agony of the war is it slowly coming to recognise its common humanity.

It is in the recognition of the world as essentially a single Commonwealth of many Nations, in the triumph of the sense of trusteeship towards the backward and the weak over the desire to dominate or exploit, in the growth of healthy democracy everywhere, and in the appreciation of the fact that peace in the international sphere can only be attained by the same means as in the national, by the

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supremacy of justice, that the real hope of lasting peace lies. Reaction from the war may save the world from its horrors for a time, but nothing but the practical determination among a sufficient number of nations that the world as a whole shall be a place in which all peoples shall have equal rights and equal opportunities, so long as they respect the laws which protect them all, will bring into being effective securities for peace.

But there is one first condition of any progress towards universal peace, and that is to win the war now. Winning the war does not necessarily mean dramatic victory over the Germanic hosts, but it does mean victory for the principle that might is not right, for which the Allies stand. It means the complete establishment of those conditions which were laid down by the British Prime Minister and the President of the United States during the first fortnight of 1918—conditions which imply the total failure of the militarist dreams and promises of expansion, and the total victory of justice and freedom. If there is ever to be an effective League of Nations it will exist in order to protect the weak from wrong and to vindicate international right. If the present League of the Allies, which now includes a majority of the great States of the world, and is in itself the nucleus of the League of Nations, does not succeed in completely re-establishing justice in Europe, what later league is likely to do so? A weak peace would in itself be the destruction of all possibility of any League of Nations.

There is no use in hoping that through compromising with justice now we can gain lasting peace. If the present rulers of Germany can prove that under their leadership Germany has been able not only to withstand the world arrayed in arms against it, but to impose its will both upon its allies and in some degree upon Europe as well, is it likely that the German people will turn against them? Seeing that they will not only have incurred the enmity of all their neighbours but will have succeeded in despoiling them, is it likely that they will disarm and trust to con-

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ferences and treaties for their future? And if they decide to rely upon their own strength for their safety instead of upon treaties and leagues of peace, is it likely that, exhausted as they are, they will start by attacking a Government which has brought them safely and with some measure of victory through the war, which alone could pilot them with any degree of competence through the difficulties of reconstruction, and which would not hesitate to use machine-guns against the impious revolutionaries who would seize the citadel of its power? There could be no greater fallacy than to believe that a patched up peace, leaving Germany in possession of conquered territory and still in a position to threaten the liberty of all Europe, would lead to an immediate victory for democracy afterwards. It would only mean that for years the machine which plotted the war and supervised its execution would remain in power, on the one hand poisoning the mind of its own people in order to induce them to maintain the armaments on which its power depends, on the other, filling the rest of the world with intrigue and corruption, suspicion and fear. So long as that happens there can be no real peace. Either no nation will dare to diminish its armaments, or they will believe the specious lies of the Prussian propaganda and open the road once more to their own hearts and the universal triumph of the Prussian sword.

The rulers of Germany, indeed, are not thinking of the terms of peace. They are still thinking of victory. Transferring the greater part of their troops and guns from the Russian front, they are preparing the most colossal of all their attacks on the Western Allies, not in order that they may retain the whole of Alsace-Lorraine or obtain this advantage or that, but in order to establish once and for all their ascendancy over Europe. For this purpose and for this purpose only they are preparing to sacrifice another 500,000 lives. Their calculation is that even if they do not succeed in overthrowing the allied armies altogether, they will at least be able to inflict such damage

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upon them that the peoples behind will weaken and come to terms. Those terms will not be particularly hard. But they will represent the clear triumph of might over right and they will have been accepted by the Allies because they will have been unable or unwilling to endure any longer the hardships and sufferings consequent upon withstanding the Prussian will. And if they succeed in thus forcing their terms on the Allies they will indeed be the masters of Europe, for no nation therein will ever dare to resist the rattling of their sword. Liberty will have succumbed to despotism.

The only road to a new era of lasting peace is a complete victory for justice and freedom now. If the Allies go through with the task they have undertaken until either the German Government or the Governments of its allies are forced by their own peoples to accept the just terms which have been offered to them, or if they persist in rejecting them, until their authority has been overthrown and a Government responsible to an awakened people is in power, the principal cause of the ambitions and hatreds which have disunited and estranged the nations and thereby caused war will have disappeared. Right will have prevailed over might, a settlement will have been made which contains within itself no seeds of fresh war, and the way will have been prepared for universal peace through proof that a League of free Democracies has in practice been able to vindicate the law of nations against the assaults of the most powerful autocratic combination that the world has ever seen. If they fail, whether through want of resolution, or inability to see clearly the tremendous meaning which the next few weeks or months may have for the future of mankind, or by giving way to the overwhelming desire for peace and plenty and a respite from the horrors of war, they will only doom themselves and their descendants to a new reign of terror and a new war worse than the old. The true peacemakers are not those who shrink from war and would sign a compromise peace in order that they may end it. They are

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those soldiers of the right who recognise that there can be no peace with evil triumphant, and who are prepared to endure whatever sufferings and hardships may be necessary in order that right shall prevail. Now that the Allied aims have been clearly defined, there can be no question as to which side has the right on its side. Let us see to it that we stand firm and that the weakening shall come first from the side that is resisting democracy in order that it may inflict new wrongs.

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EVER since the outbreak of the war there has been a more or less persistent demand from various sources for a sharper definition of the war aims of the Entente and for an official interpretation of the manner in which the broad principles emblazoned on their common banner were to be applied in practice. It is, however, obvious that the exact formulation of war aims in concrete territorial terms may at times be a futile proceeding and especially so when both the actual military situation is of such a nature as not to offer the prospect of their immediate realization and also the principles animating the two groups of antagonists are absolutely irreconcilable. In such a case a wholly satisfactory peace cannot be secured by negotiation. It can come in the fullness of time only from the conclusive victory which will give the Entente a free hand in the application of their progressive principles. Such is the constantly firmer and firmer conviction of the American people and of their leaders.

To explain in the midst of a war, at a time when the military goal is still hidden by serious obstacles, how general principles, no matter how clearly defined, should be applied is unwisely hazardous. It diverts attention from principles to details and it necessarily involves a measure of compromise and a partial renunciation of far-reaching projects of readjustment that are in themselves eminently desirable. Apart from all other factors, the effort to avoid the apparently quixotic will inevitably lead to an artificial

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equation between the desirable and what momentarily appears to be the attainable. The disparity between the ultimate idea and the transiently feasible is apt to be lessened. Hence it was sound policy on the part of the European and American leaders of the Entente to cling steadfastly to fundamentals and to resist the demand for their definition in concrete terms as long as it was impossible to foresee to what an extent the fortunes of war would permit a real equation between the desirable and the attainable.

This reticent policy inevitably encountered considerable opposition from groups animated by various motives. While it is highly improbable that the rulers of Germany, with their keen insight into certain political realities, have not always had a clear conception of the war aims of the Entente and have not known at any time during the past three and a half years on what terms peace could be obtained, there unquestionably has existed in some sections of all the Entente peoples a measure of doubt as to what exactly the war aims of their own Governments implied. When, in the late autumn of 1916, it became apparent that Germany's submarine campaign would inevitably draw the United States into the vortex, President Wilson requested both sets of belligerents to state their war aims, partly in order that the American people might not through the mere force of circumstances be committed to the support of more or less imperialistic and vindictive policies. The joint answer of the Entente satisfied the people and the Administration, and it was on the basis of "the utmost practicable co-operation in counsel and action with the Governments now at war with Germany" that the United States entered the conflict. America's object, as defined by President Wilson in his War Address of April 2, 1917, was not merely to safeguard American rights, but "to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world as against selfish and autocratic power and to set up amongst the really free and self-governed peoples of

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the world such a concert of purpose and of action as will henceforth ensure the observance of these principles." This vindication of public right had from the outset been the cardinal tenet of Entente policy and had been the central theme of Mr. Asquith's official pronouncements.

On a number of subsequent occasions Mr. Wilson further elaborated this principle and outlined its general application. In his Note to Russia of June 9 he dissociated the United States entirely from the negative and futile programme of a mere restoration of the *status quo ante* from which, as he stated, "this iniquitous war issued forth." Readjustments, he contended, were essential, but these must be based upon the following principles :—

No people must be forced under a sovereignty under which it does not wish to live. No territory must change hands except for the purpose of securing those who inhabit it a fair chance of life and liberty. No indemnities must be insisted on except those that constitute payment for manifest wrongs done. No readjustments of power must be made except such as will tend to secure the future peace of the world and the future welfare and happiness of its peoples.

Six weeks later, in his reply of August 27 to the Pope's peace plea, Mr. Lansing emphasised the fact that the object of this war is to deliver the free peoples of the world from the menace of a militaristic and irresponsible Government imbued with the ambition to dominate the world and heedless of treaty obligations and international honour.

While these principles are quite definite, their equitable application to specific problems, in which there is inevitably great diversity of opinion as to essential facts, is exceedingly difficult. In America there was no substantial agreement as to what they actually meant in practice. Hence from various quarters arose a demand, not widespread but persistent, for greater clarity as to concrete aims. In some minor part, at least, this demand was disingenuous ; its purpose was to sow discord among the Allies. To some extent also it proceeded from crypto-partisans of Germany

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who covertly insinuated that nefarious projects were lurking under the hypocritically high aims of the Allies. These insidious voices were reinforced by the *doctrinaire* pacifists, who, while free from sinister purposes, were so eager for an early termination of hostilities that almost any peace whatsoever appeared to them to be a satisfactory one. But, in the main, this demand sprang from those who contended that a clear enunciation of the concrete purposes of the Allies would both strengthen the liberal forces in Germany and also prevent the definitive secession of Russia from the Allied cause. The object was to use the moral forces of diplomacy to disintegrate the enemy and to reattach a wavering member to the coalition.

Whether or no this was sound strategy may possibly always remain a moot point about which future historians will wrangle. In so far as a still unbeaten Germany was concerned, it ignored the vital fact that a peace based upon the Entente principles meant a definite renunciation of ambitions cherished deeply and widely among all classes of the German people. Its fundamental error consisted in an over-estimate of the effect of moral forces upon a people indoctrinated with the Prussian cult of power. Western Liberalism and Prussia-Germany do not speak the same language. In the eyes not only of Admiral von Tirpitz, but also of an overwhelming majority of German leaders, a settlement according to the Wilsonian code of public right would degrade Prussia-Germany into being "the bond-slave of Anglo-Americanism." To the English-speaking peoples, not conscious of any intention to interfere with the pacific development of Germany, Admiral von Tirpitz's statement that "Germany's struggle is a terrific battle against the all-devouring tyranny of Anglo-Americanism" is merely vapid rhetoric, but to the German people it is concrete and definite. They have been systematically taught for over a generation to regard the prominent position that the English-speaking peoples have laboriously acquired on all continents as a grievance and will not voluntarily endorse

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or regard as conclusive any treaty that promises to perpetuate this situation.

Similarly, the Russian Bolsheviks and Western Liberals use different political tongues. What to the latter are cherished ideals based upon sound political principles appear to the former to be merely the rotting bulwarks of an indefensible social and political system throughout the entire world. No greater contrast is possible than that between Lincoln's ideal of union and the fissiparous policy of ensuring to even the smallest national groups unlimited self-determination. The Bolshevik aim is to abolish the perpendicular lines of State and Nation and to convert the existing war into an even more general conflict along horizontal lines of class against class. In their eyes Prussianism is not the enemy, but capitalism. It was not due to temporary aberration that one of the Press organs of the Bolshevik Party, in commenting upon Mr. Wilson's definition of America's war aims, described him "as the head of a rapacious American imperialism and as the greatest hypocrite history has ever known." Given their premises, this is the logical conclusion.

However wise or unwise it may have been for the Entente statesmen to defer a definition of their concrete war aims until the equation between the essential—not to mention the highly desirable—and the attainable was more nearly established, this reserve could no longer be maintained after the Bolshevik party in Russia had opened peace parleys with Germany and both sides had invited the other belligerents to take part in further negotiations. The challenge implied in this invitation could not be ignored. Its acceptance took the form of comprehensive statements on the part of Premier Lloyd George and of President Wilson. These statements are to a marked degree parallel, yet there are some differences. Both contain some ambiguities, and, if one were to attempt to draw a new map of the world according to them, many specifications would be found wanting. Furthermore, the subtleties of higher

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criticism have been brought into play and have led to divergent interpretations of many clauses. Yet it is possible to gain a fairly clear idea of Mr. Wilson's picture of the new world that is to emerge from the present chaos.

In his address of January 8, delivered at a joint session of the two Houses of Congress, Mr. Wilson described the course of the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk during which the Central Empires had attempted to acquaint the world with their objects in the war and had again challenged their adversaries to state their war aims.

There is no good reason, he said, why that challenge should not be responded to, and responded to with the utmost candour. We did not wait for it. Not once, but again and again, we have laid our whole thought and purpose before the world, not in general terms only, but each time with sufficient definition to make it clear what sort of definitive terms of settlement must necessarily spring out of them. Within the last week Mr. Lloyd George has spoken with admirable candour and in admirable spirit for the people and Government of Great Britain. There is no confusion of counsel among the adversaries of the Central Powers, no uncertainty of principle, no vagueness of detail. The only secrecy of counsel, the only lack of fearless frankness, the only failure to make definite statements of the objects of the war, lies with Germany and her Allies.

After referring in most sympathetic tones to the difficulties of the Russian people, whose voice, he said, was to him more compelling than any other "calling for those definitions of principle and of purpose," Mr. Wilson declared that "the day of conquest and aggrandisement is gone by." In so far as the United States was immediately concerned, he stated :

We entered this war because violations of right had occurred which touched us to the quick and made the life of our people impossible unless they were corrected and the world secured once for all against their recurrence. What we demand in this war, therefore, is nothing peculiar to ourselves. It is that the world be made fit and safe to live in ; and particularly that it be made safe for every peace-loving nation which, like our own, wishes to live its own

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life, determine its own institutions, be assured of justice and fair dealings by the other peoples of the world, as against force and selfish aggression. All the peoples of the world are in effect partners in this interest, and for our own part we see very clearly that unless justice be done to others it will not be done to us.

The programme of the world's peace, therefore, he declared, is America's programme, and that programme—"the only possible programme, as we see it"—Mr. Wilson summarised in fourteen brief articles. Some of these had in view the betterment of future international relations, others outlined the essential territorial adjustments. Among the latter, most stress was placed upon both the evacuation and the restoration of Belgium, "without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations." "No other single act," Mr. Wilson declared, "will serve as this will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws which they have themselves set and determined for the government of their relations with one another. Without this healing act the whole structure and validity of international law is for ever impaired."

Turning to France, Mr. Wilson naturally likewise stated that all occupied French territory should be both freed and restored, but he further added that "the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted, in order that peace should once more be made secure in the interest of all." This is America's first official pronouncement on Alsace-Lorraine. Like Mr. Lloyd George's prior statement of January 5, insisting upon "a reconsideration of the great wrong of 1871," this demand does not necessarily imply the retrocession of Alsace-Lorraine as an entity to France. So deep is the admiration for France's heroic stand that public opinion would not scrutinise the merits of the case too closely if this transfer could be easily effected. But in reality public opinion is somewhat confused by the

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existence of an overwhelmingly large German-speaking element in these provinces, and does not generally appreciate to what an extent this element is permeated with French sympathies. There are partisans of a *plébiscite* and others who deny that such a procedure will work equitably even under the most rigid international control in view of German colonisation of these provinces and French emigration from them. Moreover, few know what has happened during the war to the male population of Alsace-Lorraine, nor to what an extent the heavy hand of Prussia has intensified French sympathies. Possibly, the soundest solution is that of those who contend that the situation should first be studied from the standpoint of all possible frontiers, that then a *plébiscite* should be held by small districts under international control, and that, finally, after these returns are in, an international commission should select from the previously determined possible frontiers the one which conformed most closely to the popular will.

As regards *Italia Irredenta*, Mr. Wilson demanded that a readjustment of frontiers should be effected "along clearly recognisable lines of nationality." This clause unquestionably justifies the Italian claim to the Trentino where it is supported not only by the principle of nationality but also by the fact that the existing frontier is, in the words of Sir Thomas H. Holdich, "fatally opposed to all scientific theories of boundary making." Mr. Wilson's clause is less positive as to Italy's right to Trieste and Istria, and it cannot be interpreted otherwise than as hostile to the extreme claims of the *Idea Nazionale* group and probably even to the extension of Italian sovereignty to any part of the Dalmatian coast.

Leaving the West, Mr. Wilson demanded the evacuation of all Russian territory and such co-operation from the other nations as would secure to Russia an unhampered opportunity "for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy." This

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clause unquestionably means not only the evacuation of Lithuania, Courland, Livonia, and Esthonia, but also that of Poland. For in another one of these fourteen provisoes Mr. Wilson demanded both the erection of an independent Polish State, composed of all territories occupied by indisputably Polish populations and assured of free and secure access to the sea, and also the international guarantee of this State's political and economic independence and territorial integrity. Literally interpreted, this indubitably implies the incorporation of the Polish parts of Austria-Hungary and of Germany in the new Poland, but not necessarily the territorial separation of East Prussia from Germany.

As regards Roumania, Serbia, and Montenegro, Mr. Wilson demanded the evacuation and restoration of the occupied areas and the grant of access to the sea to Serbia. In general, he urged that the relations of the several Balkan States to one another should be determined "along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality" and that then their independence and integrity should be guaranteed internationally.

Distinctly less clear than any of the preceding stipulations was that about Austria-Hungary, which merely stated that the peoples of the Dual Monarchy, "whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development." During the preceding summer, in his Russian Note of June 9 and in his Flag Day Address of June 14, Mr. Wilson had emphasized the necessity of frustrating the *Mitteuropa*, Berlin to Bagdad, project and had spoken most sympathetically of the oppressed nationalities of Austria-Hungary. On the latter occasion he said of this ambitious plan:—

It rejected the idea of solidarity of race entirely. The choice of peoples played no part in it at all. It contemplated binding together racial and political units which could be kept together only by force—Czechs, Magyars, Croats, Serbs, Roumanians, Turks, Armenians.

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Six months later, in his Address before Congress of December 4, advocating the declaration of war upon Austria-Hungary, the President spoke in a different strain :—

We do not wish in any way to impair or to rearrange the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It is no affair of ours what they do with their own life, either industrially or politically. We do not purpose nor desire to dictate to them in any way. We only desire to see that their affairs are left in their own hands, in all matters, great or small.

In the light of these words it is apparent that America is not committed either to an effective reorganization of the Dual Monarchy or to its disruption in accordance with the principle of nationalism. Apart from the question whether any other course is feasible, this is in effect equivalent to an abandonment of the cause of the Czechs, Slovaks, Roumanians, and Jugo-Slavs. It is justified in the eyes of some Americans since they are convinced—partly, at least, because they wish to be—that the doctrines of ascendancy are on the wane among the Germans and Magyars of Austria-Hungary and that the protesting forces within the Dual Monarchy will be sufficiently potent to effect a radical change in the political system, especially if they be stimulated by some encouragement from without.

Mr. Wilson's opposition to the dismemberment of Empires does not apply to Turkey. He proposes to leave to the Ottoman Empire only its Turkish portions and declares that "the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees." The other nationalities under Turkish rule should, he says, be assured "an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development." What is meant is, no doubt, that Arabia, Mesopotamia and Irâk, Armenia, Palestine, and Syria should for ever be freed from the blasting tyranny of the Turk. Public opinion is not quite clear as to the exact

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disposition of these peoples. Despite the fact that all prior experiments in international government, whether in Egypt, Samoa, Macedonia, Morocco, or the New Hebrides, have grievously failed, there is considerable sentiment for renewing the attempt. If the experiment is to be repeated, the most favourable places would be Palestine and Syria, where a large measure of self-government is feasible.

As regards the German colonies, President Wilson has followed with some modifications Mr. Lloyd George's original announcement at Glasgow on June 29 and its subsequent repetitions and amplifications to the general effect that this matter should be left to the peace conference for determination in accordance with the sentiments of the natives. Mr. Wilson urges an absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims in which the interests of the populations concerned "must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined." American public opinion is as yet not at all interested in the fate of Germany's South Sea Islands. While it would probably appreciate the strength of Australia's claims, it might be less sympathetic towards those of Japan. On the other hand, it is generally assumed that German South-West Africa will remain British, and this eventuality will be pleasing to the very many Americans who admire in equal measure the stubborn resistance of the burghers during the Boer War and their general loyalty to the Commonwealth during the present crisis. On the whole, opinion is more alert as to the African tropical colonies, but it is still quite fluid. Very little is known as to the essentials of the problem. Few of the facts about German maltreatment of the aborigines have reached American ears, and there is no wide appreciation of the gravity of General Smuts's warning as to the militarisation of Africa. Nor is there a general recognition of the slight economic importance of these colonies to Germany and of the extent to which considerations of power

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and prestige enter into German colonial policy. There are vestiges of sympathy with Germany's claim for a colonial outlet, but some plan of international government like that advocated by the British Trade Union Conference finds more favour. It is, however, being pointed out by students of the question that, while an extension of international control is highly advisable, international administration would be disastrous to the real interests of the natives.

The foregoing changes constitute the territorial part of what Mr. Wilson has called "the only possible programme" of world peace. They are almost identical with those advocated by Mr. Lloyd George on January 5 before the Trade Union Conference. Moreover, as any candid inquirer will admit, they are but the concrete expression of the general principles for which the Entente has always stood. As Mr. Balfour said in this connection at Edinburgh on January 10 :—

It must be remembered that the pronouncements of Premier Lloyd George and President Wilson contain nothing that was not implicitly stated in the utterances of other statesmen, including the late Premier. The spirit that has animated Britain and her Allies has undergone no profound modification.

It would, however, be folly not to face the facts and not to realise that this territorial programme, extensive though it be, is not a full expression of these principles. It falls considerably short of those unofficial programmes whose ambitious aim was to eliminate all sources of unrest in Europe arising from maladjusted frontiers. The desirable has been considerably pared in order to make it equal to the apparently attainable. This is most markedly the case as regards Austria-Hungary. Beyond what are really mere pious wishes, nothing is to be done to secure the self-expression of the subject nationalities of the Dual Monarchy and no recognition whatsoever is given to the Jugo-Slav claims or to those of Roumanian irredentism. But as long as no satisfaction is given to these deeply cherished aspirations they will continue to be a source of danger to

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the world's peace. Mr. Lloyd George frankly admitted this when, on January 5, he said :—

Similarly, though we agree with President Wilson that a break-up of Austria-Hungary is no part of our war aims, we feel that unless genuine self-government on true democratic principles is granted to those Austro-Hungarian nationalities who have long desired it, it is impossible to hope for a removal of those causes of unrest in that part of Europe which have so long threatened the general peace.

The mere fact that this end may not be attainable should not blind us to the fact that it is pre-eminently desirable, because otherwise the peace of the world must remain unstable. To some extent, it is to be hoped, this instability will be rectified by the remedial measures planned by Mr. Wilson for the betterment of future international relations. Though it is the last in order of his fourteen provisos for the world's peace, a future league of nations is in the very foreground of his international programme. "A general association of nations," he said in his Address of January 8, "must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike." It is apparent from Mr. Wilson's previous statements that, unless Germany reforms herself, she is not to be admitted to this partnership of free peoples. For instance, in his Address to Congress of December 4 he said :—

This intolerable Thing of which the masters of Germany have shown us the ugly face, this menace of combined intrigue and force, which we now see so clearly as the German power, a Thing without conscience or honour or capacity for covenanted peace, must be crushed, at least shut out from the friendly intercourse of the nations. . . . The worst that can happen to the detriment of the German people is this, that if they should still, after the war is over, continue to be obliged to live under ambitious and intriguing masters interested to disturb the peace of the world, men or classes of men whom the other peoples of the world could not trust, it might be impossible to admit them to the partnership of nations

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which must henceforth guarantee the world's peace. That partnership must be a partnership of peoples, not a mere partnership of governments.

From this new international partnership, this projected "League of Honour," inevitably spring two of Mr. Wilson's four remaining stipulations. There can be, on the one hand, he said, "no private international understandings," but diplomacy must proceed "always frankly and in the public view"; on the other hand, armaments must be reduced "to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety." In addition, Mr. Wilson insisted upon "the removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance." The exact practical meaning of this clause is far from perspicuous. But, in the first place, one very important point should be noted—namely, that the future economic equality is to be limited to the projected international association, which implies that, unless Germany be purged of her autocratic militarism, she is not to enjoy this parity of treatment. Mr. Wilson had made a half-veiled threat to this effect before, in his reply of August 27 to the Pope; and, later, in his address to Congress of December 4, he had declared that it might be impossible to admit an unregenerate Germany to "the free economic intercourse which must inevitably spring out of the other partnerships of a real peace." Furthermore, towards the end of the Address of January 8 he had again reverted to this subject, declaring:

We do not wish to injure her (Germany) or to block in any way her legitimate influence or power. We do not wish to fight her either with arms or with hostile arrangements of trade, if she is willing to associate herself with us and the other peace-loving nations of the world in covenants of justice and law and fair dealing. We wish her only to accept a place of equality among the peoples of the world—the new world in which we now live—instead of a place of mastery.

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But, apart from the specific reference to the economic weapon, what is implied by this general economic clause? Of what "economic barriers" is Mr. Wilson speaking, and of what nature is "the equality of trade conditions" that he has in mind? It is extremely doubtful if he is for an instant considering the possibility of free trade between the states of the projected association. The United States is far from prepared for so radical an economic revolution; in fact, public opinion favours, if anything, an increase in the existing high tariff so as to protect America from a dreaded influx of European goods after the demobilisation of the armies. From a previous utterance in which Mr. Wilson unsparingly condemned the German system of economic penetration under governmental auspices,* it may be inferred that his purpose in part is to secure the elimination of such unfair competition

* In his address of November 12, 1917, at the annual meeting of the American Federation of Labour at Buffalo, Mr. Wilson said:

"There is no important industry in Germany upon which the Government has not laid its hands to direct it, and, when necessity arose, control it. You have only to ask any man whom you meet who is familiar with the conditions that prevailed before the war in the matter of international competition to find out the methods of competition which the German manufacturers and exporters used under the patronage and support of the Government of Germany. You will find that they were the same sorts of competition that we have tried to prevent by law within our own borders. If they could not sell their goods cheaper than we could sell ours, at a profit to themselves, they could get a subsidy from the Government which made it possible to sell them cheaper anyhow; and the conditions of competition were thus controlled in large measure by the German Government itself.

"But that did not satisfy the German Government. All the while there was lying behind its thought, in its dream of the future, a political control which would enable it in the long run to dominate the labour and the industry of the world. They were not content with success by superior achievement; they wanted success by authority.

"I suppose very few of you have thought much about the Berlin to Bagdad railway. The Berlin to Bagdad railway was constructed in order to run the threat of force down the flank of the industrial undertakings of half a dozen other countries, so that when German competition came in it would not be resisted too far, because there was always the possibility of getting German armies into the heart of that country quicker than any other armies could be got there."

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in the future. That he dreads a renewal of the German process is quite plain from the fact that he is urging that not only the political but also the economic independence of Poland, Roumania, Serbia, and Montenegro be secured by international guarantees. In addition, "equality of trade conditions" in all probability means to Mr. Wilson the full Open Door in all backward countries, whether they are independent or under the rule of one of the colonising Powers. This naturally implies a complete change in the colonial policy of the United States which may encounter considerable opposition. For, as a member of one of the foreign commissions—not the British one—now at Washington observed, there is in America quite a keen interest in free trade—for England.

There is left for final discussion the highly condensed clause about the freedom of the seas, whose exact significance is of grave importance. It reads :

Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants.

This clause should not be interpreted separately, but in close conjunction with the entire programme, and especially with the plan for a league of nations. From the very outset Mr. Wilson brought these two ideas into intimate association. On May 27, 1916, in his first public endorsement of the league project, he advocated the establishment of

an universal association of the nations to maintain the inviolate security of the highway of the seas for the common and unhindered use of all the nations of the world, and to prevent any war begun either contrary to treaty covenants or without warning and full submission of the causes to the opinion of the world.

Ever since the early months of the war Germany has posed as the champion of the freedom of the seas, but the

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submarine campaign is the very negation of this doctrine in whatever form it may be conceived. The occasion of America's entrance into the war was Germany's absolute denial of her long-established and unquestioned rights on the high seas, and it is in defence of the freedom of the seas that the sword has actually been drawn by America. Thus Mr. William S. Kenyon, of Iowa, said in the Senate on January 10, 1918:

Were we ready to give up the freedom of the seas? Are the people of this nation willing to give it up now, to acknowledge the right of Germany to say to us that we could send one boat a week on certain parts of the sea, provided it was painted like a barber's pole?

But, in addition to this, it is quite plain that every war in which sea power is largely employed emphasises the inherent conflict between the rights of neutrals and those of belligerents. In some wars the prevalence of belligerent rights is far more important to civilisation than is the maintenance of neutral trade; in others, diametrically the opposite is the case. But under existing conditions there is no method of determining such cases and differentiating action in them. The League of Nations would supply this mechanism. Apparently it is Mr. Wilson's plan that in any war sanctioned by the associated states sea power should be used to the fullest extent compatible with humanitarian dictates, but that in an unauthorised war of aggression neutral rights should remain fully intact. This further implies that there be created for use in such unsanctioned wars a new and more definite code of maritime war with some distinct limitations of the existing doctrines of search, capture, and prize, blockade, continuous voyage, and contraband. The subject bristles with difficulties, as does the entire league project. Upon the practicability of the league depends both the feasibility and the advisability of this special conception of the freedom of the seas. In general it may be confidently

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asserted that American public opinion is not prepared to sanction any self-denying ordinance regarding sea power, unless this emasculation is accompanied by correspondingly effective limitations upon the rail power and land power of the militaristic states of Europe.

In support of the foregoing comprehensive programme embodying "these essential rectifications of wrong and assertions of right," Mr. Wilson declared that all the Allied peoples were intimate partners. "We stand together until the end." He pledged America's willingness to fight until such arrangements and covenants are achieved.* In conclusion, he further stated that America did not presume to suggest to Germany any alteration or modification of her institutions, but that it was a necessary preliminary to any intelligent dealings with her to know for whom her spokesmen spoke, "whether for the Reichstag majority or for the military party and the men whose creed is imperial domination." †

While Mr. Wilson's statement as to the solidarity of the Entente Allies in their war aims is true, there is within this greater unity a far more perfect one formed by the identity of purpose in the peoples of the United States and the British Commonwealth. Their leaders have not only the same ends in view, but they have expressed themselves in almost identical words. This is not chiefly due to the fact that both have entered into the war for purely unselfish purposes, but proceeds predominantly from the virtual identity of the fundamental political ideals and principles that constitute the inalienable heritage

* In his address of December 4 Mr. Wilson said: "The cause being just and holy, the settlement must be of like motive and quality. For this we can fight, but for nothing less noble or less worthy of our traditions. For this cause we entered the war, and for this cause will we battle until the last gun is fired."

† In his address of December 4 Mr. Wilson said: "We shall regard the war only as won when the German people say to us, through properly accredited representatives, that they are ready to agree to a settlement based upon justice and the reparation of the wrongs their rulers have done."

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of all English-speaking peoples. As a former Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Huntington Wilson has said in advocacy of the permanent alliance of these kindred nations :

Cæsar classified the people of the North according to their resemblance or difference in "language, institutions, and laws." A better criterion has yet to be found. It is the leaven that moulds and the cement that holds to us our newer populations. It is this that gives us our national entity. The same bond is just as un-failing in the potentiality of its interplay between America as a whole and the British Empire as a whole. Better than any others can the English-speaking nations say to one another, "All the world is queer save thee and me—and thee's a little queer," which is as near the ideal relation as we are likely to get in international relations.*

The volume of such voices is constantly swelling. In combination and in somewhat imperfect unison with those who favour a less definite co-operative arrangement or who prefer a more comprehensive international association they are drowning the relatively few that advocate a reversion to the self-centred isolation of the past or the adoption of a purely self-regarding policy of national aggrandisement.†

This English-speaking unity is also far more responsible than is direct imitation for the fact that the expedients adopted by America for carrying on the war resemble far more closely those of England than they do those of the

* *A Permanent Alliance of the English-Speaking Peoples*, published in the *Philadelphia Public Ledger* of November 12 and 13, 1917, and reprinted in pamphlet form by the American Rights League. See also the significant book by Mr. H. H. Powers, *America among the Nations* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1917).

† For instance, Congressman George Huddleston, of Alabama, stated in December that the advice of Washington and Jefferson was burned in his heart and that he hoped "in finding peace we may keep ourselves clear of European entanglements and alliances, from competition in Old World systems of caste and avarice, and that we may hold to traditional American isolation and reserve" (*Congressional Record*, 56, p. 170). For some imperialistic projects in the Caribbean, see the *Proceedings* of the Academy of Political Science, July, 1917, vol. vii., Nos. 1 and 2. For a vigorous criticism of these aims, see Moorfield Storey, "A Plea for Honesty," in *The Yale Review* for January, 1918.

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other Allies or of the enemy. As human nature is fundamentally one, and as all institutions are but a reflection of human needs, given a certain situation, there is bound to be a marked similarity in the devices adopted. But their special form will depend upon the psychological peculiarities and the typical genius of each people. Hence it is not surprising that the United States has in very many important respects followed British precedents, such as the handling of the labour situation, the control of food supplies, the special taxation, and the nationalisation of railways during the war. America has not even been able to avoid, quite the contrary indeed, certain mistakes that hampered British action during the first months of the war. As there, so here, the administrative machinery was "overwhelmed by emergency and clogged by routine."

During the autumn recess members of Congress were brought into close touch with their constituents, among whom considerable discontent was rife with the apparently slow pace at which the war preparations were proceeding. The American people are somewhat impatient for results and were anxious to see tangible returns for the more than twenty thousand million dollars that had been appropriated for war purposes. In addition, the military situation as a whole had assumed quite a different aspect as a result of the fall of the Kerensky Government and the Italian reverse. Thus, when Congress reconvened early in December, it was in a serious and resolute mood and intent upon a vigorous prosecution of the war. This determination was reinforced by the fact that some of the legislators had just returned from a tour of inspection in Europe and were able to give their fellow members convincing first-hand accounts of the situation and of the need for the exertion of America's full strength. Noteworthy were the speeches of Senator William S. Kenyon of Iowa, Mr. John F. Miller of Washington and Mr. Medill McCormick of Illinois. Senator Kenyon emphasized the danger of being too late and the necessity of sending to the western

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front two million men, with one million in reserve. Among other valuable truths he said :

To make the world safe for democracy is only half. † We must make the world safe for humanity. And in order to make the world safe for democracy we must do our part to see that the Anglo-Saxon race does not go down. . . . Germany is attempting to terrorise the world. She does not understand the spirit of the British or the American people. . . . Ships, ships, and more ships is the cry of the hour. . . . It is not enough to do our bit. We must do our best.*

In the course of an eloquent speech Mr. McCormick brought out the following realities :

This war, like other long-drawn conflicts, falls into chapters of events. Such a chapter came to an end when Russia collapsed and America declared war. Russia went out of the war in the spring of 1917, while America will not go into it in earnest until the spring of 1919. There is in war, as in peace, a distinction between forms and facts. Russia has not made peace, but she no longer fights. America has declared war, but she has not begun to fight. We must see now that if Germany is not yet victorious, neither are we winning the war.†

As a result of this determined spirit, the Senate inaugurated several detailed investigations of the war preparations. In these proceedings there was a conspicuous absence of partisanship and of destructive criticism. In general, they revealed that there had been considerable avoidable delay due to lack of co-ordination, to red tape, and to a failure to appreciate the importance of the time factor. The advantage of "the flying start," due to the fact that America had been manufacturing munitions for the Allies for over two years prior to her own entrance into the war, was in a measure lost in the search for ideal weapons. Owing to an unfortunate lack of imagination, the War Department failed to bridge the space that separated America from the battlefield. The fact that the enemy

* *Congressional Record*, 56, pp. 786-8.

† *Ibid.* pp. 687 ff.

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was not at the door made the urgency appear less real than it actually was. Most of the mistakes disclosed have been in a measure rectified and the military machine will in the future work more smoothly and expeditiously. But, in spite of the errors committed, it is, on the whole, quite remarkable that so much has been accomplished, especially when the absolutely unprepared condition of the United States nine months ago is considered. During this interval the land forces, including the reserve, have been increased from 9,324 officers to 110,835 and from 202,510 men to 1,428,650. There has been an even greater relative increase in the ordnance and aviation divisions.

While it is a palpable exaggeration to say that the ability of any state to make its military strength effective decreases directly in proportion to its distance from the field of battle, yet distance is a distinct handicap and especially so when the intervening space is a three thousand mile stretch of water whose farther border is infested by submarines. What would normally be a great handicap has been immeasurably increased by the marked scarcity of shipping. The Senate likewise investigated the progress of the ship-building campaign with the object of accelerating the output. The facts revealed showed that, apart from the original delay in this enterprise due to the personal controversy of the two men entrusted with its management, progress has been seriously retarded by the scarcity of workmen, by strikes, by competition for labour between the yards, by utterly inadequate housing facilities and by transportation difficulties. Briefly, the situation at the beginning of 1918 was that contracts have been let for 1,427 ships of 8,573,108 deadweight tons. The important question is how soon will this extensive programme be completed. In the expert judgment of Mr. Homer L. Ferguson, the probable output of merchant ships in the United States during the year 1918 will be only about three million tons. Chairman Hurley, of the Shipping Board, on the contrary, is much more optimistic and expects

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an output of five million tons. If we look to the past and remember that prior to the war the greatest annual output of the American yards was 615,000 tons, either estimate would denote a tremendous stride in advance. But if we look at the need of the hour and at America's vast industrial resources the situation is distinctly disappointing. There is no reason to doubt the essential accuracy of Mr. Ferguson's statement that, if provision had been made betimes for adequate housing facilities, the shipyards in existence and under construction could turn out five million tons yearly and that "the country could, if put to it, add still other yards and produce 10,000,000 tons a year."

To some extent the rapidity of production in the ship yards depends upon the release of labour from non-essential industries. The war is slowly tightening its grip upon the industrial system. A constantly increasing proportion of the output is being devoted directly and indirectly to war purposes. "Gradually the war industries are encroaching upon other activities, attracting men, getting command of materials and obtaining a preference for such essentials as coal and railway service." The supply of non-essentials is being automatically curtailed; but production and consumption are only very gradually approaching the war basis of Europe.

Reference has already been made to the fact that President Wilson has plainly declared that economic barriers will have to be erected against an obdurate Germany and that, unless the peace terms are satisfactory, she will not be allowed access to the raw materials required for her economic reconstruction. In addition, the United States Chamber of Commerce, which includes a very large proportion of the local commercial organisations of America, is submitting to the vote of its vast membership the question whether commercial relations with Germany shall be re-established unless her militaristic policy be abandoned and a Government responsible to the people be in control there. No matter what be the result of this referendum, the fact that

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it is being taken is in itself of considerable significance. For, apart from governmental action and from organised boycott, it is quite evident that Germany's criminal responsibility for the war and her heinous conduct during its course have aroused so much resentment that German business will for a very considerable period labour under a severe handicap. There was told in the Senate the story of a member of the Illinois Legislature who noticed that he was carrying a pencil marked "Made in Germany." He cut off the marked part before he went to bed, but was not mentally at ease even then. So he arose during the night and threw the pencil out of the window.

The American people have determined to win the war, cost what it may. They are firmly convinced of the unalloyed righteousness of their cause, and when in this frame of mind they are not lenient towards those who oppose their will. Like all young and unsophisticated people, they have not many subtle shadings in their likes and dislikes. They are inclined to be wholehearted, whether it be in praise or in blame. German is rapidly becoming the synonym for all that is odious, and there is some danger of an indiscriminate condemnation and rejection of everything that bears this name.

New York. January, 1918.

THREE DOCTRINES IN CONFLICT

IN the climax of the conflict in which the world is involved men's minds have become susceptible as never before to the power of ideas. The guns are still speaking as in 1914, and they will go on speaking, ever more forcibly, till victory is achieved ; since, in the great argument which Prussia provoked, no other form of decision avails. But side by side with the guns, and mixing its music with theirs, goes a running undercurrent of discussion, of questioning, of philosophizing. Men who never reasoned before are turning their minds to consider the cause for which their continued endurance is demanded. Women too, newly enfranchised or hoping for enfranchisement, newly bereaved or in daily anxiety of bereavement, are joining in the silent debate. As the whole framework of society has been violently wrenched and reshaped to meet the necessities of a war which affects every department of social existence, so men's minds too, under the stress of change, are being torn from the moorings of custom and carried forward to unknown destinations. New ideas are blowing round us in the storm-laden sky. Old ideas, forgotten since 1848 and earlier, are astir in their company. Europe is in a ferment, and in the universal uncertainty, in the increasing misery and suffering, no man can predict what forces, what leaders, what forms of society and government will emerge for her peoples.

At such a time it is necessary, not only to meet force with force on the battlefield, but to meet argument with argument. It was for that reason, no doubt, that the

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Prime Minister, on behalf of the British Commonwealth, and President Wilson, on behalf of the United States, recently restated the war-aims of their peoples. But a restatement of war-aims does not meet the whole need of which men are conscious. It does not cut down to the roots of the debate. What questioning and critical spirits, in Britain and elsewhere, are demanding is something deeper and more searching than a statement of just terms of peace between the contending governments. They are asking for the title-deeds of the governments themselves. They are raising the fundamental questions of political and social philosophy. They desire to know by what right, kings, ministers, and generals command and soldiers and subjects obey, why the few are rich and the many poor, why some peoples bear rule and others are dependent, why, in the distribution of wealth and power both amongst individuals and nations, so much leaps to the eye which seems unequal, arbitrary, and to be justified only by the logic of force.

The following article embodies an attempt not to answer but to provide guidance towards the answer of such and similar questionings. To restate the outline of a political faith, and to contrast it with contending creeds, must necessarily involve an element of platitude. Yet nothing is more common, in times of crisis, than to find that, while the world's opinion is being swayed hither and thither by winds of strange doctrine, familiar and fundamental truths are overlooked. This must serve as an apology for what may seem trite or superfluous in the succeeding pages.

Three doctrines of society and government are fighting for mastery in the world of to-day. Two of them are contending for victory on the battlefield. All three are contending for victory over men's minds. The first is the principle of Prussianism; the second is the principle of Revolution; the third is the principle of the Commonwealth.

In the battle which has been joined between these

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three antagonists compromise will be difficult, if not impossible : for the adherents of each are struggling for a victory complete, universal and decisive. Each aspires to win success not in one country but in all—to achieve the recognition of its unquestioned predominance throughout the civilized world : for the adherents of each, and indeed the hopes of mankind, are bent upon the attainment of a settlement founded, not on the shifting sands of compromise, but on the general acceptance, as the basis of the new world order, of certain agreed principles regarding the organisation of society, the nature of government, and the conduct of international relations. It is this world-wide character of the debate and the urgency of the issues that hang upon it which justify the attempt to isolate the doctrines involved from the entanglements of surrounding circumstance and to examine them in the clear light of historical experience and ethical principle.

I

PRUSSIANISM, as we see it embodied in Central Europe to-day, is not a new phenomenon in history. In its cruder aspects it is as old as Egypt and Assyria. But it has never before been worked out with so much skill, persistence and courage or attracted to its banner such a host of able, heroic and disinterested servants. If we are to understand its full purport or the true force of its appeal, we must make an effort to see it through the eyes of those from whom, as the history of the last three and a half years proves, it has the power to call forth such an abundant reserve of sacrifice and endurance. We must learn to view it, not as a mere policy of military conquest and economic aggrandisement, inspired and directed by a caste of professional soldiers and their hereditary chief, but as a logical and consistent body of political, philosophical and religious doctrine.

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Prussianism is a doctrine of authority. It is founded on a sense of the weakness and helplessness of man in his natural state. Man is not born free. He is born a slave—a slave to impulse and caprice, to bodily need, to the buffetings of an imperious environment. Isolated, ignorant, undisciplined, man, the latest-born heir of creation, is no radiant young prince, as some idealists see him, ready and fitted to enter into the rich inheritance of the ages, but a reed shivering in the wind of inward and outward circumstance.

Thus far Prussianism moves in agreement with all those, whether in ancient Greece or modern Britain and America, who have preached the need for a rule, a standard, a guiding authority, as the base of the whole social scheme. Where Prussianism diverges from the doctrine of the framers of the American Constitution and from the principles expressed in the institutions of the British Commonwealth is in the task which it sets before that authority to perform and in the nature and credentials of the authority itself.

What is that task? What, on the Prussian view, is the object of political and social organisation? Is it to secure that this shivering reed, this weak and trembling being called man, this plaything of nature, shall attain, through wise guidance, to the self-control without which freedom is a snare, and then through freedom to the powers and responsibilities which make up the full stature of manhood? That is not the Prussian answer. Prussianism has at once too little faith in the potentialities of human nature and too keen a sense of the practical urgencies of present-day life. "Freedom," it answers, "may indeed be the hallmark of complete being. It may indeed be desirable, in the abstract, for the children of men in all their relationships. As to that we will not be dogmatic. If the conditions of social existence were other than what they are, the experiment of training the race to the exercise of uncontrolled freedom might well be tried. But within the

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limits of human life as it is, and of the possibilities open to rulers and lawgivers, we dare not contemplate the opening of the dykes which hold in the dark waters of popular will and passion. The true objects of government and social organisation are to be sought in another sphere. We do not aim at training the natural man to be free. We aim at training him for the use of an authority higher and wiser than himself. We aim at creating material and spiritual conditions which shall turn his ignorance into knowledge, his weakness into serviceable strength, and his want of discipline into firm and confident obedience. We aim at making out of lonely and capricious units, each with its own private fancies and inclinations, with its infinitely various dispositions and capacities, of which in its own narrow field it is powerless to make good use, an army, steady, self-controlled, homogeneous, invincible, a fit instrument to achieve the highest purposes of the Creator. Thus we give to each man, not what the West calls freedom—for such freedom, as all history proves, only breeds weakness and anarchy—but something which we think worthier of that great word, the freedom that the angels know, the freedom which consists, not in individual initiative or decision or assent, not in the achievement of self-chosen purposes, but in the perfect service of a righteous and revered authority.”

What is that authority? It is the authority of a Christian King, of a ruler who holds his power by Divine Right.

The Divine Right of Kings is a phrase that has so long been unfamiliar to English lips that it is hard for us to realise that the belief is still in full vigour.* We who know Prussianism by its fruits in Belgium and elsewhere are

* Prussian Conservatives hold that his divine election empowers the King to intercede between God and his people. On the occasion of William II's birthday on January 27 last, the *Kreuz Zeitung*, alluding to his prayers for his people, said: “Among the heathen and Jews the office of Priest was often associated with their King. Happy the Christian nation whose King voluntarily assumes the priestly office for his people.”

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accustomed to think of it as essentially irreligious. That such is too often its effect upon its agents the war has unhappily afforded testimony enough. But this is neither the whole truth nor indeed that part of it which it most behoves us to understand. It is a law of the world that no strong organisation, be it a nation or a band of robbers, can be purely evil; for evil through its own nature spreads weakness, suspicion and disunion. Were Prussianism purely evil it would have collapsed long ago. It could not have drawn on the reserves of strength which have enabled it to maintain an heroic unequal contest against hunger, hardship and superior numbers. Prussianism stands for more than the use of howitzers and cannon fodder. It is a creed held, with intense conviction, by men who have had the courage to apply it, logically and consistently, to every relationship of life. Its prophets and leaders, of whom Bismarck is the shining exemplar, have not only been unfeignedly devout in their personal lives, but have seen no disharmony but rather a close association between their religious beliefs and their political and social philosophy.

“No State,” said Bismarck, “has a secure existence unless it has a religious foundation. For me the words, ‘By the Grace of God,’ which Christian rulers add to their name, is no empty phrase; I see in them a confession that the princes desire to wield the sceptre which God has given them according to the will of God on earth. If we withdraw this foundation we retain in a State nothing but an accidental aggregate of rights, a kind of bulwark against the war of all against all.”

And again, speaking in 1848, when the dykes had for the moment broken down and Europe seemed about to be inundated with the waves of popular passion, he reminded his hearers, in words which have become historic as the lodestar of two generations of policy, that the Prussian cause rested “on authority created by God, an authority by the Grace of God” and had been “developed in organic connexion with the existing and constitutional legal status.”

These famous words not only reveal the nature of the

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Prussian authority—the King by the grace of God—but tell us something as to how that authority is in practice exercised and made effective. The King of Prussia is no arbitrary Oriental Sultan, no Temporal Pope, whose personal power is unlimited and personal opinion infallible : he acts, in accordance at once with the dictates of conscience and the “existing and constitutional legal status.”

What is that status ? It is a constitution granted by the King, and subject to revocation by him at pleasure, by which he limits his power and accords certain rights and responsibilities to chosen classes and individuals among his subjects.

This is not the place in which to describe the constitutional development of Prussia or to sketch the intricacies of the present system of legislation and administration. But their effect has been, in brief, to surround the monarch with a body of able, fearless and unbending retainers from among the landed gentry or *Junker* (squires) of the old Prussian provinces—a class at once fanatically loyal to their “all-highest War-lord” and fanatically jealous for their own military traditions and constitutional privileges. It is upon the basis of their allegiance that the structure of the Prussian power has been raised. Had not the Great Elector, according to the true Prussian doctrine, crushed, tamed and subjected them, converting their wilful and fissiparous feudalism into the willing instrument of his royal purpose, the Prussian nobility would have languished in petty power and disunion like their compeers in Hanover, Mecklenburg, and South Germany, the victims of their own useless and impotent freedom. “The intimate union of Crown and people,” wrote the King of Prussia a few weeks since, in reply to the birthday greetings of the Prussian Upper House, “which I received as a sacred heritage from my fathers, dates from the hard times by which Prussia was trained for its world-historical mission.”

For the last two centuries the Prussian King and his

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people—a military bodyguard of country squires—have pursued this mission together, and the relationship, at first military and personal, has been crystallised into legal and constitutional forms. Together they have added province upon province to the original Prussian domain—Silesia, Posen, Westphalia, the Lower Rhine, Schleswig-Holstein, Hanover, Hesse-Cassel have been directly incorporated. Alsace-Lorraine, conquered mainly by Prussian arms, was added to the German Empire when, in 1871, it was inaugurated under Prussian auspices. And now they have gone forward once more. Belgium, Poland, Courland and Lithuania lie within that unrelaxing grasp. Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, Turkey are dependent, as South Germany has been dependent since 1871.

But the distinguishing feature of Prussianism is not its successful career of military conquest. Military conquest, after all, is a matter of technical training, equipment and skill, of local superiority, sometimes of accident. The world has seen many examples of resounding military success, of seemingly invincible armies. Alexander and Napoleon both grew from smaller beginnings and stretched their arm farther over the known world than Prussia. What distinguishes the career of Prussia from that of Alexander and Napoleon is its capacity for absorbing its victims and converting them, within a generation, into agents for the further extension of its power. No military State in history has shown this capacity in so high a degree since the days of Rome. The Prussians are the Romans of the modern world. They are moving to world-mastery from similar small beginnings, by similar gradual stages, by a similar combination of force and civilising achievement, of legions and lawgiving, of skilful education and ruthless suppression. To give to the modern world, so restless and divided, so anxious for unhindered security, a Roman peace, guaranteed by the iron majesty of Roman laws and Roman arms, is the dream of Prussian idealism.

How has this great work of subjection and absorption

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been accomplished? By the power of fear and by the power of knowledge.

It has lately been remarked by an acute psychologist* that social philosophers are apt to judge of mankind according to the nature of the system which they desire to provide for it and to see little in human nature save what accords with their initial design. Thus Hobbes, for instance, played on the single motive of fear, Burke relied on the force of use and wont, and Bentham read self-interest into every act of man. Prussianism, like Hobbes, sees chiefly in man a being responsive to fear.

To the true-born Prussian, living as he does in a perpetual minority, like the Spartan among his Helots, reliance on terrorism and the cultivation of a sense of arrogant contempt towards other peoples and classes has become a fixed habit. "*Vox populi*," said a Junker deputy, in a recent outburst, "*Vox populi, vox catile*."

"The population here," wrote Bismarck from Frankfurt in 1848, in the days when that city was almost as great a hotbed of revolutionary feeling as Petrograd is to-day, "would be a political volcano if revolutions were made with the mouth; so long as it requires blood and strength they will obey anyone who has the courage to command and, if necessary, to draw the sword; they would be dangerous only under cowardly Governments."

According to the spirit of these words Bismarck acted towards South Germany all his life, and so his successors have dealt with their present allies. "Frightfulness" is the spearhead of the Prussian attack. They have studied the motions of fear in all their manifestations, from the first faint symptoms of weakening, the first flickering of the eyelid, to the wild-eyed panic which sweeps away regiments and populations in ignominious rout.

Fear is the cement of the Prussian dominion. Her young people know it in the class-room, when the shadow of the State examination, on which their whole social status depends, darkens their adolescent years. Their

* Graham Wallas. *The Great Society*, p. 147.

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soldiers know it in the barracks and on the drill ground. The civilian knows it in his contact with the soldier and the public official ; the South German in his contact with the Prussian, the ally in his contact with the German. The natives of the German colonies know it well. So do the inhabitants of the occupied territories, and the neutral governments and peoples, and voyagers by sea, and dwellers in cities within reach of Prussia's strong arm. It is her recurring tactic in military and naval operations, in diplomacy, in internal policy, even in business, where she has taught her agents to conceal temporary weakness and embarrassment by spreading legends of inexhaustible reserves of money-power and invincible skill in salesmanship and manufacture. Prestige, discipline, demoralisation—prestige for herself, discipline for her servants, demoralisation for the rest. These in the Prussian conception are the harvest of fear.

But with the inculcation of fear has gone the inculcation of knowledge. "Culture" and terrorism have ranged the world together. First of all European States Prussia realised that knowledge is power : that to exercise dominion in the modern world a Government must not only train its whole manhood to arms, but set its whole people to school and mould their minds to its bent. "Culture" existed before Prussia made the conception her own ; it meant, and still means, familiarity with the best products of human thought and feeling, refinement of taste, a wide outlook, an acquaintance with men and things. But culture in the Prussian sense is something less pleasing in its appeal and less universal in its range. Prussian culture is a State product : it is knowledge, State-organised and State-edited, employed to found or perpetuate a State tradition or to forward a State purpose. It is the armoury whence Prussia draws the weapons of knowledge or opinion with which to promote her designs.

Upon knowledge, thus cultivated and canalised, the strength of Prussia has depended and still depends to-day

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—upon the faithful and tireless docility of her servants and victims. It was not simply the skill of her diplomats and generals which enabled her to reap the fruits of her victory over the other German States in 1866, but the science, the swift efficiency, the monumental solidity of the system thereby revealed. She drew South Germany to her in that seven weeks' campaign and in the years that followed by the magic of intellectual achievement. She awed its statesmen; her glamour dazzled the middle class; she hypnotised the rising generation at school and in the army; she whetted the ambition and stimulated the desires of her merchants and manufacturers. So again it was not simply the physical courage of her soldiers, but the trained intelligence of Moltke and Roon, fertilised by the teachings of Clausewitz and a great school of thinkers upon the art of war, which won the victories of 1870. Nor is it any pre-eminence in natural capacity, any striking gifts of taste or insight or sensibility, which have given German scholarship its worldwide reputation. It is its patient, plodding, conscientious, systematic use of specialised knowledge, the well-devised alliance of Prussian organisation with the old South German spirit of research. By knowledge she won her position in the arts of production and in the markets of the world. And by knowledge her power has been maintained during three years of unexampled warfare and blockade—by the intelligent and well-directed industry of her workmen, by the technical skill of her chemists and engineers, her manufacturers and financiers, by the organising ability and deeply pondered experience of her General Staff, by the concentrated and disciplined labours of countless servants of the Prussian power who form the rank and file of her fighting forces at the front and in the rear.

Thus Prussia, having linked knowledge to power, and founded both in a disciplined loyalty to an authority which has been tested in action and so far not been found wanting, supported by allies, her equals in name but already

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half absorbed into her system, bestrides Europe and the Near East and looks forward, tired but confident, straitened and suffering, but to all outward seeming victorious, towards a peace which will give her breathing space to plan the next step in her "world-historical mission."

II.

IN December, 1917, the German army lay far out in Russian territory. During over three years of campaigning it had won a series of resounding victories—Tannenberg, Gorlice, Warsaw, Tarnopol, Riga. It had overrun vast provinces, centres of industry and wealth, protected by important fortresses. It had broken up the whole defensive system of European Russia, inflicting immense losses on her armies. The German navy had just successfully attacked and occupied the key of the Eastern Baltic. Before the German generals the way to Petrograd lay open. Russia was powerless to resist. Her army was demoralised and in process of disorderly disbandment. Her railways, the arterial system on which her vast bulk depends for the elements of warmth and subsistence, for the possibility of life itself, were almost as disorganised as her army. The workmen in her towns were crying out for bread and peace. Her peasants were too busy pegging out claims of fresh land, and too distrustful of the paper roubles with which the enemy had helped to flood the country, either to attend to the work of production or to make available what produce they had. Famine and civil war, disease and licence stalked through the land with giant strides. In March there had been one Russia from Poland to the Pacific; now, whether there were six or sixty no man could tell. Republics sprang up in a night. Cities and districts proclaimed their independence. The realm of the Romanoffs, of Catherine, of Peter the Great, was no more. Russia had reeled back into the dark ages. She lay prostrate, sick

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of a malady that had long been in her blood, which deprived her even of the power to minister to her own relief.

A turn of the wheel had put the reins of such organised power as still existed in her capital into the hands of a knot of resolute men, exiles lately returned to their native land. The populace asked for peace. They had joined in the demand themselves, and now they responded. They informed the enemy of their willingness, first to conclude an armistice and then to treat for peace. The armistice was concluded, and then, on a given day, the delegates of the Soldiers' and Workmen's Council, the temporary masters of Petrograd, were conveyed on a German train, dispatched to fetch them, to the headquarters of the German Eastern Army at Brest-Litovsk.

The fate of Russia was entrusted, in these negotiations, to a strangely assorted company. A peasant and a workman, a private soldier and a sailor came to take part in the discussions, shepherded by three or four revolutionary politicians. Staff officers accompanied them as technical experts, to advise their plebeian masters. One of these, General Skalon, overcome by the occasion of his mission, put an end to his life during the course of the discussions. Thus, in every circumstance of tragedy and discouragement, the representatives of the Russian Revolution entered the hall of session to open negotiations with the delegates of victorious Prussian power.

Then followed the strangest debate, surely, of which history bears record. It was not a debate, indeed, but a dialogue—a philosophical dialogue held, not, as of old, in porch or cloister, but in the open forum, with all mankind for audience. While the Prussian generals sat by waiting for the negotiations between victor and vanquished to pursue its orthodox traditional course, they saw their civilian colleague, who with an imprudent show of generosity had wandered beyond his beat, drawn into paths of metaphysical argument by men who, brooding in long years of exile, had trodden these tracks till they had become

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more familiar than solid earth. Thus the spokesmen of the Revolution, with desolation behind them, but an audacity outsoaring Prussia's to sustain their spirit, were able, from this singular point of vantage, to make a listening world familiar with their whole thought and purpose.

Bolshevism, as the leaders of the Soviet preach and practise it, is not a new doctrine. In its emotional appeal it is as old as slavery, in its speculations and projects as old as industrialism. Nor is it the first time that it has seized power and essayed the task of government. Paris has seen and remembers not all but something of what Petrograd now endures. The preachings of Lenin and Trotsky are but a crude and contorted version of ideas which have been discussed, in part adopted and in part discarded, by students and statesmen in happier countries than Russia during the last three generations. Closely examined, what they have to set before us is not a system of life and government, well compacted, logical and consistent, as the metallic and uncompromising ring of their language might seem to imply, but a patchwork composition in which victims of all the oppressions of which the modern world is so full can find food for their own particular dream of liberation or revenge, for their elemental anger, their unthinking and childlike fanaticism. Democracy and militarism, socialism and syndicalism, pacifism and the class-war, nationalism and internationalism—these are disconnected and discordant ideals, yet all are equally proclaimed or implied in the Bolshevik programme. Government by the whole people, owning and controlling the machinery of production; government by a section of the people organised in councils composed of privileged groups of workers: peace with the foreign enemy, since the power of propaganda is greater than power of the sword; war against the domestic exploiter, since only through civil war can the working class come into its own: "self-determination," the right of secession and independent sovereignty for every national group, whatever the character of its

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policy and allegiance ; the knitting together of the peoples into a single society controlled by an international council. Here is no single ordered doctrine, like Prussianism, no clean-cut programme for the future of humanity, but a shrill reiterated clamour of irrational contradiction.

Yet Bolshevism, riddled though it is with inconsistency, has a unity of its own, and the inner force that comes from unity ; and with that force it may yet make much history in Europe. Its unity is not intellectual—it is emotional. Its devotees do not think alike—they feel alike. It is the emotion expressed in the simple battle-cry which to-day, as when Marx penned it seventy years ago, can set the waves of passion surging, at moments of crisis and suffering, in any crowded concourse of wage-earners :

Workers of the world unite ; you have a world to win and nothing to lose but your chains.

It is the emotion which springs from a consciousness of wrongs daily and hourly endured, of a human birthright withheld, of gifts wasted and perverted in soulless drudgery, of the existence of a great world of power and beauty and happiness beyond the utmost reach of the individual, but just not beyond his ken. It is the revolution of the soul of man against the outcome of a century of industrialism.

No man can understand the appeal of the revolutionary movement till he has experienced or realised in imagination the degradation which the modern industrial system, with its false standard of values, its concentration on wealth and material production, its naïve detachment from ethical principle or civic obligation, has brought upon the masses who have served as the cannon fodder for its operations. "The worker in our modern world," says a writer whose lot is to live in the one country in Europe which is at once unspoiled by industrialism and relatively immune from the privations and compulsions of war,

The worker in our modern world is the subject of innumerable unapplied doctrines. The lordliest things are predicated for him, which do not affect in the least the relationship with him of those

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who employ his labour. The ancient wisdom, as it is recounted to him on God's day, assures him of his immortality: that the divine signature is over all his being, that in some way he is co-related with the Eternal, that he is fashioned in a likeness to It. . . . So proud a tale is told of him, and when he awakens on the morrow after the day of God, he finds that none will pay him reverence. He, the destined comrade of Seraphim and Cherubim, is herded with other children of the King in fetid slum and murky alleys, where the devil hath his many mansions, where light and air, the great purifiers, are already dimmed and corrupted before they do him service. . . . So great a disparity exists between spiritual theory and the realities of the social order that it might almost be said that spiritual theory has no effect at all on our civilization, and its inhuman contours seem softened at no point where we could say "Here the Spirit has mastery. Here God possesses the world."

The imagination, following the worker in our industrial system, sees him labouring without security in his work, in despair, locked out, on strike, living in slums, rarely with enough food for health, bringing children into the world who suffer from malnutrition from their earliest years, a pauper when his days of strength are passed. He dies in charitable institutions. Though his labours are necessary, he is yet not integrated into the national economy. He has no share of his own in the wealth of the nation. He cannot claim work as a right from the holders of economic power, and this absolute dependence upon the autocrats of industry for a livelihood is the greatest evil of any, for it puts a spiritual curse on him and makes him in effect a slave. Instinctively he adopts a servile attitude to those who can sentence him and his children to poverty and hunger without trial or judgment by his peers. A hasty word, and he may be told to draw his pay and begone. The spiritual wrong done him by the social order is greater than the material ill, and that spiritual wrong is no less a wrong because generation after generation of workers have grown up and are habituated to it, and do not realize the oppression; because in childhood circumstance and the black art of education alike conspire to make the worker humble in heart and to take the crown and sceptre from his spirit, and his elders are already tamed and obsequious.*

Who will say that this description is exaggerated, as applied to the countries and classes where the ideals and temper of the Revolution make their strongest appeal? And who can forbear to wonder that, confined as they are

* *The National Being*, by A. E. Dublin, 1916; pp. 66-68.

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within such narrow and squalid limits, the workers, as a class, have preserved or developed such a boundless capacity for faith and hope and generous idealism? For the victims of a system so deadening in its daily incidence the very power to feel indignation is itself an achievement. The message of the Revolution, bearing with it the glow of passion, the sense of union and organisation, the vague expectation of decisive action and perpetual release, comes as a tonic and lifegiving force. To the historian, the economist and the party leader and organiser the successive revolutionary programmes which have marked its European course, from the days of St. Simon through Marx and Bakunin to the latest Maximalist inspiration—socialism, anarchism, communism, syndicalism, in their changes and variations—are serious criticisms and philosophies of society and government. Not so to their followers. By the vast majority they are accepted, not as doctrines consciously adopted, the fruit of intelligence and reflection, but as a religion, a revelation, a vision of the Kingdom. The Revolution, which substitutes economics for theology, and gilds the repellent theorems of the dismal science with an apocalyptic glow, is the workman's substitute for a Christianity which has seemed so powerless to supply him with sustenance either for body or spirit.

The emergence of the smouldering fires of the Revolution into activity in Europe is a natural result of three years of conflict in which the populations of the Continent have suffered as in the history of modern warfare only the peoples of the Confederacy have been called upon to endure. For the subjects of the Central Empires, locked in the prison-house of a slave State, revolution is, if they dare to take it, the shortest road to safety, comfort, and freedom. But forest fires know nothing of frontiers; and to the peoples of the Alliance, some of them, France, Italy, and the smaller nations, bearing an almost equal or even greater strain, the propaganda of the Revolution at this crisis of the war against Prussianism is an unwelcome distraction

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and may even be a disaster: for it darkens counsel and divides and confuses the forces of freedom.

"Let us try never to forget," wrote a wise French Liberal * lately, "that Socialism is for Liberalism an ever doubtful ally. It has not the passion for liberty, it has not the passion for nationality, it has no passion, no instinct, save for the struggle against the bourgeois class. It has, at this moment, the instinct that whoever may be the victor, this war is preparing for it a very great future. It is impatient for the moment which will allow it to begin to gather its harvest, to store away at last the fruit of so much suffering. It is almost prepared to neglect, as a fact of secondary importance, whether it must do its harvesting under German guidance or under some other. Its thought is elsewhere. It is, moreover, made up of masses who have the habit of being dominated, and one domination more leaves it unamazed."

The same warning, never more necessary than to-day, runs like a refrain through the writings of the most prophetic of all nineteenth century idealists. "By dividing into fractions that which is in reality but one thing," wrote Mazzini in 1852, "by separating the social from the political question, a numerous section of French Socialists has powerfully contributed to bring about the present shameful position of affairs in France." And speaking of the revolutionary propaganda of that day and its distracting influence on idealistic endeavour, he wrote :

Man is not changed by whitewashing or gilding his habitation ; a people cannot be regenerated by teaching them the worship of enjoyment ; they cannot be taught a spirit of sacrifice by speaking to them of material rewards. . . . The Utopist may see afar from a hill the distant land which will give to society a virgin soul, a purer air ; his duty is to point it out with a gesture and a word to his brothers ; but he cannot take humanity in his arms and carry it there in a single bound ; even if this were in his power, humanity would not therefore have progressed.

And again, in words that strikingly recall recent history in Russia, he says of the French movement :

Anarchy entered its ranks. A man, gifted with a power of logic,

* M. Daniel Halévy in the *New Republic*, January 5, 1918.

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disastrous because applied to the service of a false principle, and able to dominate weak minds by his incredible audacity and his clear and cutting rhetoric, came to throw the light of his torch upon this anarchy. . . . He refuted one system by another; he contradicted himself ten times over. He enthroned irony as queen of the world, and proclaimed the Void. It is through this Void that Louis Napoleon has entered.*

What Mazzini said of the effect of the influence of Proudhon on the career of Napoleonism in France may yet prove true of the influence of Trotsky on the career of Prussianism in Europe.

For the revolutionary idea does more than break up the unity of the forces of freedom: it tends to realign them against one another, leaving the front unguarded against the common enemy. In the name of liberty and under the guise of friendship, it instinctively seeks out the failings to which liberalism in a crisis is ever prone, its distaste for authority, its repudiation of discipline, its tendency to mistake argument for action, its capacity for illusion and for ignoring unpleasant realities. True it presses its attack also against the legions of Prussia and her allies. But fear may well prove a firmer master than idealism, and Prussianism, with its supreme and perfected military administration, is better versed in the art of repression than the free and responsible governments of the West. While such equivocal forces are afield let the army of freedom beware!

The votaries of revolution, overleaping the present, claim the future for their own. Ignoring or discounting the war, they have already annexed the coming age. But the future is not with them. Masters alone in the arts of enthusiasm and destruction, the world will not turn to them to repair its ruin and desolation. Not through such ministers of wrath will salvation come. To steadier hands and wiser heads will fall the healing tasks of the new order.

* *Europe: Its Condition and Prospects. Collected Works VI.* pp. 239, 250-1, 253.

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III.

PRUSSIANISM and the Revolution are near akin. Both were cradled in violence and brought up on tales of conflict. Both have learned in the school of experience to regard all life as a war, now open, now concealed. Both aim at world-ascendancy and pursue that aim by terrorism. Both are unscrupulous in negotiation, daring and resolute in action, impenetrably self-centred in thought and purpose. Both acknowledge no authority, no principle of humanity or goodwill beyond the blind and driving law of their own being. Both are members of that tribe of devouring fanaticisms whose dreary and blood-stained doings fill so large and tragic a place in the recorded annals of mankind.

It was this psychological kinship, so real and perceptible beneath the striking contrast of their external credentials and appearance, which gave dramatic interest and unity to the dialogue at Brest. Here were the two great destructive agencies of our time met face to face in the persons of their chosen representatives: the one gross, solid, material, equipped with the full panoply of martial grandeur, the other with no visible legions to support it, but strong in the consciousness of a power, elusive, all-pervading, impalpable, an infection in the air, a fever in the blood, a terror lurking in the dark.

The spokesmen of the Revolution, for their part, did not fail to acknowledge the relationship. "When General Hoffmann pointed out," said M. Trotsky, on January 14, "that the Russian Government based its position on power, and that it makes use of force against all those whose opinions differ from its own, and that it stigmatises them as counter-revolutionaries and bourgeois, it should be observed that the Russian Government is based upon power. Throughout the whole of history no other govern-

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ment has been known. So long as society consists of contending classes, the power of governments will be based on strength, and these governments will maintain their dominion by force. . . . What the governments of other countries object to in the actions of the Russian Government is the way in which it makes use of its power, and from this policy it does not allow itself to be deterred."

Here is the inner link between Prussianism and the Revolution. Here is the hidden root from which so much bitter fruit has sprung. Here, in a few sentences, is the complete philosophy of militarism. If this is the whole truth about society and government, then force is the only arbiter between contending parties and principles, and the big battalions, as so often, will engage philosophers after the event to justify the necessary, the inevitable, the "progressive" character of their achievement. Or can we find some more universal and more harmonious ideal? Can we build the house of our faith, of our political and social allegiance upon some firmer and sounder foundation? Is there some standard, some guiding principle, which we can set up with assurance against the crude and corrupting doctrine of force?

Such a principle exists. It is working in us and around us. It is transforming human life and its institutions. To understand its nature, to realize the gulf which divides it from the contending militarisms, to grasp the true force and quality of its achievement, we must stand aside for a moment from the heat and conflict of the present age and survey, as from a mountain top, the situation and record of man as a whole.

IV

MAN is a spiritual being. Seventy years, or little more, is the span of his physical life. This planet, which, save when he looks upward, bounds his vision, is the place where those years are spent. To enable him to live the best

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life it can afford him is the object of political and social organization.

For unnumbered ages man has lived on the planet. They were ages of darkness and ignorance, and only dim traces of their record survive. Men and women were born, lived and died, endured cold and hunger, pain and danger, hunting and being hunted, dwelling almost as beasts among the beasts, knowing nothing of the planet save a few miles of hill or jungle, and nothing of man's being save what the passing occasion might call forth—now a stab of anger or curiosity, now a call to lead or to follow, some motion of fear or jealousy or revenge, a gleam of wonder, a glow of passion, a glory of friendship or motherhood. Man was the slave of nature, the plaything of circumstance. Life was compacted of custom and instinct. Knowledge was not yet, and Reason, for lack of material for her use, was sluggish and undeveloped.

Slowly man mastered the outer and the inner knowledge. He learnt to control his environment—to make fire, to grow food, to sail, to spin, to weave, to use metals. He learnt to control his inherited nature—to subdue fear and lust, greed and ambition, jealousy and revenge, to trust and to keep trust, to command with justice and obey with honour, to enlarge his circle of loyalty from family to kin, from kin to tribe, to spare, even to conciliate his enemy, to reverence the old and respect the young, to sweeten his intercourse with lasting affections, to dignify it by contact with the sanctities of memory and aspiration. Life was no longer a struggle of all against all. It had become, on its narrow but expanding stage, a sphere of common endeavour, of mutual service. Thus civilization began. Thus slowly and painfully, through the labours of an uncounted succession of humble men and women, was amassed the nucleus of that which is now in jeopardy, the social inheritance of mankind.

To preserve and increase this inheritance two things were needed, knowledge and institutions—knowledge as

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the instrument of future progress and conquests, institutions to embody in a living tradition the conquests of the present. The cultivation of knowledge and the establishment of social institutions mark the development of civilization.

As the pressure of material need relaxed, knowledge, the child of wonder and reflection, grew. Wisdom and the arts were handed down and perfected from generation to generation, entrusted to poet and prophet and priest, to caste and guild, to schools of craftsmanship and medicine, law and science, to the cloister and the university, to the republics of science and letters, to the company of teachers and students throughout the world. With truth for task-mistress they have laboured in honourable rivalry, not simply for hire or reward, but for the service of mankind. Thus knowledge could replace instinct, reason could dethrone passion, in the ordering of human affairs.

But if instinct and passion are the blind weapons of the Revolution, knowledge as we have seen, is the chief ally of Prussianism. Knowledge is not mistress in the house of life. She is but a handmaid, powerful of arm but unfitted for initiative. She is bound in humble service to fulfil the desires and purposes of others. What use men make of her depends in part upon their own individual and temporary desires, but in greater degree upon the character of the institutions which embody, at any time, the living tradition and lasting purposes of civilization.

What are the common needs and concerns of men for which institutions have been devised? Two stand out above the rest—one economic, the other political. For his physical existence man needs material goods, food, clothing, shelter and domestic comfort. As a spiritual being man needs justice and liberty.

The history of social and political thought and endeavour is the record of man's attempt to create institutions appropriate for the fulfilling of these needs, to embody in a lasting and progressive tradition the dream of the perfect

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state and the perfect economic system. Far indeed has the fulfilment lagged behind the quest of the ideal in either sphere. Exploitation and the class-struggle, slavery and serfdom, profit-seeking and inequality stain the one record ; tyranny and warfare, the ambition of the strong, the submission and spoliation of the weak, mar the other ; and the end is not yet. But steadily through the ages, in Greece and Palestine, in Rome, ancient and mediæval, in England, France and the New World, the purpose and ideal, first of politics, and then of industry also, have become clearer to the vision.

What is the nature of that ideal ? If the close-knit institutions of Prussianism, as we have seen, leave men's souls starved and stunted, if the Revolution dissolves all institutions and plunges society back into barbarism, what doctrine, what principle of organisation can assure man order, harmony, and freedom, can satisfy at once the needs of body and spirit ?

The inspiration of all sound and enduring political and social construction is what has been called the principle of the Commonwealth. The name is convenient because it serves to distinguish, as habitual usage does not, institutions which promote the cause of human welfare and those, such as have been described in Prussia, which have a more sectional and sinister purpose. What, it will be asked, is a Commonwealth ? A Commonwealth is a community, designed to meet the common needs of men, founded on the principle of the service of each for all. Is the Commonwealth to be identified with any particular type of government ? Is it necessarily a democracy ? Does the service of all necessarily imply the rule of all ? "Easier a great deal it is," wrote a wise Elizabethan, "for men by law to be taught what they ought to do than instructed to judge as they should do of law : the one being a thing which belongeth generally unto all, the other such as none but the wiser and more judicious sort can perform."* Yet since,

* Hooker. *Ecclesiastical Polity*, i, xvi, 2.

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despite the contempt of Prussia and the cynicism of the Revolution, the spirit of man was framed for wisdom and judgment, for responsibility, initiative and self-control, since a man without liberty is a being bereft, as the poet has said, of half his manhood, the perfect Commonwealth, the ideal towards which all political and social endeavour moves forward, is a society of free men and women, each at once ruling and being ruled, each consciously giving his service for the benefit of all.

The principle of the Commonwealth is the application to the field of government and social policy of the law of human brotherhood, of the duty of man to his neighbour, near and far. Like the opposing principle of militarism, it is as old as the need for conscious organisation, for the adoption of a policy in social affairs. In the earliest time, when men's duties and relationships were confined within a narrow personal circle, little effort was needed to enable him to discharge them. But from the day when man first felt the need for public right, for an impartial arbiter to stand between him and hot passion and bitter need, organisation has been the prop of social life and personal duty. Only through organisation, through citizenship and its related obligations, can man worthily play his part in a large-scale society. History has known organisations of every kind, designed with every sort of motive—tyranny, ambition, cruelty, greed or fear. A Commonwealth is an organisation designed with the ruling motive of love and brotherhood. It seeks to embody, not only in phraseology and constitutional doctrine, but in the actual conduct of public affairs, so far as the frailty and imperfection of man admit, the spirit and ideals of religion. *Whosoever will be great among you shall be your minister; and whosoever of you will be the chiefest shall be the servant of all.*

The doctrine of the Commonwealth, expressed in these words, has been set forth and applied from age after age to the current problems of humanity, from Plato down to President Wilson. It embodies, succinctly and unanswer-

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ably, the response of the soul of man to the twin challenge of Prussianism and Revolution. Yet there are criticisms which must be met. In theory men will argue, the principle of the Commonwealth holds the field. Religion and philosophy, conscience and idealism, proclaim it. Yet how weak is its influence, how paltry its achievements! Christianity has preached the doctrine of mutual service through twenty centuries, yet behold the shambles of to-day! Prussianism, as we have seen, pays lip service to the Christian State, and the Revolution, in its perorations, drops the language of conflict and makes its appeal to brotherhood. Yet, for present purposes, for effort in the world as it now is, both prefer systems of violence. Admirable and flawless in theory, is the principle of mutual service, men may ask, compatible in practice, here and now, with the nature of man as we see him and know him? Can we ask of the toiling masses, encrusted with ignorance and prejudice, with false traditions and blind animosities, weighed down by the load of daily care and suffering, that they should guide their lives by the light of so high and distant a beacon?

The answer to such doubters is to exhibit the principle of the Commonwealth in living operation and to recall the manifold evidence of its all-pervading vitality. If the instances which follow are drawn from the record of one only of its manifestations, the British, it is not for want of appreciation of what France and America and other members of the League of Freedom have achieved in their own field. For them it would be a presumption to speak. An ally may watch and wonder at an ally's confidence and endurance; but the secret springs of faith, the conditions of such heroic endeavour, are withdrawn from his gaze.

Consider, then, as regards the British Commonwealth, the indictment of Prussianism. "You claim," it says, "to be a Commonwealth, to unite beneath one law a quarter of the human race, to have achieved, as it were by accident, in a fit of absence of mind, as one of your writers

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has put it, without conscious purpose or the guidance of systematic knowledge, the realisation of our own cherished dream—a Roman peace diffused throughout five continents. Yet, whatever future the gods may reserve for Prussia, Britain and her Empire at least seem stricken with mortality. You talk of the law of mutual service. Is it graven, like the laws of Prussia, in the hearts and minds of your citizens! Have you laboured, as we have laboured, to create a race worthy of your imperial purpose? Have you tamed the sectional instincts, uprooted the selfish desires, chastened the unruly wills of your scattered populations? We look out over your Empire and behold everywhere the dry rot of disunion, the seeds of disloyalty and decay; here a rebellion, there a conspiracy, here an ignorant denial of duty, there a direct withdrawal of aid, here a cry for secession, and there, at the very heart, voices preaching anarchy and sedition, rallying unchecked in their defence the ignorance you have foreborne to enlighten, the passions you have foreborne to subdue. With too easy a rein you have ridden them, your millions at home and overseas! Wealth you have given them and comfort and, by our leave, a long lease of peace. But in your anarchy and scepticism, your contempt for knowledge, your wilful blindness to stern realities, we see little trace of your proud doctrine of mutual service, nor is the lazy and good-humoured tolerance of British rule the true fulfilment of the law of Christ.”

Truth is contained in this indictment. Yet were it the whole truth, the British Commonwealth would long since, in these testing years, have succumbed in the ordeal and gone the way of older dominions. If it survives intact, if it has grown in confidence and vitality, in the consciousness of its purpose and ideal, it is because, side by side with its failures, so much more visible and clamorous than the disappointments of Prussia, the spirit of mutual service is alive and vigorous among its nations, moving from strength to strength in the cause, not of the Commonwealth alone

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but of humanity. The war indeed, if it has revealed shortcomings, has not found the British character or British institutions wanting. It has endorsed and confirmed them. In fact the Commonwealth has proved itself capable of achieving these very triumphs of unity and public service which Prussianism claimed as its monopoly, only to be exploited by its own tried and tested methods—triumphs moreover on Prussia's own chosen field of war. Six million men and more, untouched by the goad of compulsion, offered their lives to the cause of human freedom. Women awoke, as never before in history, to the duty of public service and to the consciousness of their individual gifts and powers. The nations of the Commonwealth near and far, tutored and untutored, poured out their contribution of human devotion and material treasure. Among the weaker races thousands unfitted for the combat went willingly to labour in a strange land. Untrained in the issues of international policy, unaccustomed to withstand the blandishments of foreign intrigue or to tolerate the suspense and privations, the curtailments of liberty, the summary and indiscriminate procedures of wartime, vast populations worked and waited, steadily and in good heart, neither impatient nor vindictive, holding fast to the ideal. Confirmed in its inner faith the Commonwealth has begun to strengthen its outward unity also. For the first time the common purpose of its peoples, at home and overseas, has been embodied in executive institutions. Men from five continents have come together to frame common decisions. East and West, under the stress of danger, found the unity underlying age-long difference and met for deliberation in equal partnership. While Prussianism holds down its conquests by slavery and oppression, while the Revolution has broken up a Continent into its primitive elements, across the mountains, in India, among populations twice as numerous and far more varied than the peoples of Russia, the spirit of responsibility is awakening and the charter of self-government has been

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proclaimed. In Ireland, too, where old wrongs still remain to be righted, Irishmen sitting in orderly convention are seeking to shape the destinies of their country in a spirit equally removed from ascendancy and revolution. If the record of the British Commonwealth under the stress of war is less resounding than the martial bulletins of Prussia, less stirring and fantastic than the sweeping edicts of the Revolution, if its plans and achievements are dressed in the sober tints of ordinary life, it is because the Commonwealth exists not to gratify a conqueror's ambition or to demonstrate or refute a dreamer's doctrine, but to enable its citizens to grow to the full stature of their moral being. Not by the triumphs of the battlefield and the forum will the Commonwealth seek to be justified, but by the character and the influence, the noble example and the inspiring memory of its men and women.

But the Bolshevik, too, has his indictment. We need not repeat it. Its substance stands on an earlier page: the fetid slum and the murky alley; the denial of light and air and health; the sunless outlook and the soulless labour; the back bowed down not by drudgery only but by servile fear; the mind shut out from the contemplation of knowledge and beauty; inequalities of wealth and power and circumstance darkening every aspect and relation of social existence.

The indictment cannot be denied. For a century Mammon has bestridden, and still bestrides, the world. His standards, conflicting at every stage with the standards of the Commonwealth, have been embodied in law, in custom and in the social code. Yet here, too, change is on the march. In these islands men are unlearning the outworn shibboleth of "Business is Business" and seeking new and fruitful applications of the doctrine of the Commonwealth. The first and most necessary step, to enlarge the range of popular responsibility and control has already been taken. Amidst the unremitting stress of war, the electorate has been doubled and women called in to fill

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their rightful place in the common life. Education, the key of the future, is at last being extended, if as yet but timidly. Labour has received a charter of its equality with the other agents of production and has been called, through its representative organizations, into partnership with management, to control the conduct of their common services. The burden of the State is being placed more and more upon the shoulders of those who best can bear it: the yield of the taxes on incomes and profits and on the inheritance of the rich amounted in 1916-17 to £400,000,000 or double the entire budget of 1914.

Yet these changes, startling as they would have seemed four years since, and coming on the heel of events which might well, as a hundred years ago, have clogged the wheels of progress, are but the symbol and presage of what is yet to come. For in these years of strain and darkness, of common anxiety and common danger, many inward barriers have been broken down and men have learnt to face the meaning and consequences of their faith. If the ideal of the Commonwealth is to be truly realised, if the free service of each for all is to be not merely a profession but a reality in the industrial field, men must turn their minds, as they are already turning them, to a wide reform and reordering of the conditions of life for the mass of the people. Shorter hours of labour, and an annual holiday on full pay for rest and travel; protection for all who work against the accident of unemployment; more control by the workman over the conditions of his occupation; buildings for him to work in designed not merely for machines but for men, planned for convenience and even for beauty; a home, not a brick box, to live in; a town, not a mean monotony of streets, to stir his civic pride; better schools and a longer education for his children, so that they may grow, body and mind, to the full stature of manhood; the absorption by the community, rather than by the capitalist, of the surplus profits of production; justice, informed and impartial, to support and enforce the claim of freedom

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wherever it is denied or endangered ; above all, an open gateway for everyone, young and old, into the realm of knowledge and beauty, and the recognition, not in laws only but in social customs and institutions, of the spiritual basis of the Commonwealth and the equality of all its citizens in the eyes of society as in the eyes of God—such are the conditions through which, for all who work, the spirit of public service will replace the spirit of private gain as the dominating motive of their toil.

Thus the principle of the Commonwealth, tested in action and moving along its own quiet and well-tried paths, is proving itself more militant than Prussianism and more revolutionary than the Revolution. Once more it is assailed by its enemies : once more, as in bygone days, the hope of the world depends upon its victory : once more it is rallying to its defence the hearts and minds of all who know what freedom means and inspiring in them the fortitude and perseverance needed, as aforetime, to hold and break the onset of militarism. And when it has overthrown the power of Prussianism and rid the world for ever from the menace of its dominion, it will have nothing to fear from its other enemy, the destructive forces of the Revolution. For the war has renewed men's faith in it : its purpose has been clarified and confirmed by the ordeal : and even in the dust and heat of the conflict it is beginning to build up the new order of civic freedom and international justice which will govern the coming age of peace.

Yes, while on earth a thousand discords ring,
Man's fitful uproar mingling with his toil,
Still do thy sleepless ministers move on,
Their glorious tasks in silence perfecting.



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Erratum: In the reference to the shading, *Letts* and *Lithuanians* should be transposed.

THE PEOPLES OF THE BALTIC PROVINCES AND LITHUANIA*

ESTONIA, Livonia and Courland constitute together the so-called Baltic Provinces. The Governments of Kovno, Vitebsk, Vilna, Grodno, Minsk and Mohilev roughly correspond to what was known between 1569 and 1772 as Lithuania. The Baltic Provinces are the land of the Ests and the Letts, whilst *historic* Lithuania is that of the Lithuanians and the White Russians. But Estland, Lettland, *ethnic* Lithuania and White Russia are to be found on nationality maps alone ; they do not coincide with any historic or administrative divisions. Their national character is determined by the language of the vast peasant masses ; the political boundaries have been drawn by and between the races to which these peasant nations had been subject, the Poles, the Germans and the Great Russians, and at one time also the Swedes. The big landed estates in the Baltic Provinces remain to the present day in the hands of the Germans, throughout historic Lithuania in the hands of the Poles. In the Baltic Provinces the

* Total population of the Baltic Provinces and the Lithuanian Governments, according to an estimate for 1915 drawn up by the Russian Central Statistical Commission :

Estonia	512,500	Vilna	2,083,200
Livonia	1,778,500	Vitebsk	1,984,800
Courland	812,300	Minsk	3,070,900
Kovno	1,871,400	Mohilev	2,551,400
Grodno	2,094,300	Suvalki	718,000

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Germans and the Jews form substantial minorities in the towns, in historic Lithuania the Jews form the larger part of the urban population.* There are considerable Polish settlements in the Lithuanian towns, and also Polish enclaves in the rural districts of the Governments of Vilna and Grodno. Great Russians live in scattered groups throughout the Baltic Provinces and Lithuania.

Of the four nationalities which form the vast majority of the population in the Baltic Provinces and Lithuania, the most northerly are the Ests. They inhabit the whole of Estonia (including the islands at the entrance to the Gulf of Riga) and the northern part of Livland, roughly to a line drawn west and south-east of the town of Walk. Also the town of Narva in the Government of Petrograd is predominantly Est and has recently been allowed by Russia to join the autonomous State of Estonia.

The Ests speak a Finnish language and are Lutherans.

In 1897 the population of Estonia was 413,000, of which 366,000 were Ests and only 16,000 Germans. The same census put the population of Livonia at 1,299,000, the number of Ests among them at 519,000. There were 64,000 Ests in the Government of Petrograd and 25,000 in the Government of Pskov. Their total number in Russia was given as 994,000. This figure would have probably to be increased by about 16 per cent. to bring it up to date.†

In the early Middle Ages the country to the south of what is now Est territory was also inhabited by Finnish tribes, the now extinct Cours and Livs, who have given their names to the two southern Baltic Provinces. But

* Considerable numbers of Jews have recently emigrated from Lithuania. A very large proportion of the Jewish emigrants from the western parts of the Government of Kovno have gone to South Africa. In small towns such as Shavle it would be hard to find a Jewish family which has not got some relatives in South Africa, and the names of Johannesburg or Cape Town are more familiar to them than Paris or Vienna.

† The birth rate among the Ests is low and the death rate comparatively high.

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by the twelfth century Lithuanian tribes had displaced them and occupied most of the Baltic shore from about the mouth of the River Salis to the Lower Vistula and its hinterland for some two hundred miles inland. They all spoke dialects of one common language which, though not Slav itself, approaches nearest to the Slav linguistic group. The most westerly Lithuanian tribes, the original Prussians, are now almost completely extinct—just a few hundred of them are left in East Prussia, in villages on the Kurisches Haff. They have perished in the struggle against the southern branch of the Teutonic Knights of the Cross, the founders and forerunners of the modern Prussian State.

Differences in historic development have divided the surviving Lithuanians into two separate nationalities, very closely allied in speech but differing in culture and religion—the Lutheran Letts and the predominantly Roman Catholic Lithuanians. Ever since the thirteenth century the Letts have remained under the immediate dominion of the northern branch of the Teutonic Knightly Order, a dominion which did not lose its reality even when after the Reformation the German Knights, who had divested themselves of their semi-ecclesiastical character, had to admit the suzerainty of Poland, Sweden or Russia. In the fourteenth century, when in the south the original Lithuanian Prussians were succumbing in the unequal contest against the German Knights and in the north the Letts had fallen under a similar dominion, the ancestors of the present-day Lithuanians had subdued vast stretches of Russian territory and ruled over a wide empire which exceeded in extent that which is now known as historic Lithuania. Yet even they did not feel sufficiently strong to fight single-handed against the German Knights who were invading their home country on the Baltic shore. With a view to more effective defence the Lithuanians formed, therefore, towards the end of the fourteenth century a dynastic union with Poland. This union made it possible for the combined forces of the two countries to

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defeat the Teutonic Knights, to preserve the Lithuanians from German dominion, and to secure for Poland the land on the Lower Vistula—an access to the sea. But when in the course of the following centuries the Lithuanian land-owning aristocracy and gentry merged into that of Poland, gave up their own language, and finally became estranged from their own people, here also the Lithuanian-speaking descendants of the original free Lithuanians found themselves in a position not very different from that of the Letts. They too were now subject to an alien dominion.

The Letts inhabit at the present day the four southern districts of Livland (Riga, Wolmar, Wenden and Walk), the whole of Courland, and the three north-western districts of the Government of Vitebsk, usually described as Lattgalia (Dvinsk, Ryeshitsa and Lyutsin).

The Letts in Courland and Livonia are Lutherans, in Lattgalia predominantly Roman Catholics.

The census of 1897 put the total number of Letts in Russia at 1,436,000. Of these 511,000 inhabited Livonia, 524,000 Courland, and about 250,000 Lattgalia.

In recent Lettish publications the following figures are given for the distribution of the Letts, the population being calculated for 1912; but it should be observed that only the part of Livonia inhabited by Letts is taken into consideration :—

				The Lettish parts of Livonia				The Whole of Lettland	
		Per cent.		Per cent.		Per cent.		Per cent.	
Letts ...	630,000	77·6	852,000	75·0	492,000	74·8	1,974,000	75·8	
Russians ...	46,000	5·6	79,000	7·0	74,000	11·2	199,000	7·9	
Jews ...	62,000	7·6	51,000	4·5	46,000	7·0	159,000	6·4	
Germans ...	25,000	3·1	85,000	7·5	3,000	0·4	113,000	3·7	
Others ...	49,000	6·1	68,000	6·6	43,000	6·6	160,000	6·2	
	<u>812,000</u>		<u>1,135,000</u>		<u>658,000</u>		<u>2,605,000</u>		

The total number of Letts in Lettland (*i.e.*, Courland, Southern Livonia and Lattgalia) is thus estimated at 1,974,000; the total for the whole of Russia is given by the same sources as 2,300,000.

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The figure as given for Courland seems reliable. It marks an increase of about 20 per cent. on that of 1897. The number of Letts in Livonia claimed in the Lettish statistics for 1912 exceeds by about 50 per cent. that admitted by the Russian census in 1897, and for Lattgalia it is double that of 1897. Since in Courland the Letts are indisputably the dominant race and the number of the second most numerous nationality, the Jews, hardly admits of statistical jugglery, both sides seem to have kept approximately to the truth. In the case of Livonia, where the question lies between the Ests and the Letts, it may be assumed that the unusually rapid increase of the Lett population marks an over-statement on their part. In Lattgalia, where the Russian officials in 1897 are likely to have tried to exaggerate the number of White Russians at the expense of the Letts, the unnatural increase of almost 100 per cent. is no doubt the result of an under-statement on the part of the Russian officials and an over-statement on the part of the Letts.

The Lithuanians inhabit the Government of Kovno, the northern and by far the larger part of the Government of Suvalki (the north-eastern corner of what used to be Russian Poland) and parts of the three north-western districts of the Government of Vilna (Svientsany, Vilna and Troki). They touch the Baltic Sea in the district of Polangen, which only in 1817 was separated from Lithuania and joined to Courland. Moreover, the north-eastern corner of East Prussia and also its eastern fringe are inhabited by Lithuanians (parts of the districts of Tilsit, Heidekrug, Memel and Gumbinnen). This is, of course, a very much smaller region than that occupied by *historic* Lithuania, which includes White Russia.

The Lithuanians inhabiting Russia are almost all Roman Catholics, those of East Prussia are Lutherans.

The census of 1897 put the number of Lithuanians in

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Russia at 1,659,000, of which about a million inhabited the Government of Kovno, about 280,000 the Government of Vilna, and about 300,000 that of Suvalki. Their number in East Prussia was put by the German census of 1905 at about 100,000. Neither the Russian nor the German figures for the Lithuanians are reliable; and though it would be equally risky to accept wholesale any of the estimates made by the Lithuanians themselves, the official figures are most certainly under-estimates. The present number of Lithuanians in Russia and Germany may be put at about three millions. There are, moreover, about 250,000 Lithuanians resident in the United States, and there is a fair-sized Lithuanian settlement in the mining districts of Scotland; the exact number of the latter is not known.

The White Russians inhabit the larger part of the Governments of Vilna and Grodno and practically the whole of those of Minsk, Vitebsk and Mohilev. Their language is but a dialect of Russian and they themselves a branch of the Russian nation. But like the Lithuanians, the White Russians have lost their upper classes: they were merged in the Polish aristocracy and gentry and became estranged from their own people. The two Poles best known to other nations, the Polish national hero Kosciuszko and the poet Mickiewicz, were both of White Russian extraction. But had it not been for the centuries during which they remained under Lithuanian or Polish dominion, the White Russian peasantry would now no more rank as a separate branch of the Russian nation than do the Great Russian peasants of Vologda or Viatka, who speak their own variety of Great Russian. If a proper system of elementary education had been introduced by Russia when she regained these territories at the partitions of Poland, no one would now think of White Russian as a language. Only in recent years have attempts been made to develop a White Russian literary language. White Russian shades gradually through

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dialects into Great Russian and Little Russian.* In fact it is impossible to draw a line between the White Russians and Little Russians where they meet in the Government of Grodno in the midst of the biggest forests and marshes of Europe. Villages and settlements are practically cut off from one another, live their own life and speak their own tongue. But any one who knows either Great Russian or Little Russian will easily understand every single form of White Russian.

By religion about four-fifths of the White Russians are Greek Orthodox, one-fifth, inhabiting the western parts of Vilna and Grodno, Roman Catholics. The Poles have for centuries conducted a Roman Catholic or Uniate propaganda among the White Russians, just as among the Little Russians, trying to alienate these two branches of the Russian nation from the Great Russians. To the present day practically all the Roman Catholic priests in the White Russian country are Poles or Polonised, and the vernacular part of the service is conducted in Polish, even though the peasants do not understand it. The alien character of the Church has probably contributed towards rendering very slight the influence of Christianity on the western White Russians, who, inhabiting the wildest and most inaccessible parts of Western Russia, have remained, in their customs, beliefs and thinking, probably the most pagan nation in Europe. One thing, however, has been achieved by the Poles—the Roman Catholic White Russian calls his alien religion “Polish,” with a view to census abuses a most convenient confusion of ideas. Kinglake, having travelled about 1850 through what is now the kingdom of Bulgaria, described his journey without making a single allusion to the existence of the Bulgarian race—he had found only “Greeks.” And yet it would be ludicrous to suggest that the Bulgarian peasant ever considered himself a Hellene; by “Greek” he meant merely his religion. Similarly a

* In some western border districts the White Russian dialects bear also marks of Polish influence.

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White Russian peasant, if he calls himself a " Pole," means to say that he is a Roman Catholic, not that he shares the nationality of his Polish landlord. How very little feeling for Poland, Polish traditions and Polish history there is even among the Roman Catholic White Russians on the very border of Poland can be gathered from the following fact.

A certain Federowski, a Polish gentleman, in four volumes of a truly monumental work, has collected all the White Russian folksongs, legends, stories, anecdotes, etc., which he heard during fifteen years (1877-1892) spent in the western districts of Grodno, mainly or wholly among the Roman Catholic White Russians. Among these many thousand tales there are only two which refer to the Polish national revolution of 1863, a point on which Federowski himself dwells with bitterness. Of these two stories one states merely that there was a war which was not a real war, but that plenty of people had been hanged and deported. The second runs as follows : " When the Czar abolished serfdom the landlords raised a revolt and started a rebellion so that the peasants should serve them as of old, but they did not succeed ; they themselves went under, they lost their money, hiding it in the forests or losing it in the revolution, and they did not regain their hold over the peasants." Where class differences coincide with differences of nationality such misunderstandings can hardly be avoided.

The following table regarding the six Governments of historic Lithuania and the predominantly Lithuanian Government of Suwalki reproduces the results of the census of 1897, the only one which analyses the population by nationality :—

	Great Russians	White Russians	Little Russians	Lithu- anians	Jews	Poles	Total ! (in 1897)
Vilna	79,000	892,000	1,000	280,000	202,000	130,000	1,591,000
Grodno	74,000	705,000	363,000	3,000	279,000	162,000	1,603,000
Kovno	73,000	38,000	2,000	1,018,000	212,000	140,000	1,545,000
Minsk	84,000	1,633,000	10,000	—	343,000	65,000	1,448,000
Vitebsk	198,000	789,000	—	3,000	174,000	50,000	1,489,000
Mohilev	58,000	1,390,000	4,000	4,000	204,000	18,000	1,591,000
Suwalki	24,000	27,000	2,000	305,000	59,000	134,000	583,000

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The Russian statistics no doubt understate the number of Poles in Lithuania just as they do also with regard to the Lithuanians. But even less acceptable are the methods used and the figures given in the quasi-scientific Polish statistical works. They usually start by asserting or by silently assuming that every Roman Catholic White Russian is in reality a Pole. In support of the fanciful estimates which they obtain by these and other methods they frequently quote two authorities which at first sight no one would expect to favour Polish claims—a calculation made in 1909 under the authority of M. Stolypin and census returns compiled in 1916 by the Germans for some parts of Lithuania. But M. Stolypin had a definite purpose in view when drafting his memorandum; he wished to prevent the establishment of Zemstvos in Lithuania and, in order to restrain the Russian Nationalists and Centralist Liberals, painted to them the Polish “danger” in the blackest colours possible. He therefore accepted for once the Polish contention about the Roman Catholic White Russians. The German officials, on the other hand, like Kinglake, were misled by the confusion which exists in the minds of the Roman Catholic White Russians between a religion and a nationality. But even on these returns the Poles constituted hardly more than 25 per cent. of the total population of the Governments of Grodno and Vilna. To reach more favourable results these figures require further treatment. Thus one Polish author claims that the Poles form 55 per cent. of what he describes as the total population of the larger part of the Government of Vilna. The numbers analysed by him are 478,753, whereas in reality the Government of Vilna had in 1897 a population of almost 1,600,000 and in 1915 of over 2,000,000! As a matter of fact the German statistics quoted by that author refer merely to the north-western districts of the Government of Vilna, where the percentage of the Poles is highest. A writer who would quote the statistics of Quebec as illustrating the “total

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population " of " the larger part " of Canada would put himself out of court with his readers without distinction of creed, race or politics.

If we put the percentage of Poles in the three Governments of Vilna, Grodno and Kovno at an average of about 15 per cent., we shall have conceded to them the most which can be conceded with justice, and perhaps even more than that.

There are no important mining districts or industrial centres either in the Baltic Provinces or in Lithuania. The country lives almost entirely on the produce of its agriculture and its forests, and whatever industry exists is based chiefly on the raw materials grown at home. The only large town in the Baltic Provinces is Riga, with a population of about 500,000 ; the next largest is the port of Libau, with over 100,000 ; in Lithuania there is Vilna, with about 200,000 inhabitants.

The Ests and Letts, the Lithuanians and White Russians are almost entirely peasant nations, and the land is the pivot of their life and thinking. To keep the land they have and to acquire more land is the desire deepest rooted in their hearts. And their national interests coincide with this peasant passion for the land ; for the big landed estates in their countries are owned mainly by aliens, Germans and Poles.

The history of the Ests and Letts has been an endless struggle against the German Baltic Barons. Nowhere in Europe has serfdom been as ruthless as that imposed by the German conquerors in the Baltic Provinces, a fact admitted even by German historians. Only at times did outside interference succeed in lightening a little the burden of the serf population, as, for instance, in the seventeenth century in Livonia during the enlightened rule of the Swedish King, Gustavus Adolphus. But when towards the end of the eighteenth century Catherine II tried to improve the condition of the peasants

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in the Baltic Provinces, she met with the determined opposition of the Barons and failed. "The nobility," writes Dr. Seraphim, a fervent German patriot, in his *Baltische Geschichte* (1908), "consisted largely of retired officers in whom camp life had developed that contempt for other men which the difference of nationality had by itself implanted in them. . . . They resented the demands of the Empress as an unjustified and ruinous intrusion in their private affairs." When in the reign of Alexander I. the German Barons found it necessary to admit a change in the legal position of their peasants, and abolished serfdom in the Baltic Provinces, they declared the entire land their private property; whereas everywhere else in Eastern Europe, on the abolition of serfdom, part of the land was assigned to the peasants. Moreover, all kinds of feudal privileges were retained, and in the parts now under German occupation they survive to the present day (they were not abolished by Ukase until 1916). Politically the German Barons were until about 1880 all-powerful in the Baltic Provinces. From among them came most of the German officials who filled the highest posts in the Russian Army and civil service—the Osten-Sackens, the Keyserlings, the Uexkülls, etc.—and these used the hold they had over the Russian Government for strengthening still further their power in the Baltic Provinces. The Landtags by which these provinces were administered were exclusively in the hands of the noble landowners; in Courland the Landtag was elected by about 500 voters! In the Baltic Provinces the revolution of 1905 was a social and national war of the Est and Lett peasants against the German landlords, who, on the collapse of the revolution, directed the penal expeditions in these provinces, having first constituted themselves into a "voluntary constabulary."

The following extract from folksongs, reproduced from M. E. Doumergue's excellent book on the Letts (in French)

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may serve to illustrate the feelings of the Lett peasants
towards their German masters :—

“ The work for the master is hell, is hell,
Nothing is lacking except the cauldron.
Lords, Governors, buy therefore a cauldron ! ”

* * *

“ All the castles are on the hills,
Our house is in the plain,
It stands in the plain,
In a morass of tears.”

* * *

“ O German, child of hell,
Some day thou wilt be a beggar,
And my own brothers will give thee
A piece of bread.”

In the course of the nineteenth century the Est and Lett peasantry succeeded in redeeming from the German Barons about half the land of their country. The other half is still divided into 462 big landed estates in Estland, 804 in Livland, and 648 in Courland. The biggest of the “ noble entails,” Dondangen, covers no less than 250 square miles.

There is hardly another country in Europe where the peasantry is as highly educated as in the Baltic Provinces ; there are practically no illiterates either among the Letts or the Ests ; and there is for the same reason hardly another peasantry which resents the rule of landlords more violently than they. The average Est or Lett is by nature and training a revolutionary, and at the present day they supply the Bolsheviks with the most intelligent and best trained and best disciplined regiments. But more than anything else in politics the Letts and Ests are anti-Germans for reasons both social and national.

The hostility between the Lithuanian and White Russian peasants on the one hand and the Polish landlords on the other is slightly less violent than that which subsists in the Baltic Provinces. Yet it remains the dominating

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feature in the political life of the whole of historic Lithuania.

The Lithuanian national movement has grown up in spite of the most decided hostility on the part of the Polish land-owning gentry and the Polish Roman Catholic clergy. Like the renaissance of every submerged nationality, it started in the first place as an educational movement. But the land-owning classes had looked askance even at any Polish attempts to educate their peasantry for fear that this might increase its power of resistance to their dominion. Still less were they inclined to favour a movement which by giving their peasants the consciousness of a separate nationality was bound to render still more violent the conflict between the two classes.

The Roman Catholic religion, common to Poles and Lithuanians, might be expected to form a bond of union between them. Yet, as a matter of fact, it is just in the common Churches that the bitterest feud has broken out. The Polish clergy has systematically tried to exclude the Lithuanian language from the churches, declaring it to be "pagan." In many places the Polish Nationalists have organised bands of rowdies to prevent the singing of Lithuanian hymns : and the Lithuanian Nationalists have retaliated. During the years preceding the war free fights in churches in the Lithuanian districts became an everyday occurrence, and in many cases led to bloodshed.* Finally the Lithuanians found it necessary to organise an "Association for Guarding the Rights of the Lithuanian Language in the Church." The bitterness of the struggle is felt practically in every district by the devotedly Roman Catholic Lithuanian peasantry. Even the Lithuanian clergy, unlike the Roman Catholic "Polish" clergy among the White Russians, take up the cause of their nation in a truly self-sacrificing spirit.

* *E.g.*, at Karlwarja, Government of Suwalki, in the autumn of 1906 ; at Biniakonie ; at Bierzyniki, where the Poles were excommunicated for trying to prevent the Lithuanians from singing in their own language, September 12, 1904, etc.

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The powerful agrarian movement which under the influence of the Russian Revolution is now sweeping the whole of Eastern Europe is coupled in Lithuania with the national contrast between Polish landlords on the one hand and Lithuanian and White Russian peasants on the other. The Polish national interest in Lithuania rests predominantly, and in most parts of the country entirely, on the big manor houses and the hold which these possess on the country. The Poles themselves frequently measure their *status possidendi* in Lithuania by the millions of acres owned by their nobles. Every manor house is, moreover, a small Polish centre, the officials on the estate and many from among its servants and immediate dependents being Poles. The one thing, therefore, which the Polish Nationalists could never admit in Lithuania would be a thoroughgoing agrarian reform, which is the first point in the national programmes of the Lithuanians and White Russians. Polish dominion over any part of Lithuania or White Russia would mean the dominion of the land-owning class, the last thing which a peasant population bent on acquiring the land would ever accept, to say nothing of desiring.

The following incident characterises the attitude of the White Russians towards the Poles. In April, 1917, a White Russian Peasant Congress at Minsk declared against autonomy for White Russia and in favour of a direct union with Russia. "The attitude of the Congress, which consisted exclusively of White Russian peasants," says the report in a *Polish* newspaper, "is shown by the fact that one of the speakers was not allowed to speak in White Russian, and that the adherents of autonomy were interrupted by cries of 'We don't want autonomy,' 'Autonomy has been invented by the *pany* (Polish lords) in order that they may master us and not give us the land,' etc." "The unnatural hatred of the White Russian peasants to the idea of White Russian autonomy and of their own national movement," the article goes on to say, "springs from the deep dislike which they feel for Polish

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policy represented by big landowners and the fear that in an autonomous White Russia the Government might pass into the hands of the Polish reactionary elements."

During recent months the parts of Lithuania behind the Russian front have been the scene of a most violent peasant revolt, and numerous manors have been sacked and burnt down. The peasants are taking their revenge for centuries of serfdom and oppression. Meantime west of the line, under German occupation, the Lithuanian and White Russian peasants are gnashing their teeth at the thought that because of the presence of German troops they cannot deal with the agrarian problem. In the Polish Press voices are raised openly admitting that, should these provinces be evacuated now, they would be threatened by an immediate peasant revolution.

It has been recently said by a Polish politician that "the Baltic Germans themselves are afraid of remaining face to face with the Letts, and look for support from outside," and that for this reason "in Courland, now under German occupation, there has appeared among the German upper classes a leaning towards incorporation into Poland." It seems quite likely that, threatened by a peasant rising, the Polish land-owning gentry both in Lithuania and Poland and the German Barons in the Baltic Provinces feel a kind of comradeship for each other which surmounts national feuds; but it is evident that, since the German power and the German armies are real, whilst the Polish power and the numerous Polish armies are so far merely vapourings of heated imagination, the land-owning classes in Eastern Europe will not find it difficult to choose their protectors against the Bolshevik revolution which rages behind the Russian front and knocks at their own doors. The peasant in revolt, who desires to seize the land, provides at present the one great anti-German force throughout the Baltic Provinces and historic Lithuania, and is the potential ally of anyone who fights Germany.

PALESTINE AND JEWISH NATIONALISM *

AMONG all the surprises of the war there is perhaps none more striking than the emergence of Zionism, the Jewish national movement, from comparative obscurity into the sunshine of popular acclamation and international sanction. Four years ago Zionism lay outside the orbit of the student of political affairs. It had, indeed, solid achievements to its credit. It had created a world-wide organisation, numbering some quarter of a million of Jews of every possible political allegiance and every possible shade of belief. The regeneration of Palestine by means of Jewish agricultural and urban settlements had made considerable progress, despite the manifold obstacles imposed—rather passively than actively—by Turkish rule, and there had been a marked growth of Jewish national sentiment in these settlements, which found expression in 1913 in a revolt against an attempt to oust Hebrew in favour of German as the language of instruction in some schools controlled by a German-Jewish organisation opposed to Zionism. When war broke out Zionists were busy with a scheme for a Hebrew University in Jerusalem, which would have been—and will be—a rallying point of Hebrew scholarship and idealism and a powerful means of restoring to Hebraism its rightful place in the life of the civilised world. These phenomena pointed to the steady if not rapid or easy development of a self-conscious and self-dependent national

* Contributed.

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centre of Jewry and of Judaism in Palestine. But there was nothing to attract the attention of the statesman to what Zionism had done and what its achievements foreshadowed. Though various Governments had on occasion expressed sympathy with the aims of Zionism, and the British Government in particular had made the Zionist Movement an offer (which proved abortive) of a territory in East Africa as the home of a Jewish settlement with some measure of autonomy, Zionism was not, and had no apparent prospect of becoming, a factor to be reckoned with in international politics.

Now, almost suddenly, all that is changed. Thanks to the breadth and sincerity of British statesmanship, to the inherent justice of its own aims, and to the ability with which those aims have been presented, Zionism has received the official approval of the British Government—an approval which, in the circumstances in which it was given, makes the realisation of the objects of Zionism one of the avowed war-aims of the Allied Powers. The way in which the Government's declaration of support has been received shows that substantially it speaks the mind of the whole British nation, and indeed of the whole Commonwealth. And while, no doubt, for many people the declaration obtained its special significance by virtue of its coincidence in time with the victorious advance of British troops in Palestine, it is none the less true that the permanent occupation of Palestine by Great Britain is in no sense made a condition of the support to be accorded by Great Britain and her Allies to Zionism. Mr. Lloyd George, in his statement of British war-aims on January 5th, did not stipulate for a British Palestine, but laid it down that the "separate national conditions" of Palestine must be recognised: and this statement, taken in conjunction with the Government's earlier declaration, means that, in whatever way the political future of Palestine may be determined by the peace settlement, Great Britain will insist on explicit recognition of the right of the Jewish

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people to establish there its "national home." This position accords both with the general spirit of Allied war-aims and with the requirements of Zionism, which, while it imperatively needs a just, stable, and progressive government in Palestine, and knows how such a government is most likely to be obtained, would obviously be travelling beyond its proper sphere if it attempted to insist on the transference of Palestine to the control of one or more specified Power or Powers.

Be that as it may, the Zionist question has definitely attained political importance of the first rank, and the time is ripe for an attempt to understand what Zionism is, what it has done, and what it aims at creating. What is precisely the place of Palestine in the Jewish scheme of things? What have Jews done in practice to substantiate the claim that they can build a "national home" for themselves in Palestine, and ought to be given facilities for doing so? What political conditions must be created as regards Palestine if Jewish hopes are to be realised? And what are likely to be the consequences, both immediate and more remote, of the establishment of a Jewish "national home" in Palestine? These are among the questions that call for an answer.

I. WHAT PALESTINE MEANS TO THE JEW.

THE Jewish love of Palestine is a thing unique in its kind, and its particular quality requires elucidation if the meaning of Jewish nationalism and the significance of the Jewish return to Palestine are to be understood at all.

Love of his country is a natural instinct of the normal man, an instinct capable of calling forth the utmost endeavour and sacrifice of which he is capable. Nor does the attachment necessarily cease when a man leaves his own country for another. Not only does the emigrant

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himself retain the sentiment, but he may transmit it to his children and his children's children, so that it persists through generations of men who have never set foot in "the old country." But this sentiment does not live and grow in the hearts of the absent except on the prop of some concrete connection. Contact is maintained through friends and relations who remain behind; the sentiment, the spiritual fact, finds concrete expression and nourishment in the interchange of letters, of newspapers, of personal visits. At the very least, there is the living recollection of some ancestor who once lived himself in "the old country," and whose portrait, perhaps, is treasured as a family relic. When every concrete connection of this kind—trivial in itself, but important because it is the material basis of something spiritual—has vanished, the sentiment can scarcely survive, and sooner or later the descendants of those who left "the old country" become merged heart and soul in the life of the new.

With the Jews and Palestine the case is very different. It is not, perhaps, so different as might appear at first sight: for, though the number of Jews who have had any concrete personal connection with Palestine during the last fifteen centuries or more must have been an insignificant minority, yet throughout that period, whenever there have been Jews in Palestine, the collection of funds for their maintenance has been recognised as an integral feature in the life of every traditional Jewish community elsewhere. But the existence of a link of this kind is an effect, not a cause, of the Jewish love of Palestine. There seems to be no reason in the nature of things why a Jew in Russia should contribute money for the support of Jews in Jerusalem whom he does not know, and with whom he has no personal contact of even the most indirect kind. The fact is that the link between the Jew and Palestine is a national link in the most absolute sense—in the sense of being entirely independent of any sort of personal connection. The individual Jew may live

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his life outside Palestine, and his tradition gives him a scheme of values and a code of religious, ethical and social practice which make his life distinctively Jewish. He may have no idea that there will be any concrete restoration of Jewish national life in Palestine before the Messiah comes to fulfil the promise of the Return. But deep down in the roots of his being, bound up with the very sense of his Jewishness, there is the conviction that until the Return takes place his nation is in exile, because, however satisfactorily he and millions of other Jews may adjust themselves to their different environments, the life of his nation cannot be properly lived except in Palestine. This it is that explains why for so many centuries the Jewish love of Palestine has found its most characteristic expressions not in political effort for the recovery of the country, and not even in pilgrimages (though these have not been wanting), but in constant prayer for the restoration of the Temple as the symbol of the restoration of the full Jewish life; in the elaboration and study of religious rites which cannot be performed outside Palestine; above all, in the attitude of mind expressed in the Rabbinic saying that the Divine Presence is itself in exile, and will be restored to its home only with the restoration of Israel. The feeling underlying all these phenomena, and others of the same kind, is not one of personal dissatisfaction, of individual home-sickness or longing for something that the individual has lost, but one of national incompleteness.

The Jewish love of Palestine, then, as it has persisted through centuries of estrangement between the people and the land, is peculiar in its selflessness and its spiritual quality. And that fact has given rise to misunderstanding among men whose conceptions of the relation between the spiritual and the material and between nationality and religion are derived from the theory and practice of modern Europe, and not least among those Jews who have adopted the European standpoint as a matter of course in the process of assimilation to their environment. From that

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standpoint the Jewish love of Palestine comes naturally and almost inevitably to be regarded as something purely religious, as a feeling which has for its object not a particular piece of territory on the eastern side of the Mediterranean, but simply a "spiritual Zion." Palestine, it is supposed, has become for the Jews merely an abstraction, merely a symbol for the realisation of their religious and ethical ideals: the Return, so long and earnestly hoped and prayed for, does not mean a physical restoration to the physical land, but merely symbolises the establishment of the Kingdom of God and the empire of righteousness. Christianity has helped to give currency to this notion by its practice of using the concrete terms of Jewish history in a spiritual sense of its own. But nothing could in fact be more opposed to the whole spirit and tendency of Jewish teaching. Judaism knows nothing of a "new Jerusalem" which exists only in Heaven. Judaism spiritualises the material, but for Judaism to spiritualise is not to dematerialise. The material remains material: but it derives a spiritual value by virtue of its being regarded as the necessary basis of an idea. Body is body and spirit is spirit, but in life the two are necessarily interdependent, and if it is the spirit that gives meaning to the body, it is the body that gives to the spirit the possibility of expression and activity. Throughout the whole range of Jewish ideas there runs this conception of a relation between body and spirit which is such that, while the spiritual is supreme, the material has a necessary part to play, and would lose its power of playing that part if it were transmuted into something merely abstract or symbolical.

What Palestine means to the Jew can be understood only in the light of this Jewish attitude to the problem of body and spirit. In the course of centuries of exile Palestine has become spiritualised—but spiritualised in the Jewish sense. It has not become, and never can become, an abstraction or a symbol. It is the actual, physical land that matters, though its geographical position and its

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physical features are absolutely unknown to millions of those who pray for it. If once the masses of Jews were to abandon their belief in the future restoration to Palestine in favour of a belief in a "spiritual Zion," to be realised in the world to come, the principle of Jewish cohesion would be gone, and the Jews would soon cease to exist as a distinct human group. But, on the other hand, if the spiritual ideal which is associated with Palestine in the mind of the Jew were removed—if his love of Palestine became simply the desire for a country with so much milk and honey, so much natural wealth, so many harbours, so much scenic beauty—then Jewish nationalism would equally be a dead thing and "the Jewish people" an empty phrase. It is the combination of the material and the spiritual element, each indispensable to the other, that gives its specific quality to the Palestine-sense of the Jewish people. It is this alone that explains the extraordinary persistence of the feeling of exile in a people which has ceased to be a nation in the ordinary sense, has built up prosperous communities in all parts of the world, and has provided itself with a way of life which is capable of adjustment to the most widely differing environments. That feeling of exile is, as was said above, a feeling of national incompleteness: an instinctive recognition of the fact that in the national life the elements of body and spirit are not developing side by side and co-operating as they must do for its full self-realisation, because the material basis—the national land—is lacking, and whatever spiritual development takes place without it can be nothing more than a semblance of life.

It is instructive in this connection to contrast the position of Palestine in the life of the Jewish people with that of Greece in the life of the ancient Greeks. Probably the Greeks were much more alive than the Hebrews to the physical beauty of their country, and loved their country for its own sake in a way of which ancient Hebrew literature shows little if any trace. But their national consciousness

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was independent of the particular piece of territory which they called Hellas. Their sense of the difference between themselves and other human groups had its roots mainly in two things—in difference of language and in difference of political institutions. And they were able to carry their language and their City State with them to other countries. They could be as Greek in Italy as in Hellas ; they could create a great centre of Hellenism in Egypt. The Hebrews, on the other hand, when they left Palestine ceased to speak Hebrew, and adopted for every-day purposes the language of the land in which they settled ; and they regarded the communal organisations which they built up as nothing more than temporary expedients. It could never occur to them that their own distinctive form of national life might be lived in its completeness as well outside as in Palestine. They took Palestine with them in their hearts : it remained an essential element in their national consciousness. Their physical land and their spiritual ideas were inseparable, and “ to sing the song of the Lord in a strange land ” was an impossibility.

In the light of what has been said it will be clear that the modern Jewish aspiration for a return to Palestine is not simply—is not fundamentally—a desire to change political conditions for the benefit of a particular nation. It is first and foremost a natural expression of his Judaism on the part of the modern Jew. It is as true to-day as it ever was that the ideas of the Jewish God, the Jewish way of life, the Jewish people and Palestine are inextricably bound together, are in fact but different facets of one central principle which is the *principium individuationis* of the Jewish people. None the less, modern Jewish nationalism is, like the nationalism of other peoples, an attempt at self-preservation. Its differentia is that in the Jewish people the idea of self-preservation is more consciously bound up with the sense of universal human values and ideals. And for that reason it may claim with some justice that its realisation will be fraught with consequences

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of peculiar importance to humanity at large. If every nation, by virtue of feeling itself a nation—no matter what may be the elements of its national consciousness—is regarded as having an indefeasible right to the opportunity of self-development, and if the general concession of this opportunity will enrich human life, then surely humanity should reap a peculiarly rich harvest through the free development of a nation whose national consciousness has become bound up with its sense of universal spiritual values. In a very real sense the Jewish nationalist may claim that “Palestine for the Jews” means “Palestine for the world,” not because he wants Palestine to be anything but distinctively Jewish, but because he feels that the more distinctively and truly Jewish it is, the greater will be its influence on the world in the direction of establishing a truer understanding of the right relation between body and spirit, between the individual nation and the divine idea of human brotherhood.

But if modern Jewish nationalism, standing as it does in the closest relation to the fundamentals of Jewish thought, regards itself as charged in some degree with the fulfilment of the universal purpose which works through Jewish history, it remains none the less true that there is a gulf fixed between the restoration seen in the Prophetic visions and the restoration for which Jewish nationalists are working here and now. That complete fulfilment to which the Prophets looked forward is and must remain a distant ideal, and one to which human effort can stand only in the relation of blind groping, not in that of conscious and well-calculated endeavour. It is in its very nature catastrophic, a sudden and complete reversal of things as we know them. To work for its realisation would be like working to bring about a volcanic upheaval. Zionism is concerned with matters of human calculation and effort, with things that are, humanly speaking, attainable by a gradual evolution. But there is of course no contradiction here, though there is a difference. Zionism has suffered at times from being

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thought (and perhaps from being in fact) anti-Messianic, and at other times from indulging in visions too Messianic in their brightness. Its own inner development and the events of recent years have given it equilibrium and the possibility of understanding itself as a typically Jewish union of body and spirit—at once a concrete, practical attempt to re-establish a Jewish national settlement in Palestine, and an idea which derives from the Prophets and can have its ultimate fulfilment only in the fulfilment of their vision.

II. RECENT JEWISH WORK IN PALESTINE

IN actual practice ideas do not work themselves out by their own motion, and their realisation is not brought about solely or even mainly by the efforts of those whom they consciously inspire. Human beings generally need the pressure of some material need to rouse them to action for a cause, and every human movement can be interpreted with some degree of truth as a reaction to material stimuli. In the case of the Jewish national movement it would be absurd to ignore the material pressure which led numbers of Jews to emigrate to Palestine in the "eighties" of last century; but it would be equally absurd to represent it as having created the national sentiment to which in fact it only gave an incentive to action. The conscious Jewish nationalism of modern times—as distinct from the nationalism which is implied and taken for granted in the whole Jewish scheme of things—began as a reaction not against persecution or anti-Semitic prejudice, but against the tendency to assimilation which set in as an inevitable result of the political and social emancipation of the Jews in Western Europe. As far back as 1862 a German Jew, Moses Hess, published a book called *Rom und Jerusalem*, in which he subjected to a scathing analysis the prevalent assimilationist conception of the position of Judaism in the

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modern world—that conception which is conveniently summed up in the phrase “Englishman (Frenchman, German, etc.) of the Jewish persuasion”—demonstrated the essentially national character of Judaism, and forecasted the re-establishment of a national Jewish commonwealth in Palestine under French auspices. A little later a Russian Hebrew writer, Perez Smolenskin (1842–1885), again consciously attacking the assimilationist tendency, urged the importance of Palestine, along with the Jewish Law (*Torah*) and the Hebrew language, as a vital factor in Judaism. Nor were there wanting practical efforts towards the resettlement of Palestine. To say nothing of the schemes of Sir Moses Montefiore in the middle of the last century, in 1870 the Alliance Israélite Universelle founded an Agricultural School (called *Mikveh Israel*, “The Gathering (or Hope) of Israel”) near Jaffa. This step was taken on the suggestion of Hirsch Kalischer, a Rabbi of Posen, by whose writings Moses Hess had been influenced, and who himself took part in the foundation of a Jewish agricultural settlement near the Lake of Tiberias. A few years later some Jews of Jerusalem established a small agricultural settlement called Petach Tikvah (“The Gate of Hope”) on the Audja, which is now the largest and richest of the forty or more Jewish “colonies” in Palestine.

But it was unquestionably the terrible outbreak of persecution and massacre in Russia, in 1880–81, which finally gave direction to the nationalist aspirations that were floating in the air of Jewish life. While the great tide of Jewish emigration from Russia set towards America, some of the more idealistic, including a number of University students, turned to Palestine, hoping not only to win a better life for themselves, but to set their people on the way to national redemption. These early settlers founded agricultural “colonies” in Galilee, in Judea and in Samaria, and braved with extraordinary stubbornness the manifold difficulties with which their undertaking was beset—difficulties which were enhanced by their lack of

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means, of experience and of knowledge of the country. They could not have survived at all if not for help from without. This help was provided in the first place by societies of "Lovers of Zion" (*Chovevé Zion*) which sprang up in Russia, and later in other countries, for the propagation of the national idea and the support of the Palestinian "colonies"; afterwards, and in larger measure, by Baron Edmond de Rothschild, of Paris. Thanks to this assistance the colonisation movement survived the ills of infancy, and, though it achieved no results commensurate with the hopes of its early sponsors, gained at least the possibility of development when circumstances should become favourable.

It lies outside the purpose of this article to trace the history of Palestinian colonisation in detail.* Suffice it to say that by 1895 some twenty "colonies" were established in various parts of the country, and the idea which underlay their work, the idea of the "Lovers of Zion," was surely if slowly gaining ground in the Jewry of the Dispersion. Then an event occurred which gave a temporary set-back to colonisation work, and seemed likely to divert Jewish national effort for good and all into other channels. Dr. Theodor Herzl, a Viennese Jew living in Paris, published a brochure called *Der Judenstaat*, in which he asserted that the Jewish problem could be solved only on the lines of the recognition of the Jews as a nation and the provision of a territory in which large masses of Jews could live under conditions of autonomy, and outlined a scheme for the acquisition of a territory under the necessary international guarantees and the transference to it of as many as possible of those Jews who were not contented in their present surroundings. Herzl received his immediate impulse from the ugly manifestation of French anti-Semitism in the Dreyfus affair: and that fact explains both the strength and the weakness of his scheme. Jewish national effort may be stimulated by anti-Semitism; but an attempt to

* For a detailed account see *Palestine: The Rebirth of an Ancient People*, by A. M. Hyamson (Sidgwick & Jackson, 1917).

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base Jewish nationalism entirely on anti-Semitism ("the pressure from without makes us one people," says Herzl) is doomed to failure, because nationalism is a positive and not a negative thing. On the other hand, Herzl, looking at the Jewish problem from the external rather than from the internal point of view, was able to grasp the need for a big organisation and for work on a large scale. Had there not been a genuine Jewish national movement—of however modest dimensions—in existence, Herzl might have wasted himself in endeavouring to carry out a purely "political" scheme which ignored the real character of the Jewish people and the really vital elements of Jewish nationalism. As it was, there came about ultimately a fusion between Herzl and the "Lovers of Zion." It was the Russian "Lovers of Zion" who came in largest numbers to the first Zionist Congress, which he called together at Basle in 1897; and though they were on the whole too ready to yield to the glamour of his large political ideas, and to believe him capable of making bricks without straw, they at least secured the tying down of the Zionist programme to Palestine—a point which Herzl's brochure had left in doubt. This notwithstanding, the new Zionist movement was for a time unsympathetic to "petty colonisation," which did not accord with Herzl's notion of getting a charter and purchasing the country outright. But as time went on the true instinct of Jewish nationalism asserted itself. During Herzl's lifetime the movement took several important steps in the direction of Palestinian work, and after his death (1904) the diplomatic activity in which he had excelled sank for a time into the background, and the development of the settlement in Palestine became the chief care of the movement. The net results of Herzl's work—and they were invaluable—were the publicity given to Zionism, and the creation of an organisation which, when the time came, would be able to assert the claims of the Jewish people.

That organisation possessed, at the time when the war

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broke out, not only the support of some quarter of a million Jews, and the active sympathy of many more, but also a concrete basis for its claims in the Jewish *Yishub*, or settlement in Palestine. The number of agricultural "colonies" had grown to upwards of forty, with a population of perhaps 12,000, engaged in the cultivation of vines, oranges, almonds, and cereals. Marsh lands had been drained and made habitable and fruitful. Afforestation had been begun on a small scale. The Jewish population in the principal towns had grown by leaps and bounds, and garden suburbs of European type had been built by Jewish energy and capital. A proper system of credit had been introduced into Palestine by the Zionist Bank, the Anglo-Palestine Company. Farm-schools and an Agricultural Experiment Station had been established. Experiments had been made in co-operative colonisation and in co-operative workmen's settlements. The nucleus had been formed of a class of agricultural labourers who were at the same time small holders. The Jewish "colonies," left very much to themselves by the Turkish authorities so long as they paid their taxes, had dealt successfully with the problems of local government, administration of justice, and defence. A beginning had been made of the organisation of the "colonies" for common purposes by means of a Council consisting of representatives of each. At the same time, the *Yishub* had become more and more conscious of its national character and significance. Hebrew had replaced other languages as the mother-tongue of the younger generation. Hebrew schools of all kinds, including a music school and a school of Arts and Crafts, were in existence, and the first steps had been taken towards the foundation of a Hebrew University. In a word, there was scarcely a phase of national activity—excluding foreign affairs—in which the Jewish people, through this small advance-guard in Palestine, had not adventured. Everything was on a small scale, much was merely inchoate or experimental. But a national life was there in miniature.

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The importance of this achievement in colonisation is not, of course, to be measured by its size. What it has done is to place beyond doubt the will and the ability of the Jewish people to regenerate Palestine and itself in and through Palestine. And as a consequence it has given to the claims of Zionism a solid basis such as they could not have obtained by any amount of organisation and activity, whether propagandist or political, outside Palestine. The *Yishub*, small in size but large in potentiality, is the great political asset of Zionism. Without it the sentimental and historic claims of the Jewish people might have been disregarded, as they have been before; with it, they have become irresistible.

The potential value of the Jewish colonisation of Palestine—its value as an indication of what the Jews, and they alone, can make of Palestine—is enhanced by the fact that it has been carried out hitherto in spite of difficulties created not only by the absence of any State organisation behind it, but by the shortcomings of Turkish government. It must indeed be said, in fairness to the Turk, that from the Jewish national point of view his rule has had its good as well as its bad side. Talaat Pasha, in a recent interview, made much of the fact that anti-Semitism was unknown in Turkey, and that the Jewish “colonies” in Palestine had been allowed freedom in local administration and in the use of the Hebrew language for educational and general purposes. He had a right to take credit for this tolerance, which, if it resulted rather from passivity than from active goodwill on the side of the rulers, was none the less of great value to the ruled. It may well be that if during the last thirty years Palestine had been in the hands of an efficient and centralised government, Jewish colonisation might have progressed more rapidly on the material side, though the settlers might have been much less easily able to learn the rudiments of self-government and to retain and strengthen their specific national consciousness. But there is a heavy account on the debit side. Not only has Jewish

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colonisation been hampered by burdensome taxes, restrictions on the sale of land, and the neglect of the Government to provide those material facilities without which a country cannot be developed on modern lines; but the absence of security has kept out of the country much Jewish energy and capital which would otherwise have flowed into it, to the benefit both of the Jewish national movement, of Palestine, and of Turkey as the overlord of Palestine. The Turkish revolution of 1908, which Zionists welcomed as the dawn of a new era of freedom and opportunity, turned out in fact to be the precursor of a policy of Turkification which was even more fatal to Jewish national effort on a large scale than the laxity of Abdul Hamid's *régime*; and since the war broke out much has happened to destroy whatever lingering belief Zionists may have retained in the possibility of achieving their object under Ottoman suzerainty. It is clear, therefore, that Zionism imperatively needs a substantial change—whether or not accompanied by a formal change—in the political position of Palestine if the work of a generation is not to be practically wasted, and if the Jewish people is not to be doomed once more to fall back on hopes and prayers.

III. POLITICAL CONDITIONS NECESSARY FOR A JEWISH PALESTINE

THERE is room for divergence of opinion as to the precise settlement of the political problem of Palestine which would best accord with the legitimate demands of Zionism as well as with the wider interests that are necessarily involved. But so far as the Zionist side of the question is concerned, one or two propositions may be laid down with certainty. In the first place, the relation between the Jewish people and Palestine must be recognised as the relation between a nation and its national homeland. This recognition is provided by the British Government's

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declaration of November 2, 1917, while the peculiar relationship of the Jews to Palestine is specifically mentioned in the programmes of war aims formulated both by the British Labour Party and by the international Labour Movements. Secondly, while Zionism cannot of course renounce all claim to ultimate political independence if the system of small States is to continue—its fundamental postulate being that the Jewish people is to have the opportunity of complete and unfettered self-expression—political independence for the Jews of Palestine would be a mere phrase at the present time and in the immediate future, and at the start some other agency must secure to the Jewish people adequate facilities for building up its national home in Palestine on the foundations already laid, by establishing and maintaining law and order in the country, by making proper provision for its defence against aggression from without, and by lending sympathy and active support to Jewish colonising work in the broadest sense. Thirdly, and as a consequence, the government of Palestine in the immediate future must be entrusted to a single Power, and not to a condominium or an international commission. There is much loose talk about the “internationalisation” of Palestine, which, however well meant, is likely to do more harm than good. For experience shows that when a country is controlled by two or more Powers each of them is likely to care more about pushing its own interests than about the welfare of the country; and, however ardently one may hope for and believe in the growth of a better spirit in international relations, only a rash optimism could expect progress in that direction to be other than slow and gradual. Equally bad would it be, from the Zionist point of view, if the Powers contented themselves with declaring Palestine neutral. A purely negative policy of that kind would not give the Jewish people the help that it needs if the promise of the Allies is to be made effective. “Internationalisation,” then, in any sense which can be attached to the term at present, is to be avoided. This is

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not, of course, to say that international consent is not desirable. Nothing could better accord with the interests of the Jewish people and of Palestine than the universal recognition of the Jewish national claim, and the creation of such conditions as would secure Palestine against becoming again a bone of international contention. And that end might be secured if whatever Power undertook the control of Palestine did so as the mandatory of the Powers in general. But the possibility of a solution on those lines depends on the question whether something in the shape of a real League of Nations is going to emerge from the present war. If that aspiration is realised, it will be eminently fitting for one of the Powers to act for the League as sovereign of Palestine during the period that must elapse before the Jewish nation can grow to full maturity.

The governing authority, whatever it be, would, as Zionists frankly recognise, have responsibilities and obligations to others beside the Jews. Palestine is at present, as it has been for centuries, peopled mainly by Arabs. According to the figures available before the war, the Jewish population numbers roughly 125,000 in a total of about 700,000. Moreover, sacred though it is to the Jews, Palestine holds within its borders shrines sacred to Christians and Mohammedans also, and the Jews have no desire to intrude in any way upon the Holy Places of those religions. They only claim to be allowed to be neighbours : and, in the historic phrase uttered by Pope Benedict XV. to the Zionist ambassador, their hope and belief is that they will be "good neighbours." They recognise too that Palestine has been and may be again a pawn in the game of international rivalry : and though they earnestly desire to be allowed to work out their own national destiny in peace, they do not wish to interfere with the claims, or to be involved in the jealousies, of any of the Powers. The present situation is too uncertain and too full of difficulty for Zionists to debate the question whether Palestine will

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ever become a predominantly Jewish country, or, still more, a self-governing Jewish Commonwealth. Many years must pass before such issues will arise in practical shape. Yet it may not be an unfitting conclusion to this article to project our gaze forward into a period when Jewish enterprise and Jewish industry have had time to leave their mark upon the life and institutions of the country. What follows then must be read, not as a claim or a programme, but as embodying the natural aspirations of a nation long exiled from its home.

IV. FUNCTIONS AND INFLUENCE OF A JEWISH PALESTINE

WHAT a revived Hebrew nation in Palestine may mean to humanity in the future may conveniently be considered under two heads—first, the direct influence on the world's history of the development of Hebrew national life in Palestine itself; secondly, the indirect influence which the Hebrew national centre will exert through the Jewish communities in other parts of the world. For, however rapidly and successfully the Jewish settlement in Palestine may grow under more favourable conditions than have prevailed hitherto, for many generations at least, if not for all time, the numerical majority of the Jewish people will remain outside Palestine, and the Jewries of the Dispersion cannot be left out of account in any forecast of the part which the Jewish people may play in centuries to come. Such a forecast must naturally be speculative; but if certainty is unattainable in a matter of this kind, some developments may be regarded at least as probable.

Jewish effort in the past generation has already reclaimed parts of Palestine which had been swamp or desert for centuries. With increasing Jewish immigration and improved facilities, this work of reclamation should proceed apace, until at last the potentialities of the country are realised to the full. What those potentialities are is still a

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matter of some doubt : in particular, it is doubtful whether Palestine has the natural resources that are necessary for the building up of industries on a large scale. But there is no doubt whatever that the agricultural productivity of the country can be vastly increased ; and it is equally certain that with proper harbours and railways it can become as of old a great highway of communication between the Mediterranean and the East. Palestine has, then, an economic future ; and in making the most of its economic possibilities the Jews will not merely lay a secure foundation for their own national life, but will enrich the world by the addition of one more to the number of productive territories.

This economic development will be fruitful of benefit to the Arab inhabitants of Palestine and the neighbouring lands. The Palestinian Arabs have already gained considerably as a result of Jewish colonisation work, with its modern intensive methods of agriculture, its scientific appliances, its western ideas of hygiene and business methods. There is every reason to hope that future Jewish development in Palestine will react favourably on the economic condition and the culture not only of the Arabs in Palestine, but of the Arab kingdom of the Hedjaz. The Arabs are apt to be regarded as a backward race, constitutionally incapable of joining in the onward march of modern civilisation. It is difficult to believe that charge of a nation with such an illustrious record of civilising work in the past. But for centuries the Arab has not had a chance. The rule of the Turk, though sympathetic to him from the religious point of view, is politically oppressive, and makes for stagnation rather than for progress. With the European he has too little kinship of ideas and temperament to be capable of learning from him what the West ought to teach the East. But there is a very real kinship between Jew and Arab—a kinship not merely of blood, not merely of language, not merely of religion (for Islam owes more to Judaism than even Christianity), but of joint work

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in the diffusion of knowledge. It was the Arab and the Jew who brought scholarship and medicine into Europe at the beginning of the Middle Ages. Jewish philosophers and scientists got their knowledge of Greek thought from the Arabs, and brought that knowledge with them into Europe. The Jews thus owe the Arabs a debt which they should be eager and able to repay when their genius has free scope in a national life of their own and the Arabs are their closest neighbours. Coming to the Arabs not as strangers from an entirely different world, but as kinsmen who have gained a rich experience during ages of separation, they will help the Arabs by their influence and example to adapt themselves to modern conditions, and, side by side, the two races will realise their national possibilities.

In its co-operation with the Arabs the Hebrew nation of the future will be fulfilling a part, but only a part, of the function which should properly fall to it of acting as mediator between East and West. For Palestine will not merely become a highway of commerce in the material sense : it will be a meeting-place of ideas and civilisations. Politically it may have to be a kind of buffer-State ; spiritually it will be the converse. Instead of serving as a barrier, which is the function of the buffer-State, it will hold open the door between East and West, and will help each to a better understanding of the other. Nor will it simply act as a transmitter of ideas : it will make its own positive contribution to the problem of harmonising the divergent conceptions of East and West. For centuries the Jews have been intermediaries in the sphere of ideas as in that of commerce : that was the natural *métier* of a people intellectually gifted, but lacking a solid basis of its own, and doomed always to wander from continent to continent in search of a resting-place. A restored Jewish nation in Palestine will aspire to something higher than that. It will be creative, not merely imitative ; it will be, spiritually if not economically, a manufacturing and not merely a trading nation. And its creative work will express a spirit

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subtly compounded of elements from East and West—the eastern passion for righteousness, for ideas, for God, combined with western initiative and appreciation of the possibilities of man's command over nature. A Hebrew University in Palestine, re-interpreting the ideas of the Prophets in terms adapted to the modern world, might draw students from distant East and distant West alike, and send them back to their homes with an outlook not merely widened by intercourse with men of the most widely different types, but deepened by contact with those spiritual truths of which Israel is still the guardian, and at present the mute guardian. In international politics, again, which will become more and more concerned with the relations between East and West, a Jewish Palestine might fulfil an important function as the seat of a Court of Arbitration. Both sentiment and geography point to Palestine as of all countries the best suited for this purpose; while the ideal of international brotherhood is so woven into the very fabric of Jewish national sentiment that concrete association with the cause of international peace would be one of the most natural manifestations of the Jewish spirit. A Court of Arbitration at Jerusalem would not be an exotic; it would be a real expression of Hebrew national life, and its moral force would be enhanced for that reason.

Both spiritually and politically, then, a Jewish Palestine may do much towards establishing that world-harmony, that accommodation and fusion of different conceptions, without which mere international settlements can be of no avail. And in such a task Jewish nationalism would be working in close accord with the ideals of the British Commonwealth. For it is one of the primary functions of the Commonwealth, stretching as it does across the Old World and the New, to bridge the age-long gulf between East and West, to create and develop a sense of human brotherhood and civic fellowship between their peoples.

Lastly, and not least important, the Hebrew nation in Palestine should justify itself by contributing something of

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value to the solution of social problems. Even in modern Europe, under conditions of assimilation in which the essential character and ideals of the Jew tend to be submerged, the Jewish passion for social justice has shown itself time and again in individuals. Jews have been prominent wherever there has been a fight for liberty and equality within the State. In a Jewish Palestine this fundamental and ineradicable quality of the Jew would have free play ; and its fruits would be the more valuable in that it would be able to express itself in constructive work. Circumstances have too often driven the Jew in modern Europe into the revolutionary camp. But he is not by nature a revolutionary. He has a strong sense of social solidarity and a deep-seated regard for human life as a thing of value in itself ; and his individualism is tempered by an instinctive reverence for law and a habit of defining moral obligations with legal precision. A people with these characteristics should be capable of building a social fabric possessing the elements both of stability and of progress, and of adjusting aright the claims of the individual and of the community. Moreover, the conditions in Palestine are favourable to a new experiment in social evolution. On the one hand, the very atmosphere of Palestine at once recalls to the Jew the social ideals of the Prophets. On the other hand, he can start his work there with the aid of all the science and experience of modern Europe, and yet without the need for that constant struggle against the dead weight of outworn prejudices and institutions which nullifies so much of the energy of the reformers in a country of long-established economic and social traditions. The Jews in Palestine will have no relics of feudalism to fight against. The political equality of men and women, towards which the nations of Europe struggle so slowly and painfully, is already an accomplished fact in the small Jewish settlements in Palestine. Democratic government and co-operative institutions are matters of course. The Hebrew nation has the advantage of

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beginning at a point which it has taken Europe centuries to reach, and of being able to experiment with the minimum of risk and of friction. Herzl, in his prophetic sketch of the restored Jewish community, described it as *Altneuland* (Old-New Land), and the name will prove an apt one. Before long the characteristic spirit of the nation will express itself in social reform as in art and literature, and it will give as well as take in that interplay of ideas through which values created by one nation become the property of all. It may even be that from the Judea of the future there will go forth to the world another great wave of religious and moral inspiration, to break, not wholly in vain, on the rock of materialism. At least, a world which has done homage to the Jewish Prophets of the past will not think the worse of the Jew if his national ambition takes the form of aspiring to produce successors of the Prophets in time to come.

Meanwhile, the Jewish communities of the Dispersion will have felt the beneficial effects of the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine both in their inner life and in their relations with their neighbours. There has been much misapprehension, partly genuine and partly affected, about the effect of the restoration of Jewish national life on the political and social status of the Jewish communities outside Palestine. Some fear, or profess to fear, that when the Jewish nation has once more a political existence of its own Jews will no longer be allowed to exercise the rights of citizenship in non-Jewish lands, or even that they may be compelled to leave those lands for their own. It was no doubt to allay such apprehensions that the British Government's endorsement of Zionism was accompanied by a proviso safeguarding the "rights and political status" of the Jewish communities in countries other than Palestine. This proviso is valuable as placing on record the British Government's recognition of the fact that there is no inherent incompatibility between the realisation of Zionist aims and the continued enjoyment by

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Jews of social and political equality in Great Britain or any other country. It does not, and in the nature of things could not, afford any guarantee, because no Government could bind its successors, still less the Governments of other countries, as to the course to be adopted in circumstances which have not yet arisen. But no such guarantee is necessary. Only prejudice or loose thinking could set up the contention that the constitution of a Jewish nation in Palestine—even if it had full State sovereignty—would necessitate a change of political allegiance on the part of any single Jew who belonged by citizenship to another State ; and if the apprehension of loss of equal rights does not rest on that contention, it rests on nothing. For, when once it is recognised that a Jew born in England, and exercising the rights of citizenship according to the law of England, can owe no political allegiance to a Jewish State in Palestine unless he goes to live in that State and becomes its subject by process of naturalisation, it becomes obvious that the creation of a Jewish State no more affects the political position of that particular Jew than would the creation of a Hottentot State. It may, indeed, be contended that the existence of a Jewish State, or even of a Jewish national home, would lend a handle to those anti-Semites who wish to rid their own countries of Jews, but cannot make out a plausible case for expulsion, or for such restrictive legislation as would force Jews to emigrate, so long as the Jew has no place of his own to which he can go. But there is a simple answer to that argument. If the nations which have granted equal rights to Jews are capable of retrogressing so far as to substitute a policy of persecution for one of toleration, it would be absurd on the part of the Jews to expect to find in their own homelessness a shield against the evil which threatens them. Experience in Russia (under the old *régime*) and elsewhere proves that a country which for one reason or another is predisposed towards an anti-Semitic policy is not deterred from carrying it out by the consideration that the Jews have no country

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of their own. If, then, it be assumed that other States will in future model their treatment of the Jews on Czarist Russia, what ground is there for supposing that it will make any difference whether there is or is not a Jewish national home? The fact is that the Jews, as a scattered people, must always depend on the liberality and enlightenment of the States in which they live (or at any rate of those States which are too strong to fear punishment or reprisals at the hands of a Jewish State if one exists); and if the civilised world is going to relapse into chauvinistic intolerance, the outlook for the Jews is so bad that they would be well advised to secure at least a corner of the earth where they can hope to be beyond the reach of anti-Semitism. But there is no reason so to despair of human progress, at any rate within a year of the Russian Revolution.

To obtain an idea of what is really likely to be the effect of the realisation of Zionist aims on the position of the Jewries of the Dispersion, it is necessary to realise first of all what sort of relation will exist between those Jewries and the national home in Palestine. That there must be some sort of relation goes without saying: otherwise the term "Jewish" must become a misnomer as applied either to the community in Palestine or to the communities outside Palestine, or to all alike. To assume that there will still be a Jewish people, with a national home in Palestine and settlements outside Palestine, is to assume that spiritual continuity with the Judaism of the past and the present will be maintained both in Palestine and outside it. And it is precisely for this maintenance of spiritual continuity that the national home will be of greatest value to the people as a whole. Its chief function, regarded purely from the point of view of the Jewish people, will be—to use a phrase made famous by Achad ha-Am, the "master of those who know" in Jewish nationalism—that of a "spiritual centre." Embodying in its own life what is best and most characteristic in the Hebraic outlook, the national home will be to the scattered Jewish communities a pattern on which they

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can model themselves in their attempt to realise Judaism in their own lives. Politically and economically the Hebrew nation in Palestine will move along lines determined by its own needs and circumstances, and the path which it takes will have no direct bearing on the position and the problems of extra-Palestinian Jewry. But in the realm of the spirit, in ideas, in religion, in ethics, it will exert a profound influence on the Jews of the world. They will turn to it perforce for a truer understanding of what Judaism essentially is, and of how far traditional Judaism requires adaptation, and how it can be adapted, to modern conditions ; they will look to it in large measure for their preachers and their teachers ; its scholars will help them to a deeper insight into their national past, its poets will give them a new vision of their national future ; they will send their sons and daughters to its schools and universities, to come back with a quickened Jewish consciousness and a healthy pride of race. By virtue of a conscious individuality of outlook which will give their language, their history, and their customs a value in their own eyes and in those of their neighbours, they will gain a new sense of dignity and of self-respect, and will meet their fellow-citizens on equal terms, knowing that in the commerce of ideas they can give as well as receive. So the Jewish communities of the world, each adapting itself to the political and economic conditions of its environment, will yet remain united by a spiritual bond, and will transmit to the world whatever of value the national centre has to give.

Nor will this renewal of national spirit in the Jew benefit his race alone : it will also benefit all those with whom they live. Keen-sighted statesmen and thinkers in most countries where there is a large Jewish population have favoured the Zionist movement because they have recognised that Zionism, whilst making its disciples better Jews, makes them also better citizens of the State to which they belong. It is no accident that the leader of American Zionism should have stood in the van of the social reform movement

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in the United States and should have won his way by his untiring devotion to public service to a seat on the Bench of the Supreme Court. It may indeed be hoped that, when the promise of Zionism is fulfilled and its harvest is gathered in, many time-honoured prejudices against the Jew will be at last destroyed. For his fellow-citizens will be no longer tempted to regard him as a homeless man, a man who has lost his national birthright, and therefore in some vague sense inferior to themselves, incapable of service as wholehearted as their own to the State of his adoption, at the worst a parasite in the body politic. Not least among the fruits of the renaissance of Jewish nationality will be a fuller sense of civic equality and human brotherhood between Jew and Gentile throughout the world.

A few words may be said, in conclusion, as to one particular effect which the realisation of the Zionist ideal ought naturally to have on the development of political thought and practice. Of all the questions which the present war has brought to the forefront of men's minds there is none more important and more insistently demanding solution than that of the relation of the conceptions of State and Nationality. Throughout the nineteenth century the prevailing idea in Europe was that State and Nationality should be co-terminous; each nation, however small and however unfitted for self-government, should have the complete machinery and independence of a sovereign State. It was a period, therefore, of the creation of petty States and—what is worse for the cause of peace—of irredentist movements. And if the conception of the nation-state is to retain its predominance in political thinking, there will assuredly be no end of irredentism and no end of war. The only hope lies in the general acceptance of the opposite conception, according to which the ideal arrangement is that of a number of nations grouped together for the conduct of the affairs which concern them all in common, but maintaining each its own individuality in language and culture, and endowed with a sufficient measure

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of internal autonomy. The British Commonwealth comes nearer than any political organism of the present or the past to realising this ideal. The new Russia may perhaps in course of time approximate to it. But the day is yet far distant when the world as a whole will be organised on the basis of large groups of nations in free association for State purposes, and any new force which will strengthen the tendency in that direction, theoretically or practically, should be welcomed by those who hope for real progress in international relations. Now in so far as the Jewish people develops along the lines here foreshadowed—and they are lines which it must follow if it remains true to itself—it will be a force making in that direction. For the existence of Jewish communities all over the world, keenly conscious of their national distinctiveness, spiritually attached to their own national home, yet sharing politically and economically the struggles and the fortunes of the peoples among whom they live, will be an object-lesson in the true distinction and the right relation between State and Nationality. It will strengthen the hands of all those who are thinking and working for the great cause of removing the international rivalries and animosities which have now plunged the world in chaos. The Jewish nation, alike at its centre and at its circumference, will help to show mankind that a nation's life is best lived, not in isolation and conflict, but in community and co-operation; that nationality is essentially a thing of the spirit, not bound up with and fettered by political machinery, but working freely in the hearts and minds of men, and expressing itself in the effort of different human groups to approach the same summit by different roads, each striving upwards along the path marked out for it by its own character and spirit.

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THE FOURTH WINTER

The Restatement of War Aims

THE last three months, relatively uneventful on the various fronts, have been, partly for that very reason, a trying and difficult period at home. The year ended leaving us, to outward seeming, still as far, if not farther from victory than at the end of 1916; and, in taking stock of the situation, men had time during the lull to realise the full effects of the Russian collapse and the necessary delay which must occur before the force of the United States could be brought adequately into play. For the moment, and for some time to come, the stress of the war must fall chiefly upon the British Commonwealth among the Allies, and among the peoples of the Commonwealth chiefly upon the people of this island. The British people are in the habit of facing facts: they realise the price which may have to be paid, and they well understand the cause in which the continued sacrifice will be demanded. They are neither weary nor discouraged, but it is in a sober, resolute and patient, rather than a sanguine spirit that they greeted the New Year and look forward to its incalculable vicissitudes. The full strength of the Allied position, especially in the economic sphere, is still not fully understood; nor is it realised how little the defection of Russia relieves the anxieties of the Central Powers in regard to the supply of

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the materials of which they stand most in need. Ignorance, indeed, in this and other matters, is the greatest enemy with which the country has to contend in its attitude towards the war. But, whatever the estimates, whether their temper be hopeful or subdued, men have made up their minds that sooner or later, with the strength of the Alliance and the public opinion of the world behind it, the cause of right and liberty will prevail.

So far as the opinion of the country as a whole can be tested it remains firmly behind the Government, supported, as it still is, by the House of Commons. Only one contested election has taken place during the quarter—at Prestwich, near Manchester. As on so many previous occasions since the pacifists abandoned in despair the policy of putting forward Parliamentary candidates, it was not fought on the war but on subsidiary issues. The Coalition Candidate, an officer fighting in Palestine, was elected by a three-to-one majority against Mr. May, Secretary of the Co-operative Parliamentary Representation Committee, who came forward on a rather vague programme, as a “consumers’” candidate, armed, oddly enough, with a letter of commendation from M. Albert Thomas. Mr. May’s signal defeat is of some interest, since he is not only one of the leading spirits in that wing of the Co-operative movement which (as recorded in the last issue of *THE ROUND TABLE*) is anxious to promote closer association with the political Labour Party, but he had actually signed a joint statement with the Labour Party and Trade Union Congress leaders warmly endorsing President Wilson’s war-aims statement of January 8 and laying rather undue stress on those relatively minor points on which it exhibited variations of policy or phrasing from the statement made a few days before by the Prime Minister on behalf of all nations and parties in the British Commonwealth. In so far, then, as the election was fought on political issues arising out of the war, Mr. May’s rejection may be regarded as indicating

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that the electors of this unquestionably democratic constituency accept the Government's foreign policy as the national policy and do not favour the method of sectional diplomacy.

Discussions about the future settlement have indeed been much in the public mind during the past quarter, and must therefore find a place in this record. On November 29, during the absence of the Prime Minister at an Allied War Council in Paris, at a moment when the Russian defection and the Italian defeat were fresh in the mind of all Europe, Lord Lansdowne wrote a letter to the Press which excited much discussion at home and in allied and enemy countries. Emanating from the man who had been Foreign Secretary in the Cabinet which originated the *Entente Cordiale* and changed the orientation of British foreign policy into the direction which it has since followed, his words were naturally everywhere felt to carry unusual weight. Writing in guarded and deliberately ambiguous terms, he expressed the opinion that the difficulties in the way of an early peace were not insurmountable and that if satisfactory assurances were given to Germany on five specific points "an immense stimulus would probably be given to the peace party in Germany." The five points in question were all of them familiar: indeed, he himself admitted that authority could be found for most of them in Ministerial speeches. They summarised with fair precision the general feeling existing in the country against a vindictive or penal treatment of Germany after the war and as to the desirability of "an international pact" between the Powers to prevent future wars. But on the nature of the new order which was thus to be safeguarded, and on the importance of basing it on a stable foundation of responsible government among all the contracting Powers, the letter was significantly silent, except for a sentence stating that "some of our original desiderata have become unattainable." It was therefore not clear to the reader, either at home or abroad, what grounds Lord Lansdowne had for expecting that a renewed

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or more formal statement of his positive proposals would improve the prospects of a satisfactory peace ; and, on the negative evidence, the letter was widely and not unnaturally interpreted, especially in Germany, as concealing a manœuvre of surrender. This impression was removed, or, at least, substantially modified, by Lord Lansdowne in a letter of explanation and, two months later, in a public speech ; but meanwhile, as became clear in the subsequent attitude of Berlin, the harm had been done, and the impression left on the minds of the enemy Governments and General Staff who regard the obstinate idealism of Great Britain as the most formidable impediment in their path, will not easily be effaced. It is not reasonable to expect that Berlin and Vienna, or even Washington, Paris and Rome, should know how little the opinions and outlook of a veteran Conservative peer correspond with the real forces that are now alive and astir in the mind of the people.

On December 7 one of the sanest and most clear-headed of the Labour members, Mr. J. H. Thomas, made a much more helpful contribution to the discussion. After dealing briefly, in retrospect, with the way in which the country, and especially the working class, had responded to the call of a war for which it was both materially and intellectually unprepared, he laid stress on the real issue at stake—"whether a free people fighting for freedom was prepared to make the sacrifice necessary to defeat an autocracy which was attacking their freedom and that of others." He stated that "there had been too many ambiguities about what we were fighting for," and asked that the issues of the war should be "reduced to simple language."

There is no doubt that the ambiguity thus referred to existed in many quarters. It was due to several causes. First and foremost must be placed the effect upon the popular mind of the publication of the secret treaties with Russia and Italy, with their arbitrary and cynical arrangements for "partitions" and "compensations," and their scant consideration for the wishes or welfare of the inhabi-

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tants of the territories concerned. It is true that in his Glasgow speech last June, delivered before the treaties were published or expected to be published, the Prime Minister, speaking on behalf of the Government, had answered the question of the Russian Provisional Government and the implied question of Washington by definitely renouncing the British conquests and pledging the only one of the Entente Powers which was actually in possession of territory dealt with in the secret treaties to abide by the decision of the Peace Conference as to its disposal. But in the months that had since elapsed his words and their implied reference had been overlooked and the publication of the treaties offered an opportunity for misrepresentation of which advantage was naturally taken by enemy agents and their dupes. Mr. Thomas was therefore quite right in urging that a fuller and more effective statement was required. Public opinion in the fourth year of a war which has revolutionised our thinking is happily far more alive to questions of foreign policy and international relations than it was when the British Government acquiesced in the treaties in question; yet it must remain a mystery how, even under conditions as they were in 1915, the Government of the day should have allowed its Foreign Secretary to set his hand to such pacts. It would be idle to deny that their publication has come as a shock to the great mass of high-minded and patriotic opinion which constitutes the real driving force of the nation. We should indeed be the hypocrites that our enemies consider us to be if the arrangements thus made in our name left our complacency undisturbed.

There is another cause of uneasiness and dissatisfaction upon which a plain word must be said. Much of the "propaganda" carried on under Government auspices is not only unworthy of its professed cause but a source of direct and unmistakable injury to it. Occasional lapses of geography and good taste in Ministers may be passed over. Harmful abroad, they are taken at their true worth

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at home. But the disheartening effect caused by the effusions of paid writers and speakers trained in the school of pre-war party warfare cannot be so easily discounted. The establishment last autumn of a National War Aims Committee, to be supported out of public funds, with Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Asquith, Mr. Bonar Law and Mr. Barnes as presidents, was a wise and much needed step ; but it is as significant as it is unfortunate that the Labour Party should recently have decided to remove their representative from the Committee as a protest against the nature and tone of its publications. Nothing perhaps illustrates so clearly the gulf which separates the shallow and listless electorate of 1914 from the serious, responsible, and determined public opinion of to-day, whether in khaki or mufti, than the disgust which is excited by the survival and even the recrudescence of the old methods and temper of political controversy. Those who wish to carry the nation with them to-day and in the future must be prepared to face a newly awakened spirit of criticism and inquiry. If they will meet argument with argument and knowledge with knowledge, they will find the British people, impatient of clap-trap and catchwords from any quarter, ready and eager to pay their tribute to sincerity and public spirit, to genuine experience and plain common sense. The recent appointment of Lord Beaverbrook, a Canadian millionaire, otherwise little known to the public, to a very responsible position as Minister in charge of Propaganda and Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, cannot help exciting the reflection that this obvious lesson has not yet been learnt by those in authority. There is a good deal to be said for appointing to such a post someone who is in touch with one of the Dominions, but care should have been taken to make sure that the person selected possessed the general confidence of the people of the Dominion in question.

No such criticism applies to the statements, made in response to the appeal of Mr. Thomas and others, by

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Ministers and ex-Ministers themselves. On December 11 Mr. Asquith, who was Premier when the secret treaties were made, once more associated himself with President Wilson's point of view and made a significant reference to the desirability of a "clean peace." On December 19 Mr. Arthur Henderson, as Secretary of the Labour Party, circulated the Party's Memorandum on War Aims (already referred to in **THE ROUND TABLE**) as finally revised and passed by the Parliamentary Committee of the Trades Union Congress and the Executive of the Labour Party. The proposals therein embodied differed not at all in principle and relatively little in detail from those of the Government spokesmen. On December 19 Lord Robert Cecil, speaking in the House of Commons, stated that he regarded "the idea of the League of Nations" "as the only thing really worth struggling for in connexion with international affairs." On December 20 the Prime Minister, reviewing the general situation, took occasion to restate his Glasgow declaration. On January 5, speaking at a conference of Trade Unionists, he went further and made the detailed statements of British war aims with which the world is now familiar.

Such difference as exists between various sections of opinion about war aims is concerned rather with tactics than with principles. The Labour Party, in the person of its leader, Mr. Henderson, has committed itself to the view that much is to be achieved by making moral appeals to the enemy peoples over the head of their Governments. In pursuance of this policy, he and his colleague Mr. Bowerman, the representative of the Trade Union Congress, have issued several manifestoes to the world, some of them couched for the occasion in language embodying continental rather than British modes of thought. No one can question the sincerity and earnestness of the promoters of this new and extra-constitutional diplomacy, and it is greatly to be hoped that it may influence the German people. But their efforts are inevitably handicapped, as men like Mr. Vander-

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velde could doubtless tell them, by their ignorance of the psychological factors involved and their want of familiarity with the political and constitutional situation in the Central Empires. It must be remembered also that Mr. Henderson and Mr. Bowerman speak on behalf of only a section of the community, although this fact is apt to be obscured by the inevitable ambiguity of words like "labour," "democracy," and "people," and by the importance which the more highly organised Trade Unions have assumed during the war in the life of the State. An impossible situation would be created if the leaders of any single part of the community were to address to enemy peoples manifestoes which substantially conflicted with the opinions and wishes of the Government, which alone can represent the country as a whole.

The Representation of the People Act

The seventh session of the Parliament elected in December, 1910, closed on February 6 and the eighth (and presumably the last) opened on February 12. The chief fruit of the session was the passing of the Franchise Bill or, as it will be known to history, the fourth Reform Act: but a good deal of other important legislation was carried through. By the Corn Production Act, which became law in the summer, minimum prices were fixed for wheat and oats for six years and the Board of Agriculture was armed with powers to enforce proper cultivation. At the same time a minimum wage of 25s. (inclusive of allowances) was guaranteed to agricultural workmen and Wages Boards were set up to enforce it. Two Military Service Acts were passed in the session. The first, enacted in the spring, empowered the military authorities to call up for examination three classes of men hitherto excepted—home service Territorials, men discharged owing to disablement or ill-health, and men previously rejected on any ground.

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The second, known as the Man-power Bill, became law at the end of the session and will be referred to later. Acts were also passed creating an Air Ministry, with a Secretary of State at its head, and a Ministry of Reconstruction to deal with post-war problems. By the Non-Ferrous Metal Industry Act powers were taken to supervise and, if necessary, eliminate undesirable influences in the control of a "key" industry. In its passage through the House of Commons, this measure was keenly criticised by the enemies of State interference with private trading and numerous safeguards were introduced to alleviate their fears.

By the Reform Act the electorate is increased from about eight to almost sixteen and a half millions, of whom some six millions will be women, the ratio of increase being very similar to that brought about by each of the three previous Acts. One in three of the population of these islands will now be qualified to vote and, judged by the width of the franchise, the United Kingdom will become one of the most advanced democracies in the world. The last stages of its passage were complicated by a dispute between the two Houses on the subject of Proportional Representation and the Alternative Vote. The House of Commons on five separate occasions manifested its hostility to Proportional Representation, but the persistence of the Lords was rewarded by the adoption of a compromise making possible its trial in not more than a hundred constituencies. The Alternative Vote, on the other hand, which was carried several times in the Commons, mainly by Liberal and Labour as against Conservative votes, was rejected by the Lords and eventually dropped. As the Labour Party are preparing to put up four hundred candidates at the next election, there will probably be many three-cornered contests, and it is not impossible that the next Government may represent a minority of the electorate.

The detailed provisions of the Act which abolish numerous long-standing abuses and will undoubtedly transform

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the electoral system and traditions of the country are best set forth in the following summary :—*

I. FRANCHISES

Men.—Qualifications for a vote :—Twenty-one years of age, and six months' residence or occupation of business premises.

Women.—Qualifications for a vote :—Thirty years of age, and either a local government elector or the wife of one. (The qualification for the local government franchise is six months' ownership or tenancy of land or premises. Lodgers in furnished rooms are not qualified.)

University.—The qualification for this franchise is the attainment by a man or woman within the above-age limits of a definite standard, which in England and Wales is the taking of a degree. A woman is also qualified to vote for a university which does not admit women to degrees if she has fulfilled the conditions for the admission of a man to a degree.

War Service.—Naval and military voters to be registered for the constituencies for which they would have been qualified but for their service. This provision applies to (1) sailors and soldiers on full pay, and (2) merchant seamen, pilots, and fishermen, and persons engaged on Red Cross work or other work of national importance abroad or afloat. Male voters who have served in the war will be qualified at the age of 19 years.

Dual Voting.—No person to vote at a General Election for more than two constituencies.

Disqualifications.—Conscientious objectors to be disqualified during the war and for five years afterwards, unless they satisfy the Central Tribunal that they have fulfilled certain conditions, such as employment in work of national importance. Only British subjects to be qualified. The receipt of poor relief to be no longer a disqualification.

2. REGISTRATION

Registers of Electors.—Two to be prepared in every year—one in the spring and one in the autumn.

Registration Areas and Officers.—Each Parliamentary borough and county to be a registration area, with the town clerk of the borough and the clerk of the county council respectively as registration officer.

Appeals.—If from a decision of a registration officer, to lie to the County Court. A further appeal on any point of law to lie to the Court of Appeal, whose decision is to be final.

* *The Times*, February 7, 1918.

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Registration Expenses.—Half to be paid out of local rates and half by the State.

3. METHOD OF ELECTIONS

Proportional Representation.—To be applied to university constituencies returning two or more members; eleven seats affected. Commissioners to prepare a scheme for the election of 100 town and country members in Great Britain by "P.R.," to take effect if approved by resolution of both Houses.

General Election.—All polls to be held on one day. Nomination day to be the same in all constituencies.

Absent Voters.—Separate lists to be prepared. Ballot papers to be sent to absent voters, marked by them, and returned with a declaration of identity.

Voting by Proxy.—To be permitted in the case of naval and military voters in distant areas, and merchant seamen, pilots, and fishermen at sea.

4. COSTS OF ELECTIONS

Candidates' Deposits.—Fixed at £150. To be forfeited if the number of votes polled by a candidate does not exceed one-eighth of the total number polled. To be returned in any other case.

Returning Officers' Expenses.—To be paid by the Treasury.

Scale of Election Expenses.—Maximum to be 7d. for each elector in a county constituency and 5d. in a borough.

Unauthorised Expenses.—No person, unless authorised by the election agent of a candidate, to incur any expenses by holding meetings or issuing advertisements or circulars to promote the election of any candidate.

5. REDISTRIBUTION

Basis.—One member for every 70,000 of population in Great Britain; one for every 43,000 in Ireland (by separate Bill).

London Boroughs.—62 members, a gain of three.

Other Boroughs.—258 members (33 more). Forty-four old boroughs extinguished; 31 new boroughs created, including 13 (returning 18 members) in Greater London and eight in Lancashire.

Counties.—372 members (five less). Changes chiefly in boundaries of divisions.

Universities.—15 members (six more). Representation extended to the new universities.

Membership of House.—England, 492 (31 more); Wales 36 (two more); Scotland, 74 (two more); Ireland, 105 (two more). Total, 707.

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Man-Power

On January 14 the Minister of National Service, Sir Auckland Geddes, introduced a Military Service Bill, embodying the Government's latest proposals with regard to recruiting and man-power. He spoke with a reorganised and well-equipped Department behind him and his speech revealed a comprehensive grasp and a breadth of outlook which compared almost painfully with the treatment of the subject in the earlier stages of the war, when different interests were competing for recruits without any central guidance and direction.

"The man-power problem," he reminded the House in words that attracted much attention, "is the central problem of the war. It means everything—ships, armies, munitions, food, light, heat, coal—everything. . . . What we require is a sane, carefully considered, carefully balanced programme, steadfastly pursued. We must avoid being led away by the thought of Continental Powers, to whom their army is their all-in-all. We are an island, not a Continental nation. Ultimately it is on the control of the seas by us for our Allies that all depends. Since August, 1914, we have trodden some strange paths and they have brought us little profit for the treading. . . . Let us keep our sense of perspective and remember that at sea we must be supreme, in the air we must win supremacy, and on land we must do the best to fill the gap that Russia has made, until America can take her place, and all the while we have to keep our vital industries going. Industries not vital to the war may have to suffer. It is a pity, but what is the alternative?"

He went on to state that, wholly excluding Russia and Roumania, the Allies had a substantial superiority both in fighting and in ration strength over the armies of the Central Powers. "Nothing," he declared, "but a psychological catastrophe in our own or an Allied country, such as that which has befallen Russia, can save the Central Powers."

He estimated that the secession of Russia had added to the potential enemy strength on the Western Front, including Italy, "possibly as many as 1,600,000 men, without taking into consideration the reserves which would

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otherwise have been required in service on the Russian Front." He then passed to the "British" contribution to the Allied forces. Its total, he said, amounted to 7,500,000 men as compared with 850,000 in the Navy, Army and Territorial Force at the outbreak of war. Out of this total, 60·4 per cent. was contributed by England, 8·3 per cent. by Scotland, 3·7 per cent. by Wales, 2·3 per cent. by Ireland, 12 per cent. by the Dominions, and the remaining 15·3 per cent. by India and various African and other Dependencies.

The proposal which he had to bring forward involved the immediate raising of some 420-450,000 men from amongst those now in civil life. Those numbers must be regarded as a minimum and might later have to be exceeded; but they would be to some extent balanced by the return of discharged soldiers to civil life. Three possibilities had been considered by the Government and, for the present, rejected: to lower the military age below 18, to raise it above 43, and to apply compulsory service to Ireland. The only remaining course was to make available for military service a very large number of the young men now engaged in "essential industries" and to take all steps necessary to maintain those industries after the young men had been withdrawn.

In pursuance of this policy, which chiefly affects the engineering industry, the Government has become involved in a somewhat tangled conflict (which at the moment of writing is still proceeding) between the Amalgamated Society of Engineers, by far the largest Trade Union catering for skilled engineers, and the other Trade Unions, skilled and unskilled, interested in the engineering and allied trades.

The Government was a party to agreements arrived at in May, 1917, providing that, until the original schedule of protected occupations was revised, "dilutees fit for general service should be called up before skilled men or apprentices." The object of this provision, which was not limited

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to members of the A.S.E., was to secure that the services of the skilled men should be given to the nation in the way in which they were most useful. It was apparently made clear at the time that the policy was not intended to apply to all "dilutees." but only to those under 32 years of age. As Mr. Henderson, who was then acting on behalf of the Government, stated on May 10, "The Prime Minister may have said some strange things—we all do ; but he has not said that every man of 40 with his big family shall be taken before men of 19 or 20 years of age." But the adoption of the agreements had the unfortunate result of placing the A.S.E., as the chief skilled union, in what appeared both to its own younger members and to other workmen as a position of privileged superiority. Moreover, the interpretation of the agreements could hardly fail to cause friction, since conflicting meanings can be given to the term "dilutee." It was always understood that the agreements might be abrogated under changed circumstances, and the present proposal is to deal with the position shop by shop, by means of the local "dilution officers" of the Ministry of Munitions who are in touch with the Unions and the firms affected. Committees presided over by independent chairmen have been set up to deal with complaints arising out of the enlistments made in this way.

Difficulties have arisen as to the procedure to be adopted in the negotiations between the Government and the A.S.E., but these will probably be surmounted. Behind them looms the larger difficulty arising out of the attitude of many of the younger men, which has been aggravated by food and housing difficulties in "munition" centres and by a certain amount of revolutionary agitation. The case of Government, backed up as it is by the other Unions and by public opinion, is so strong that it is not to be anticipated that serious difficulty will arise in the application of Sir Auckland Geddes's policy, embodied, as it now is, in an Act which passed through Parliament practically unopposed.

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Food and Shipping

"The war is a death grapple of nations rather than of armies," remarked the President of the Board of Agriculture in a recent speech, "and the struggle will be decided in the prosaic region of the human belly." The region in question has afforded considerable material for public discussion and criticism during the last quarter. The submarine menace, although checked, still remains extremely serious : in one week of December, for instance, three million pounds of bacon and four million pounds of cheese were sunk. The margin is being cut finer and finer, and the anxiously awaited moment when the launchings will begin, not in occasional weeks but regularly, to exceed the sinkings is still in the future. As was to be expected, the effect of the growing shortage of shipping upon the food supply has been increasingly felt during the past quarter, and it has been accentuated by the withdrawal, for the relief of France, Italy and Greece, of considerable supplies which would otherwise have been available for the people of this country.

Under these circumstances, the position of the Food Controller and his Department has been far from enviable. The problem of controlling supplies and eliminating profiteering in the food trade has been overcome with success by the policy of fixing prices at every stage, although in some cases, where the producer has not been amenable to pressure, it has resulted here, as in Germany, in tending to dry up the source of supply. But the problem of the fair distribution of the supplies thus controlled has proved far more difficult to solve, and has eventually necessitated the adoption of a system of rationing for a number of essential commodities, to begin in the last week of February. Tea, margarine, meat, cheese and milk have all been seriously short at various times and places, and queues outside the shops

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dealing in these articles have become a familiar sight. That they have been mainly composed of the poorest class of the population, which lives from hand to mouth and does not deal regularly at any shop, may explain but does not alleviate the hardship of the situation, and much indignation has been caused by the contrast thereby afforded between rich and poor. Steps were taken before Christmas to deal with the difficulty by giving the local authorities power to commandeer and redistribute supplies of the commodities in question within their areas. Meanwhile the rationing plan that has been adopted is based generally upon the system of registered orders, which the Labour War Emergency Committee has the credit of being the first to suggest. For the rest, the Ministry of Food has thrown a large part of its responsibility on the local Food Committees, some 2,000 in number, who are assisted by twelve District Food Commissioners. The work of the Committees, as might be expected, has been very unevenly performed; some of them, Birmingham in particular, have shown great initiative and resource; others have been unequal to their work or dominated by the shop-keeping interest. The establishment of communal kitchens has not kept pace with expectations, and, like so much else, has been hampered by inter-departmental difficulties. The Ministry has, however, taken the wise step of arranging to keep in systematic touch with public opinion by the establishment of a Consumers' Council, presided over by Mr. Clynes, a Labour member who is Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry.

Taken as a whole it must be said that the food shortage has caused much inconvenience, and some hardship, but as yet little actual privation. "Far fewer families in the British Isles," said a careful writer recently, "failed to get, not only a full but even an extravagant Christmas dinner in 1917 than in 1913." Lord Rhondda has even ventured to speak of the "great improvement in the health of the people," accompanying the reduction in the food values

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consumed, and to quote the vital statistics in his support. But it is too early yet to draw such confident conclusions, and it is the next few months when the shortage of meat, especially, will be serious, which will be the decisive and critical time.

The Irish Convention

While the people of Great Britain are thus preoccupied with problems arising directly from the necessities of the war, public opinion in Ireland is chiefly concerned with the attempt to obtain a substantial measure of agreement among Irishmen as to their future constitutional position. The privacy in which the Convention has carried on its work has been loyally respected. The general public in this country have awaited its issue without impatience, convinced of the earnestness and sincerity of its members, and recognising that a task so delicate and difficult and so vitally important for the future harmony and strength of the whole Commonwealth could not be hastily rushed through.

On December 21 Sir Horace Plunkett, the Chairman of the Committee, at a meeting of the Irish Agricultural Organisation at Dublin, referred to the Convention in language which suggested that the end of its deliberations was not very far off.

"All I will say about the Convention is this. There has been in that body no unnecessary delay. Any delay that has been caused is to be explained by one consideration only, and that is that every member of that body is determined to do his utmost to arrive at a settlement which can come under the definition of a substantial agreement. Everybody knows that the Irish question was never a simple political problem, and all political problems are far more complicated and difficult at this stage in the world's history than, I suppose, they have ever been before.

"We are making progress. We have agreed on many things. There are some things on which we have not agreed. I cannot tell you yet that we will be able to produce a unanimous report, but I

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can tell you that at the end of our deliberations we shall leave the Irish question better than we found it, because we shall be agreed on many things, and those who have to complete the task which we may have left unfinished will find that they have a much simpler work to do than we had."

He then alluded specially to the "problem of the completion of land purchase." "As far as my judgment goes, the work that has been done by the Sub-committee of the Convention upon that problem is very likely to produce a solution that the country will approve."

"I will ask you," he concluded, "to have patience with the Convention, and not to believe everything that you hear about it. It is perfectly true that we have often been on the rocks, and probably shall be on the rocks again, but there are tugs always lying by ready to pull us off. We shall get off somehow, and I myself am very hopeful of the ultimate result."

This statement was clearly meant as a warning to the public not to be unduly disappointed and disheartened if the Convention should fail in its primary purpose of securing "substantial agreement" on the main constitutional question. A month later (January 21) the sudden resignation of Sir Edward Carson from the War Cabinet revealed that a crisis was at hand. In his letter to the Prime Minister he said that he had never differed from his colleagues as to the conduct of the war, and that his only motive in resigning was to free the hands of the Cabinet on the one side and himself on the other in dealing with whatever situation might arise in Ireland as the result of the Convention. Finally, on January 24, in response to a letter from the Prime Minister stating that "before a decision was come to by the Convention on certain issues under discussion he and his colleagues in the Cabinet would be happy to confer with leading members representing different sections of the Convention should they desire to follow such a course," certain members were selected to meet the Prime Minister and his colleagues, and the Convention was adjourned.

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It is clear, therefore, at the moment of writing, that "substantial agreement" on the main issue has not yet been attained in the Convention and that a final effort to attain it is being made. That it will succeed is the anxious hope not only of the vast majority of the people of the British Commonwealth—alike in the United Kingdom and in the Dominions—but also of the Allies, and especially the United States.

London. February, 1918.

CANADA

I. THE GENERAL ELECTION

THE General Election resulted in a decisive majority for the Union Government. At most the Opposition under Sir Wilfrid Laurier will have 90 seats in the new Parliament. It is believed that when the votes of the soldiers are counted the Government will have a majority of 55 or 60. It is doubtful if more than one Liberal candidate will secure election in the four Western Provinces. Out of the 82 seats in Ontario all but seven or eight will be held by the Administration. In New Brunswick seven out of eleven and in Nova Scotia six out of sixteen constituencies will elect Unionists. In Quebec, however, only three Unionists were returned, while the four constituencies of Prince Edward Island elected Oppositionists.

The two French Ministers were defeated, but all the English-speaking members of the Government were returned. Those who contested seats in the English Provinces had large majorities. In North Toronto Sir George Foster had a majority of 14,607. Fewer than 3,000 votes were polled by his Liberal opponent, who, however, declared for conscription as strongly as the Minister. Sir Edward Kemp, in East Toronto, had 7,600 majority; Major-General Mewburn, in East Hamilton, over 3,000; Hon. N. W. Rowell, in Durham, nearly 5,000; Sir Thomas White, in Leeds, over 2,000; Hon. J. D. Reid, in Grenville, over 2,000; Hon. T. W. Crothers, in West Elgin, 1,000; Hon. Hugh Guthrie, in South

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Wellington, 4,500 ; Hon. T. A. Crerar, in Marquette, Manitoba, 6,000 ; Hon. Arthur Meighen, in Portage la Prairie, Manitoba, over 3,000 ; Hon. J. A. Calder, in Moose Jaw, Saskatchewan, nearly 5,000 ; Hon. Arthur Sifton, in Medicine Hat, Alberta, over 3,000 ; and Sir Robert Borden, in Kings, Nova Scotia, over 900. The Unionist majorities in Toronto and York aggregated 56,000. Centre. Winnipeg gave a Unionist majority of 13,340 and South Winnipeg of 12, 821. Regina gave a Unionist majority of 5,000, and there were Unionist majorities in Calgary, Vancouver and Victoria of 4,000. On the other hand, the Liberal majorities in Quebec were as large as the Unionist majorities in the English Provinces. In Quebec East, which Sir Wilfrid Laurier has represented for 40 years, he had a majority of 6,000, while in Champlain the Liberal majority was 7,300 ; in Hochelaga, 9,000 ; in Maissonneuve, where Hon. Rodolphe Lemieux was the candidate, 5,200 ; in Richmond and Wolfe, 4,795 ; in St. John and Iberville, 4,500 ; and in St. Denis, 8,400. It must also be remembered that in seventeen constituencies in the Province of Quebec the Liberal candidates were not opposed.

In all save five or six of the constituencies carried by the Opposition French and German voters were influential, if they did not constitute a majority of the electorate. If the female relatives of soldiers had not been enfranchised it is doubtful if a single Unionist would have been elected in the French Province. For the first time since Confederation French and English in Quebec divided according to racial affinity. It is not suggested that the English-speaking voters of Quebec were an absolute unit in support of the Government, but in a far greater degree than ever before they answered to the appeal which was so influential in the other Provinces. During the last two or three weeks of the contest Unionist candidates in the English Provinces denounced Quebec as hostile to the war, slack in recruiting, careless of the honour of Canada, and of doubtful loyalty

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to the Army, the Empire and the Allies. It was argued that if Sir Wilfrid Laurier succeeded in the election the Military Service Act would be repealed and the Army abandoned. Public feeling was inflamed by the failure of the Prime Minister to secure a hearing at Kitchener, which is the German stronghold in Ontario, and by the organised disturbances at Unionist meetings in Quebec. It is true that no French Unionist candidate could hold a public meeting. Even Hon. C. J. Doherty, Hon. C. C. Ballantyne and Sir Herbert Ames found it difficult to hold meetings in Montreal. The French Province was almost closed against the candidates of the Government, and inevitably there was anger and resentment throughout English-speaking Canada. There was, however, little if any disturbance at Liberal meetings, while Sir Wilfrid Laurier himself was treated with courtesy and respect. He never spoke to greater audiences than those which assembled to hear him at Winnipeg, Regina, Calgary and Vancouver. There were, too, manifestations of personal sympathy for the veteran Liberal leader which excited grave apprehension among Unionists. In all his speeches he opposed conscription, but declared that the necessary reinforcements could be secured under the voluntary system, and that if he succeeded in the election Canada would continue in the war with undiminished vigour and energy. But apparently the country did not believe that there could be any satisfactory revival of voluntary recruiting. Nor could the people be persuaded that a Government depending upon elements opposed to conscription and called to office as a protest against conscription would or could adopt and enforce the policy defeated in a general election if the judgment were reversed in a referendum. They felt that the creation of a Laurier Government would inevitably mean a weakening in the military effort of Canada. It is certain that all the elements hostile to the war supported the Opposition and that the attitude of Quebec Nationalists was wholly repugnant to the

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English-speaking population. No doubt there were extreme utterances by Unionist newspapers and Unionist candidates, but Sir Robert Borden himself refrained from any appeal to racial prejudices and refused, as he has done throughout all his public life, to have any personal quarrel with Quebec, although he has failed so signally to secure its sympathy or support. There is, therefore, no personal reason why the Prime Minister should not yet receive the confidence of Quebec. He has "titles manifold" to the consideration and respect of its people. Nor should co-operation in the future be difficult if, as Sir Wilfrid Laurier and Sir Lomer Gouin have declared, Quebec is willing to submit to the will of the country as expressed in the General Election. As to what is the will of the country Quebec can have no illusion. Even if no women had been enfranchised and no aliens disfranchised conscription would have been sanctioned and the Union Government sustained. No country ever registered its decision in more serious or more resolute temper. The election was not so much a contest between parties as a dedication of Canada to the men in the trenches, to the cause of the Empire, of freedom, and of civilisation. The words, perhaps, fall glibly from the tongue. They may have the flavour of rhetoric. But if ever a country spoke in the language of service and sacrifice Canada so spoke on December 17, and there is among the masses of the Canadian people a solemn pride that they were not altogether unworthy of those who have fallen and those who are fighting in a cause as righteous as any for which men have contended since time began.

Women were very active in the electoral contest. Many women spoke for Unionist candidates and a few for the Opposition. All over the Dominion the women voters were thoroughly organised. At least 80 per cent. of the women entitled to the franchise were registered. Few of these votes were not cast. Generally the women created their own organisation, canvassed the voters, and saw that

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the votes were polled. Of the 400,000 or 500,000 women enrolled at least 70 per cent. gave their ballots to Unionist candidates. The Protestant clergy were also very active. They spoke from many platforms and, contrary to the general custom in Canada, made direct appeals from the pulpit in behalf of the Government. As active were the leaders in the universities and in the professions, many of whom had never before appeared in a political contest. Few representative newspapers in the English Provinces gave their support to the Opposition. Toronto has six daily newspapers and all fought the battle of the Unionists. It would seem almost inconceivable to any student of Canadian political history that the *Globe* could oppose the official leaders of the Liberal party; for the *Globe* was the father of the party and for more than sixty years had been its most aggressive and powerful advocate. But no other journal was more steady in its advocacy of the draft or in its support of Unionist candidates in Ontario, of whom sixty-eight out of eighty-two had belonged to the Conservative party. In Hamilton, Kingston, Ottawa, and Brantford no daily newspaper adhered to the Opposition. In the whole province the *London Advertiser* was the only important or influential daily journal which supported Liberal candidates, while even the *Advertiser* was willing to have a hundred thousand men raised by conscription. In Nova Scotia and New Brunswick the chief Liberal journals also allied themselves with the Government, while in the West the *Edmonton Bulletin* stood almost alone among Liberal newspapers in its support of the Opposition. The three dailies of Winnipeg, the two dailies of Regina, two of the three Calgary newspapers and all the daily press of Vancouver and Victoria were vigorous advocates of the draft and the coalition. In Quebec the *Montreal Daily Star* and the *Montreal Gazette* gave energetic support to the Government, while *L'Événement* alone among French journals, despite the strength and fervour of local feeling for Sir Wilfrid Laurier main-

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tained its lifelong association with the Conservative party, fought the Liberal leader and the Nationalists, and at least did not oppose conscription. Practically Sir Wilfrid Laurier, who three or four months ago still had the zealous and united support of the powerful Liberal press of Canada, had to fight his battle in the English Provinces without newspaper support, with the Provincial leaders of the Liberal party either in the Union Cabinet or supporting it, and with his party organisation shattered by wholesale defections. But the Liberal leader faced all these adverse circumstances and influences with steady courage and had but few words of reproach for those who had fallen away from his standard. It was a vain fight, but the veteran warrior bore himself gallantly in the field of his defeat. Since polling day he has maintained a complete silence. It is believed that he will continue to lead the Opposition, but whether or not he will still oppose conscription is not disclosed.

Since the election there has been much violent writing in the French newspapers, and a Liberal member of the Quebec Legislature has given notice of a resolution in favour of the withdrawal of Quebec from Confederation. But even Mr. Bourassa regards separation as impracticable and unnecessary, while *La Presse*, the most widely circulated of French journals in Canada, uses moderate and conciliatory language, and urges submission to the Military Service Act. It says :

This is not the time when we should discuss the merits of the law. Each one of us will understand that the wisest way out is to conform to the law which the authorities judge to be best for the country. The sacrifice is a great one, of course, for families as well as individuals, but a courageous and worthy submission to the law of the land always brings its own reward. Let our men especially avoid being guided by the fear of persecution, as a sentiment of having accomplished a duty, painful though it may be, yet assigned to us by the leaders of the nation should be an encouragement to go ahead.

On the other hand, *Le Journal*, the French Liberal

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organ of Montreal, joins with Mr. Bourassa in insisting that no French Canadian shall enter the Government. It declares that a French Minister in such a Cabinet could only misrepresent Quebec. It goes beyond *Le Devoir* in advocating a boycott of the merchants and manufacturers of Ontario. *La Croix* fears that, now Sir Robert Borden has "the brutal force to do so," he will put his war programme into execution. It suggests that Quebec should exact separation from Upper Canada, enter into an alliance with the Atlantic Provinces, raise up a constitutional wall against Ontario, and thus escape from political association with immigrants "from the slums of London" and those who "from the other side of the Ottawa seek to destroy us like the hideous serpent which, after being warmed into life, raises its head against its benefactor." *L'Action Catholique*, of Quebec, while demanding equal authority for French-Canadians in the Confederation, opposes any movement for separation as impracticable and inimical to the true interests of Quebec. Mr. Bourassa himself declares that the situation is not desperate. He thinks the most turbulent elements of the Unionist party would drive the Government to measures of reprisals against Quebec, but is confident that Sir Robert Borden and his more responsible associates will resist rash and extreme counsels. He believes it is false to argue that the Government's majority is equivalent to a referendum in favour of conscription, but suggests that Sir Wilfrid Laurier and his lieutenants, in declaring throughout the country that Canada was in the war to the end, "left no issue to those Canadians who think it more patriotic to save Canada from ruin and suicide than to bleed it white without profit to the Allies."

Mr. Bourassa thinks that the Liberals who deserted Sir Wilfrid will be faithful to the coalition while the war lasts, after which the parties will be broken up again. He contends that all the concessions that Liberals have made to Imperialism, militarism and jingoism have done them no

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good and that "in the conflict between Imperialism and Nationalism the place of the French-Canadian is made, no matter what politicians of any party may say or want." As he looks at the future "the alignment of political forces will be on two principal questions: the settlement of our accounts with England and the readjustment of our own economic equilibrium." He thinks the ideal political destiny for Canada is independence, but he would accept "Empire partnership." He is careful to add that this must not be "such a partnership as the Imperialists favour." He looks for a socialist and anti-militarist Government in England after the war and a free discussion of the affairs of the Empire, with a reaction in Canada in which a leading part will be taken by the English-speaking Provinces.

In the meantime not much is said in English-speaking Canada to increase irritation in Quebec. It is confidently expected that the Government will deal fairly with the French Province, that the Military Service Act will be enforced in Quebec as elsewhere, and that such responsible statesmen as Sir Wilfrid Laurier and Sir Lomer Gouin will not encourage any agitation for secession. There is no disposition in the Government to persecute Quebec or subject its people to any treatment different from that which will be applied to the other Provinces. It can be reduced only by its own action to an inferior status in the Confederation. There is, however, a feeling in the English Provinces against new concessions to any racial or religious element which no Government could resist. Before **THE ROUND TABLE** appears again the situation will be more clearly revealed. There will be a degree of darkness until Sir Wilfrid Laurier speaks or Parliament assembles. Canada will be grateful and all the reserve of affection for the Liberal leader which lies in the hearts of the Canadian people will flower with fresh luxuriance if he will exhibit the resolute patriotism and fine magnanimity which have characterised the course and conduct of Mr. Asquith since he laid down the authority and responsi-

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bility of office. There are signs that the Unionist party will develop a permanent character and that early action will be taken to create an active Unionist organisation in the Province of Quebec.

II. THE CANADIAN UNIVERSITIES AND THE WAR

CANADA holds an honourable position in regard to higher education. Of her population of 8,000,000 there were before the war 14,000 students in attendance at the score of universities and colleges of the Dominion, in most of which women are registered on equal terms with men. Though the enrolment in some of these institutions is small, the leading universities with great professional faculties rank among the largest and best equipped in the Empire. Not the least hopeful promise for the future is to be discerned in the rapid and healthful growth of the recent provincial universities of Western Canada. The people of these Provinces have begun to take pride in their own institutions; and, though for some years to come parents who graduated in the East will continue to send their sons and daughters to their old university, the real needs of the West will soon be provided for at home. Already the Legislatures have made a good beginning in the financial aid that they have given to their own creations; but Canada has still a long way to go both in the East and the West before the universities are equipped as are those of the United States by reason of the liberality and foresight of its legislators.

The students of the Canadian colleges are drawn from all circles of the people and from all sections of the provinces; but, as in Scotland, the majority come from homes of modest comfort in the towns, villages, and countryside, and require to earn sufficient to put themselves through, or to supplement their allowance, though the rapid growth of wealth in the cities has been reflected in

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the larger numbers of undergraduates who are supported entirely by their parents. The universities are thoroughly representative of Canadian opinion, especially that of the energetic, solid, honest old stock, but in the West also that of the best immigration which has come in recent years from Europe or from the United States. Convictions which take strong hold of the students will soon react upon the country as a potent if silent influence. It was, therefore, of the utmost importance that from the earliest moment the meaning of the war was clearly set before, and quickly grasped by, the youth of the universities. Presented with clearness and earnestness the Allies' case made its appeal to their generous natures; and through them, as they came to a decision, it confronted their parents as a vital issue; and they, in their turn, have undoubtedly been influential in creating a right sentiment throughout the country. The effect of this academic awakening will undoubtedly be felt in the present political crisis; for the enlistment of the choicest of our students who come from the best homes in the Dominion will have moulded opinion in their neighbourhood, and will have determined many to exercise their vote in such a way as to enable the Dominion to continue in this struggle and to render effective the sacrifice which her youth have so nobly made. The universities have fulfilled their function worthily in this period, and have justified all that was confidently claimed for them throughout the years of peace, as being creators of character and sources of ideals for service on behalf of the public by whom they are supported. Never have divergent standards of education been so thoroughly tested as in the present war, on the one side the Teutonic view as to what the State must demand from the individual, and, on the other, the Anglo-Saxon and French conception that the primary aim in education is the formation to high purpose of what is universal and truly human in each person. Our type has stood the test well. It has produced intelligent people who can grasp

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quickly for themselves and take action upon the essential facts in a great crisis. Instead of education producing irresolution in those who have been trained to see both sides of a question, it has purified the eyes of the heart and given sight to the will. No section of the community has contributed a larger share of their best than the universities. The initial response of the students, their behaviour in the unprecedented horrors of actual warfare, their record as officers and the distinctions that have been won on the field, are a renewed testimony to the value of higher education as serving to give intelligent direction to the common human virtues of courage and self-sacrifice. One result of our experience is that our voluntary recruiting has made a disproportionately large draft upon the young men of the universities, more of whom might to the future advantage of the country have been kept until they were twenty years of age and had completed a portion of their academic training, so that on their return they might more easily resume their studies and the sooner be prepared for their civil duties. An interruption between the school and the university tends to become permanent. A careful system of official drafting, wisely using the splendid readiness of our youth to do their duty wherever they may be asked to serve, would have provided the country with better service both in the present and in the future.

In order to form a just estimate of the work done in the war by the universities and colleges of the Dominion it must be borne in mind that the long established institutions of the East have rolls of graduates from which large numbers have enlisted ; but the Western universities are of quite recent origin, except Manitoba, whose oldest graduates are now beyond the active military age. Out of the 180 graduates of Saskatchewan, for example, one of the newest universities, 76 have already enlisted. It is difficult to obtain complete information, but it may be safely affirmed that by August, 1917, 12,000 members of the universities,

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including graduates, members of the staffs, former students and undergraduates, had been on active service. Of these some 400 are members of the staffs and 6,000 are on the undergraduate register. There are nearly 800 names on the Rolls of the Fallen. What this means may be inferred from the estimate that of the 14,000 in attendance in all the Canadian universities before the war not more than 10,000 were men. As the war has proceeded the attendance upon the faculties has fallen so rapidly that several universities report that at the end of last session few physically fit men were left except those under age in the first year. As might be expected there is a marked difference between the faculties. Applied Science has suffered most. In one of the Eastern universities, for example, the attendance in this faculty in 1916-17 was smaller by 75 per cent. than at the opening of the war. In the same university the registration of men students in Arts fell by 65 per cent. The faculty of Medicine maintains a higher average, because after the first winter the military authorities were unwilling to recruit as combatants students from the last two years ; and, as the war has lengthened and in view of the urgent need that will arise if it is protracted, even less pressure is now being put upon the earlier years to enlist. So great has been the demand for medical officers that several universities held summer sessions in 1916 and 1917 in order that from the graduating years a supply of trained men for active service might be made available as soon as was consistent with efficiency.

One inconvenient result for the universities arising out of these activities is that they have found themselves involved in financial difficulties. In some instances the income from fees has been reduced by 50 per cent. with but a small corresponding reduction in the cost of maintenance, because the reduction in staff was relatively not great and the working expenses as made up of wages, materials for the upkeep of buildings, fuel and laboratory supplies have advanced greatly in price. Governing bodies, there-

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fore, have realised that the very wholeheartedness of their patriotic effort has presented them with urgent and serious financial problems. Probably no other institutions in the country have paid so dearly for their patriotism.

To enlarge somewhat more fully upon these activities. At the beginning of the war the Canadian Officers' Training Corps was organised in most of the universities under the leadership of members of the staffs who either had former military experience or who in August and September began to prepare themselves for instructing students as soon as possible after the opening of the session. Large numbers of undergraduates soon joined the corps and began to train on the university grounds without uniforms or rifles. Enlistment in the C.O.T.C. was quite voluntary, but the gravity of the situation and the extraordinary import of the issue were soon grasped by the students. Allowances as to academic standing were made to those who joined and performed the duties with success, except in the professional faculties in which the standards were maintained, though the required attendance was slightly lessened in some cases. By the spring of 1915 many from the C.O.T.C. had either enlisted or were in special training corps. The military authorities showed willingness to co-operate, and soldiers of wide experience advised that, as far as possible, the universities should be made sources of supply for officers, as the intelligence of their members could as a rule be thus used to the best advantage. This policy has resulted in the transfer of many officers from the C.O.T.C. to the Canadian units and also in a steady stream of efficient men who have been sent to take commissions in the British armies.

It soon became evident that the C.O.T.C. could not meet all the military requirements. Some students either did not wish or were not qualified for commissions at once, and would do their best work first in the ranks. To provide for these men an agreeable companionship two opportunities were offered, first in the East and later in the West. A

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university company was established to reinforce the famous Princess Patricia Regiment, the members being drawn from many of the universities and recruited on the McGill grounds at Montreal. Six such companies in all have been formed containing besides university men others who wished to be associated with them. The record of these companies has heightened the already fine reputation of one of the best-known Canadian regiments. Later, in the West, the 196th Western Regiment has been established to afford similar opportunities within a more uniform circle.

Infantry did not make a powerful appeal to many. Artillery became rapidly a more popular branch of the service, and batteries were formed within the universities, which were sent across as units or have served as permanent depots from which drafts are constantly made as they are ready. Other branches such as the cyclists, signallers and the flying corps have received their quota of students.

Most important services have been rendered by many members of the universities' staffs in the military schools of instruction—infantry, musketry, signalling. Accustomed to teaching, they have been able to apply to military affairs the aptitude which they have acquired by experience, and many who were unable to go on active service have fulfilled their patriotic duty in this way.

Through the faculties of Medicine the universities have played a large part, not only in training officers for units at the front, but in maintaining ambulances and hospitals manned by university teachers and graduates. Well managed though the Canadian hospitals have been on the whole during the war, the university hospitals have held a unique position, because their personnel was chosen with a special purpose, and consisting of fellow-graduates trained in the same methods of hospital practice and with the best scientific equipment, their staffs have been animated by a common loyalty to their university, and have been no less faithful to their country, for which they have made heavy personal sacrifices. Six Canadian university

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hospitals have been sent away. Of these three are large General Hospitals officered from the teaching staffs and graduates of McGill, Toronto and Queen's, and now stationed respectively at Boulogne, Salonica and Etaples. Stationary hospitals similarly officered have been sent by Dalhousie, Laval and the Western (London, Ont.) Universities and are stationed in France. The Medical College of Manitoba University has raised a Casualty Clearing Station and a Field Ambulance. These hospitals are maintained by the Dominion Government on the same basis as all other hospitals, but over and above this they have all been equipped and are handsomely supported by their friends and the graduates of the respective universities with extra supplies for the patients, instruments, scientific apparatus, motor-trucks and ambulances. Strong committees of ladies, working either independently or in conjunction with the Red Cross, keep the supplies up to the requirements.

On the field of this war medicine and surgery have won great victories through the many scientific investigators who are serving at the front. The laboratory has been carried to the armies. In it the war against death and disease is being waged amidst the welter of bloodshed ; its victories will be proclaimed when the din of battle has ceased and their beneficent results will gladden generations to come. At home also the laboratory has done its part, supplying sera and anti-toxins for typhoid, meningitis, tetanus, the manufacture of which has been conducted on a large scale in the Hygiene Laboratory of the University of Toronto.

Wounded or incapacitated soldiers are now returning in great numbers, and most of those who are still invalided are cared for in hospitals under the direction of the Dominion Hospitals Commission. In the case of those at Kingston, Queen's Medical Faculty has become responsible for their oversight in a building which the university has set apart for this purpose.

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Experiments of a new and interesting character in the way of the re-education of returned soldiers are being conducted also under the auspices of the Dominion Hospitals Commission at the University of Toronto. Psychological and medical experts give special treatment to soldiers who have lost their powers of speech or the control over their limbs. For each case apparatus is devised where necessary, and an individual instructor is assigned. Already gratifying results have been obtained, and more may be expected when the work which has been done in England and France has been studied by our specialists. Psychology and physiology combine in this work of restoration to provide a new chance and create a new hope in life for many a poor man who has thought himself nothing but a wreck cast upon the pity of a world that forgets all too soon.

The amount of work done in the other laboratories of Canada has been relatively much less than in England because so much less responsibility rests upon our Government for the conduct of the various phases of the war, and no advisory scientific committee for military or naval purposes has been created in Canada as was the case in Britain. Possibly more might have been attempted, but the research and experiment conducted in the Canadian laboratories for the Imperial authorities and for the manufacturers of munitions have been sufficient to show that in these laboratories the Dominion possesses potential resources which may be turned to great advantage in the future.

An occasional voice was raised in favour of closing the universities, but it was irresponsible and found little or no echo. University buildings, however, have been handed over to the military authorities for all sorts of purposes, for military instruction, as residences for military units, as hospitals; in fact, the universities have held themselves in readiness to inconvenience themselves and reduce their wants to the lowest possible requirements in order to put

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their space at the disposal of the military authorities. But the structure of laboratories and classrooms is such that the uses to which they can be put are few. Of the housings within the universities not the least interesting is that of the Royal Flying Corps. Large numbers of young Canadians have taken commissions in the Royal Naval Air Service and the Royal Flying Corps, in which they have done excellent work. This country offers an excellent field for this kind of recruiting, and in the winter of 1916-17 a cadet school of instruction, with further training facilities and mechanical equipment, was opened in Toronto by the Home authorities, and it bids fair to supply many officers for a branch for which the Canadian seems to have peculiar aptitude.

An unexpected but most welcome opportunity for the university man who has returned wounded and is unable to resume active service at the fighting line or is on long leave has been presented by reason of the entrance of the United States into the war. Repeating the experience of Canada and endeavouring to profit by what we have learned, their universities are coming to us for officers who may give their students practical training made effective by what they have gone through in real warfare. They hope to get from our officers not only instruction adapted to the new conditions brought about in this war, but also an enthusiasm which will be created in the mind of the undergraduate, naturally a hero-worshipper, by his intercourse with a college man who has won the right to honour. The widespread and urgent needs of the army of the United States leave few officers for purposes of instruction in the universities, which, therefore, have turned to Canada for help. Our military authorities have co-operated most heartily with the universities in releasing for this duty such returned officers as the universities may recommend as being suitable for this work. Already Yale, Columbia, and other American institutions have been supplied; but not nearly all the requests can be met,

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as the number of returned officers who after a short leave are unable to resume their duties at the front and are well enough to have the necessary qualifications is smaller than might be expected. Those, however, who have gone are rendering most valuable service in strengthening between the two countries bonds of friendship which we hope will become indissoluble through our united sacrifices for the preservation of similar ideals of civilisation.

In another respect the United States has made wise use of its universities. Two Boards have been appointed by Congress to disseminate right views of the war among the people and to educate them as to the progress of events. One is entitled the Committee on Public Information and the other the National Board for Historical Service. These committees are composed for the most part of members of the universities, who in this way are enabled to use their special gifts for the direct service of their country. In Canada no such effort has been organised by the Government, but patriotic leagues have been formed to provide speakers for recruiting purposes, who by explaining the meaning of the war to as wide circles as possible have stimulated enlistment and created interest in patriotic funds. This work has been very successful. In it members of the universities have taken a large part, and, in addition, the universities themselves have arranged courses of lectures on the historical, political, military, and economic aspects of the war which have been heard by large audiences in many centres.

The present war has given science a new prestige in the eyes of the man in the street. He sees that the instruments and explosives of modern artillery are the products of science, that the aeroplane and submarine are the creations of scientific genius. The terrible effectiveness of modern warfare as measured by its wreckage of human life and of the fruits of civilisation is to be laid to the account of science, though not the spirit which called

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these instruments into exercise. But by an almost insane paradox science has also snatched the wounded from the jaws of death with unprecedented skill and has warded off the disease which aforetime was as deadly as the bullet. Science itself puts its triumphs at the disposal equally of the man of war or of peace, of him who will use them for the destruction or for the restoration of mankind. It may be expected, therefore, that the military man, even in those countries which will never be "militaristic," will henceforth be a defender of the scientific institutions of his nation, and will advocate the laboratory as a defence against aggression.

Already the world is looking to the days of peace. When the war is won the devastated world will appeal both to the pity and to the energy of the survivors. If science has revolutionised war it will also revolutionise the arts of peace, and recover wealth for the impoverished. The economic waste must be repaired by a more rigid application of science to industry. This conviction has laid hold upon the leaders of the peoples who are now at war. Britain has called her scientists and her most capable and far-seeing men of business to serve upon committees and in bureaus for giving a lead to the industrial and commercial life of the new era, and fruitful results may be anticipated from the precision, thoroughness, imagination, and powers of organisation of these men. This movement has reached Canada, and the Dominion has its Advisory Council on Scientific and Industrial Research, which owes its existence in large measure to the fact that Sir George Foster took counsel with some of the scientific men in the universities, and, acting on their knowledge and associating with them more experienced industrial leaders, has provided for Canada an organisation similar to what exists in Britain. Co-operation with the universities will be essential for its success, and that co-operation has already begun. Recognising that the first step in progress is to secure well-trained investigators, the Council has established a series of

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research fellowships which are to be held at the universities under the direction of the heads of laboratories. Definite problems will be undertaken not only in the bureaux that may be established, but we may suppose also in the existing university laboratories. The Council may thus become a means of co-ordinating and economising the existing scientific opportunities of the country.

In view of this demonstration of the utility of Applied Science it will doubtless be less difficult to persuade the people that universities, which are directly and indirectly of such enormous potential value to the industrial and economic development of the country, should receive more generous financial support. And, of course, the rapid increase in the expenditure of a modern university is due to the equipment and maintenance of laboratories, especially those of Applied Science. Physical, electrical, and mechanical apparatus is very expensive. In the path of progress lie strewn costly instruments which are soon out of date. New plant involves large outlay; renewals cost heavily; even the supplying of the library with the current scientific periodicals of the world is no small item of expense. In science up-to-dateness is essential for development. This fact must be grasped by the intelligent people, for the future will face them with more insistent demands than ever from the universities. But the years of war have crippled the resources of the universities. Rigid economy has been enforced; expenses have been reduced to a minimum; stocks have run very low. It has been a sufficiently serious task to keep the universities going; impossible to provide equipment which would be adequate apart from war conditions. The scrupulous economy of these war years may leave the universities with a new problem. If these minimum war requirements are taken by the public as a possible standard of efficiency, the latter state of the universities will be much worse than the former. They will need the support of their friends to justify them, when, as is inevitable, the

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expenditures will rise rapidly after the war if even the former standards are to be recovered. But those standards must be surpassed if what has been said above about the application of science to industry should come to pass. There will be insistent demands for the enlargement of the departments for the purposes of research. Appeals will be made for the establishment of new departments as the industries come to see that the laboratories can be made to serve them, and electrical and chemical developments will grow apace. National self-sufficiency likewise will react upon education, and we shall be expected not to remain in dependence upon the intellectual hospitality of other countries for the training of our experts in the sciences and the arts.

An inevitable result of the war will be that we shall have in the next generation an insufficient supply of our own men to do the work of science for the country. The universities have given so prodigally of their best that we shall suffer a lack of highly equipped men. This loss is irreparable. But will not this loss be compensated for by the enduring possession that will be ours in the rebirth of idealism through the sacrifice of so much of the best? It is as creators of intellectual and moral idealism that universities fulfil their supreme purpose. The average man may be persuaded to approve the expenditure of vast sums on their scientific equipment because he has come to see that science prepares the road for material progress. But such as he can never in this spirit be the true supporters of a great university. The universities perform their noblest function and are of most enduring value to the community as the inspirers of idealism in youth, and in becoming homes for those who will keep brightly burning in the nation the zeal for knowledge and for the pursuit of truth, and who are on the alert to discover in their students those to whom they may in confidence commit the sacred torch. Idealism gives new life to universities; by its revival they have been rejuvenated through the

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centuries. This war, again, has called forth heroic idealism in the youth who saw the truth in the conflict and have been obedient to it even unto death ; and in this magnificent inspiration the universities of Canada will renew their strength.

III. EARL GREY IN CANADA

THERE was general mourning throughout Canada over the death of Lord Grey. It was as though one greatly cherished had been taken out of our own household. Few Canadian newspapers or periodicals failed to deplore his loss and bear tribute to his character. In all these utterances there were evidences of genuine affection. His great services to Canada were freely extolled, but there was something more personal and intimate than cold gratitude for faithful discharge of public duty. One feels that no other Governor-General of Canada so expressed the impulses and characteristics of the Canadian people. He had their natural optimism, their confident courage, their evangelical ardour, and their eager devotion to reforming and regenerative movements. It was felt that he understood the attitude of Canada towards the Mother Country, the aspiration for a full measure of self-government and the conception of an equal citizenship throughout the Empire. There was a feeling also that he was a democrat by instinct. When he had been a few years in Canada we forgot that he belonged to any class or group. He was neither weighted by aristocratic training and connections, nor regarded by Canadians as separated by any social caste from complete identification with their interests, their environment, and their outlook.

Earl Grey succeeded Lord Minto as Governor-General of Canada. He landed at Halifax on December 10, 1904, where he was met by Sir Wilfrid Laurier and other members of the Canadian Cabinet. On December 13 he reached

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Ottawa, where he was destined to remain for a longer period than any of his predecessors in the office of Governor-General. At Halifax, as at Ottawa, he was the object of official demonstrations, and in various public addresses he established a sympathetic relation with the Canadian people which was never afterwards disturbed. Twice his term of office was extended, once in recognition of his exceptional personal popularity and intimate identification with Canadian affairs and once in order to convenience the Duke of Connaught, who succeeded him. On October 11, 1911, Earl Grey sailed from Quebec. The retiring Governor-General was the central figure of many public demonstrations during the last weeks of his residence in Canada. To the end his personal popularity was unabated. He spoke with more freedom than had any previous occupant of Government House. His ardent temperament was not easily restrained by the limitations which surround the office of Governor-General. There was positive teaching in some of his addresses on the relations between Canada and the Empire, on the regulation of the liquor traffic, and on proportional representation. He was suspected of undue interest in the agitation to induce the Government to organise a Canadian navy or co-operate with the Imperial authorities in naval defence. He was denounced by the extreme nationalists of Quebec as conspiring to involve Canada in untimely Imperial projects. But such isolated criticism and attack made no impression upon the masses of the people. Even Quebec would not be excited. Indeed, it is doubtful if any other Governor-General since Confederation was more warmly regarded by the French people. They had a curious insight into his eager temperament, with perhaps an instinctive feeling that he was too frank for subterfuge and too open for intrigue.

This feeling was strengthened by the close friendship which existed between himself and Sir Wilfrid Laurier. There was some friction between the Liberal leader and

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Lord Minto over the slow action of Canada when war broke out in South Africa. It is true that there was no long breach nor any actual estrangement, but the country suspected an undercurrent of conflict between the Governor-General and his advisers. But between Earl Grey and the Liberal Prime Minister there was unbroken attachment and complete mutual confidence. A Governor-General who maintains such relations with the Prime Minister can even afford "indiscretions." Between Earl Grey and Sir Wilfrid Laurier, however, there was something far more intimate than an official relationship. The Prime Minister was never reluctant to assume responsibility for the utterances of the Governor-General. Possibly there was some feeling that a greater freedom of utterance for the King's representative was desirable. Ever since Confederation we had confined the Governor-General to vapid compliment and solemn platitude. In rashly disturbing this ancient tradition it was found that a generation had appeared in which its absolute observance was not required. This is not, perhaps, the time or place to speculate about the office of Governor-General. One feels that the position is unlikely to remain exactly what it has been in the past. One feels, too, that there must be a freer admission of Dominion representatives to the great Crown offices throughout the Empire and to responsible ambassadorial appointments. But that is for peace and the future.

Intimate as were the relations between Lord Grey and Sir Wilfrid Laurier, the Governor-General never gave offence to the Parliamentary Opposition. He had the warm personal regard of Mr. Borden and they co-operated heartily so far as co-operation was permissible or desirable. During the contest over continental reciprocity, in which the Liberal Government was defeated, his attitude never came under suspicion. If, as is now believed, he could not think that undesirable consequences would follow a ratification of the fiscal agreement with the United States,

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he scrupulously held his opinion in reserve, even in conversation with those with whom he had the closest personal intercourse. No doubt this was only as it should have been, but the fact suggests that he was incapable of any indiscretion that would involve the Governor-General in conflict with either political party.

Perhaps the most delicate undertaking to which Earl Grey committed himself was the acquisition of the Plains of Abraham for public purposes. He was influential among those who persuaded the Government to acquire the historic battlefield, and he conceived the memorable historical and military celebration at Quebec to signalise its reservation as a national park and playground. The chief features of the celebration were a series of historical tableaux, going back to the discovery of New France, reviving incidents in the French *régime*, illustrating events surrounding the British occupation, and marking outstanding epochs in Confederation, and with these a naval and military display of national and Imperial significance. The fêtes were peculiarly distinguished by the presence of the Prince of Wales, so soon to ascend the Throne, and by the remarkable popular enthusiasm which Lord Roberts excited. In attendance also were direct descendants of Wolfe and Montcalm, cherishing in happy amity the glories of their ancestors and rejoicing in all evidences of concord and co-operation between French and English in the Confederation. By his gracious bearing throughout the ceremonies the Prince of Wales left with Canadians of both races a legacy of pleasant memories for which alone the celebration had enduring value. But the event was also effective in stimulating a firmer Canadian and Imperial patriotism. For Lord Grey the whole celebration was a personal triumph since undoubtedly at the outset there was apprehension of misunderstanding and a revival of race feeling.

During his term of office Earl Grey made many official journeys throughout the country. He visited every con-

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siderable settlement in the Western Provinces, and was not less well acquainted with New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island. One of his most notable expeditions had Hudson Bay as its object. In that journey he was accompanied by a special correspondent of the London *Times* who now sits in the Imperial Parliament. It cannot be doubted that the Governor-General's report encouraged the Government to proceed with the construction of the Hudson Bay Railway. He visited Newfoundland ; but if he cherished any hope of reconciling the Island to union with Canada, there is reason to think he was convinced that the problem belonged to the future. He was often in New York and occasionally at Washington. Before American audiences some of his most vibrant and impressive addresses were delivered. Between Mr. Roosevelt and himself there was complete sympathy and understanding. Unquestionably he gave Mr. Bryce strong and effective support in finally adjusting various outstanding questions between Canada and the United States which for long years had been prolific causes of irritation and dispute ; while of even greater value was the creation of joint machinery to prevent such disputes in the future. Earl Grey was a frequent speaker before Canadian clubs. He was active in many benevolent and patriotic movements. He powerfully assisted Lady Grey in providing cottage hospitals in remote frontier settlements. Here, perhaps, it may be said that no woman who ever dispensed the hospitality of Government House is more honoured throughout Canada than Lady Grey. Never aggressive or showy, she became the object of a wealth of affection rooted in simple respect for her genuine and wholesome qualities. And it was among women that this regard was most freely and most strongly expressed. The Cadet Corps in the Public Schools commanded Earl Grey's special interest. He concerned himself with various Canadian sports and braved inevitable criticism in order to give his patronage to the Woodbine Race meeting at

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Toronto. It was said, indeed, that he was the most loyal Canadian in Canada and had at least as much knowledge as any Canadian of its soil, climate, industries, resources and people. This was the secret of his popularity. Imperialist though he was, he understood alike the most cherished aspirations and the dearest prejudices of the Canadian people and strove with no small success to harmonise national feeling with the sentiment of Imperial patriotism. If Canada was something to Earl Grey, he was much to Canada. The end came far too soon, but, as Matthew Arnold said of his friend,

—We retain

The memory of a man unspoiled.

Canada. January, 1918.

AUSTRALIA

I. THE GREAT STRIKE

THE last Australian article included a short account of the great strike which commenced in Sydney on August 2, 1917. As it was still proceeding at the time of writing, any attempt at a complete analysis of its causes and implications had to be deferred. The course of events may be briefly recalled in order to make clearer what follows. The strike began with the Amalgamated Society of Engineers and other ironworkers in the Government tramway and railway workshops in Sydney, ostensibly through the introduction by the Railway Commissioners of a card system of recording processes of work with a view to reducing them to terms of cost. Negotiations were brought to an abrupt end by a 24-hours' "ultimatum" from the men. A few days later the majority of the men in the railway and tramway departments came out, and during the next fortnight one union after another declared a sympathy strike, until most of the important industries were practically at a standstill. Railwaymen, wharf labourers, coal miners, seamen and firemen, gas workers, slaughtermen and butchers, and many minor unions entirely ceased work, while practically all others refused to handle goods declared "black," as having been previously handled by non-union labour or as being destined for Government use. Even transports and other war services came under the ban. Another evidence of the disturbed

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conditions was the large daily procession of strikers through the city. The public were greatly inconvenienced by very severe restriction of all services and supplies. The stoppage of industries with an inter-State sphere of action, together with existing unrest throughout the Commonwealth and the extension of the "black" doctrine, caused the strike to spread to all States. The Federal authorities, however, left the State Governments unfettered to grapple with the situation.

The Government of New South Wales showed great firmness and capacity in dealing with the strike during the ten weeks of its duration. The men demanded the withdrawal of the card system before resumption of work and immediate inquiry into all their grievances. The Government insisted upon an immediate return to work, promising that after three months an inquiry into the working of the card system would be held, and that if the report were unfavourable it would be abandoned. This being rejected, they treated the strike as an organised rebellion, both in its defiance of constitutional authority and its callous neglect of the pressing needs of war-time. A Volunteer Service bureau was set up in Sydney, at which were enrolled several thousands of men, mainly from the country districts, who were provided with camping grounds in various parts of the city. These volunteers, with the aid of the faithful remnant of the employees, maintained a limited and gradually improving railway and tramway service. Other industries in more or less degree were provided for. Even a limited coal supply was furnished by the efforts of amateur coal miners, Parliament having passed an emergency Act permitting the use of such labour. This prompt and determined action, supported by exceedingly strong public feeling and increasing distress among the families of the workers, forced the Unions Defence Committee to accept the Government's terms. The original strikers returned to work, and after some further negotiation the miners, wharf labourers, and

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finally the seamen also resumed. But when volunteers desired to remain in the work they had undertaken they were kept on, and consequently many of the strikers found themselves still out of their job.

The Government and the general public look upon the grievance against the card system as a mere excuse, covering a deliberate attempt on the part of the Labour leaders to bring about an industrial defeat of a Government over which they had failed to gain a victory at the polls. It is held that the industrial and political leaders of the Labour movement had long been awaiting an opportunity for an upheaval, and that this petty dispute seemed to them to provide the convenient occasion. It is very difficult to determine exactly the part played by the card system. The Government, like employers generally, were convinced of the existence of a policy of "slowing down" systematically pursued by the men, as well as of a good deal of loafing, and were determined to check it. To the rank and file, on the other hand, the card system appeared not the means for checking "slowing down," but a step towards the general introduction by employers of a pernicious system of "speeding up," facilitated by the presence of war conditions. Ignorant and exaggerated talk about the introduction of Taylorism from America, through the card system as a first instalment, was widely believed, though the Labour Press and many of the leaders must have known perfectly well that similar card systems were already in use in many industries in Australia and elsewhere without injury to the workers. There is, however, little doubt that psychological conditions were favourable to the reception of suspicion by the men. The attitude of the workers towards the social system leads them to attach to particular measures of the employers a significance which is out of all proportion to their actual content if they are considered by themselves. It must be confessed that some of the hostility to the card system was caused by frequent references on the part of the Railway Com-

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missioners to the excellences of railway administration in America; and there were complaints concerning the management of the men in the workshops. The existence of alarms and even of grievances may, however, have furnished the occasion rather than the cause of the strike. Undoubtedly some of the leaders of the men were spoiling for a fight. They believed they could wipe out their political defeat by industrial action through a strike. Yet it seems to be certain that the Unions Defence Committee did not wish the strike to spread indefinitely, and it was due to weak rather than over-bold leadership that the area of dispute was so greatly extended. There were contradictory indications. In some cases strikes were called by leaders without a ballot in defiance of union rules. On the other hand, the general body of railwaymen, the wharf labourers, and the slaughtermen came out against the advice of the Committee. The spread of the strike was due, in fact, much more to the industrial and political solidarity of the rank and file than to energetic leadership. Only a few unions, like the Millers' and the Painters', refused to come out, and even they made levies on behalf of the strikers. To what extent defective or unscrupulous leadership is responsible for this upheaval demands further discussion.

So far as the strike is traceable to the condition of labour organisation and the state of mind of the workers the situation of Australian politics must be held largely responsible. The workers and their leaders were genuinely surprised at their defeat in the New South Wales election, and this was speedily followed by defeat at the Commonwealth election. They themselves estimate that at least 25 per cent. of the Unionists voted for the newly formed National Party led by Messrs. Holman and Hughes, who had been recently expelled from the Labour Party for supporting Conscription. This political motive of the strike was frankly confessed by some of the leaders in New South Wales. It also influenced, in varying degrees, the

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minds of the most class conscious of the rank and file. Desire for revenge and recovery of power in the community was accompanied by an over-weening confidence in the minds of industrial extremists due to their belief in industrial as against political action and to finding themselves in control of the unions in place of the "political" leaders whom they had expelled. They found ready material in the irritated and suspicious minds of the Trade Unionists. At the same time, it is very easy to exaggerate the extent to which deliberate policy and systematic preparation were responsible for the strike. One fact that points to the conclusion that there was very little deliberate preparation is the exposure of the inefficiency of the leaders in the management of the strike. There were various factors in the situation unfavourable to such an enterprise. The volume of employment tended to shrink. Owing to the lack of shipping, large stocks of wool, wheat and meat had accumulated. Increased cost and scarcity of materials was affecting every industry. The financial position of the unions was very weak, owing to unemployment, loss of members, expenditure on the anti-Conscription campaign. The time of year was favourable for drawing workers from the country. The correct conclusion seems to be that the workers were quite ready for a strike, as were the leaders also, but nobody had thought out any plan of organisation; all trusted to solidarity, and for the rest the movement was allowed to progress by its own momentum. Evidence of the lack of control by the leaders is furnished by the contradictory applications of the "black" doctrine. Some ridiculous incidents occurred, the same commodity often changing from "black" to "white," and *vice versa*, several times in its precarious journey.

Another aggravation of the conditions which led to the strike was the award by Mr. Justice Edmunds, twelve months ago, under emergency legislation, of the demands of the coalminers after a big strike. It is widely felt that

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such an easy surrender gave the men an exaggerated sense of power, which largely accounts for the abounding confidence with which they entered upon the struggle. Another contributing cause was the rise in the cost of living, resulting, of course, in increased stringency in working-class homes. Moreover, the knowledge that while prices were high foodstuffs in abundance were available in Australia and large quantities of wheat had been destroyed by plagues of mice was a source of grave irritation amongst the workers. The fact that all the stores were under contract to the Imperial Government was no satisfaction to the less thoughtful. Whether enemy influence was stimulating trouble cannot be said with certainty. The increase in strikes in essential industries has certainly had a most serious effect upon Australia's share in the conduct of the war. Enemy agents could, of course, do effective propaganda without the workers being conscious of their presence. At the same time, it is regrettable that allegations of disloyalty and susceptibility to German bribery were brought against the strikers without qualification. No doubt a small percentage of them were actually disloyal. But it is just as certain that the vast majority, though careless and wanting in a sense of responsibility regarding the war, were quite innocent of any disloyalty or corruption. At the Commonwealth elections the combination of Liberals and of Labour men following Mr. Hughes adopted the term "Nationalist" for their designation, and came to be known as the "Win-the-War Party" among their supporters. The assumption of this title by one party, with its obvious implication, was in itself a source of irritation, though the Labour Press subsequently found some satisfaction in applying it derisively to the Ministry and its supporters. But the frequent claims to a monopoly of loyalty tended, naturally and most unfortunately, to give to professions of loyalty some party colour and to provoke counter professions. This tendency was aggravated intensely by the strike, the

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constant reference to the volunteers as loyalists and to the strikers as rebels and disloyalists being a gravely irritating factor in the situation. While any division of the political parties by such titles as Win-the-War and Pacifist respectively is false and misleading, it is true that to the present Labour Party naturally gravitate all the elements of disloyalty and pacifism, and the whole Party is lamentably wanting in a realisation of the injury done to the cause of the Allies by their irresponsible stoppages of industry. On the other hand, the public and the employers are far too apt to be impatient of all industrial unrest in war time, whatever the cause. There are two sides to the wage bargain. The worker's legitimate grievances must not be neglected. The employer does not need to strike to secure his redress. On the other hand, Australian institutions offer peculiar facilities for the investigation of grievances, and it is difficult to find any excuse for the men's deliberate breach of agreements entered into in the Arbitration Courts, or the thoughtless neglect of the higher interests of the country and humanity which such action implies.

In the system of Industrial Arbitration the conflict and overlapping of Commonwealth and State awards has been the cause of a great deal of unrest for some years. The ill-defined spheres of the two jurisdictions have made inevitable a great number of inequalities in the awards. Such conditions inevitably encourage strikes, as the workers in a particular trade find it extremely galling to be earning less under one award, while their fellow-workers are much more favourably situated under another award. The tendency of the Commonwealth Court to give higher awards than State Courts has caused a multiplication of industrial disputes, inter-State in scope, so as to provide the technical condition under which the workers may secure an adjudication by the Commonwealth Court. Further, many people contend that it is the general tendency of Industrial Courts, to unsettle the mind of

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the worker by offering him a constant inducement to agitate for increases in wages. War-time conditions have, of course, aggravated this general tendency to unrest.

The Australian Labour movement suffers from a very inferior newspaper Press. The tone and outlook of its principal periodicals are intensely prejudiced, while their actual misrepresentations in making out a case exceed those familiar enough in party journalism. The Labour Press generally wielded but little influence before the Conscription Referendum. With that came its opportunity, and it used it very successfully. The same bitter and aggressive spirit which marked its conduct of that campaign is still at work fomenting all causes of industrial unrest and political agitation. It seldom contains any articles marked by deep thought or of an educational character. It is devoted almost exclusively to operating upon the minds of the workers as an irritant, so as to intensify bitter class consciousness. The tone of its personal allusions is generally vindictive.

Another serious disadvantage of the working class is that all their important decisions and movements are conditioned by a state of mind which suffers from all the defects of mass action. Whereas all groups and associations in other ranks of society enjoy a better education and more opportunities for deliberation, and therefore are much more likely to arrive at well-considered decisions, the workers are practically always exposed to the ignorance, prejudice and hastiness of crowd psychology. In ordinary times they suffer from the apathy of the mass, and in times of excitement from its irresponsibility and fanaticism. Thus the organised workers are generally at the mercy of the agitator and the junta.

Though the immediate causes of the outbreak reveal much that is fundamental to the analysis of industrial and political conditions in Australia, there are still more important factors of a general character, an understanding of which is essential to the student of Australian sociology.

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In a previous article in *THE ROUND TABLE* (December 1916, p. 165) occurs this passage :

The continued existence and violence of industrial disputes has proved puzzling to many observers, even when resident in the Commonwealth. They point to the evident fact that the conditions of labour, including wages, are far more favourable to the worker in Australia than to his fellows in any other part of the world. The standard of comfort is admittedly high, the power of Unionism very great, all of which advantages are enhanced by excellent climatic conditions. Why, then, it is asked, should the workers be unsatisfied ?

It was further pointed out that periods of prosperity and power are more marked by unrest than periods of stringency and unemployment. The Australian workers have enjoyed a long period of political power. The lavish expenditure of public money by Labour Governments, the want of understanding of large interests and public policies and of social responsibility, natural in the circumstances of their class, have caused a feeling amongst the workers that government is easy, and that the most sweeping changes can be effected with little thought. To these causes also may be attributed that excessive belief in equality common to advanced democracies. The Australian worker is as firm in his belief that the social millennium is easy of accomplishment as in his belief in his own worth and in his right to the economic benefits enjoyed by the more fortunate or more able of his fellow-citizens.

This also accounts in part for the intense class hostility which so keen an observer as Lord Bryce remarked as being possibly more acute in Australia than in any other place in the world. Comparatively good conditions have not prevented the Labour movement from adopting the Marxian theory of the class war. There is within the movement a large and growing minority of irreconcilables whose influence has recently increased to an extraordinary degree. Large quantities of syndicalist literature have been imported from America. A well-known trade

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union secretary sent to America some time ago for literature. He received a ton of I.W.W. pamphlets, and declares that they completely destroyed his authority with his union. The war has greatly increased the influence of this revolutionary school of thought, for it provides numerous apparent proofs of the truth of the doctrine of the class war. The trial and conviction of twelve members of the I.W.W. in Sydney for sedition and arson aroused a remarkable degree of sympathy amongst unionists entirely opposed to the methods of the I.W.W.; it was enough for them that "these men suffered for their class," a significant indication of the strength of the idea of class solidarity. It is not enough to say that there is no room for the philosophy of violence in a country like Australia, where the worker enjoys good conditions and frequently holds the reins of government. His more fortunate situation whets his appetite, without providing him with the new social system on which he believes. What the ordinary member of the middle class fails to understand is that the doctrine of the class war is sufficiently close to the facts of modern industrialism to offer a plausible explanation of all its abuses in one simple generalisation—capitalism. The Australian worker's class consciousness is deep enough to lead him to see the force of the Marxian call to world-wide labour solidarity. Certainly it is grotesque for the imported revolutionary to preach the same *jehad* in Australia as in America or England; but once the worker has become fully class conscious nothing is easier than to persuade him that the capitalist system is the same all the world over, and that in spite of all the boasted reforms of Australia he is still a wage-slave; there are degrees of slavery, but it is slavery still. Thus Marxianism appeals to the ordinary worker through its simple theory of exploitation, and to the more intellectual through its internationalism and its abstract economic reasoning. It is curious that this growth of a class-consciousness, based on internationalism, exists together with an extraordinary ignorance

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of the world outside Australia. And yet the one assists the other. In Australia there are few of those many influences which modify extremes and exaggerations of opinion in England. There is no cultured and leisured contribution to the stream of thought and art. There is no complex system of civilisation to give variety and distraction to our society. Issues are too clear cut. The position and outlook of Australia are exceedingly insular and her domestic life very parochial. Everybody's material interests are so obviously involved with those of everybody else; we live too close together. Again, there is no recognition of such striking distinctions between the ability of the best intellects and that of the average worker to give pause to the assumption of equality. Especially is this true in the political sphere, where the continued lack of men of great distinction is remarkable in all parties. The Labour Party has suffered in particular by the fact that the split took away its ablest men in State and Federal politics and among the leaders of official Labour to-day in Australia there are none who can approach in capacity of mind and force of personality the leaders of the British Labour Party. Further, the Australian worker has an even narrower conception of the State than the average Marxian. Not only is his outlook narrowly industrial, but he uses political action as merely another form of industrial action. He neither knows nor cares that politics is wider than economics. It is to him but one part of the great fight against capitalism. If high ability coupled with the statesman's breadth of view is absent from Labour counsels, there has grown up in the last few years a chicane that will seize every tactical advantage and opportunity in a way that the most astute politician of the old parties might envy. This tendency has been fostered by the arbitration system, which turns Union officials and men into special pleaders, keenly on the look-out for the smallest chance to make a point in their favour.

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The social and economic theory of the Australian Liberal has all the defects of a commercial and individualist tradition. His natural tendency to repudiate responsibility for the condition of life of the workers has been intensified rather than mitigated by the paternal intervention of the State on the worker's behalf. If the employer admits generally the right of the worker to good conditions, he so frequently opposes any particular efforts to maintain or better those conditions as to induce the belief that he still regards the worker merely as an item in the cost of production and not as a citizen exercising his social function. The striker is a rebel, to be dealt with by the strong hand. Of the worker's psychology the majority of employers know practically nothing. Such employers fail entirely to understand that the most deep-seated cause of industrial unrest throughout the world is the feeling of the worker that his personality has no opportunity in the present industrial system of expressing itself, and his self-respect is deeply injured by his being treated as an inanimate tool. This feeling is even stronger than the sense of economic insecurity. Though such insecurity is by no means so prevalent in Australia as elsewhere, it is within the experience of practically all Australian workers. But far more powerful is the determination of the worker to be satisfied with nothing less than a full human share in the control of industry as in the control of government, and the growing belief that this will not be realised without fundamental social changes—a belief that is greatly reinforced by the worker's exaggerated interpretation of equality. Always opposed to profit-making in any form, he is able to point to the increased prosperity of many capitalists as a direct result of the war. Though he generalises with gross unfairness over the whole field of capitalist enterprise, it is not surprising that he exhibits intense impatience when talk of loyalty and sacrifice differentiates against his class, which has suffered like others in the war. A further aggravation

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of class division during the war is due to resentment in Labour circles at the number of prosecutions of workers for industrial offences in the last few months, which to them have a decided colouring of political bias. Under the Unlawful Associations Act, many members of the I.W.W. have been imprisoned for six months ; three of the strike leaders were prosecuted for conspiracy, though they were not convicted owing to a disagreement of the jury. However divided may be the rank and file upon economic doctrine, they are absolutely at one in regarding these cases as demonstrations of class bias. Furthermore, the use of the censorship to examine the correspondence of the Trades Hall during the strike greatly increased the belief in a political and capitalist conspiracy against Unionism.

Australian Governments are alive to some of the dangers exposed by recent events. At the moment of writing a Conference is being held of representatives of the various States and the Commonwealth for the purpose of dealing with the overlapping of industrial awards. Another measure of amelioration foreshadowed by the Government of New South Wales is a scheme of Unemployment Insurance. It is unlikely, however, that for reasons already indicated, any mere improvement in governmental machinery or in wages and conditions is likely to go to the root of the industrial trouble. Even the system of industrial arbitration, though its potentialities are by no means exhausted, tends to stereotype the cleavage between employers and workers. The workers are certain to go on organising towards the One Big Union. The employers show an equal propensity towards closer union. Many employers have suffered so grievously in recent years from the operations of the Unions that there may be some temptation in the recent success over the workers to use the occasion for breaking the power of Unionism. But there could be no greater curse to Australia than any such deliberate fomentation of the already bitter antagonism between the two sides. There could be no other result

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than a large increase of I.W.W. influence, to be followed by something in the nature of a social revolution. The prevailing narrowness of outlook and want of social responsibility can be reformed, partly by such movements as the Workers' Educational Association, but chiefly by means designed to carry the worker through his apprenticeship in playing his part in the control of industry. There are so many State enterprises in Australia that the Governments are offered an excellent opportunity for experimenting with some of the measures proposed by the Reconstruction Committee appointed by the Prime Minister in England. It would be comparatively easy to draw the workers into a share of the control of the purely Labour side of Government enterprises, delaying their introduction to any purely business aspect of industry until such an extension should be proved to be safe and practicable. It might be possible also to base upon the Arbitration Courts a similar system of co-operation between employers, workers, and the State for the management of industry. The greatest barrier to any such constructive scheme as that of industrial parliaments outlined in the Whitley Report is the hostility between the two classes. But unless some positive effort is to be made to set up a workable scheme of co-operation more extensive than the experiments hitherto made the outlook for Australia is dark indeed. Some words written in *THE ROUND TABLE* of June, 1916, are even more true of the Australian than of the English worker :

The unrest in the industrial world to-day has not its roots solely in poverty and want. There is something deeper still at work. The wage-earners are filled with a vague but profound sentiment that the industrial system, as it is now, denies to them the liberties, opportunities and responsibilities of free men.

The problem of industry is to satisfy the demands of human liberty, while inculcating the spirit of true social discipline.

The Reinforcements Referendum

II. THE REINFORCEMENTS REFERENDUM

ON December 20 a vote will be taken by Executive Act under the War Precautions Act, 1914-1916, to obtain the answer of the men and women of Australia to the following question: "Are you in favour of the proposal of the Commonwealth Government for reinforcing the A.I.F. oversea?" The proposal is set forth in a Proclamation of November 16, and the gist of it is that voluntary enlistment is to continue, but that to the extent to which this fails in any month to supply 7,000 men, or such less number as may be actually required, compulsory reinforcements are to be called up by ballot from among single men between the ages of 20 and 44 years. As on the last occasion the vote will have no legal effect, but will give an expression of opinion which will justify the Government, in the event of an affirmative answer, in passing the necessary legislation.

In order to give a clear idea of the position it is necessary to review very briefly what has happened since the Conscription Referendum on October 28, 1916. The vote on that day—"Yes" 1,087,557, "No" 1,160,033; majority against conscription 72,476—was disheartening. Those who believed that it was the plain duty and interest of Australia to assist the Empire to the utmost in the prosecution of the war felt that in the face of the adverse decision of the people the only practical course was to make greater efforts to secure the necessary men by voluntary recruiting, though they had a more than uneasy feeling that this method would be inadequate. The National Government, which was formed by a coalition of the Liberals under Mr. Cook with Mr. Hughes and the minority of his former Labour supporters, went to the country on a "win-the-war" policy, and was returned to office on May 5 last, with a strong majority in both the Senate and

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the House of Representatives, but the size of this majority was possibly due, in some measure at least, to the abandonment of conscription. The Government gave a definite pledge in the following terms :

The Government will not enforce or attempt to enforce conscription, either by regulation or statute, during the life of the forthcoming Parliament. If, however, national safety demands it, the question will again be referred to the people. That is the policy of the Government on this question.

On a later occasion the words used were :

We shall put it only if the tide of battle, which now flows strongly for the Allies, turns against them ; in that case we shall put it before the people.

At the same time the Government owed the bulk of its support to an undertaking that, subject to its pledge, it would subordinate every other interest to the war. In the circumstances there was a general feeling among its supporters that the Government was entitled to a reasonable time in which to fulfil its "win-the-war" promises. Those who believed in conscription loyally assisted the Government in a further and more systematic attempt to obtain volunteers, while many of those who during the Referendum Campaign professed their faith in voluntary recruiting remained coldly and unmistakably aloof.

With the Russian *débâcle* many individuals, and notably Sir William Irvine, who had refused to be a party to the Government's pledge, thought that the conditions indicated in the pledge had arisen, and that the end of the period during which the Government might claim to be testing the possibilities of the voluntary system was already in sight. There was a good deal of private discussion, in several at least of the States, by groups of men who thought that the need for conscription was daily becoming more

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obvious. These groups were composed of men who had no close association with politics or political parties, and were in fact rather distrustful of politicians in general. They realised something of the gravity of the European situation, and were anxious to stir public feeling in such a way that the politicians would be bound to reopen the question of conscription. In New South Wales, which was responsible for the "No" majority, a movement for a petition to the Government to submit the question to another referendum was started, but practically the whole of the New South Wales conscriptionists were strongly of opinion that the proper course was to have a dissolution of the House of Representatives and a general election in which the Government would ask the electors for a release from the pledge. Sir William Irvine, who had already spoken in Victoria on the necessity for conscription, came to New South Wales on the invitation of the Committee which was launching the petition, with the idea, no doubt, of helping the movement for conscription, but without any intention of advocating a referendum as the right solution of the difficulty in which the Government had been placed by its pledge. A few days before he spoke in Sydney the disaster in Italy had become known, and had aroused people to a sense of the real gravity of the situation. Sir William Irvine's speeches at Sydney and Brisbane at once evoked widespread and strong approval. At Brisbane he crystallised the position by asking whether it was too much to ask members of Parliament to risk their seats when our soldiers were risking their lives. It was becoming plainer every day that the conscriptionists wanted a prompt and courageous decision. On October 31 Senator Pearce Minister for Defence, had expressed a wish that the large meeting, which he was then addressing in the Sydney Town Hall, might have been postponed for a fortnight, because in a fortnight's time the Federal Cabinet, with a full knowledge of the recruiting figures and of the requirements in the matter of reinforcements for those at the

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front, would have come to a decision as to its policy for the future. On November 7, at a hurriedly convened meeting of the Cabinet, it was decided to take a referendum. This decision was a profound disappointment to a very large number of people throughout the Commonwealth, but especially perhaps in New South Wales, where it was felt that the right course and the course most likely to be successful was an appeal to the people at a general election to choose between the National Government with conscription and the Opposition without conscription. Even after the announcement of the Government's decision to take a referendum efforts were made to induce the Government to declare for a dissolution. Failing this, the Government was strongly urged to stake its existence on the result of the referendum. Eventually, and apparently at the last moment, the Government made up its mind to say to the people, through Mr. Hughes at Bendigo on November 12, that it could not and would not attempt to govern without the powers for which it asked. By powers, of course, it meant an answer of the people that would tell the Government that its pledge against conscription was no longer binding, and so leave it free to give effect to its proposal to introduce conscription.

Why the Government did not decide in favour of a dissolution is not quite clear, but in a general way it might be said that the explanation is to be found in the history of political events in Australia since Mr. Hughes's return shortly before the last referendum. Probably some Government supporters in the House of Representatives felt that, though the Government might come back with a majority, there would be some casualties by the way, and that they ran a considerable risk of being included in the list. Even those whose seats were safe enough probably had no inclination to face an election so soon after the contest of May 5. Members of the Senate who had also given the pledge probably stressed the view that the pledge con-

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templated that the question of conscription should be submitted to the people by way of a referendum and not by way of a general election, and that, even if the Government were returned to power after a dissolution of the House of Representatives, that would not free the pledged Senators.

While it seems impossible to contend that the Government has taken the best course, it is a matter for considerable satisfaction that it has taken the next best course by staking its existence on the result of the referendum. That decision was at least some evidence that the Government was sincere in its undertaking to subordinate party interests to the war and that it was genuinely convinced of the necessity for conscription. The increased gravity of the military situation, the clearly demonstrated inadequacy of voluntary enlistment, the limited character of the Government's proposal, the definite exemption of rural and other essential industries, the elimination of the German vote and the decision of the Government not to remain in office if its proposal is rejected make the prospect of success better than on the last referendum. The present campaign, however, has to contend with a bitterer and more vigorous opposition from the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Melbourne (Dr. Mannix), though many leading Catholics have publicly and emphatically dissociated themselves with his sentiments and have strongly deprecated his effort to apply Sinn Feinism to Australian conditions and his doctrine of "Australia first—the Empire second." An unfortunate conflict has also arisen between the Commonwealth and the State of Queensland with respect to the publication of anti-conscription matter in the Queensland *Hansard*, but with the information at present available it is impossible to offer any definite opinion as to the merits of this conflict or as to its effect upon the referendum, though it may not improbably have a most serious influence. Any discussion of this, however, must be left to a later article. Persons of enemy origin,

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probably exceeding 100,000, will not be entitled to vote on this occasion.

Australia. December, 1917.

POSTSCRIPT.—The result of the referendum was as follows :

" Yes "	1,013,361
" No "	1,173,256
" No " majority	159,895

SOUTH AFRICA

ALBERT, EARL GREY, AND LEANDER STARR JAMESON.

THEIR WORK IN RHODESIA.

DEATH has within the last few months robbed the Empire of two of its most splendid and striking personalities. Both men did the State great service in great positions. The life of each in its different way has been an inspiration to all to whom the idea of the British Empire conveys no vulgar notion of mere aggrandisement, but a call to strenuous and self-sacrificing labour for mankind. The two men were close and lifelong friends ; both spirits were finely touched to the fine issues of their lives by the genius of Rhodes ; and though both men strove and succeeded in a larger sphere, it was in Rhodesia that the real careers of both men began. It is above all in connection with Rhodesia that the work of Jameson in particular deserves to be held in everlasting remembrance.

Grey, who had previously been known as a popular and charming member of Parliament with a generous enthusiasm for projects of social reform, was travelling in Mashonaland when he succeeded to his earldom in 1894. He had been drawn there by the friendship he had formed with Rhodes in London, and had already, if unconsciously, been a benefactor to the country by directing to it the footsteps of his gallant cousin, George Grey, one of the noblest of Rhodesian pioneers.

At the end of 1895 came the great catastrophe in Rhodes's career when the fiasco of the Jameson Raid appeared to

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have overthrown him irretrievably and had cast all the affairs of the young territory of Rhodesia into confusion. Grey was appointed to be Administrator of Rhodesia in succession to Jameson, in February 1896, at a time of unexampled difficulty. Many of the settlers were impoverished and discontented. The rinderpest swept through the country, destroying the cattle in which all the wealth of the natives consisted. The Chartered Company's forces were depleted and the Matebele rose in revolt in March. The crisis was so serious that no man of less calibre than Rhodes himself could have controlled it, and it was by the personal ascendancy of Rhodes over his fellow-men, white and black, of Rhodes at the very ebb of his fortunes and politically ruined as he appeared to be, that the native rising was settled rather than suppressed, and the situation saved. Had Grey been other than he was, his official position as Administrator might well have made his relations with Rhodes impossible, but Grey's generous nature was marred by no taint of self-seeking, of jealousy or meanness. He was a brave and adventurous man; his personality was one of the most vivid in the world, but it never craved the limelight. He possessed, indeed, to an extraordinary degree the true Christian virtue of humility and the genius for friendship, and his letters at this time are full of his admiration for the great achievement of his friend.

For the rest his kindly accessibility and ready sympathy endeared him to all sorts and conditions of men. He threw himself with all the keen uncritical enthusiasm that was characteristic of him into schemes for the advancement of the native population; and when he retired from his post in 1897 he carried with him universal affection and an experience of administrative problems that must have stood him in good stead in the higher offices which he was afterwards called upon to fill. On his return to England he joined the Board of the Chartered Company, and though he resigned his seat upon it when he went to

Albert, Earl Grey, and Leander Starr Jameson
Canada as Governor General in 1904, his love for Rhodesia and the keenness of his interest in its affairs never failed to the day of his death. He had been along with Jameson appointed to be one of the Trustees under Rhodes's famous Will, and his connection with Rhodesia was happily renewed towards the end of his life when he went out again to South Africa in 1912 to dedicate the noble memorial to Rhodes on the slopes of Table Mountain.

To attempt to do justice to Jameson's work in Rhodesia is an impossible task. A mere catalogue of his work in and for the territory would fill a volume. To convey to men who did not know him any idea of his indomitable spirit and amazing courage would tax the powers of a great historian or a great poet. He has been described as the follower of Rhodes, and truly, since it was from Rhodes that his inspiration was drawn, and he himself spoke of Rhodes as the "master mind." Yet the follower may well have been the equal of the leader; indeed as between the two men it is somewhat idle to speculate whether either was before or after the other, for each was alike indispensable for the work which as partners they had to do. But for Rhodes's foresight and imagination, but for his persuasive power over others, his schemes for securing for the British Empire the great territories lying to the north of the Transvaal would never have taken practical shape; and the outbreak of war in August, 1914, would have revealed as an instant menace the peril which General Smuts's recent speeches have pointed out of a great continuous belt of German-African territory, from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean, with a vast native population armed, drilled and trained under German leaders for aggression and conquest. Yet if the creative brain was Rhodes's, the hand and the sword were Jameson's, and but for Jameson's splendid audacity, his boundless energy and tenacity of purpose, and his irresistible personal charm, Rhodes's schemes could not have been translated into action.

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The years of Jameson's life from 1888 to 1896 are filled with a whole series of Odysseys of adventure, of high endeavour and great achievement. The series ends in gloom and disaster, but the unconquerable mind of the man, fortified with a new patience born of adversity, rises superior to all the blows of fortune ; and for fifteen years after the death of Rhodes the record of his life is one of strenuous and successful service of the State in the spheres of politics and administration, ending happily amid the cordial admiration of his countrymen alike in England and in South Africa.

It was in 1888 that Lobengula, the paramount chief of the Matabele, ruling over the whole country now known as Southern Rhodesia, granted the original concession over the minerals in his territory which was the basis of the formation of the Chartered Company ; but to grant the concession was one thing, to allow the concessionaires to avail themselves of it in the face of the opposition of indunas and warriors fiercely jealous of the advent of the white man was another. Between October 1888 and May 1890 Jameson, throwing up without a thought his lucrative medical practice at Kimberley, made no less than three perilous journeys as Rhodes's emissary to Lobengula's kraal at Bulawayo with the object of inducing him to allow the pioneer column to enter the eastern portion of the chief's territory, known as Mashonaland. His courage and charm succeeded in the face of every danger and every obstacle, and in 1890 he accompanied the pioneer column on their hazardous but, as it turned out, unmolested march from Macloutsie, on the borders of Matabeleland, to Salisbury, now the capital of Southern Rhodesia. Arrived in Mashonaland, Jameson set himself to find a road of communication, through country then wholly unexplored, with the port of Beira ; and no sooner was this adventure accomplished than he started off on another with the object, successfully achieved, of obtaining a mineral concession from a chief named Gungunhana, in the wilds of Portu-

Albert, Earl Grey, and Leander Starr Jameson
guese East Africa. This last adventure led to Jameson
being taken by the Portuguese to Delagoa Bay under
arrest ; and both adventures involved a degree of physical
hardship and suffering hardly to be imagined in these days
when, thanks to Jameson and the pioneers, a man may
travel to Beira in all the luxury of a railway sleeping saloon.
Jameson, whose camp on one occasion had been burnt
through an accident, had had to row nearly a hundred
miles half naked on a tropical river ; he had been alter-
nately scorched by the sun and soaked by the rain ; he had
been starved and shaken through and through with fever ;
his health had been permanently injured, but not his
gaiety or his spirit. He returned cheerful, kindly, and
uncomplaining to all the difficulties of administration in
a territory which lacked every resource of civilisation,
where the little band of pioneers were growing discontented
and dispirited under their hardships, but where never-
theless his first duty was ruthlessly to cut down expenditure.
No man with a personality less magnetic than "the
Doctor's," whose very vituperation (freely enough dis-
pensed) was felt by its victims as a kind of endearment,
could have carried such a burden. But another and yet
greater adventure awaited him.

The juxtaposition of what was in process of becoming a
settled white community with the armed and organized
savagery of the Matabele was not permanently possible ;
and in 1893 sundry outrages committed by them on
Mashona servants of the white men at Fort Victoria
convinced Jameson that the military power of the Matabele
must be broken. In October a Matabele attack on a patrol
of Bechuanaland Border Police (an Imperial force) brought
matters to a head, and Jameson with some 700 European
volunteers and police, under the military command of
Major Forbes, started out to attack the legions of Loben-
gula. For the hundredth time he dared and achieved the
impossible. The Matabele were twice beaten at the
Bambesi and Shangani rivers. Lobengula evacuated his

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head kraal at Bulawayo and fled away to die in the bush ; and with the completion of the conquest of Matabeleland the new state of Rhodesia was established on foundations which none of the storms that have since swept South Africa have been strong enough to shake.

Jameson seemed now at the zenith of a brilliant career. To the adventurous spirit of a Cortes and the prowess of a paladin he had shown that he joined the skill of a successful civil administrator ; and cordially as he detested all pomps and flatteries he could not wholly escape these public tributes of admiration which his countrymen crowded round him to bestow.

And then, as it were in a moment, his whole career lay in ruins, and he became an outlaw, a prisoner and a convict. The story of the events of the Raid has been told many times, and this is not the place to tell it again. That it was a blunder and a wrong no man insisted more sternly than Jameson himself. That it required the fullest expiation no man realised half so clearly as he who schooled himself to pay it in such abundant measure. That he was impelled by no mean or sordid motive, and that his conduct throughout was marred by not an instant's failure of courage or personal dignity, requires no demonstration now. He erred greatly, failed and fell ; but when a man's whole life has been an example of obedience to Danton's maxim,

“ De l'audace, et encore de l'audace, toujours de l'audace,”

posterity may well pardon him, as his contemporaries have done, if one stroke of audacity failed and if his consummate self-confidence once led him into transgression.

Released from prison in 1897, broken in health but not in spirit, he was back again in South Africa in the days of the war in 1899. Nearly dead from enteric fever in Ladysmith, he recovered slowly at Groote Schuur, Rhodes's house at Cape Town, and set himself, by patient political service, to make amends for the past. Men's minds were

Albert, Earl Grey, and Leander Starr Jameson aflame with the passions let loose by the South African War, and the Dutch, not quite unnaturally, looked upon him as the incarnation of all that they hated. Obloquy was showered upon him, but he sat silent, and in 1902 he suffered the heaviest blow of all when Rhodes's death parted him from his lifelong friend and left him to stand alone. In that year he broke his long silence in the Cape Parliament, and, almost as it were at a bound, found himself at the head of the British party. In 1904 he stood in the House as Prime Minister, an astonishing example of how a man's unconquerable spirit may meet and recover from overwhelming disaster. During his tenure of office his ready sympathies, his gay wit and personal charm, which had to be felt to be believed, softened the fiercest animosities ; and one of the greatest of his services to South Africa and the Empire was rendered in the part he played in bringing about the South African Union.

It fell to him to address to Lord Selborne as High Commissioner the invitation that he should review the then existing situation in his now celebrated Memorandum from which the Union Movement may be said to have taken its formal start. He was out of office before the Union Convention met at Durban in October, 1908, but the part which he played at that Convention, as leader of the Opposition in the Cape Parliament, was none the less vital on that account. The whole force of his personality and of his influence was directed towards accommodation and compromise between conflicting views and to the allaying of racial antagonisms. He showed, as he had done throughout his parliamentary career at the Cape the friendliest sympathy with all the reasonable aspirations and a kindly understanding even of the prejudices of the Dutch South Africans ; and by common consent he shares with General Botha the chief credit for the happy issue of the Convention's labours. His policy of a Government for the new Union composed of all the "best men," irrespective of race or party, unhappily

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failed of adoption ; but he continued nevertheless as leader of the Opposition from 1910 to 1912, when failing health compelled his return to England, to give to General Botha, with whom he had established relations of the most cordial intimacy, a generous support in all measures for the common good of the country.

Jameson's parliamentary work at the Cape had necessarily separated him to a considerable extent from Rhodesia, and though he had been elected a director of the Chartered Company after the death of Rhodes, he was not able to pay more than an occasional visit to the territory. But after his return to England in 1912 Rhodesia once more claimed the greatest share of his energies. He was elected President of the Chartered Company in 1913 in succession to the late Duke of Abercorn. He threw into the work of the Company all his unexhausted vitality ; he revisited the territory in the winter of 1913-14 and again in the winter of 1915-16, travelling from end to end of it, speaking to the settlers, and watching the growth of the young white state which he had done so much to found. In ill-health always, and often in acute physical pain, he continued to the very end to work tirelessly and cheerily for Rhodesia, and so his great career closes where it began in service to the ideals of his friend.

And to his friend he will return at the last, to lie by the side of Rhodes in the Matopos, with the granite hills to stand as sentinels round the grave of the last of the Elizabethans.

“Lofty designs must close in like effects :

Loftily lying,

Leave him—still loftier than the world suspects,

Living and dying.”

London. February, 1918.

NEW ZEALAND

I. AFTER THREE YEARS OF WAR

ON October 15, 1914, the First Expeditionary Force, numbering about 8,000 men, left the Dominion. Little then did anyone dream what was in store for the men who went with that force, for the people who sent them, or for the world at large. The great tragedy was only just beginning, and its magnitude was only dimly realised, and indeed it may be doubted if it is yet fully realised. We knew this, however, that a great crisis in our national life had arisen, that our liberties and our national existence were at stake, and that the time had arrived when we were to be put to the test as to whether we were deserving of the privileges we had enjoyed through long years of peace. It was a supreme challenge to our race to prove that it was worthy of its traditions. And no one can recall without a thrill of pride how eagerly the flower of our youth and our manhood responded. Without bargaining, without reservation, but rejoicing in their opportunity, they placed their services and their lives at the disposal of their country. We did not then even faintly conceive what these men were to achieve and to suffer. Gallipoli, with its deeds of glory and honour, with its long months of suspense for us and of trial for them, and its tragic failure, was in the unrevealed future. Nor could we foresee that after three years of war list after list of killed and wounded would still be spreading anguish and mourning throughout the land.

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Though New Zealand has so far been spared the worst of the grim horrors that are experienced where the enemy is within striking distance, it has ample reason to realise the gravity of the struggle it is engaged in. Not only do the continued losses in the ranks, the gaps in families, and the increasing number of those returning maimed and sick combine to deepen the growing sense of its real meaning to us, but the question of ways and means in itself has become a matter for grave concern. The prospect of calling up before long the Second Division, comprising married men, with the consequent further dislocation of industry and disturbance of family relations and need for making greater provision for dependents, has made the financial aspect still more prominent. Yet with all there is no sign of weakening in determination to go through to the finish. The married men assert their willingness to join the ranks, and the country declares its readiness to shoulder the financial burden, and its resources still seem ample to meet the abnormal strain on its finances. The continued prosperity of the country is evidenced by the general style of living which so far shows no outward decline.

Patriotic workers, men and women, are still devoting themselves to maintaining the funds and supplies for Red Cross and kindred purposes, and there are many evidences that throughout the community there is a quickening of the sense of individual responsibility. Amongst the many associations and more or less organised efforts which have been called into being by the war the dominant note is voluntary service and devotion to the common purpose of national needs. With a view to furthering this end a new association has now been formed under the name of "The Empire Service League." Its general object is to endeavour to improve the relations between antagonistic classes by seeking to convince them that the common welfare demands sympathetic consideration of each other's needs and to persuade them that their own interests will

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be better advanced by working in harmony for the good of the community instead of wasting their resources and the resources of the community in strife. The League was established at Hastings in Hawke's Bay, and its keynote is indicated by the title of the pamphlet, "What Freedom Means," read by its author at the inaugural meeting. If the League realises any substantial part of its objects its existence will be justified.

Apart from casualties, nothing else has brought the war really home to us so much as the decrease in the shipping facilities. Unless some adequate relief can be obtained we have to anticipate a considerable shortage in exports, and a consequent reduction in the national income. The Government has been held by many to be to blame for allowing the U.S.S. Company's service, which has been of such value to the country in the past, to pass into the hands of an outside company, in consequence of its amalgamation with the P. & O. Company. The entry of the two American Continents into the war may involve still further decrease of our shipping, owing to the deflection of available ships for the transport of troops across the Atlantic.

One illustration of the healthy financial condition of the country and of the readiness of the people to help in carrying on the war is afforded by the remarkable response to the appeal of the Government for a further War Loan. Last year £8,000,000 of a required loan of £16,000,000 was offered to the public, and it was regarded as doubtful whether any large portion of it would be subscribed. The amount subscribed was, however, £9,250,000, and it was considered a matter for gratification that such an amount could be obtained within the Dominion. This year the amount required to be raised was £24,000,000, and it was decided to raise the whole of it locally. £12,000,000 was offered in September, to be followed by £12,000,000 in March. The term of the loan is 21 years, and the rate of interest offered the same as last year, $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. free of income tax. This exemption of income tax has been

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strongly criticised in many quarters, but no doubt it had a material effect in getting the money, and it was on that ground the Ministry justified it. Sir Joseph Ward said that he must have the money, and that this was the only way to get it. There are some new features in connection with this loan; bonds can be applied in payment of death duties if specially taken up for the purpose, and the investor can at his option take up the loan in the form of inscribed stock. The success of this loan has been still more marked than that of last year, for within the time allowed for closing subscriptions it was over subscribed to the extent of £5,000,000, and further subscriptions have been coming in since the time expired.

In consequence of the expenditure for the current year being found to have been underestimated in the first instance, it has since proved necessary to increase the amount required to be raised, and a further loan of £4,000,000 has been decided on, making a total of £28,000,000 for the current year.

II. THE SESSION

THE events of the session have shown that the principle of a National Government is still approved by Parliament and people. The Government throughout retained the solid support on all vital matters of the whole House. Some three or four members whose loquacity has been in inverse ratio to their numerical strength have shown consistent opposition to the Government on the chief features of its policy, but have been quite ineffective in influencing it. Nevertheless a considerable amount of restiveness was displayed at one part of the session by a section of the Liberal element in the coalition which maintains the national Government in power, and it is probable that the Government has suffered some loss of public support.

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The taxation proposals were, of course, a fertile source of dissatisfaction. The Government was charged with failure to deal with war "profiteers" by not re-enacting in some form the tax on excess profits, though it was generally agreed that the tax of last year had been properly repealed. Demands for some other form of taxation to secure excess profits were opposed by the Government on the ground of impracticability. The Government objected to an export tax because of the danger of discouraging production and raising prices still further to the home consumers. Another cause of dissatisfaction was an alleged want of candour in regard to reinforcements. Certain members strongly criticised the Government for withholding information as to the strength of the Expeditionary Force, the obligations entered into, and the actual requirements as to reinforcements. The Government defended itself on the ground of its inability to disclose confidential information received from the Imperial Government, and generally because military necessity forbade the publication of information which might be useful to the enemy.

The chief controversy of the session centred on allowances to dependents of soldiers. Substantial increases were demanded, and the Government was faced with a threatening prospect of disruption in the ranks of its supporters. The possibility even of a general election was freely discussed. Mr. Massey declared that, if a general election was desired, it could be held; but this challenge was not accepted.* A feature of the proceedings was the holding of three separate caucuses—one of the Conservative element, another of the Liberal, and the third a combined caucus or conference convened at the invitation of the Government at which financial and other statements were understood to have been made by the two leaders of the Ministry. The only other well-defined

* The present New Zealand House of Representatives was elected in December, 1914, and would expire through effluxion of time this year.

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Party is the Labour Party, which consists of five or six members only. Exception was taken in the House to Government statements being made in this manner. One member, who evidently voiced the feeling of the dissentients, when taunted with not knowing the financial position as disclosed at the conference, emphatically declared that the proper place to make a financial statement was on the floor of the House. However, the object of the Government was attained, as fifty out of fifty-two members who attended did not thereafter question its reason for opposing further increase in expenditure, declaring that they were satisfied with the information which had been disclosed. The result of the conference certainly seemed to strengthen the position of the Government.

When it had become apparent that they would eventually be called up, the men of the Second Division organised with a view to securing more adequate allowances for their families and dependents than were provided by the original scale. This organisation was mainly responsible for the demands made in the House for increased allowances. Under the scale proposed by the Government the estimated expenditure compared with the present rates for the ensuing twelve months for the next thirteen reinforcements were as follows :

	<i>Present Rates.</i>	<i>New Rates.</i>	<i>Increase.</i>
Wives ..	£301,000	£826,000	£525,000
Children ..	246,000	318,000	72,000
Total ..	<u>£547,000</u>	<u>£1,144,000</u>	<u>£597,000</u>

In addition to these, provision was made for new allowances for widowed mothers and for brothers and sisters up to sixteen years of age dependent on the soldier, which added to the above would increase the total estimate as follows :

<i>Present Rates.</i>	<i>New Rates.</i>	<i>Increase.</i>
£558,000	£1,157,000	£599,000

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The allowances were computed on a basis of a standard minimum, the standard being not that of the well-to-do but of the ordinary working man.

According to these rates a married soldier would get 35s. a week, his wife 21s., and his child 7s. Further than this the Government refused to go, although these proposals fell short of the demands of the Second Division League.

Much heated debate ensued ; but, after the statements made to members at the combined conference, those members present who had pressed for further increase admitted that they were satisfied the Government had gone as far as it was warranted having regard to the obligations it had to meet and the condition of the country's finances.

In comparison with other countries affected by the war the rise in cost of living has not been relatively high in respect of necessary food supplies. The following comparison is taken from published official returns and shows the increase, between July 31, 1914, and July 31, 1917, in the retail prices of food, weighted according to the proportions consumed by the working classes : United Kingdom, 102% ; Australia, 26% ; New Zealand, 27% ; Canada (June 30), 60% ; Sweden (April 30), 75% ; Italy (April 30), 64% ; Vienna (May 31), 188%.

It will be seen from this that the people of New Zealand have, comparatively speaking, not much cause for complaint. But that they do not all realise this is evident from the many and loud expressions of dissatisfaction from popular representatives and newspapers.

Money wages have risen since the outbreak of the war, and employment has been very good, but it is realised that the tendency to lower real wages will become stronger as the war proceeds and that every reasonable effort ought to be made to minimise the force of all factors operating to diminish the real income in the shape of goods and services enjoyed by the mass of the people. But the danger

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of misguidance is very great when politicians seek to legislate upon economic problems in response to popular clamour.

It is a firmly rooted popular belief that it is in the power of the governing authorities to find an external remedy against increased cost of living, and the Government which fails to apply one promptly is apt to be regarded with suspicion and distrust. It is natural to suppose that when the price of commodities is going up someone is making an increased profit and that by dealing with the "profiteer" the matter will be remedied. It does not so readily occur to the popular mind that scarcity owing to increased difficulties of production may be an important factor in causing a rise in prices, and that the scarcity might be remedied at least in some degree by the exercise of personal economy of consumption and of other ways of saving. What appears most obvious is that it is a matter that the Government can and should remedy, and pressure is accordingly brought to bear on it with that object. The usual formula has been tried in New Zealand. The Government was appealed to and did what might be expected : it set up a Parliamentary Committee to enquire and report. Its report was duly presented to Parliament, but whether it will result in any material assistance in solving the problem remains to be seen. The report in its original form cannot be said to have thrown much light either on the origin or on the remedy of the trouble. It was rather a statement of the objects aimed at than of the means by which they are to be attained. It recommended the appointment of a food controller with "plenary" powers "to control and regulate the prices of food supplies and any other necessities of life." This, no doubt, would give him power to order an importer, for instance, to import at a certain limited price, but, if the importer could not or would not import at the price named, it was not made clear how the controller was next to proceed, whether by importing himself or conscripting

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others to do it. Amongst his other powers were to be included "powers to effectually prevent increase in prices where such proposed increase is not justified to his satisfaction."

In regard to retail prices the heroic remedy was suggested of Government purchasing at the ruling export prices and selling at such lower prices as the Controller should think fit, the loss to be paid out of the Consolidated Fund—in other words, buying food and distributing it gratis if need be. No solution was proposed of the problem which would arise when the Consolidated Fund was used up, nor was reference made to the vital difficulty of the uncertainty introduced into the estimates of the Minister of Finance. The Controller was also to eliminate the middleman, but how to do so was left for him to find out. Other remedies suggested were protection of the public from short weight and short measure (oblivious of existing efficient legislation), the encouragement of the formation of co-operative societies, Government trading, and the development of the fishing industry. The report also advocated the establishment of a State controlled co-operative line of steamships.

Neither the country nor the House showed any enthusiasm for these proposals. The newspapers were mostly satirical and certain members of the Ministry were emphatic in their criticisms. Referring to the shipping proposals the Minister of Finance laughed the idea to scorn, saying that the Government had no more chance of getting the shipping than of jumping over the moon. The report was referred back to the Committee and was afterwards again presented to the House with the clauses giving plenary powers to the Food Controller and for payment of loss out of Consolidated Fund deleted.

The Government has been charged with failure to grapple effectively with the organisation of industries and commerce, with having done little or nothing beyond the appointment of a National Efficiency Board. It cannot

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be said that there is much in evidence with which to meet this charge. Some considerable discussion has arisen in reference to the relations between the Government and the Board, and the institution of such a Board has been sharply criticised in principle. The powers of the Board were limited to making recommendations, but recommendations made by men who are chosen for their special capacity to deal with the questions at issue are naturally regarded by the public as having great weight; and the Government was placed in the dilemma of either ignoring and so by implication discrediting the Board or of accepting its recommendations, whether or not it could agree with them, and so practically submitting to its dictation. When it was found that few if any of its recommendations were acted upon, the Board, not unnaturally, asked whether it was not wasting its time. Mr. Massey replied that he was not going to allow the Board to be the Government, and emphatically asserted his right to accept or decline its recommendations. The position became acute, and the Board tendered its resignation.

Much interest had been taken in this experiment in endeavouring to secure the services of specially qualified men in order to bring Government methods somewhat into line with the undoubtedly more efficient methods of commercial undertakings. Government methods are notoriously inefficient in many important respects. Take, for instance, the Army. Though we must concede that it effects the object it is designed for—the conversion of civilians into an ordered and disciplined military force—it unquestionably does so at an enormous waste of both money and energy, unless it is controlled by a master-mind in organisation and commercial methods. It is only to be expected that this is seldom found combined with military genius; and, as military genius must be given sole control, the economic aspect has to take its chance. Every other Government enterprise suffers more or less in the same way. In the commercial enterprises of the

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Government the man in power is the politician ; and as political genius, like military genius, is rarely combined with commercial training or natural business ability, the economic aspect is always subordinate in these enterprises to the political. Suppose such methods were applied to the science of navigation, and the commanders of ships were chosen from the ranks of successful politicians. A wreck-strewn ocean would soon point the moral.

In these days of war the incapacity of politicians to deal with problems requiring special skill and experience becomes more apparent than in ordinary times and is more fraught with peril ; and it is this that accounts for the Government's attempt to obtain the assistance of specially qualified men. It is a recognition firstly of the fact that direct popular election does not supply the country with the best brains and most capable men for enterprises requiring special skill and knowledge, and, secondly, that there should be some way of securing such men for the service of the State. There is, however, no answer to the objection that there must be only one Government. The existence of an irresponsible body controlling the Government involves an abnegation of governmental functions. It has been contended that the course which should have been adopted was to appoint to the Upper House, and, if need be, to the Cabinet, the men whose services were deemed essential on account of their special capabilities. The Board has now been reconstituted by including two Cabinet Ministers and reappointing some of the members of the original Board.

It should be stated, however, that the National Efficiency Board has been of material service to the country in many respects, notably in regard to the organisation of committees to deal with the case of farms of soldiers absent on active service and generally to see that labour in the essential industry of agriculture is not unduly depleted. In this connection it may be noted that the Government has definitely decided that the last man on the farm is

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not to be taken. It considers it essential that every farm should be left with labour to work it, and that in no case should a man doing the whole of his farm work or the last son of parents unable to work be taken. The Efficiency Board was also in some degree responsible for further legislation in connection with the liquor trade.

Public feeling in regard to the necessity for the restriction of the consumption of liquor resulted in a very insistent demand for shortening hours of sale. This movement had not been merely one of the Prohibition Party. The feeling that unnecessary waste should be curbed is an outcome of the public appreciation of the seriousness of the war and the conditions which it has brought, and of the necessity of making an endeavour to live more economically. The liquor trade is regarded as presenting one of the most conspicuous instances of preventable waste, and not merely of waste but of habit seriously interfering with efficiency. On these grounds numbers of people having no connection with the party of prohibition have interested themselves in advocating reduction of hours of trade. At meetings held in all the chief centres many prominent business men and other citizens who had not hitherto taken any part in dealing with the liquor question were outspoken in their condemnation of allowing the state of things to continue as it was. The movement eventually resulted in strong petitions to Parliament and other representations urging the need for a Bill to provide for closing all licensed premises from 6 p.m. to 9 a.m., instead of 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. as hitherto. Their case was very much strengthened by a report of the National Efficiency Board recommending National Prohibition with compensation. The Government, recognising that public opinion was undoubtedly in favour of a measure of reform, brought down, somewhat reluctantly as many thought, a Bill to provide for closing from 8 p.m. to 9 a.m. The advocates of the six o'clock measure were, however, not to be denied, and declined to compromise. The Government

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did not make their Bill a party measure, and on its coming before the House it was found, to the surprise of most people, that the advocates of six-o'clock closing were largely in the majority. The Government bowed to their opinion, and the Bill as finally enacted fixed the hours at 6 p.m. to 9 a.m.

III. FINANCE

DURING the month of October, just closing, there have been several important Ministerial statements in the House regarding the condition of the national finances. On the 9th Sir Joseph Ward, Minister of Finance, announced that certain alterations had been necessitated in the estimates of war expenditure for the current year, since the delivery of the Budget. These would result by September 30, 1918, in an estimated deficiency in war finance of eight millions as against the revenue to be provided by the Budget proposals. To place the finance on a firm basis he announced the intention of the Government to obtain authority to borrow an additional five millions, which would, he thought, be ample to meet the expenditure to July 31, 1918, by which time Parliament would again be in session. The revised estimate of war expenditure for the eighteen months, April 1, 1917, to September 30, 1918, was 36½ millions. Sir Joseph warned the House that the whole position required "to be looked at and dealt with very cautiously." The revenue from the railways, Customs, and other departments of Government had fallen so that there had been during the six months April to September of this year a net decrease of £300,000 in total revenue. Still, he went on to say, "I am not for a moment of opinion that there is any ground for apprehension, because to a large extent I have made provision for the altered position which has been brought about." But there is the probability of a much greater

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falling off in Customs revenue than estimated in the Budget, now that freights are rising so high (at present the rate from the United Kingdom to New Zealand is £10 a ton), and our Home suppliers find it almost impossible to fulfil orders. When Sir Joseph was speaking there were four or five steamers coming out with no cargo at all. After reviewing the possible sources of any heavy additions to the revenue, Sir Joseph stated his opinion that we cannot obtain adequate revenue within the short time required by the exigencies of the situation created by the war if it proceeds beyond another year except through the Customs tariff, and that would mean sending up the cost of living still higher.

The interest on the war loans of the New Zealand Government had reached the sum of £3,170,000 per annum by September 30 last, and the corresponding sinking fund charges £600,000, making a total war loan charge of £3,770,000. On our ordinary debt before the war the corresponding total charge was £2,888,000, so that the present grand total is about six and three-quarter millions. Up to September 30 £46,847,000 had actually been borrowed for war purposes, and at the time of writing the total amount of loans authorised from the beginning of the war is £67,335,000. Sir Joseph said he hoped to be able to get the Home Government to accept some of our stock, at least four millions, in part payment to the Imperial Treasury for amounts disbursed for the maintenance of our troops at the front.

The state of the ordinary finances of the Dominion has not escaped criticism, though there is no ground for believing that they are in anything but a healthy condition. The chief cause of complaint is the absolute increase of expenditure compared with pre-war years. For the last financial year ending March 31, 1917, the expenditure was just upon eight millions, or £380,000 more than that in the last pre-war year; and during the six months April to September, 1917, it increased by £101,000, whilst the

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revenue decreased by £300,000. It is to be noted, however, that in the recent Budget the Minister had estimated that the revenue would decrease by a million, whilst the expenditure would increase by two millions, and in his statement on the 9th inst. he said: "That the country can stand what is being done, I have no hesitation in saying." But it is certain that, in order that we may shoulder the war burdens to which he was alluding, we shall have to set about lightening the cost of the ordinary work of Government.

The returns of the banks doing business in the Dominion for the quarter ending September 30 illustrate some of the more striking economic features of the country. In particular they afford some evidence of the extent to which the currency in its widest sense has been inflated since the proclamation in August, 1914, of bank notes as legal tender, the great increase in the note issue, the fall in the ratio of gold coin and bullion on hand to total liabilities, the great increase in deposits and in credit generally. The velocity of circulation of the currency has undoubtedly greatly increased since the outbreak of war. Most of these factors tend to raise the level of prices and are too often altogether neglected by those seeking to discover causes of the rise in the cost of living. The following table gives a rough comparison of the figures on September 30 last, with the figures representing the average quarterly returns for the four years 1910-1913, when conditions were almost stable:

	Sept. 30th, 1917.		Average for 1910-13.
	£		£
Deposits	43	} millions	26
Advances	28½		21½
Gold coin and bullion in hand	8·3		5·2
Notes in circulation ..	5·7		1·7
Ratio per cent. of coin and bullion to total liabilities	17		19
Population : 1,096,000 (June 30)			1,042,000

New Zealand

Before the war it was estimated that about 87% of the value of our trading was done by cheques, 7% by notes, 5% by gold and 1% by silver. Since the war gold currency has almost disappeared for ordinary trade purposes.

At June 30 of this year there were 554,983 depositors in the Post Office Savings Bank alone (representing more than half the population), the corresponding average for the years 1910-1913 being about 419,000. These had a total amount of deposits to their credit of over twenty-five millions compared with not quite sixteen millions in 1910-1913. There were also 81,900 depositors in other savings banks, with deposits of nearly two and a half millions, at the end of 1916. These savings bank figures are, of course, not included in the banking returns given above, but they tell the same tale of greatly increased or inflated bank deposits and credits.

New Zealand. October, 1917.

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"There is no other course open to us but to fight it out. . . . With our backs to the wall, and believing in the justice of our cause, each one of us must fight on to the end."—Sir Douglas Haig's Order to the British Army, April 12, 1918.

I. 1918 AND 1914

THERE can be very few men and women in this country or in the Dominions who fail to realise the gravity of the crisis which has confronted the British Commonwealth since from March 21 onwards, in successive assaults of unprecedented weight and violence, almost the whole striking force of Germany has been thrown against the British army in France and Flanders. For the first time since the beginning of the war we have witnessed a British retirement on a large scale in the West, and have been forced to contemplate eventualities at least as serious as those which threatened us at the time of the retreat from Mons. The ordeal of August and September, 1914, is being repeated in a sterner form. We know better now than we knew then the power of the Prussian military machine, the capacity of its chiefs, the discipline and bravery of its soldiers: we know better, also, what would be involved in such an indefinite prolongation of the war as would result from a great German victory in France, how

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heavy the further toll of suffering and sacrifice that would then be needed to save from destruction the cause for which we are fighting. And because of this fuller knowledge the test now put upon our strength of mind and will is more severe. When Sir Douglas Haig, on the morrow of the fall of Armentières, issued to his army the order quoted above, he knew that men fight best when their only choice is between victory and disaster. To that appeal the soldiers of the Commonwealth in the field gave the response which they have always given. And the peoples of the Commonwealth at home are bound to follow their example. Our purpose is the same as it was in 1914, when we one and all accepted the pledge not to sheathe the sword until the military domination of Prussia was wholly and finally destroyed, knowing that only so could liberty and justice prevail among men. The issue of the present battle may make that purpose easier or harder to achieve; but, whichever it be, we must strive on unceasingly for its achievement; and, if the worst comes to the worst, our courage must be firmer, our will more united and inflexible, just because the task is harder and our backs are to the wall.

If the German onset has thus reproduced the critical situation of 1914, it has also revived the spirit in which the peoples of the Commonwealth faced it. After more than three years of war that spirit had, inevitably perhaps, lost much of its first strength and ardour. And the great disappointment of 1917,—the complete breakdown of Russia and the consequent abandonment of the long-cherished hope of ending the war by a simultaneous assault in East and West—had increased the moral strain. It seemed both in this country and in the Dominions as if the war was no longer being prosecuted with the single mind and heart of the whole Commonwealth. The claims of selfish interests, personal or sectional or national, were gaining ground. The duties of the war were not so cheerfully assumed as they once were; its hardships not so easily

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softened and illumined by the sense of devotion to the common cause. If the great majority of men and women were as firmly resolved as ever to persevere till the object of the war was attained, the notion of "limited liability" as to the personal service it demanded, the idea of having "done one's bit," was more readily entertained. There was, of course, no cessation of patriotic effort, but it was tending to become mechanical and uninspired. And not unnaturally under these circumstances the fine sense of unity with which we entered on the war had been impaired. The old miasma of distrust and jealousy, of partisanship, recrimination and intrigue, seemed to be spreading its poisonous atmosphere once more over our social and political life. There was no reason for pessimism in the prevalence of such tendencies. The heart of the British peoples was sound; their latent store of resolution and endurance was intact; and there was much to account for any outward symptoms of slackening energy or divided spirit. They were partly the natural outcome of physical and mental fatigue, of war-weariness in all its many guises; and they were partly due to a false estimate of the magnitude of the effort still required to bring the war to its only tolerable end; but their main cause was a weakening of conviction as to the means by which that end might be brought about.

When men desire to attain an object which cannot be attained except by overcoming with toil and suffering an obstacle that lies in the way, there is always a strong temptation to believe either that the obstacle may somehow be circumvented, or that it is in part imaginary and not really so complete an impediment as it seems. The object in our case is the re-establishment of liberty and public right in Europe and the foundation of a new order of international relations governed by the ideals of friendship, co-operation and peace, instead of hatred, antagonism and war. The obstacle is the existence of a militarist and autocratic system which commands the allegiance and the power of

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Central Europe. At the outset of the war there was, save among a wholly negligible minority, no disposition to believe that this obstacle was unreal or could be circumvented. The character of Prussianism had been nakedly exposed first by the course of the diplomatic relations immediately preceding the outbreak of war, and secondly by the invasion and treatment of Belgium. And the absolute control exercised by the masters of the Prussian system over Central Europe was equally manifest. The Austrian assault on Serbia was known to have been encouraged, if not instigated, by them; and when at the eleventh hour Vienna shrank from war, Berlin deliberately precipitated it. From that moment, it was clear, the destiny of the Hapsburg realm was fast in the grip of Prussian militarism—a situation which was openly welcomed and abetted by German militarists at Vienna and Magyar militarists at Buda-Pesth who regard Prussian hegemony throughout Central Europe as a guarantee of their ascendancy over the subject nationalities of the Dual Monarchy. Austria-Hungary, in fact, like Bulgaria and Turkey later on, had become a vassal of the German Empire. And just as the Governments of those vassal States were able to compel their own populations to fight and die in the Prussian service, so also could the Kaiser and his Prussian generals command the unquestioning obedience of the German people—a great people in numbers, capacity and organised power; compact, industrious, disciplined; the core and mainstay of the whole fabric of Prussian militarism, the fine-tempered weapon for its long-planned stroke for the dominion of the world. It was in a spirit of high patriotic devotion, with a firm belief in the righteousness of their cause, with an unfaltering trust in their rulers, that those German soldiers marched in August, 1914, to destroy Belgium, to crush France, to sweep the little British Army into the sea, and to dictate a conqueror's terms to Europe before the autumn leaves had fallen.

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With a system so avowedly aggressive and tyrannical, supported with such unmistakable enthusiasm by the great mass of the German people, there was no thought of compromise among the nations of the British Commonwealth in 1914. There was no doubt as to the solidity of that obstacle to the rule of freedom and justice and the pursuit of peace and good will among men; no suggestion that somehow a way round it could be found. The British peoples were convinced that, cost what it might, its dominating power in Europe must be destroyed. Cost what it might—but did anyone foresee in those days what the cost would be? No one doubted that the sacrifice would be heavy, but the beliefs then current as to the probable length of the struggle and the relative ease with which our aims would be attained seem now almost incredibly below the mark. And as the war dragged on, as mistakes and misfortunes accumulated, as the enemy's war-map and war-power seemed to expand rather than shrink with every year, as each spring gave birth to fresh hopes of victory and peace and each autumn buried them, as every winter the demand on our effort and endurance went deeper into our hearts and homes, the temptation to believe that this long and terrible road through the valley of the shadow of death was not the only way to our goal began to make its power felt.

Thus in the year 1917 a belief gained ground that a "clean peace," through which the ideal of freedom and justice should decisively and finally prevail in the world over the ideal of Prussian militarism, could be attained by some other means than by victory, than by proving beyond question that the force behind the one was stronger than the force behind the other. As to what those other means might be there were four main currents of opinion. The first school argued that the contagious spirit of the Russian Revolution had spread so far and deep among the German people that the downfall of the Prussian system was assured, and that the continuance of the war alone prevented a

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prompt and general rising in Germany, because it enabled the military authorities to maintain absolute control over internal affairs, compelled the manhood of Germany to submit to rigorous discipline, and kept them at a safe distance from their homes. Let the Allies, therefore, negotiate for peace. They could afford to be generous as to its terms if only it could be signed. For then the German revolution would break out, the obstacle of Prussian militarism would be circumvented, and the new world-order established with the help of the German democracy.

The second school pinned their faith to constitutional rather than revolutionary forces in Germany. They noted the domestic crisis of last summer, the Peace Resolution of the Reichstag, and the Kaiser's promise of immediate reforms in the Prussian constitution. They ascribed those events, not unreasonably, to the existence of a passionate desire for peace in Germany, to a growing mistrust of the control exercised by the General Staff over the political as well as the military side of the war, and to the strong impulse given thereby to democratic agitation. But they read more than that into the crisis. They thought that behind the Reichstag stood a great body of middle-class opinion in Germany which had become aware of the moral schism between the Central Powers and the rest of the civilised world, had resolved to break away from the traditional *Real-politik* of their Prussian rulers, and in their repudiation of annexations and indemnities had shown their desire to bring about a settlement by consent rather than by force and in deference to right as well as might. No longer, therefore, should the Allied Governments refuse to open up negotiations. A peace concluded in accordance more or less with the Reichstag policy would confirm the triumph of the constitutional movement in Germany.

There was, thirdly, a body of opinion which hoped to circumvent the power of Prussian militarism with the aid not of its subjects, but of its allies: they looked not so much to Germany as to Austria. Here again the first steps were

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on solid ground. There was truth in the assumption that Austria was in more desperate need of peace than Germany; that in the congeries of peoples which comprise the population of the Hapsburg Empire there was far less unity of feeling, far less patriotic ardour, than among their relatively compact and homogeneous neighbours; that among subject nationalities burning like the Czechs and Slovaks with the conviction that their national freedom could only be attained by independence, or like the Southern Slavs and Roumanians and Italians with the desire for union with their fellow-nationals beyond the frontier, and among a proletariat far less advanced as to the conditions of industrial or agrarian life than that of Germany and unappeased by any such benevolent social legislation as stands to the credit of Prussia—that here was a considerably more promising field for revolution than in Germany; and that, finally, under such circumstances there was no reason to doubt the sincerity of the young Emperor Charles's avowed desire for peace. These assumptions were reasonable enough; but it was a long step further to assume that the Emperor and still more his ministers and generals, Hungarian as well as Austrian, were prepared to purchase peace at the price of such concessions to the principle of national self-government throughout the Empire as would satisfy the public opinion of the Western democracies, or that, even if Vienna were of that mind, Buda-Pesth would acquiesce. And it was again a long step further to assume that Austria-Hungary was ready to break away from Germany—for that was manifestly the second instalment of the price of peace—and that, even if she wished to break away, she was actually able to do so.

These three groups of opinion were at one in the belief that through the action of the German people or their allies the obstacle of Prussian militarism would be circumvented and our purpose achieved in all its vital elements. But there was a fourth group which was tempted to

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believe that the character of the obstacle itself had changed, so that it no longer blocked the way to at least a partial fulfilment of our aims, and was tempted also to resign itself to such a partial fulfilment lest worse befell. Obsessed by the fear that the material basis of modern civilisation would be weakened beyond recovery if the war were not quickly brought to a close, they persuaded themselves that the rulers of Germany, whatever their outward bearing, must in reality be sharing their own anxiety and ready therefore to make a reasonable peace. Their outlook, their ambitions, it was argued, must needs be very different now from what they were in 1914. Even the hierarchy of Prussian militarism, the General Staff itself, must have learned its lesson. Its chiefs were far too clear-sighted not to recognise that their Napoleonic project of world-dominion had been proved impracticable. They had indeed got much; they could scarcely hope to get more from a world now united in arms. Might they not therefore rest satisfied with the hold they had won over the Russian borderlands and the Balkan States, and be ready to come to an arrangement with the Allies in the West? Peace on such terms, it was true, might be described by idealists as a cynical bargain between German and British imperialism, as a barefaced betrayal of the smaller or weaker nations. But ideals must give place to realities; and such a peace would not only save the world from the utter ruin towards which it was now hastening, but would guarantee it against the repetition of the present catastrophe. For the rulers of Germany would be "satiated" as they were in 1871: they would feel, as Bismarck felt, that their power had reached its limit of expansion, and they could henceforth be trusted to live in harmony with their neighbours. A Germany, indeed, thus disillusioned and yet not discontented, would fitly take a leading place in a future League of Nations.

The great majority of British citizens at home and overseas did not commit themselves to any of those

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opinions. The common sense of the average man and woman was too deeply impressed by the record of Prussian militarism in its conduct of the war to believe that anything short of its direct defeat could secure the world from further outrage. But it was difficult to reject outright any proposals which promised a "clean peace" by other means than the indefinitely long continuance of the horrors and losses of the war, especially when such proposals were canvassed by reputable newspapers and responsible politicians. The subtle mechanism of German propaganda was also working hard in that direction. And so the insidious suggestion began to make its way into men's minds that it might not after all be necessary to go on toiling and enduring at the very maximum of our strength. Our soldiers and munition-makers had done their part; if only our statesmen would do theirs, peace might well prove to be far nearer than it seemed. In some quarters these hopes and fancies crystallised in attacks upon the Allied Governments. The complaint of the German Press that the uncompromising attitude of M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George was the only real obstacle to peace found an echo in this country. And some were inclined to indulge the mood of self-depreciation further. "Was it certain," they asked, "especially after the publication of the 'secret treaties,' that our war aims were much less selfish and 'imperialistic' than those of our enemies?" Doubts were even raised again whether the rulers of Germany were quite as responsible for the outbreak of the war as was generally supposed.

The prevalence, even among a small minority, of such ideas as these was sufficient to account for the uncertainty, the "second thoughts," the vague suspicions, which had begun during last winter to impair our vigour and our unity in the conduct of the war. The clear air, the unfaltering conviction, the unanimous purpose of 1914 were becoming obscured and darkened by a fog of miscalculation and illusion. And then, in the early months of the new

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year, a wind blew from Berlin, the fog melted away, and the air was once more as clear, the truth as manifest, our duty as plain and single, as in that first autumn of the war.

II. THE GERMAN PEACE IN THE EAST

THE cause of this clearing of the air can be very briefly stated. The spirit and purpose of 1914 have been restored throughout the British Commonwealth because the spirit and purpose of 1914 have been restored throughout the German Empire. And this in turn has resulted directly from the conclusion of peace between the Central Powers and their neighbours in the East and from the circumstances under which it was concluded.

The Resolution passed by the majority of the Reichstag on July 19, 1917, had been the high-water mark, so to speak, of the democratic tide in Germany. The representatives of the people had for once interfered in the conduct of foreign policy, hitherto the inviolate preserve of the Kaiser and of the ministers and soldiers he chose to consult. Save only in high military circles, the desire for peace was strong throughout Germany, and stronger still in Austria. If war-weariness was beginning to affect the temper of the Allies, it was telling still more on the *morale* of the Central European peoples, who had suffered more severely not only in loss of men but from shortage of food. The Russian Revolution had, indeed, relaxed for a moment the military pressure on the East; but Russia was still in arms, the forces of the Revolution might soon be able to advance with no less weight and greater ardour than the forces of the Czar, and there was no knowing, especially in Austria, how far the insidious and destructive doctrines now abroad beyond the line of trenches might make their way into the camp of autocracy. In the West, meanwhile, so far from any likelihood of obtaining a decisive victory, the German armies were steadily giving ground and losing

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strength before the repeated British and French offensives. The prestige of Prussian generalship—the very keystone of the Prussian system—was weakening. Finally, the “unrestricted” submarine campaign had failed to fulfil the promises of its authors by bringing Britain to her knees ; and sooner or later the price would have to be paid for it to an American army in Europe. Under all these circumstances the conduct of the war by the Kaiser and his inner circle of advisers could not escape criticism even from so submissive a body as the Reichstag had hitherto proved itself. A coalition of parties, resting mainly on an alliance between the Catholic Centre and the Majority Socialists, came out in open opposition to the unchanging and unchangeable opinion of the General Staff that a satisfactory peace could only be obtained by force, and passed their famous resolution in favour of “peace by agreement.” As a step towards securing it they declared that “the forcible acquisition of territory and political, economic, or financial usurpation are incompatible with such a peace,” and in the name of the Reichstag they repudiated “all plans which strive for economic exclusion and animosities between peoples after the war.” The Kaiser bowed to the storm. Hindenburg and Ludendorff withdrew into the background and bided their time. The new Chancellor, Dr. Michaelis, was instructed to give a halting assent to the Resolution. And by the appointment of Herr von Kühlmann as Foreign Minister an opportunity was given for clever diplomacy to show what it could do. In Austria, meanwhile, the current was setting still more strongly in the direction of peace “by agreement,” and it was thought that in his efforts towards it Herr von Kühlmann could count on the warm support of his Austro-Hungarian colleague, Count Czernin.

A chance soon offered in the East. As the winter drew on, the prospects of converting the old Russian Empire into a united democratic commonwealth became more and more hopeless. The Bolsheviks were in effective control

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of Petrograd and Moscow, but they were at open war with the constitutional and reactionary forces in Great Russia and the breach between them and the Governments of Finland and the Ukraine was steadily widening. It was clear that a continuance of aggressive operations on the part of Russia against the Central Powers was no longer possible; and at the close of the year negotiations were opened, an armistice concluded, and a peace conference initiated at Brest Litovsk. It had one positive result. On February 9 a treaty of peace was signed between the Central Powers and the Ukrainian Government. By recognising and virtually taking under German protection an independent Ukrainian State it brought the disruptive tendencies provoked in Russia by the Revolution to the point of open schism—a schism which, if maintained, would in itself destroy the balance to German power and the barrier to German ambitions in the East. Of more immediate importance, it broke the Allies' "blockade" and opened the way to what had been the richest granary in Europe. More than half the treaty was comprised by Article VII., which laid down elaborate provisions, pending the conclusion of a permanent commercial treaty, for the economic relations between the signatory Powers and in the first instance for the "reciprocal exchange of the surplus of the more important agricultural and industrial products." And while the open door into the Ukraine thus offered a hope of meeting the most pressing material needs of the moment, it provided also for the future an alternative to the Balkan route for German economic penetration and political aggrandisement in Asia.

The treaty with the Ukraine was thus a notable achievement to the credit of Herr von Kühlmann and Count Czernin. But against it stood their complete failure to bring the Bolsheviks to terms. M. Trotsky had spent the long weeks at Brest Litovsk in appealing through the medium of the conference to the sympathy of the proletariat throughout the world. The peace he was aiming at was

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not an agreed peace between the Russian Soviets and the Governments of Central Europe, but a peace enforced on all the belligerent Governments by the joint action of their peoples. Finally, on the day after the Ukraine treaty was signed, he announced his refusal to conclude "a formal peace-treaty," but declared the state of war with the Central Powers to be ended, and gave orders for the demobilisation of what remained of the Russian armies on all fronts.

This evasion of a settlement was not by any means what the German Government or the German people had wanted. They had wanted a clean ending of the whole war in the East, a formal acknowledgment by the Bolsheviks of the dominant position which the Central Powers had acquired along the whole front, and a guarantee on their part of a final cessation of all hostilities in words as well as in acts. The Ukrainian treaty itself, it was true, had broken the unity and crippled the power of Russia ; but for that very reason the new Republic needed to be made as secure as possible against Bolshevik interference and agitation. For a complete settlement, therefore, Kühlmann and Czernin had made definite proposals to the Bolsheviks, but had obtained no definite response. The delimitation of the Russian frontier, the recognition of Finnish and Ukrainian independence, the status and destiny of Poland and the Baltic Provinces, the adjustment of economic relations, the crucial question of revolutionary propaganda, and a multitude of minor points were left entirely in the air. Without a cut-and-dried document, a binding public law guaranteed by their signatures, the Bolshevik leaders could keep their hands free and await events. It was the business of the diplomats to have tied them down, and they had failed. Nor, since Trotsky's declaration, was any further effort at negotiation practicable.

From this *impasse* there seemed only one way out. What German diplomacy had failed to do could easily be done by German arms. The military chiefs at once resumed their old control of affairs, broke off the armistice on the

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ground that the Bolsheviks were using it to make revolutionary appeals to German soldiers, and ordered an advance. Little resistance was encountered. A few days' forced marching and the German troops had occupied Reval and Pskov and lay within 150 miles of Petrograd. Practically all the Russian artillery on that part of the front had been captured, together with vast stores of war material. Meanwhile an ultimatum was presented to the Bolshevik Council demanding the acceptance of the German terms within forty-eight hours. These terms were no longer subject to negotiation: they were the terms dictated by the victors to the vanquished, and they were far harsher than those discussed at Brest Litovsk. The Bolshevik leaders realised that "the policy of phrases" was now useless, and that only by their prompt surrender could the German advance on Petrograd be stayed. On February 24 they surrendered; on March 3 the Peace of Brest Litovsk was signed.

The main conditions of this treaty may be summarised as follows:

(1) Russia concludes peace with the Quadruple Alliance and will conclude it with the Ukrainian Republic, recognising the latter's treaty with the Quadruple Alliance: and she will at once demobilise her army and disarm her fleet. (Articles V. and VI.)

(2) A line is fixed from the Gulf of Finland between the islands of Dago and Oesel and the Estonian coast to Riga; thence along the north-eastern boundary of Courland and across the province of Vilna to the Ukrainian frontier near Pruzhany. The regions west of this line "which have belonged to Russia" (*i.e.*, Courland and Lithuania) "shall no longer be subject to the Russian State Sovereignty." "Germany and Austria intend to determine the future fate of these regions in agreement with their populations." (Article III and appended map.)

(3) "Germany is prepared, as soon as a general peace has been concluded and the Russian general demobilisation has been carried out completely, to evacuate the region to the east of the line." Meanwhile Estonia and Livonia, as also Finland and the Ukraine, will be evacuated without delay by Russian troops and Red Guards. But Estonia and Livonia "will be occupied by German police forces until security has been guaranteed them by their own institutions and political order has been re-established." (Articles IV. and VI.)

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(4) The East-Anatolian Provinces (*i.e.*, the Turkish districts, including Armenia, occupied during the war by Russia) and the Erdehan, Kars and Batum districts (*i.e.*, the western half of Russian Transcaucasia) are to be evacuated by Russia as soon as possible. "Russia will not intervene in the new arrangement of the political and international relations of these districts, but leaves it to the populations of these districts to carry out the new arrangements in agreement with their neighbouring States, especially Turkey." (Article IV.)

(5) "Basing themselves on the fact that Persia and Afghanistan are free and independent States, the contracting parties pledge themselves to respect the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of these States." (Article VII.)

(6) The contracting parties will discontinue all agitation or propaganda against the Governments or institutions of their respective countries : and Russia will discontinue it as regards the Ukrainian Republic, Finland, and the territories at present occupied by the Quadruple Alliance. (Articles II. and VI.)

(7) The economic relations between Russia and the Powers of the Quadruple Alliance are to be governed by "binding stipulations" appended to the treaty (Article XI.). These stipulations include, among other economic advantages to the Central Powers, the revival of the oppressive Russo-German commercial treaty extorted from Russia at the moment of her weakness in 1904.

In the light of such a treaty the superior effectiveness of military over diplomatic methods seemed incontestable. All, and considerably more than all, the civil practitioners of *Real-politik* had so long contended for in vain, in order to secure and extend their "German peace" with the Ukraine, had been swiftly obtained by the policy of the General Staff. Not only had the Bolsheviks definitely pledged Russia to peace and disarmament and promised to abandon their aggressive propaganda ; not only had the independence of the Ukraine and of Finland been admitted and confirmed ; but one more great district, including Courland, Lithuania and the whole of Russian Poland, together with Riga and the islands which dominate the Livonian Gulf, and containing at least 17 million inhabitants, had been cut away from Russia ; and the secession of another great district comprising the remainder of the

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Baltic Provinces, with more than 2 million inhabitants and controlled for the present by German forces, was evidently only a matter of time. Thus the *de facto* Russian frontier, once so dangerously adjacent to the German, had been thrust back more than two hundred miles from the borders of East Prussia. With one sweep of Hindenburg's sword the old "Russian peril" had been instantly and utterly destroyed.

Such, at any rate, was the prevalent opinion in Germany. Few Germans were inclined to question the official interpretation of the Treaty in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*: "In the military sense, it means the end of the war on two fronts; politically, it means that the ring set round us by the enemy's policy is broken; and, economically, it means that the war plan of our enemies is destroyed." And the Kaiser echoed the feelings of the great majority of his people when in his message to the Reichstag he spoke of "the complete victory in the East," and ascribed it in his telegram to Prince Leopold of Bavaria not so much to the collapse of Russia as to the irresistible valour of his troops.

Once again I had to call my brave Eastern Army to battle in order to fight with the sword for a peace which the Russian Government refused by way of negotiations. Under your command my incomparable troops brilliantly accomplished this task within a few days. There still exists in them the old attacking spirit. . . . This fortnight's victorious march in the East, abounding in efforts and hardships, but also in successes, will remain a glorious page in the history of the German Army.

The military chiefs now once more firmly in the saddle, it remained for them to deal with the flanks of the Eastern front—with Roumania and with Finland. For men of their mettle the first was an easy task. The reorganised Roumanian army, numerous, brave and well entrenched could have continued to play an important part in the war if it had still been supported by its Russian allies; but the defection of the Ukraine and the Bolshevik surrender not

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only gave the enemy access to the rear of its position and rendered possible its complete encirclement, but also cut it off from any further supply of munitions. Under these circumstances there was no choice for Roumania but to yield, at any rate for the time being, to her enemies ; and when the inevitable ultimatum came, with the proviso that, if the Austro-German terms were not accepted, Roumania would be "extinguished from among the class of independent nations" and her territory divided between Hungary and Bulgaria,* King Ferdinand and his Government bowed to their fate. The terms were drastic. (1) Roumania was to cede the Dobrudja as far as the Danube to the Central Powers (Article I. of the Preliminary Treaty), despite the fact that this rich coastal province had been settled and civilised and provided with roads and railways by Roumania during the last forty years, afforded her only means of access to the Black Sea, and included the port of Constanza, which her capital and enterprise had so efficiently equipped. (2) Roumania was to surrender also "the frontier rectifications demanded by Austria-Hungary" (Article III.)—*i.e.*, a strip of territory several miles in width which would extend Austria-Hungary's control of the Danube below the Iron Gate and of the Petroseny coal-basin, and set her in indisputable command of every important pass along the whole Carpathian frontier. (3) Roumania was to concede "the economic measures corresponding to the situation" (Article IV.). The details of these were left for future settlement ; but, as Count Czernin explained on his return to Vienna, "our [*i.e.*, Austro-Hungarian] interests in the questions of grain and food supply and raw petroleum" would be "fully respected." "We shall strive," he said further, "by means of a new commercial treaty and the appropriate settlement of railway and shipping questions, duly to protect our economic interests in

* Mr. Balfour on April 6.

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Roumania.”* (4) Eight divisions of the Roumanian army were to be at once demobilised, and the remainder on the conclusion of peace between Roumania and Russia (Article V.). (5) “The Roumanian Government undertakes to support with all its power the railway transport of troops of the Allied Powers through Moldavia and Bessarabia to Odessa” (Article VII.). Such were the main terms of the Austro-German ultimatum; and in accordance with them a preliminary treaty of peace was signed on March 5. Pending the conclusion of a final treaty, the troops of the Central Powers remained in occupation of the country. In the meantime measures of “economic [penetration]” were quickly set on foot. It was announced on April 18 that four banking concerns in Austria-Hungary had combined to establish a bank in Roumania for the financing of industrial and agricultural enterprises;† and on April 23 that a predominantly German company would shortly be formed to control the Roumanian oilfields, which “remain in the hands of the military authorities so long as the war in the West continues.”‡

While the Central Powers were settling their score with Roumania in the South, circumstances in Finland gave Germany an opportunity of consolidating her position in the North. Finland, like the Ukraine, had declared her separation from Russia; and like the Ukraine, but more severely, she had suffered from the anarchy and bloodshed arising from the Bolshevik *régime*. The Finnish Bolsheviks or “Red Guards” were soon at open war with the forces of the Constitutionalists or “White Guards”; and the latter being inferior in numbers and material and hard pressed, the Government appealed for help, especially in the supply of arms, munitions and food, to Sweden and

* Reply to a deputation from the Vienna City Council on April 2, in the course of which the details of the “frontier rectifications” summarised above were also given.

† Vienna telegram in the German Press.

‡ Berlin telegram in the Dutch Press.

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to Germany. The Swedish Government declined (to quote the words used later by the Prime Minister) "to take part in such a dangerous game": but the German Government showed "no disposition" (to quote the same authority) "to permit the great sphere of influence thus voluntarily opened to her to slip through her hands." * On March 7, a month after the conclusion of peace between Germany and the Ukraine, a similar treaty was signed between Germany and another national fragment of the Russian Empire of the past. Since the separation of Finland from Russia had not yet been formally recognised by the British and other Governments, the first article of the treaty contained a declaration that "Germany will do what she can to bring about the recognition of the independence of Finland by all the Powers." There were many Finns who regarded this declaration as not altogether consonant with the national self-respect of the young Republic; and in business circles still louder protests were raised against the fifth article, which provided that "the trade relations between the two countries shall be regulated by a commercial and shipping agreement" until the conclusion of a permanent commercial and shipping treaty. The only other article requiring mention here is the tenth, which dealt with the Aaland Islands, the gate of the Gulf of Bothnia and the strategic centre of the Baltic seas. The predominantly Swedish population of these islands, which had been attached to the Russian province of Finland, had recently voted by a majority of 95 per cent. for incorporation in Sweden.† Article X., tacitly assuming the rejection of this claim, prescribed that the Russian forts on the islands shall be destroyed and that their "permanent non-fortification and their other management from a military and shipping technical point of view shall be regulated by a special agreement between Germany, Finland, Russia and Sweden";

* Dr. Eden, Swedish Prime Minister, on March 20. *Times*, March 22.

† Appeal of the Aaland Islanders to the Senate of Finland, the King of Sweden, and the German Emperor. *Times*, March 14.

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other Baltic States to be parties to the agreement "if desired by Germany."

The members of the Finnish Government who were responsible for the conclusion of this treaty are not representative of educated Finnish opinion as a whole. They belong to the party of the Extreme Right ; and it is possible that the Finnish Senate may decline to confirm the treaty. But in the meantime German force has followed close on the heels of German diplomacy. On the day before the signing of the treaty it was officially announced that, "as a result of the Finnish Government's request for military assistance, German troops have landed on the Aaland Islands" ; and on April 3 a German army was disembarked on the mainland at Hangö. Thenceforward regular German *communiqués* from the Finnish front were published. They recorded the occupation of Tammerfors, the chief industrial centre of Finland, on April 3, of Helsingfors, the Finnish capital, on April 15, and of Viborg, within a hundred miles of Petrograd, on May 1. It is suggested that the "White Guards" and their German allies may advance eastwards beyond the old Finnish frontier and occupy Russian Karelia. The inhabitants of this district are mainly of Finnish stock and speech : it is the home of Finnish folklore and saga, and regarded by the Finns as the birth-land of their civilisation. Through it, moreover, runs the Murman Railway—the only outlet from Petrograd to an ice-free harbour on the northern coast. Long fastened on the Adriatic and now grasping the Black Sea, the tentacles of German power have encircled the Baltic and may even gain a hold upon the Arctic Ocean.*

Thus swiftly and completely the German peace in the East was made. And there was no doubt as to where the

* The Finnish claim to Karelia is an old one, and its annexation to Finland was recognised by Article XVII. of the treaty between the Russian and Finnish Bolsheviks, concluded in February last. North of Karelia the Murman Railway traverses districts the scanty inhabitants of which are mostly Lapps.

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main credit for the achievement lay. The representatives of the German people in the Reichstag—it scarcely need be said—had had nothing whatever to do with it. The agents of the civil Government had succeeded in laying one of the foundation-stones at Brest Litovsk, but had then found themselves powerless to continue the work and had left it unfinished and unstable. The men who had so promptly and firmly overcome the deadlock and completed and secured the foundations so that the other parts of the structure seemed to fall into their places by themselves, were the chiefs of the German Army. It was not without significance that the treaty with the Bolsheviks had been signed not only by Herr von Kühlmann and Count Czernin, but also by a Prussian soldier, General Hoffman, an unprecedented incident which evoked a few futile protests in the Reichstag. The ending of the war in the East was in fact acclaimed as a masterpiece of Prussian militarism. Inevitably, therefore, the creed and its exponents regained in an instant the hold they had possessed on the hearts and minds of the German people in 1914. The long protraction of the war, the failure of so many promises of victory, the pressure of an unbroken ring of enemies, had begun to cloud its prestige and to weaken its grasp. But now, it seemed, Hindenburg and Ludendorff had suddenly proved anew its ancient power, had re-established its historic tradition of conquest and aggrandisement, had broken the ring like the great Frederick and imposed a victor's peace on half the circle, and finally had revived the hope of victory in the West as well as in the East and the dream of a German peace for all the world. A sign had been given, and those among the German people who had been tempted for a moment to stray from the iron path of Prussianism returned to their old gods.

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III. A NEW BIRTH OF PRUSSIANISM

THE peace in the East was warmly approved by the general body of public opinion throughout Germany : and the Reichstag confirmed the treaties with the Ukraine and the Bolsheviks by overwhelming majorities. It mattered little that the settlement violated at various points the principles to which many Germans had paid lip-service in the summer of 1917 and on which the Reichstag Resolution had been based. Government spokesmen tried indeed to minimise the discrepancies. Count Hertling, unable to argue that the peace with the Bolsheviks was attained by agreement and not by force, was at pains to insist that the Army had only advanced at the urgent request of the populations of the Baltic Provinces* ; and Count Czernin, fresh from the treaty with Roumania, declared that " the slight frontier rectifications were *not* annexations."† But there was no need for such pretences. The majority of the Reichstag, for example, were not so much concerned to twist their construction of all that had been done in the East into agreement with their Resolution as to escape from that embarrassing commitment, to explain it away, to shelve and forget it. At first, it is true, Herr Erzberger, its principal author, protested to the Reichstag, amid laughter from the Left, that the Russian peace was " within the limits " of it ;‡ but he and his colleagues in the coalition soon began to claim that, since the Entente Powers had refused the peace offer it embodied, they need no longer be bound by it. And when presently new hopes were raised of " annexations and indemnities " in the West, the newspapers and public speakers of the Centre and Progressive Parties declared in chorus that their hands were free, while

* *E.g.*, in the Reichstag, February 25.

† Speech at Vienna, cited p. 443.

‡ Reichstag, February 27.

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in Pan-German circles the definite repudiation of the Resolution was demanded.* By the middle of April most of the Berlin Press had come to speak of the crisis of 1917 as possessing "only an historical value."† In fact, as a Junker deputy put it in the Prussian Diet, "the damned peace resolution" was dead.‡ And beside its grave we can conceive the shade of Bismarck murmuring his famous maxim, not perhaps without anxiety as to the manner of its application by men of a lesser breed—"Not by speeches and majority votes are the great questions of the time decided, but by blood and iron."

The Majority Socialists, as was only to be expected, were not far behind the middle-class parties in resuming their previous acquiescence in the military control of war policy. Several of their newspapers described in triumphant language the rapidity of the advance into Russia and the great captures of guns and war material "which our Army Command can make very good use of on the western front."§ And to the glamour of German victory was doubtless added the prospect of work and wages for the German working-class resulting from the economic ascendancy established throughout the eastern borderlands by the peace. Thus the Majority Socialists were not minded to oppose its ratification in the Reichstag; they voted in favour of the Ukrainian treaty, they abstained from voting on the treaty with the Bolsheviks. And the Press took the same line as the politicians. The Russian peace was not the peace they wanted—so ran the refrain—but it was not to be repudiated. "To-day," said one paper, "it is an accomplished fact that Europe can no longer

* E.g., A meeting of the *Gesamtvorstand* of the *Alldeutsche Verband* at Berlin on April 14 passed the following resolution: "The German people must demand from the sense of duty of the German Reichstag that it give up the decision of July 19, 1917, and, following the historical events, stand for the war-aim which arises out of the military situation."

† Berlin correspondent of *Frankfurter Zeitung*.

‡ Count Spee, April 30.

§ Article of the *Internationale Correspondenz*, reproduced in many Majority Socialist newspapers.

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become Cossack.”* “After all,” asked another, “is not any peace better than war?”† Of all the many organs of Majority Socialist opinion it appeared that only two or three were bold enough to stand against the flowing tide. In one of these, Herr Wendel, the youngest member of the Reichstag, wrote: “After this peace with Russia . . . after this peace with Roumania . . . what remains of all those flowery phrases about an understanding, the right of self-determination, disarmament, a League of Nations, but empty sound and smoke? The policy of force has won.”‡

But this was a voice crying in the wilderness. The Minority Socialists were the only party with enough conviction and enough courage to denounce the Russian treaty and to back their words with their votes. In January, during the course of the conference at Brest Litovsk, they had taken an active part in the strike organised among the munition workers as a protest against Pan-German propaganda, the organisation of food-supplies, the delay in reforming the Prussian franchise, and, above all, the failure of the Government to bring about a general peace. Little had come of it. The Trade Unions had held aloof; the Majority Socialist leaders, afraid to condemn the strike, but still more afraid to oppose the Government, had tried to mediate; and after three days the strike had been rigorously and completely suppressed by the military authorities, and its instigators, including a prominent Minority Socialist member of the Reichstag, arrested and imprisoned. But this fresh proof of the absolute power exercised by the Army Command over the domestic life of Germany had not deterred the party from maintaining an unflinching opposition to its policy in the East. Herr Haase told the Reichstag the unpleasant truth that “a peace of power had been forced upon the Russians.”

* Königsberg *Volkszeitung*.

† Munich *Post*.

‡ Frankfurt *Volksstimme*.

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"Our children and our children's children," he said, "will have to pay for this policy."* And what was the result of this resolute stand? To all appearance it has checked the current of opinion among the German workers which in 1917 was flowing strongly towards the Minority Socialists and has turned it back to the Majority. It is probable that the strike had already provoked a reaction; for the love of order and efficiency is deep-rooted in every German heart; the spectacle of the chaos in Russia under the Bolshevik *régime* has been almost as repugnant to the great majority of the working class as to the Prussian oligarchy itself; and, if forced to the choice, they prefer to submit to a Government which, if iron-handed, is clean, orderly and efficient rather than to side with those who summon Germany to follow Russia along the path of Revolution.† And in their opposition to the peace as in their support of the strike the policy of the Minority Socialists doubtless seemed dangerously akin to Bolshevism. Add to that the sense of German victory, so carefully stimulated by the Kaiser, the Army chiefs and the civil Government, the actual attainment of peace in the East and the hopes it offered for the future of German trade and industry, and it is easy to account for the set-back to the only genuinely "pacifist" movement in Germany. The seriousness of this set-back is clear from the by-elections. The Minority Socialists lost ground heavily in two municipal contests in Berlin on March 3; and on March 14 they suffered a still more serious defeat at Niederbarnim, where a vacancy in the Reichstag had been occasioned by the death of a prominent

* Reichstag, February 27. Cf. the *Arbeiter Zeitung*, the chief Austrian Socialist organ (February 27): "It will leave half a dozen small States to form a second Balkans; to be the occasion for intrigues between the Great Powers and the starting-point of new perils of war."

† In *Vorwärts* (February 15) an article by Otto Braun, the well-known Majority Socialist, drew "a thick and visible line of demarcation" between the Russian Bolsheviks and the German Socialists. "They must be told with all plainness that their hope of an early violent revolution in Germany is a piece of madness. . . . There is no room in Germany for the Bolshevik methods of revolution."

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member of their party. This industrial constituency in the northern and eastern suburbs of Berlin had always been dominated by the advanced wing of Labour; but the Majority Socialists carried it by 26,694 votes over the 17,815 given to the Minority candidate.

“The result,” said *Vorwärts* (the chief mouthpiece of the Majority Socialists since October 1916), “makes almost a certainty out of the supposition that the Independent movement is only one of those ephemeral phenomena which the Socialist Party has often witnessed and outlived. This movement will also decline, and its supporters will return to the Main Party or disappear from public life.” *

The great majority of the middle and working classes in Germany have thus accepted, with more or less approval, the triumph of the General Staff in the East and the restoration of its supreme authority at home. And naturally it has provoked an outburst of exultation from the Prussian Junkers. Their politicians and their leader writers have vied with each other in pæans on the House of Hohenzollern and its pillars, Hindenburg and Ludendorff, and in abuse of the Reichstag for its meddlesome interference in 1917. “What is all this hubbub about democracy?”† they ask; and in that spirit they are setting themselves to wipe out all traces of the concession, slight as it was, which was made to democratic principles in the crisis of last summer. In direct repudiation of the Kaiser’s pledges and in open opposition to the express desire of the Government, an elaborate six-class franchise was substituted in Committee of the Lower House of the Prussian Diet for the equal franchise proposed in the Government Bill, and on May 2, despite the protests of Count Hertling and his promise to provide the most effective “safeguards,” the Committee’s resolution was adopted by the House by 235 votes to 183. The Prussian Government may eventually deem it the wisest course to enforce the fulfilment,

* March 27.

† Herr Wildgrube; *Times*, February 26.

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in outward form at any rate, of the Kaiser's promises ; but whatever the upshot, the action of the Diet has revealed how fully the old obstinate self-confidence of the Prussian oligarchy has been restored by the events of the spring.

At all points, in fact, reaction triumphed in Germany as the result of the peace in the East. The German people bowed themselves before the masters of the Prussian system as gladly or submissively as in the days before the war. It only remained for them to bring the recalcitrant elements in Austria to heel again. The disclosure by the French Government that the Emperor Charles had initiated separate negotiations with France early in 1917 and had even alluded to her "just claims in Alsace-Lorraine" gave them the opportunity of making their power felt. The Vienna Government's prompt denunciation of the notorious letter as a forgery was not enough. The Emperor Charles was obliged to sign telegrams to the Kaiser repudiating M. Clemenceau's charges and affirming the complete solidarity between the Hapsburg and the Hohenzollern Empires. Following on the publication of these humiliating documents, Count Czernin's resignation was accepted and Baron Burian was restored to the post at the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office which he had held from the beginning of 1915 till the Emperor's accession. The re-appointment of the man who is known as "Tisza's shadow" and has always been regarded as his intimate and instrument, proved to all the world how unshaken is the traditional hold of Prussian and Magyar militarism on Austria-Hungary and how futile are the hopes of those who think it possible for the "brilliant second" at Schönbrunn to break away from his masterly principal at Potsdam.

Thus all the ground was cleared for the chiefs of the German General Staff to continue with undisputed authority their conduct of the war ; and already, on the morrow of the Eastern peace, they had begun to consolidate and extend the position they had won by it. Developments in Finland

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have already been described. Meanwhile a series of messages to the Kaiser and deputations to the Chancellor began to arrive from the "liberated" Baltic lands *on both sides* of the line drawn in the Treaty of Brest Litovsk. The various bodies from which they came, provincial and municipal, social and academic, were by no means representative of the populations of these countries, in which the native peasantry form an overwhelming majority,* but rather of the landowning and commercial classes of predominantly German stock. The Kaiser himself had given them their cue in his telegram to Hindenburg on the signing of the Russian Peace: "Our Baltic brethren and countrymen are liberated from the Russian yoke and many again feel themselves Germans." Accordingly, the German *Ritterschaft* of Livonia hastened to offer the Kaiser their most humble thanks "for putting this ancient German colony under the protection of the powerful German Empire," while the German professors and students of "the old German university" of Dorpat expressed their gratitude "for the deliverance of Germanism." As early as March 8 the Landesrat of Courland passed a resolution asking "the King of Prussia and German Emperor to accept the Ducal Crown." On March 26 the Municipal Council of Riga requested that the "provinces of Livonia, Estonia and Courland, together with the Baltic metropolis of Riga, should form a united local monarchy . . . under the supremacy of the exalted House of Hohenzollern, united to Germany in unchanging fidelity for all time by a personal union." A few weeks later a United National Council of Livonia, Estonia, Riga, and Oesel expressed the same desire for a "united State." "annexed to the German Empire by personal union with the King of Prussia." In reply to these and other similar addresses the Kaiser and his Chancellor declared their

* For the statistics of the population of Lithuania and the Baltic Provinces and the antagonism of the peasantry towards the Germans, see the article in the last issue of THE ROUND TABLE (March, 1918).

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readiness to assist in uniting the Baltic Provinces and in concluding "the requisite conventions relative to military matters, the currency, communications, customs, etc.," between the German Empire and the new State. The request for a "personal union" with Germany under the Prussian Crown was to be "benevolently entertained." If the present settlement in the East were to remain unaltered, the virtual annexation of the Baltic lands would thus seem to be inevitable. The rulers of Germany evidently regard the whole territory—with its oppressed and sullen peasantry—as a ripening fruit (in the words applied by the *Kölnische Zeitung* to Livonia)* "which will have nothing more to do with Mother Russia and is falling into the German garden by its own weight."

And what of Poland, left derelict by the repulse of Russia? The constitution it is to "receive," as Count Hertling put it on February 25, is still under discussion. It is apparently to be an "autonomous" State, but it is certainly not to be a united nation. Not only is there obviously no question of the inclusion of the Poles now in Prussia, but the remnant of ancient Poland which survived in the Russian province is to suffer yet a fourth partition. Already by the treaty of February the district of Cholm was ceded to the Ukraine.† The exact delimitation of the frontier was left by the treaty to a Joint Commission; and the Cholm line may be modified to appease the Poles of Austria. But that territory in the north and west of Poland will be annexed to Prussia seems unquestionable—if, again, the German peace in the East should endure. Untroubled by their failure in the past to reconcile or to absorb the Poles already within their borders, the Prussian Junkers are demanding the incorporation of several millions

* March 13.

† Herr Gröber (Centre Party) in the Reichstag, February 19, pointed out that by planning elections "for the new Poland" in the district of Cholm, the Government had already recognised it "as belonging to Poland as a matter of course."

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more.* “The Poles,” said Count York von Wartenburg in the Prussian Diet, “must be thoroughly well taught that they *belong* to Prussia.” And the master is of the same mind as his disciples. “I shall not neglect,” said Hindenburg, “to obtain adequate strategical safeguards for the Eastern marches.”† Mutilated, enfeebled, cut off from the sea and “enclosed in a ring of iron,” the Polish State (in the words of the Polish delegation at the Rome Congress in April) is to be “degraded to the status of a German *hinterland*. Then there would be no further obstacle to the flow of the German tide eastwards and Germany’s dominion over Central and Eastern Europe would be assured.”‡

The eastward flow of the German tide is already running far out across South Russia. “The territories of the Ukraine,” said Herr von Kühlmann in the Reichstag on February 19, “embrace the whole northern coast of the Black Sea”; and in its self-appointed task of consolidating these territories against the revolutionary forces in Russia, the German Army occupied Odessa on March 13 and Nikolaiev, with its port and naval arsenal, a few days later. Easily overcoming such resistance as it met with, it has penetrated since then to the Crimea and to Rostov and is approaching the foothills of the Caucasus and the steppe that borders on the Caspian.§ Nearer home, meanwhile, the exaction from an unwilling peasantry of the food contributions imposed by the treaty has proved a difficult task; and the German military authorities have been obliged to override the Ukraine Government and take action on their own account. At the beginning of May the issue of Marshal von Eichhorn’s decree, ordering the peasantry to work, the subsequent arrest of members of the Government by German soldiers within the official

* E.g., in the debate in the Upper House of the Prussian Diet in the second week of April.

† To the National Liberal Association of West Prussia in April.

‡ The text of the Polish manifesto is given in the *New Europe*, No. 81.

§ An ethnological map, published in the *Münchener Neueste Nachrichten*, extends the frontier of the Ukraine to the Caspian Sea.

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precincts and the appointment of a Pro-German Ukrainian general as a kind of dictator, proved—if proof indeed were needed—that the relations of the Ukraine to Germany are not those of a free and independent ally.

Lastly, on May 7, the final Treaty with Roumania was concluded. In its main lines it carries out the provisions of the Preliminary Treaty. The annexations by Austria-Hungary are confirmed. Bulgaria recovers the southern part of the Dobrudja which was assigned to her by the Treaty of Bucharest in 1913, with new and extensive “frontier rectifications.” The rest of the Dobrudja up to the St. George mouth of the Danube remains in the hands of the Quadruple Alliance as a whole (Article X.). Except for a small force on the Russian border the whole of the Roumanian army is to be reduced to a peace footing; and all the artillery and war material thus made available is to be entrusted to the custody of the Supreme Command of the Allied forces remaining in occupation of part of Roumania until the conclusion of a general peace (Articles IV. and V.). Roumania is to conclude a new Danube Navigation Act, guaranteeing freedom from tolls or harbour dues to the traffic of the Allied States down the Roumanian Danube and abolishing, five years hence at the latest, the duty previously levied by her on goods passing through her ports. Moreover, the International Danube Commission which contains representatives of all the great European Powers is to be replaced by one which represents only “the States situated on the Danube or the European coasts of the Black Sea” (Article XXIV.)—a significant revelation of the exclusive character of the *Mittel-Europa* programme.

Humiliating as these terms may be, it is not the declared intention of the German Government to make Roumania its perpetual enemy. As a set-off to the loss of the Dobrudja Roumania is promised “an assured trade route” to the Black Sea by Constanza; and even the recent adhesion to Roumania of the province of Bessarabia, predominantly Roumanian in nationality, as the result of the

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decision of the local Diet, has been reluctantly confirmed. It is apparently the aim of Prussian statesmanship, with the co-operation of the Pro-German elements in Roumania, gradually to wean her from the dream of freedom and to draw her, by appeals to personal and class interests as well as by the proof of German power, within the fabric of a *Mittel-Europa* firmly knit together by economic and military ties and strictly controlled from Berlin. To such a future for Roumania the great mass of her population is passionately averse ; but such would surely be her fate—if the German peace in the East were to be forced on the acceptance of the world. And the German people, at any rate, are not now in the mood to doubt the fulfilment of that all-governing condition.

“The Black Sea, like the Danube,” writes Herr Jäckh, a publicist of the Eastern school of German imperialists, “will be free from Russian, French, and English interference ; Russia will no longer touch its coast and disturb the East in the service of England and France. The Black Sea will be entirely encircled by the Quadruple Alliance—to the largest extent by Turkey ; secondly, by Bulgaria (both of them allies of Germany) ; further by the Ukraine and by Transcaucasia (both of them protectorates of Germany), and between them by Roumania (Germany’s converted ally).”*

IV. FROM EAST TO WEST

FROM the moment the military collapse of Russia was confirmed by the Treaty of Brest Litovsk the Army Command of the Central Powers no longer needed to keep large armies in the East, and the subsequent operations described above were carried out with relatively few troops. It was possible, therefore, by a wholesale transfer of men and guns, including the captured Russian artillery, at last to outnumber the Entente forces on the Western front. The Kaiser and his generals were thus confronted with a choice of policies. Should they stand on the defensive,

* *Deutsche Politik* (Times, April 27).

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able as they now were to count on repelling any attack for at least a year to come, and from this strong position propose a bargain to the Allies, offering substantial concessions in the West, and asking in return for the acceptance of the German settlement in the East, and the restoration and enlargement of the German Colonial Empire, together with complete equality and freedom of action for German commercial enterprise throughout the world? Or should they take the offensive and, with better chances of success than they had ever had since 1914, make one last bid for a supreme, decisive victory?

The choice they made now belongs to history. Perhaps, in their own interests, it was the right one; for the democracies of the West would not have accepted the bargain involved in the other alternative. No more in 1918 than in 1917 is the fate of Belgium and Serbia and Alsace-Lorraine, the establishment of a new order of freedom and justice throughout the world, a matter for them of "give and take." For them the war is a conflict of ideals between which there can be no compromise, and the only end to it which they can willingly accept is an end which destroys the domination of Prussian militarism and makes the world safe for democracy. But it is improbable that any such conception of the Allies' purpose and determination was the primary cause of the decision. Its primary cause, surely, was that the attitude towards the war of those who made it—the inner ring of Prussian soldiers round the Kaiser and his heir—is as uncompromising as our own. For them also the war is a contest as to which of two ideals shall govern the future of mankind. For them also there can be no bargain. Peace on such terms would only mean for them a breathing-space in which to gather strength for a real settlement of the inexorable issue.* And any such delay, they must have argued, would be dangerous. "Who

* Cf. Ludendorff's declaration last summer that a peace concluded then would be followed by another war in ten years' time (ROUND TABLE, No. 28, September, 1917).

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can tell what will happen in Russia or how safe our new position in the East will be as long as democracy remains undefeated in the West ? How long, again, can we keep control over democrats in Germany and rebels in Austria unless we secure ourselves—perhaps for all time—by a triumph even more decisive than that of 1870 ? Now is our moment, when we are strongest at home through our successes in the East and strongest abroad between the collapse of Russia and the full development of American war-strength. Now, therefore, let us hazard all we have that we may win all we want ; and, if our old gods still guide the German sword, we shall have done, once for all, with the rivalry of ideals and the balance of power. *Weltreich oder Niedergang*, the Empire of the World or Downfall—that is our choice.”

So the word went out that peace could only be obtained in the West as it had been obtained in the East. And here as there it must be a “German peace.” That was the note which the war-lords of Prussia sounded in unison on the eve of the great offensive. “A good German peace,” said Hindenburg ; “no other can be of use to us.” “A German, not a soft, peace,” repeated Ludendorff. “No soft peace,” echoed the Kaiser, “but one which corresponds to Germany’s interests.”* And it was soon evident which of the Allied Powers they considered the chief obstacle to such a peace. It was against the British army that the German masses were launched ; the advance was hailed in the German Press as the beginning of “a single combat between Germany and England to decide our future position in the world” ;† while so eminent a Prussian statesman as Herr Helfferich reopened the old campaign of slander and invective, repeated the old parody of English history as an unbroken record of selfishness and perfidy, and the old charge that England made this war through jealousy of German trade, and declared that Germany was

* *Kölnische Zeitung*, March 14 and 15 ; *Times*, March 22.

† *Tägliche Rundschau* (*Manchester Guardian*, March 23).

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now fighting "the cause of the world" against "British domination." *

Once more, then, with the same object of forcing a swift decision, but with their main effort now directed against the British rather than the French, the German armies, as brave and disciplined as ever, resumed their westward march. And, just as in 1914, the mass of the German people behind them, dazzled now as then by the glitter of the German sword, intoxicated once again by the thought of German victory, greeted the initial successes with a burst of jubilation and discussed with confident anticipation the fruits of the final triumph. Again as in 1914, the advance of the soldiers was accompanied by a swelling chorus of demands from the publicists and politicians as to the terms of the "German peace." Pan-German circles at once revived their maximum programme of annexations and indemnities. The following resolution was passed unanimously by a conference of the "Fatherland Party" at Berlin on April 19:—

We expect that a close attachment of Courland, Livonia, Estonia, and Lithuania to the Empire, political, military, and economic, will be attained by the separate negotiations now taking place, and that fresh settlement-land for *Reichsdeutsche* will be opened up. In the West the improvement of our maritime-geographical position as against England is above all requisite. To this end it is unconditionally necessary that Belgium be permanently withdrawn from the Anglo-American and French influences, and, together with the Flanders coasts, be kept firmly in German hands, politically, militarily, and economically. Further, the ore-basin of Longwy and Briey must, in the urgent German industrial, manufacturing, agricultural, and commercial interest, be ceded by France to Germany. These two things, together with such further requisite frontier-securities as may be regarded as necessary by the Supreme Army Command, offer the guarantee for the permanent protection of our western frontier from enemy attack, for the freedom of German shipping, and for the undisturbed effectiveness and expansion of German work. Finally, the resolution demands the securing of our food and of the supply of raw material for industry and manufacture by the winning of new possibilities, and also the reconstruction of a

* Speech at Stuttgart; *Times*, April 24.

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colonial empire corresponding to our needs, and an adequate indemnity for the severe economic losses we have sustained, for the benefit primarily of our war-invalids.

In the same spirit General Keim, who has acted for more than three years past as military governor of the Belgian province of Limburg, declared that Belgium "has only been treated according to the laws of war" and that the annexation of the Flanders coast together with the necessary *binterland* is "indispensable for us." * The demand for the annexation of the Briey and Longwy districts of France (to which Krupp's chief newspaper added Morocco)† was repeated in a memorial presented to the Government and the High Command by the Union of German Iron and Steel Industrialists and the Union of German Iron-founders, recalling the notorious manifesto of the Six Industrial Associations in 1915.‡ Now as then the iron magnates of the West make but a thin pretence of covering their greed for the French ore-bed with the familiar plea for "frontier-rectifications" of a defensive character. General-director Vögler, indeed, says openly:—"The acquisition of the iron district of Briey and Longwy is a question of life or death for the German iron-industry." §

Nor, of course, are German ambitions oversea to be forgotten in the settlement with Britain. Dr. Solf, the German Colonial Secretary, declared, before the opening of the offensive in the West, that in urging the consolidation of the German colonies in Central Africa he had never meant to imply that South-West Africa or the colonies in the Pacific should be surrendered. All these possessions, he insisted, must be restored to Germany.|| Herr Zimmermann, meanwhile, demanded Nigeria and Sierra Leone

* *Kreuz-Zeitung*, April 10.

† *Kreuz-Zeitung* (*Times*, April 11).

‡ Discussed in the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, March 27. The 1915 Manifesto is reprinted in *The Issue* by J. W. Headlam (1917).

§ *Vossische Zeitung*, April 7.

|| *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, March 13.

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besides the French and Belgian Congo ; * and Professor Hans Meyer of Leipzig wrote as follows :—

Germany's greatest colonial peace aim must be the construction of a united Central Africa, resting on the four pillars of Togo, the Cameroons, East Africa, and South-West Africa, stretching from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean, and taking in the intermediate territory of our enemies, especially the Belgian Congo, French equatorial Africa, Portuguese Angola, and the northern half of Mozambique, thus forming with our old colonies a solid continental block.

To protect this great area he suggested that "a chain of naval stations" should be constructed out of the Portuguese colonies of St. Thomas, Guinea, Madeira, and the Azores.†

Still more significant of German intentions and German self-assurance is the revival of the demand for indemnities, not only in Pan-German circles, but in more sober and representative quarters. The annual reports of the Diskonto-Gesellschaft and the Dresdner Bank expressed the hope that the impending peace (to quote the latter) "will relieve the German people of a considerable part of the heavy financial burden imposed on it by the war." Official confirmation of this attitude was soon forthcoming. "Our enemies who have prolonged the war must provide compensation," said the Saxon Minister of Finance on April 9 :‡ and the claim for "economic and financial indemnities" was asserted a few days later by no less a personage than Prince Friedrich Wilhelm of Prussia.§ Finally, in a speech in the Reichstag on April 23, Count von Rödern, Imperial Financial Secretary, took the exaction of an indemnity for granted. "We do not yet know," he said, "the amount of the indemnity that we shall win."

Thus the aims of Prussianism, so familiar in the earlier

* *Vossische Zeitung*, April 16.

† In his recently published book, *The Portuguese Empire of To-Day*. Cf. the claims of Herr Hupfeld, director of the German Togo Company, *Times*, April 30.

‡ Herr von Seydewitz at Dresden.

§ *Kölnische Zeitung*, April 19.

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phases of the war, have been republished to the world with the same candour and the same assurance of success. And the one touch needed to complete the parallel was supplied by the disclosures of Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador in London at the outbreak of the war. His confession that the war was caused by the insistence of Berlin that "Serbia must be massacred" and that Sir Edward Grey worked wholeheartedly to obtain a peaceful solution which all the Powers could honourably accept, recalled and confirmed the statement of the facts by the British Government in August, 1914. His admissions, moreover, that there was no desire in commercial circles in England for anything but peace and friendship with so good a customer as Germany and that treaties securing a German "sphere of influence" in Mesopotamia and the Portuguese Colonies had been completed and only remained unsigned because Sir Edward Grey would not concede the desire of the German Foreign Office to keep them secret—these admissions disposed once more of the myth, so sedulously propagated by the German Government, of an envious England, plotting untiringly for the "encirclement" of Germany, jealously barring her from all access to "a place in the sun," and finally engineering this war for her destruction.

But no more now than in 1914 are the German people in the mood to listen to the truth. They have not lost the habit of docility. They did not question the truth or the morality of the case put forward by the Prussian oligarchy for the necessity of the war, for the violation of Belgium; nor do they question now the case for a "German peace" in the West as in the East. They only judge the cause of Prussianism by its success, its right by its might. And so, their old belief in its invincibility buttressed by the events of the last few months, they are ready to go on sacrificing their manhood and bearing their load of suspense and privation in order that Prussianism may prevail in its last great effort to overthrow the rival creed of brotherhood and equality among men and nations and enthrone itself by force above all the world.

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V. THE TESTING OF THE COMMONWEALTH

WHETHER Prussianism is sooner or later to achieve this consummation of its being or to be deprived for ever of its power to obstruct the progress of mankind towards a better life depends mainly on the conduct of the peoples of the British Commonwealth during the coming months. The fighting power of the American Republic (for reasons discussed in the following article) cannot be fully developed in Europe until next year. The peoples of France and Italy, meanwhile, suffering more acutely than we can easily realise behind our wall of sea from the horrors and anxieties of invasion, and the peoples of Belgium and Serbia, in captivity or in exile, are looking to us to stiffen and secure the whole alliance, not only by our military and naval strength, by our ships and coal and food, but especially by the example of that unflinching tenacity of will which the tradition of friend and foe alike ascribes to us.

If the German onset in France attains its main strategic object, we shall need to remember that tradition, and we shall do well to recall the events in our history on which it chiefly rests. For, whatever the issue of the present battle, our position at the end of it cannot be worse nor our prospects more desperate than they seemed a century ago on the morrow of Ulm and Austerlitz. All Europe then lay prostrate at Napoleon's feet, and Britain stood alone in his path to world-dominion. Save for the young colonies in Canada, who a few years later were to render noble service to the Commonwealth in a distant field of the war, there were no democracies overseas to set their manhood in the breach beside the soldiers of the motherland. Above all, the American Republic, her youthful vision clouded by the estranging memories of the Revolution, stood aloof and hostile. But the courage of our forefathers rose all the higher because they were alone and "with their backs to the wall." For ten weary years, despite checks and reverses abroad and pessimism and intrigue at home, the British

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Government carried on the war with the same grim determination with which Wellington and his men fought on in the Peninsula, till the military domination of Napoleon was wholly and finally destroyed and the eternal issue between liberty and despotism decided for a hundred years. If history repeats the first act of the drama, it will be for us to prove ourselves worthy of our fathers and to see it played out to the end.

It may be hoped that the ordeal in front of us will not be so severe as that ; but in any case it will be severe enough to try our utmost strength. For if the German advance, already checked by the heroic resistance of the Allied armies, is finally brought to a standstill, let no one suppose that the outcome of the whole long struggle will be at once thereby determined, and the purpose with which we entered on it nearly four years ago within an ace of its fulfilment.

The German High Command will have failed, it is true, to win the stake for which they gambled, and they will be faced with the consequences of failure—the bitter disappointment of the German people and their allies and a reaction, perhaps, against their supreme control of the policy of the Central Powers as swift and strong as that which confirmed and applauded it on the eve of the offensive. But the card they rejected in the spring can still be played. They can fall back on the defensive and propose a “bargain” peace. And if such a peace could be obtained—a peace which at the price of concessions in the West left Germany mistress of the East from the Gulf of Bothnia to the Caspian, a peace also at which we dropped our economic as well as our military weapons—then the exponents of Prussian militarism could claim to the German people that, if the whole of their dream had not come true, at least the war had left Germany far more powerful than it found her, and that force once more, and force alone, had made a world of enemies and rivals consent at long last to her aggrandisement.

Such, doubtless, will be the method by which the Prussian oligarchy, if their great military gamble goes

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against them, will seek to avert their fate. And if the spirit of the British Commonwealth were as clouded and uncertain now as it seemed to be last winter, they might hope to succeed. But the clouds and uncertainty of the winter have been dispelled by the events of the spring. With the daily increase in the toll of loss and grief, with the thought of yet another winter of war in front of us, the old temptation will certainly return ; but no one who reads the record of German action and opinion in those decisive weeks between the Peace of Brest Litovsk and the opening of the Western offensive can ever play again with the belief that Prussian militarism is not a real unchanging obstacle to the attainment of our purpose or that it can be circumvented. We may still think it possible that, if once the shadow of defeat begins to darken the horizon, the German Government may be hard put to it to subdue the discontent and anger of the masses, and that the smouldering embers of unrest in Austria-Hungary may flame out in rebellion ; but no one will now imagine that to come to terms, like the Bolsheviks, with the present rulers of the Central Empires would foster the forces of disruption within them. The Reichstag coalition, again, may be recreated and renew its conciliatory professions ; but no one now will interpret them as a proof of " a change of heart " in the German people, of a real *rapprochement* between their ideals and our own. Nor will anyone believe now, whatever the Hapsburg may wish or say, that he has in actual fact the power to free himself from the Hohenzollern. And no one, finally, will fancy now that Prussianism itself has been converted by the lessons of the war. Even in peace its disciples were impatient of evasion or concealment ; when the war came they stripped off all pretences ; and now again they stand, naked and unashamed, defying the judgment of the civilised world, confessing their hatred of democracy and their scorn of public right.

We face our ordeal, then, with no illusions. There is no way round the obstacle. Only by the straight road, by

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meeting the force of Prussianism with "the righteous and triumphant force which shall make Right the law of the world," can we attain our end. With the resources of America behind us and our allies, there is no doubt that in the long run we have the material power to do it. The issue depends on whether we have also the requisite moral power. France and Italy are facing their trial with clear eyes and undivided hearts: can we do likewise? Now that the spirit of 1914 has been restored to us, can we keep it unweakened and untarnished to the end? If we are faced with reverses or even disasters, can we keep our heads as high as our fathers and show the same stubborn power of recovery as they? Or, if it is only delays and disappointments that are in store for us, can we patiently endure, however long the time and heavy the sacrifice? Can we of this generation willingly acquiesce, if need be, in the loss of all our private happiness and comfort that so the generations of the future may live in a better world, free at last from the perpetual shadow of war, free to devote their gifts and energies not to perfecting the hideous machinery of conflict and destruction, but to the needs of their mutual welfare and the constructive tasks of a new epoch of unity and concord among nations? Can we, in this high temper, rigidly subordinate the particular interests of all the component elements of the Commonwealth—the individual and the class, the province and the nation—to the general interest of the whole? Can we show that we recognise and are determined to maintain the principles on which it rests? Can we prove to "the natural foes of liberty" that the freedom we venerate is very different from the licence they condemn; that freedom means to us the opportunity of service and the acceptance of responsibility; that freedom, as we understand it, does not split up society into a random multitude of factions, each jealously striving to pursue its selfish ends, but gives to each element its due place and power and the capacity to develop to the full its individual qualities, not as a concession to its sentiment or self-regard, but in order that it may thereby better serve the common weal? Can we show the world that a polity based on this

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ideal of freedom can fight in a good cause with the same unity and resolution as the Prussian system ? And as we stand together to defend it at the moment of its greatest peril, can we draw from our devotion to it the spiritual force which alone enables men to rise above themselves and carries them cheerful and uncomplaining, shoulder to shoulder, to the last limit of endurance ?

In our answer to these questions lies the supreme test of the British Commonwealth. By our answer it will be shown whether we can make good our title to be "the immemorial champions of freedom"; whether we can redeem the trust of our allies who have mingled their blood with ours and whose sacrifices, if we fail them, will like ours have been in vain; whether we can vindicate the faith of democracy throughout the world. A century ago, at the outset of the last long struggle with Napoleon, Pitt put the same stern truth before his countrymen in a speech in which he exhorted them to realise the magnitude of the danger threatening them and, in order that they might meet it in the proper spirit, to recollect also what they were contending for. "It is for our character," he said; "it is for our very name as Englishmen." The scope of the ordeal is greater now. It is the character of a worldwide Commonwealth that is at stake, the good name not of Englishmen or Scotsmen only or their descendants in each far-off Dominion, but of Irishmen likewise and French Canadians and Dutch South Africans, and of all those peoples in India and elsewhere who, whatever their race or creed, are members one of another in the body of the Commonwealth. We stand as a community in the presence of one of those great moments in history which put the character of all such human organisms to the proof and determine what part they are fitted to play in the life of the world. On how we bear ourselves now depends the judgment whether we are worthy of our faith and capable of realising in days to come the ideals of service for mankind to which we have dedicated ourselves.

THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN WAR-POWER

NATIONS at war have little time or inclination for a study of their neighbours. A neutral is judged by the extent of his acquiescence in reasonable measures of war directed against the enemy. An Ally is generally judged even more summarily by the promptness and force of his appearance on the field of battle. Yet the application of these rough standards, though natural, falls short of wisdom. Thorough international understanding is not merely a counsel of charity in times of peace ; it is also a condition of true foresight in the stress of war ; and this is particularly true in modern times, when every phase of feeling in a nation—every strand in the texture of its society—has a direct relation to the mobilisation of its resources for war.

At the present moment it would be folly for an American or an admirer of America to ignore the average Englishman's feeling of disappointment in regard to the United States. Neither do Americans desire to ignore it. One of the leading banking institutions of New York has just included the following frank confession in its Bulletin for April :

We have not made progress as fast as we might or should. . . . We have not as individuals appreciated our relations to the task. The Secretary of the Treasury announced that disbursements in this fiscal year will fall far below what was expected, because the war work is behind, and it is behind because the prosperity of the country has placed demands upon the industries which together with the war work could not be met. The lesson is plain. The

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labour supply and industrial capacity of the country must be devoted far more effectively and completely to the Government's needs.

On the other hand, Englishmen have to recognise some partial responsibility for their own disappointment. It is not only that a better knowledge of the United States both before and since her entry into the war might have saved them from many mistaken expectations. They have also to take into account that the loosening of the moral sinews of war in England during the past year, alluded to in the preceding article, has had its effect on the other side of the Atlantic. Uncertainties as to the validity of war aims ; adumbrations of a negotiated peace ; over-confidence in the resurrection of Russia or in the success of the Ypres offensive—all these phenomena in England have had their echo in America. Active opinion in the United States has tended to be divided into two sections—one contemplating the possibility of an early negotiated peace, the other assuming that the war would last for another three years, and that America had therefore time to develop her full strength as an independent military factor in the field. Neither of these views was probably shared by the Administration at Washington, but official knowledge could only imperfectly permeate the network of Government organs created to deal with the mobilisation of the country's resources, and it could not be communicated at all to the public, on whose co-operation such mobilisation must depend. Americans would have been quicker to recognise the supreme importance of the 1918 campaign if English public opinion itself had appeared to be conscious of it. Englishmen should not forget the gradual development of the war situation and of their own forecasts during 1917. When the United States entered the war the Russian Revolution was popularly regarded rather as an invigoration than as a collapse ; Kerensky long remained a hero ; the submarine menace overshadowed the question of man-power, and confident claims were made as to the size of the British ship-building programme. It is only recently that the

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withdrawal of the whole German army from the Eastern front has revealed itself to the mind of the country as an imminent danger. But now that the full menace of the situation has been appreciated the danger is that Englishmen will fall back on recriminations and despondency, and that the same lack of knowledge and understanding which has led them to expect too much from America in the past may lead them to expect too little in the future. Twelve months of war have revolutionised the United States, and already the American troops flowing into France to-day represent a very different country from that which sent General Pershing's original force to Europe eighty days after the declaration of war.

I.

THE United States has been commonly regarded in Europe as a country of mixed races, deficient in unity of sentiment, fertile in party divisions and unconscious of national responsibilities, but possessing vast economic resources which have been exploited with great energy and business ability. This estimate is just true enough to be misleading. The foreign elements in the American population are congregated mainly in the centres of industry, where their peculiarities have to be taken into account by political candidates and labour administrators, and in certain cases by the police. In some sections, especially in the Far West, the mixture of races has intensified labour troubles by generating local opposition to the war. But where this has happened "doctrines of internationalism, the conviction that all wars are capitalistic," usually already governed the mind of the English-speaking labour elements also. In general it is fair to say that the most ignorant and the least assimilable of the foreign elements are precisely those who have the greatest feeling for the United States as the home of liberty, and will therefore

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respond most readily to such appeals as that recently issued by the Seamen's Union to its members: "The nation that proclaimed your freedom now needs your services." The German and Irish elements are the only ones that have ever threatened to affect or modify the opinion of the country and it may fairly be said that the "Americanism" of these elements is not now in doubt. Moreover, partisanship in American politics and the slowness of the American people to respond to national responsibilities may be, and have been, as easily exaggerated as the economic strength of the country.

The truth is that, both socially and economically, America is loosely knit and vulnerable mainly in her means of internal communication. Distances are great, and the centres of population and production have been gradually shifting westwards. Economically this has entailed a vast railway system; socially, it has led to a great development of the Press and other channels of publicity. These are the two best-known achievements of America, but neither has proved equal to the growth of population and business. The breakdown of the railways last winter and the consequent shortage of coal and congestion of the ports on the Atlantic seaboard surprised Europe, but the danger had long been foreseen in the United States. The railways were weak. In 1914, out of a total mileage of 387,208 miles—or 288,923, excluding yard track and sidings—no less than 256,547 were single track, and the proportion of double track has been little if at all increased since then. The number of freight cars, which had increased by about 89,000 a year between 1900 and 1907, increased by only about 47,000 a year between 1907 and 1914, and between 1914 and 1916 the rate of increase appears to have actually fallen to about 600 a year. Similarly, the rate of increase in the number of locomotives employed fell from about 2,500 a year in the first period to 1,300 in the second period, while between 1914 and 1916 the number appears actually to have decreased by almost 900. Finan-

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cially, while the gross earnings of the companies had largely increased, the net earnings had strikingly diminished. Beginning from November, 1916, five successive committees had been formed to cope with car shortage and other difficulties, which had even then become notorious. Finally, the unprecedented flow of freight eastwards in 1917, culminating in an exceptionally severe winter, imposed a strain on the system which could not be met.

This weakness in the economic arteries of the country has a certain analogy in the sphere of national sentiment. The centre of the national consciousness lies really in the Middle West, but the channels which feed the Western Press run through New York. The news and views which should inform the mind of the farmers or factory worker in Illinois or Indiana have not been written for him but for the population of the Atlantic seaboard. Thus written, he has rejected them. Even the Press of Chicago, St. Louis and Kansas City has failed to mould the feeling of the region of which those cities are supposed to be the centres. Instead, the people of the Mississippi Valley States have evolved their own methods of information and education, their own newspapers, associations, State fairs and lecture circuits, wholly provincial in character, cut off from foreign news, gaining their views of politics rather from the peripatetic orator than from the Press correspondent at Washington. The popular magazines which circulate largely in these districts are for that reason deliberately written to suit these tastes.

No doubt, this account is something of an exaggeration, but it is broadly true. It explains the slow growth of interest in the war west of the Alleghanies during the days of American neutrality; and even during the past year, it explains not a few of the difficulties encountered by the Food Administration, the Department of Agriculture and other vital organs of the Administration in securing national co-operation in their policies.

The divergent interests and conditions of different

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regions constantly tend to give rise to movements out of harmony with the national trend. For instance, the Pacific Coast and the Rocky Mountain States still suffer from their peculiar labour conditions. A traditional industrial anarchy, extending from the lumber camps of Washington and Oregon to the mines of Arizona, has gravely hampered the production of aeroplane timber and reduced the output of copper in three months last summer by about 100,000,000 lbs. Farther east, a farmers' movement, under the name of the "Non-Partisan League," has captured the State Government in North Dakota and has begun to penetrate into Minnesota and the neighbouring States. Beginning in 1916 as a purely farmers' movement with a programme of State ownership of grain elevators and the like, it has, largely owing to the influence of its leader, A. C. Townley, taken on something of an anti-war and revolutionary tinge. It has been a centre of opposition to the price-fixing policy of the Food Administration and it has even attempted to form a coalition with discontented labour elements not only in the West but in New York, where the State Federation of Agriculture, representing the farmers, was also, at its meeting in February, up in arms against the agricultural policy both of the State and Federal Governments. Local conditions still exert a very great influence on national politics, as, for instance, in the elections in New York City and Wisconsin, where a variety of local controversies combined to give the socialist candidates a startling number of votes. These phenomena, while probably neither dangerous nor permanent, are similar to those which appeared in the West after the Civil War and indicate imperfect moral lines of communication between different sections of the country.

What is true of physical distances is also true of class divisions. America entered the war hampered by a more rudimentary system of relations between employers and employed in industry than perhaps exists in any other country in the same stage of economic development. The

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President's "Mediation Commission" reported in January that "American industry lacks a healthy basis of relationship between management and men," that "there is a widespread lack of knowledge on the part of capital as to labour's feelings and needs and on the part of labour as to problems of management," and that "too often there is a glaring inconsistency between our democratic purposes in this war abroad and the autocratic conduct of those guiding industry at home." These evils have given rise to many projects for improved machinery of administration, but they are fundamentally due not so much to defective organisation of industry as to defective communications. Here, as in other matters, reforms in the United States have to be preceded and supported by schemes of publicity unparalleled in other countries. Such bodies as the "American Association for Labour Legislation" have long been obliged to carry on campaigns of education which in more compact countries are replaced by the normal interchange of ideas. Advances in labour and industrial organisation have depended on the systematic popularisation of experiments instituted by the various State Governments or by individual employers in different parts of the country. Owing to the limitations of the Federal Government's powers, a large number of Bureaux in Washington—for instance, the Bureaux of Mines, Labour Statistics and Education, and the Children's Bureau—have been created not for the purpose of administration but in order to carry out this kind of co-ordinating propaganda. At the present moment the Labour Administration created by the President in January out of the former Department of Labour has a great administrative task, but its task of popular education is probably even greater.

Employers and employed have not only been divided from each other; they have also been equally distant from the Government. Government in the United States is not a unified body of policy or administration, for not only are legislation and administration in industrial and commercial

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matters distributed between the Federal Government, 48 State Governments, and even a number of municipalities, but also each Government, whether State or Federal, is split into two conflicting authorities, legislative and executive, and is overshadowed by the judiciary. The more advanced States have in recent years found this conflict of powers in such matters so fatal that they have set up Industrial Commissions and the like to act as practical dictators with both legislative, administrative and judicial powers; but in some cases at least, and especially perhaps in the case of the Federal Interstate Commerce Commission, these bodies have rather increased the misunderstanding between industry and Government than diminished it. On the one hand there has been a more or less bitter hostility and mutual suspicion between the Governments and the great corporations; on the other there has been almost open warfare between labour and the judiciary. Such elementary questions as Labour's right of association and the limitation of hours of labour have been fought back and forth over the floor of the State and Federal Courts, and even during the last year two judicial decisions have been handed down throwing into doubt the right of Unions to extend their membership in factories where any workman is under contract with the employer not to join a union. All this has led to a mutual lack of confidence which has been a serious obstacle to really cordial co-operation between the Government and the leaders of industry, and at the root of this discord of ideas and purposes has lain the same lack of adequate means of communication—divergencies of education; defects of legal and administrative training; instruction divorced from ideas or controlled by ideas arising out of local conditions or political phases; a multiplication of schools and colleges unco-ordinated by a sufficient body of teachers.

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II.

SUCH have been the weaknesses of the country as a whole. It remains to consider what has been their actual effect at the centre of war administration in Washington.

Before entering upon this there are two peculiar points which must be understood.

Largely owing to the limitation of Federal powers and the consequent restriction of Federal action in many vital matters of internal policy to a vague co-ordinating function the Civil Service at Washington has never been built up to anything like the same degree as in England. The "spoils system" which hampered its growth twenty years ago is now moribund, but the conditions of American Government themselves stand in the way of its full development. Consequently there was not at Washington even that steadying substratum of humdrum Civil servants on which new Departments in London like the Ministries of Munitions and Shipping have been built. Enormous staffs recruited haphazard from dozens of business houses and law offices had therefore to take up wholly new duties of which not so much as the groundwork had been laid, and, for reasons already explained, they did not even enter into any of that general goodwill among the non-official public which Whitehall, with all its red tape, had built up before the war.

To this was added the even greater handicap of the division of powers under the American Constitution. The British Constitution with its Ministry responsible to what is practically a single chamber Legislature allows a rapidity of action, legislative and executive, invaluable in war, whatever may be its danger in times of peace. A Defence of the Realm Act was passed in England on the first day of the war. Any measure the Government insists on

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as necessary for the war goes through without delay. Contrariwise, an inefficient and bungling Executive may be immediately brought to book by the Legislature and ousted. Some kind of harmony of opinion and action is forced upon both sides.

The American theory of Government is different. The Executive and Legislature are two hostile powers. It is the traditional duty of the Legislature to check the Executive. The Executive has gained greatly in power in recent years, and President Wilson, during his first term, had established a remarkable domination over Congress; but a continual fear on the part of Congressmen that the Executive will claim unlimited authority springs naturally and inevitably from the separation of powers and from the fact that the President is irremovable and not responsible to the Legislature. This has serious consequences in war. The Constitution does indeed give the President almost dictatorial powers in time of war as Commander-in-Chief of the Army, but Mr. Wilson has shrunk from the controversies and the appeals to the Courts to which an exercise of these powers without statutory authority might give rise. On the other hand, he hesitates to ask Congress for such statutory authority to the full extent required, and Congress, since it has no power to remove a President, is most reluctant on its side to give it. In consequence the United States has even yet no charter of powers comparable to the Defence of the Realm Act, though many very arbitrary powers have been granted to and exercised by the President. In particular, departmental reorganisation, redistribution and reform are limited by Congressional statutes—especially by the absence of any unified Budget system and by a vicious method of making appropriations, the avowed aim of which has been strictly to limit the power of the Executive and to retain the right of the Legislature to interfere in the internal organisation and functions of the Departments. All this has led to many difficulties in the rapid prosecution of war preparations

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Congress has much delayed the passage of complicated measures like the Food Bill, and has for months been at variance with the President as to the main principles of war administration. Committees of Congress have favoured Bills creating a Ministry of Munitions and a War Cabinet. The President has expressed his unalterable hostility to them, and produced his own Bill for freeing the Administration from hampering restrictions. This latter Bill, introduced into the Senate several months ago, was only finally passed by that body on April 29. Necessary reforms in organisation are meanwhile delayed.

These two conditions peculiar to Government in the United States—the absence of a Civil Service and the lack of necessary authority from Congress—have led to peculiar difficulties and developments. Expanding governmental functions have, in the absence of specific authority for their exercise, tended to be vested in purely advisory bodies. The innumerable committees of the Council of National Defence in the first six months of the war were attempts to secure representation in Washington of the technical and business interests throughout the country in order to effect by voluntary co-operation what could not be effected by executive authority. But here the general conditions of the country, which we have endeavoured to explain, had a very remarkable influence on the conduct of the war. These committees were necessary, partly in order to bridge the gulf between Government and industry, partly to bring the various members of particular industries throughout the country in closer touch with each other. But they did not succeed in bridging the gulf, at least at first. For instance, the advice of the Coal Committee as to the fixing of prices was summarily rejected. Divergent views and lack of understanding immediately appeared. For this, industry itself was largely responsible. The American nation was a year ago still less educated to the meaning of war than the British nation in 1914. In the last three years the harsh pressure of war has taught us

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that everything in our life, industrial, economic and social, must be subordinated to its all-consuming demands. Neither the American people nor American industry had fully learnt that lesson. There is no people in the world more ready to meet any sacrifice if it clearly understands its necessity. But the war was far away, and the terrible consequences of delay and of half-hearted action had not come directly home to them. It is true that the vastness of American resources made it unnecessary to stifle all peace activities to the extent that all European belligerents have been forced to do. But much in that direction required to be done and too little has been done. The big interests in American industry resented control. The steel industry, for instance, hampered war preparations by resisting the Government's price-fixing policy. The acute railway crisis in the autumn and winter to the causes of which we have already referred, was, in spite of all extenuating circumstances, largely brought about by the super-imposition of a huge war business on the top of a huge and unrestricted peace business. You cannot run peace and war together. You cannot have enough skilled mechanics to build an unparalleled number of ships, guns, trucks, shells, and aeroplanes, and at the same time to produce as many private motor-cars as before. There was not in the United States any control over industry and labour comparable to that necessarily exercised in European countries. Greater control would have saved time and prevented friction. As it was, in lieu of definite Government coercion, the President had in the summer to meet a growing public commotion by addressing an allocution to the business community on the subject of patriotism in its relation to profits. Later a new advisory body was created on a more official basis, to absorb a large part of the unco-ordinated activities of the Council of National Defence. This body—the War Industries Board—has been gradually expanded and was to a considerable extent re-organised at the beginning of April. But though it now

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possesses defined functions as a kind of co-ordinating liaison between the various purchasing Departments and between the United States and the Allies, it remains largely an advisory body, partly, no doubt, owing to the absence of power in the President to create a new administrative department and to allocate to it specific statutory powers. Good administration requires a clear delimitation of functions and the grant of proper power to exercise them. War requires action and not advice. It requires centralised authority capable of rapid and continuous decision, and much of the delay in war preparations at Washington has been due to the lack of these things.

Again, the peculiarities of the American Constitution and of American society have discouraged the Executive from adapting the machinery of government to the immensely expanded needs of war even where it had the power to do so. Both the British and French Governments have found it necessary to create new and central organs of government to deal with the new functions imposed upon them. In particular they had to create Ministries of Munitions, partly to provide supplies, still more to exercise a central control over industry. They had to create War Cabinets because urgent decisions of the highest importance had to be taken day by day affecting more than one Department and therefore incapable of settlement by any one Minister. These questions thus raised daily could not conceivably be thoroughly examined by the Prime Minister alone, nor were the original non-War Cabinets, meeting once or twice a week, competent bodies to decide. Difficult as a War Cabinet is to work entirely satisfactorily, some central body of the kind is during the war indispensable.

In Washington no machinery of this kind was created in 1917. Nothing in the shape of a War Cabinet existed, and the function of controlling industry was exercised in some degree by various Departments such as the Food and Fuel Administrations and the War Trade Board, but mainly by the advisory committees already referred to and by the

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War Industries Board. The President decided everything ultimately. Burdened as he was with the vast responsibility of foreign affairs and all internal administration as well, it was inevitable that many disputes of grave importance should only be submitted to him when they had reached a crisis. In the summer of 1917 Mr. Denman and General Goethals, the two chief officials of the Shipping Board, conducted for many weeks a public controversy in the papers, during which time the work of preparation for ship-building was more or less suspended. Ultimately the President dismissed them both. One day of this public controversy in England would have led to a parliamentary debate and one week of it to a parliamentary crisis.

But it would be a mistake to ascribe this lack of organisation simply to administrative ineptitude. It was difficult for Americans to adjust their mind to the necessity of a War Cabinet, because they had never known a Cabinet in the British sense of the word at all. As there is no Government in America responsible to Congress, but only a President responsible to the country, Cabinet officers have been merely the President's personal official family, appointed indeed by consent of the Senate but dismissable at the President's own will. As there is no joint responsibility in this official family, all responsibility for the administration as a whole tends to fall on the President, while each Cabinet member is tempted to consider only how to make his own personal record before the country. Further, the traditions of the Press bring all the steps taken by the Departments into the limelight of publicity, and this not because of any vulgarity in American public life, as seems too often to be supposed in England, but because, if the loosely-knit country is to be stirred to a realisation of its task, an apparently exaggerated publicity is really needed. Though Mr. Denman's personality unfortunately played a large part in the incident referred to above, it was this tradition of the public official's public record which made the incident possible; and this same

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necessity of setting constantly before the country the magnitude and progress of the Government's administrative business also accounts for many of the sanguine programmes of shipbuilding, army development and the like which have misled Allied opinion in Europe.

While such facts are not a justification for the slowness to centralise control in the hands of a War Cabinet, they do furnish some explanation of it, and an earlier appreciation of them might have enabled Englishmen to predict it. The same may be said of the failure to create a Ministry of Munitions. Mr. Baker stated that he was deterred from adopting proposals for such a Ministry by the size of the country and the absolute necessity for considerable decentralisation to meet the difficulties of distance and varying local conditions. This objection betrays some confusion of thought, but it reveals the manner in which the American mind is influenced by national conditions, and it is true that the Fuel and Labour Administrations, the Food Controller, the Shipping Board and the Railway Administration have all found it necessary to create zonal, State, or other regional authorities to discharge functions which in more compact European countries could be discharged by the central administration.

III.

THE foregoing are general considerations governing the whole work of the American Government. But the supreme task of a Government at war is to create and use an army, and some special consideration of this particular problem is necessary.

In the first place, the American army was at the outbreak of war in a state of complete unpreparedness. Nothing had been decided as to the types of artillery, machine guns or rifles to be adopted in the event of war, and months were spent after the outbreak of war in investi-

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gation. Many changes of type were made, not always with due regard to the vital factor of time. The Ordnance Department, as then constituted, unquestionably paid too little attention to that factor or to the great advantages, both from the point of manufacture, use in France, and common reserves, of adopting the British types unchanged, which had been and were being so largely made in the United States and Canada. In consequence the American army now has some British types, some French and some purely American.

Secondly, the American War Department set itself the most difficult and arduous task that it could have undertaken. It is not easy to put ourselves back into the atmosphere of the early part of 1917 when the United States entered the war. In April, 1917, the Russian Revolution had only just occurred, the Provisional Government was in power, and the subsequent collapse of the whole nation into chaos was then not generally foreseen. Few supposed that Germany and Austria would be able to withdraw almost the whole of their forces from the Eastern front, or anticipated that the Allies could not maintain at least a preponderance of numbers on the Western. At that time the alternatives seemed to be either that the Allies would break through on the Western front in 1917 or, failing that, that they could easily maintain a strong defensive attitude as long as they liked and until America had time to create a big army to assist in giving the finishing stroke. It is true that, owing to the exhaustion that was overcoming all European countries, there were obvious reasons for America to hurry, but in view of her immense resources and her reputation for organisation and rapidity of action an over-optimistic view was taken as to the length of time her preparations would require, and it was generally supposed by the public that at any rate by the summer of 1918—*i.e.*, more than a year after the entry of America into the war—American reinforcements would play a large part

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Since then the Russian collapse has changed the face of the war. The great German offensive has again revealed to us in a flash—what years of trench warfare had tended to obscure—that time is its essence. We see this now more clearly perhaps than we have since August, 1914, and we recognise clearly that America's value as a belligerent depends at least as much on the speed as on the extent of her preparations and on their taking such a form as will enable her—by providing *men*—to strike the heaviest blow at the earliest moment. If these truisms had been given their full weight by all concerned at the time when the character of America's preparations was determined—*i.e.*, during the Balfour and Viviani Mission to the United States—American preparations might have taken a different form. As it was, however, the American Government determined to create from the outset an entirely distinct American army with its own staff, its own types of artillery, of shells, of rifles, machine guns, etc. In other words, America followed the plan adopted by Great Britain at the outset of war, the plan which obviously every great nation would properly and instinctively follow, unless there were the most urgent and compelling reasons to the contrary.

Yet after their own experiences the Allied leaders can have had no illusions as to the difficulty of throwing together a vast army in a few months. It is to be presumed they realised the immense nature of the American task, and in addition that there were obvious reasons why American preparations should take a good deal longer even than England's at the beginning of the war. America was still more unprepared than England had been; her small army possessed far less knowledge of modern warfare, and far less staff experience than the British in 1914; it may be likened to the British Army before the South African War. Furthermore her great distance from the seat of war and the lack of shipping added immensely to her difficulties. Had there been no other delaying causes, therefore, it should have been realised that the help an

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American army as such could give in 1918 must necessarily be comparatively limited. The first really great and sustained offensive that the British New Armies were able to conduct was in July, 1916, at the Battle of the Somme or nearly two years after the commencement of war.

We can see now that there was another possible alternative open to the United States Government. In the light of present circumstances it would seem to have been the correct one, and indeed the dire pressure of events is now forcing the American Government to adopt it to a limited but still valuable degree.

That alternative was that the American Government while not abandoning in any way the determination to build up in time a great American army, should get large numbers of men actually into the fighting line months before that would have been possible by any other means, by incorporating temporarily American troops in the British Army. In other words, that the American troops should form part of the British Army in the same manner as had the Australians and Canadians.

For the American Government to act thus would have been of course an entirely different matter from what it had been for the Australian and Canadian Governments. Considerations of national pride and prestige, apart from the vital one of time, would naturally lead the American Government to create its own army. But if the factor of time had been rightly estimated, it would probably have outweighed all others.

The problem was different in essential respects from that facing the British Government in August, 1914. The British Army was ready to fight in France as a unit at once, and was affording valuable assistance within three weeks of the outbreak of war. All subsequent expansion of the Army was built on this nucleus already in France. In the second place the war had not been in progress for nearly three years. In the third place, and perhaps most important of all, the British and French spoke different languages.

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While other reasons might have inclined the United States Government to choose co-operation with the French army, similarity of language far more than outweighed them all, and, if any plan of the kind had been adopted, would have made their choice of the British Army inevitable. Had it been so adopted it can hardly be doubted that large numbers of American troops would long ago have been in the fighting line. Within nine months of the outbreak of war, although neither Canada nor Australia had had before any army at all, Canadian and Australian divisions had played a glorious part in the fighting line and decisively affected the outcome of great battles. The reason is obvious. Australia and Canada had in general merely to find officers and men. Equipment, guns, shells, rifles and aeroplanes were all found for them by the British Army. The higher command too at first was British. Australian and Canadian officers were able gradually to be trained in staff work, and to take over from the British Staff. Thus the date at which Canadian and Australian troops could actually take part in the fighting was limited only by the period of training required for their men and officers. If the United States had followed the same plan the British would have been able for many months to provide all materials required in the way of guns, shells, rifles and aeroplanes. The United States would in that case, and unquestionably with immense advantage to both sides, have adopted the British types of guns, shells, rifles, etc., in order as their forces grew to supplement the British output. Meanwhile the American soldiers would have been trained in the art of actual warfare. And when they were sufficient in numbers, and when their officers had been adequately trained in staff work, they could have been extracted from the British Army and formed into a complete American army. In other words, America's preparations would have taken a two-fold form, first a temporary period of absorption in the British Army, secondly concurrent plans and preparations in France and elsewhere for the time when the

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American forces would be reformed into an American army.

In the circumstances of that time probably any such plan would have been regarded as extravagant. It would have needed on all sides, and on that of the Allies quite as much as the Americans, a far truer appreciation than they had of the real war situation.

In considering American preparations, we must therefore first of all recognise that she was set the huge task of creating a great army out of nothing, and that until it was ready in all respects for action the American effort would have no appreciable influence in actually strengthening the battle front in France.

It is clearly impossible without far more knowledge than the public possesses to estimate the actual performances and failures of American army organisation and war material production. We know that the ordnance and aircraft programmes, like the shipbuilding programme, have been much delayed. That has been stated in the Senate investigations last winter and has been confessed by the reorganisations in the War Department and the Aircraft Production Board which have taken place since then. We know that there has been much administrative confusion and inefficiency. We know that the resources of the United States in skilled administration have proved inadequate and that not least among the ranks of the business community in whose ability the public abroad had generally reposed an almost superstitious trust. Such failures in efficiency had long been foreseen in the United States itself, where, during the last decade, an energetic, if somewhat ill-regulated, cult of the "efficiocrat" had grown, in universities, in municipalities and on public platforms, out of a realisation of certain ramshackle qualities in American business administration. But these failures, whether great or small, are mainly the natural consequences of the fundamental assumption on which American military policy has been based, and in face of the present crisis it is

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not of great importance what may have been the delay in the American programme for guns, shells, machine guns and the like. France and England can probably supply these for all troops that America can send to Europe in 1918. Delays in aircraft may be more serious but are not vital. What is vitally important is the largest possible supply of ships and, above all, of men, trained or untrained. It is on these simple problems that the attention of the Allies must be concentrated, to the exclusion of controversies on more intricate and complicated subjects. It remains to consider what in these circumstances are the grounds of the hope indicated at the beginning of this article.

IV.

IN any estimate of the rapidity with which the United States set herself to the task of war there are three things to be remembered to her honour, besides the generous and invaluable financial assistance which she has afforded—that she adopted conscription within forty days after the declaration of war, despatched General Pershing's force to Europe within little more than eighty days, and in substance adopted the whole Allied blockade programme by her embargo on exports to the northern neutrals within ninety days. Of these accomplishments by far the most remarkable, the first outstanding act, which must be placed to America's credit, is the rapid adoption of conscription. It was a policy totally foreign to all her current opinions and was voted by none more enthusiastically than by the representatives of the Middle West, which had been identified by many with confirmed pacifist opinions. That there have been practically no disturbances in its enforcement, even among such German populations as that of Wisconsin, was proof of the innate patriotism and growing unity of sentiment of all elements

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of the American people. By means of the draft America has had for months more than 1,000,000 men in training camps. She is now calling further large numbers, and can continue doing so indefinitely. Further numbers of men are certainly required, for if we are to suppose the war will continue during 1919, we must aim at getting sufficient men to make possible a military decision in that year. There is every evidence that Mr. Baker, since his return from Europe, has clearly grasped both the urgency of the present crisis and the full demands which will be made on American troops in the 1919 campaign. The one thing of which we can be sure in these days of uncertainty is that in this matter, in the provision of men, America's effort from to-day on will indeed be, in the President's words, "without stint or limit." And it is important for Englishmen to remember this. This summer there will be many thousands of Americans in the trenches, wherever the exhaustion of British and French reserves may need them. There will be heavy casualties, yet neither their presence nor their losses will perhaps be given any prominence in the European Press. Englishmen may recall that in the summer of 1915, when the shadow of Gallipoli and the first heavy losses of New Army battalions on the Western front lay across their country, they had to listen to the complaints and reproaches of France, staggering under the disappointment and suffering of the Arras offensive. They recognised that such complaints and reproaches were on the whole not unjust as applied to the past preparedness of England, but they felt them to be out of harmony with the spirit of energy and determination which then inspired her. They will not wish that any similar voices should reach America from Europe at the moment when at length the American people will have in truth begun to seal their professions with their blood.

The voting of conscription had another and an even more enduring significance. It was the first clear evidence of the quiet process of education which had been working

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in the mind of the Middle West, whose remoteness has been emphasised at the beginning of this article. Since then that process has developed with extraordinary rapidity. The stress of war, which so completely dislocated the transport of goods, has done much to improve and stimulate the circulation of ideas. There has been a demand for information in the Central States and the demand has created its supply. A population which was commonly identified by the more "advanced" Eastern States with unpractical political idealism and aloofness from the outside world has shown a bent for national thinking, an impulse towards unity and a certain simplicity and hard-headedness of judgment in regard to the issues of the war which have gone far to make it the centre and backbone of the country's determination. One of the main characteristics of this development has been a curiosity about England, a sincere desire to learn the true facts about her—and to unlearn traditional suspicions now recognised to be out of date if not fallacious, and a growing admiration for her achievements in democratic reform at home and for her efforts and sacrifices in the war. The record of the Canadian West at the recent Dominion elections will have prepared England for the truth that it is in the Mississippi Valley that she will meet, in years to come, a fundamental friendliness towards her which has long waited for recognition—a sentiment intensely national but unfeignedly honest, free from sentimentalism but unclouded by jealousy.

Recognition of British achievements and an unaffected eagerness to imitate them has also been a characteristic of American opinion, official and unofficial, throughout the country, in the field of labour policy. Here much has been done to clear up class misunderstandings and to promote Government action. From the outset the warmest co-operation was established between the American Federation of Labour and the Administration at Washington; mediation and adjustment commissions have been set up; the

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record of the War Department in all labour matters arising in connection with the execution of Government contracts has been on the whole remarkably good ; and the new Labour Administration, in the four months since its creation, has sketched a comprehensive organisation for the supply, regulation and housing of labour which, in at present somewhat rudimentary and chaotic, gives promise of constructive work. The extremely bad record of the year 1917 for strikes and loss of working time has shown a great improvement since the beginning of the present year and a better feeling has grown up throughout the ranks of Labour. The Socialist and Independent Labour organisations in the East and Middle West have specially thrown themselves more wholeheartedly into war work since the revelation of German aims in Russia, and the representatives of the War Department in the North-West have coped successfully with the feud between the I.W.W. and the employers in the lumber camps and mills.

The breakdown in the economic lines of communication of the country led to the taking over of the railways by the Government at the end of the year, and the Secretary of the Treasury, who has been appointed Railway Administrator, has made a record of energy and ability which has already relieved anxieties. His task is one of great difficulty and must remain an uphill fight for some months to come, as is shown by recent indications that the supply of steel to the shipyards is still irregular, and the supply of cars for lumber in the North-West insufficient ; but the congestion of freight on the Eastern roads has been largely cleared up and energetic steps have been taken to increase the output of rolling stock and to speed up repairs.

In shipbuilding, as in the production of ordnance and aircraft, America has put in hand immense preparations which, though partly begun on a scale too great to permit of early realisation and partly hampered by successive conflicts and changes in the Shipping Board, ensure an

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almost unprecedented output next year. One ship-building company alone is spending \$200,000,000, or two-thirds of the total cost of the Panama Canal, 235 yards with 730 ways are under construction, and the three great "fabricated ship" yards will have between them alone as many as ninety ways in operation. For the present year itself the best recent published estimates indicate an output of about 3,000,000 tons dead weight of shipping—half only, that is to say, of the programme promised and that perhaps in a considerable degree made up in the closing months of the year, but still not a negligible contribution and one which should relieve the Allies of their main anxieties. The appointment of Mr. Schwab, of the Bethlehem Steel Co., as controller of ship construction ensures the maximum possible speeding up of the programme. In order to increase the present available shipping very drastic measures for the restriction of imports and the reduction of inter-American trade to a minimum are now being carried out and American sacrifices of trade interests both as regards exports and imports deserve very cordial recognition.

Much the same may be said of the production of aircraft. There have been great delays which should be largely eliminated by the recent reorganisation of the whole business under Mr. J. D. Ryan, one of the most respected and ablest captains of industry in the United States. Nothing is more important than that he and Sir W. Weir should dovetail British and American preparations in this sphere.

Published estimates of achievements and prospects even when drawn from official sources, are still sometimes exaggerated and must continue to be accepted with caution so far as the factor of time is concerned, but America's preparations are now really beginning to bear fruit. If an example be needed of the characteristics of American business enterprise when faced with new problems, one may quote the great rifle contracts which

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early in the war the British Government placed in the United States. Vast plants were built but no rifles were delivered until a year or eighteen months later, when they were no longer needed. When deliveries did commence, they were on a great scale, and these same factories, working now for the American Government, are turning out 11,000 rifles a day, more in fact than the whole American army require. That the output of munitions of all kinds in the United States will ultimately be vast is certain, and we have good ground to hope that the American troops who will be fighting this summer in front of British and French artillery will ensure that it will not be too late. "The idea underlying the whole of the great battle in France," the Germans have said, "is that of the annihilation of the enemy reserves." That idea is bound to be frustrated and time gained for the full fruition of the ambitious programme of the United States if American troops in large numbers are available in the fighting line in the next few months.

Such are the grounds of our hope so far as they can be written down. But their full force can only be appreciated by those who share to-day the life of the new America. It is only slowly and with difficulty that any of us put away childish things; for the nation that has great possessions, as England herself has found, it is particularly hard. We are wise if, in dark days, we can fix our eyes for a moment on growth rather than on achievement. The new America is not yet "mighty through sacrifice," but, in the heart of her people and of many of her public men, she is already "humble because of knowledge." And the new America has been touched in these months by an admiration for the new England. Until she has won her spurs, she asks for no praise in return, but, before the year is out, she will surely not need to claim it.

THE IRISH CRISIS

DURING the latter half of April the Irish Question entered upon a new and dangerous phase. The older problem of establishing a system of self-government for Ireland, consistent with the supremacy of the United Kingdom Parliament and acceptable to the two chief divisions of Irish society, was suddenly complicated by two new issues—the first, the declaration of the Nationalist Parties of their intention to resist the decision of the Government to extend to Ireland the Military Service Acts, the second, the action of the Roman Catholic Hierarchy in taking a leading part in this movement for resistance to the law.

These events are obviously of great significance. They may be but the final detonations of the Anglo-Irish thundercloud ere sunshine and peace return. They may equally be the herald of very grave events. It is, therefore, of the utmost importance that public opinion should be fully informed of the fundamental issues at stake. It is the purpose of this article to supply these facts as accurately, dispassionately, and justly as possible. The first step is to gain the historical perspective.

I. THE IRISH PROBLEM IN HISTORY

IT is not necessary in this article to go in detail into the history of the Irish Question. It was dealt with at some length in *THE ROUND TABLE* for September, 1916,

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and a fuller treatment will be found in a chapter of *The Commonwealth of Nations*. In brief outline it may be summarised as follows. Notwithstanding a rapid development of civilisation in primitive times—a development which reached a high point in literature and in art—the state of Ireland at the time of her union with the crown of England in 1172 was very different from that of both England and France in what we regard to-day as certain essentials of political and economic civilisation. Ireland has never received the advantages conferred upon Great Britain either by the establishment of Roman rule or by the Norman Conquest. It had neither great highways nor effective unity. It had no central administration or organised national system of law courts. Its society and its government were still tribal in character, as was the society of the highlands of Scotland till less than 200 years ago. It is from this difference in the levels of civilisation in the two islands that subsequent disasters have largely sprung.

Simple and attractive as Irish society probably was, it was quite unable to withstand the impact of the more developed civilisation introduced by the Normans. When, therefore, the Norman nobles, tired of the suppression of their military activities by the vigorous Plantagenet Kings, crossed over to Ireland in the twelfth century at the invitation of the local chieftains, to assist them in their quarrels, they found that their own superior military weapons and methods enabled them to make themselves rapidly lords of large parts of the country. This growth of the power of his vassals in Ireland, where they were not subject to his control, soon began to alarm King Henry II., who was well aware of the results to the King of France of the conquest of England by William the Conqueror, Duke of Normandy. Accordingly in 1172 he crossed to Ireland and exacted the homage not only of his own barons who had established themselves there but of the Irish chieftains as well.

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The interest of the English Kings in Ireland, however, was mainly defensive. Provided the Irish chieftains did not become a menace to English security they left them very much to themselves. The sphere of English control was narrowed to a small Pale about Dublin, and the descendants of the Norman invaders rapidly became merged in the Irishry.

During the whole of this time the progress of England was rapid. The state of Ireland, on the other hand, grew worse rather than better, partly because of the internecine feuds of her own chieftains, partly because, while England gave no real unity or government to Ireland, she was too fearful of the consequences to encourage any central Irish authority to spring up instead. It was not until the sixteenth century that first the Tudors and later Strafford began to introduce real government throughout the length and breadth of the island. The failure of the English to rise to the level of their responsibilities towards their less progressive neighbour during these centuries constitutes the first chapter in the history of the misgovernment of Ireland by its larger neighbour.

Unfortunately at the very moment when a new era seemed to have opened the situation was complicated by the Protestant Reformation. Largely, no doubt, owing to the difference in the development of the two countries, Great Britain became Protestant, Ireland remained Roman Catholic. As a result of this difference in outlook, Ireland, during the long and bloody wars which devastated Europe in later years, nearly always took the side of the external enemies of England and supported the cause of autocracy in England itself. The Irish aided and abetted Philip II. of Spain, they intrigued with Louis XIV., they were faithful throughout to the Stuart as against the Parliamentary cause, they fought bitterly against William III. of Orange, they rebelled again during the war with France in 1798. It was a barbarous age and the rulers of England dealt with the Irish rebels in a barbarous fashion. The massacres, the for-

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feitures of land, the plundering of Ireland by crowds of greedy adventurers, the plantations of English and Scots veterans as a kind of army of occupation, especially by Cromwell and the revolutionary Government, are pages in history which all must shudder to read. Whatever the blindness and bitterness of Irishmen in later days, no Englishman can claim to be righteous over a state of affairs which his own ancestors so largely contributed to bring into being.

The past, however, has left an even deeper sore than the historic hatred for everything English in the Irish mind. It has left an Ireland profoundly divided by religion. One quarter of Ireland is Protestant, with its head and centre in Belfast, wholly dedicated to the British connection, three-quarters is Roman Catholic with its capital in Dublin, mainly anxious to be quit of all unnecessary connection with a neighbour so intimately bound up with its sufferings in the past. It is from this religious difference that most of the later difficulties have sprung. As we shall now see, this was especially the case in regard to the establishment of Home Rule.

When Edward I. summoned the first English Parliament in 1295 he instructed his Viceroy to adopt a similar procedure in Ireland also. Accordingly the colonists were summoned to send representatives to Dublin, and from that time onwards they acquired the power of making laws for themselves. It was not a responsible legislature in the ordinary sense of the word, because not only was the executive responsible to the English Government, but by Poynings's Act passed by the Irish Assembly in 1495 the English Government was given an overriding power over all Irish legislation. Moreover, the Irish Parliament itself was representative only of the English colonists, as the Celtic society beyond the limits of the Pale was still under the control of the tribal chiefs. After the Reformation the Irish Parliament represented only the Protestant minority in Ireland and became the stronghold

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of the Protestant ascendancy. It was this body rather than the British Government which was responsible for the worst and most ferocious penal legislation of the eighteenth century.

In the middle of this century, however, the Irish Parliament began to assert its independence. It was the time when the mercantile system held the field. According to this theory Great Britain, in return for defending her Dependencies, was entitled to preserve a manufacturing monopoly for herself. This policy not only led to the American secession, but nearly led to the same results in Ireland also. With their industries half ruined by exclusion from English markets the industrious Protestants of Ulster claimed, first, fiscal freedom and then complete legislative independence for the Irish Parliament. At the time when England was in her greatest difficulties with the war with the American Colonies and France they proceeded to try to enforce their demands by organising a voluntary army with which to terrorise the Government. So effective was the pressure on a weak administration that the British Government meekly surrendered, and in 1782 Poynings's Law was repealed and the complete legislative independence of the Irish Parliament was formally recognised. Though the executive still continued to be appointed by the English Cabinet, and that executive was able to retain a majority in the Irish Parliament by means of rotten boroughs, Ireland occupied at this time, so far as the legislature was concerned, the status of a modern Dominion.

Within twenty years, however, the system had hopelessly broken down. It broke down for two reasons. The first was the impossibility of conducting the common affairs of the United Kingdom through two co-ordinate Parliaments. No sooner was the Irish Parliament established than, under the leadership of Grattan and others, it found itself driven into conflict with the Parliament of Great Britain. Its commercial policy involved questions of foreign policy, its trade was hampered whenever Great

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Britain went to war, it finally claimed to create an independent army and navy of its own. No really serious crisis could arise, however, so long as the executive was appointed by the British Cabinet and could maintain an Irish majority through its control of rotten boroughs. The movement, however, for Parliamentary reform, inspired by the French Revolution, brought matters to a head, for reform meant the loss of control by the Irish executive of its majority in Parliament. The reform movement had another and quite opposite effect. It revived the religious quarrel. At first Wolfe Tone and other disciples of revolutionary doctrines wished to open the franchise to the Roman Catholics. As, however, the Protestant minority which then controlled the Irish Parliament began to realise that reform meant the return of a Roman Catholic majority, their ardour cooled and was finally converted into vehement opposition. The situation drifted from bad to worse until the attempt of the extremists to seize control of Ireland with French assistance in 1798 brought things to a head. Pitt then cut the Gordian knot by applying to Ireland the same settlement as had been so successful in the case of Scotland. In a final orgy of corruption the Irish Parliament extinguished itself, and Irish representatives thereafter were returned to a Parliament representative of and with legislative power over the whole of the United Kingdom. It was part of Pitt's policy to combine this with an Act emancipating the Roman Catholics. But he was unable to carry this second feature of his policy (resigning in consequence), and the removal of Roman Catholic disabilities was delayed till 1829.

There is no doubt that the Act of Union served its main purpose. It put an end to the growing conflict between Great Britain and Ireland in the matter of foreign policy, defence, and trade policy. It ended the budding quarrel between Roman Catholic and Protestant by making it possible to give the franchise to Roman Catholics without giving them a majority over their Protestant fellow citizens.

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It abolished the jobbery and corruption which had been characteristic of the earlier system of Irish government. And it made possible the utilisation of the immensely larger resources of Great Britain for the purpose of Irish development. Whatever may have been the misconduct of England towards Ireland in earlier days, there is no doubt that real attempts at redress have been made in later years. The North of Ireland has made astonishing progress, and is now one of the most vigorous and prosperous manufacturing and agricultural areas in the world. The South has made a less rapid advance, but poverty has diminished, agriculture has improved, and such movements as the Co-operative movement have, under the inspiration of Sir Horace Plunkett, made beneficent headway. The best testimony to the real benefits which have been conferred upon Ireland is to be found in the words of Mr. John Redmond himself. Speaking in 1915, he said :—

I went to Australia to make an appeal on behalf of an enslaved, famine-hunted, despairing people, a people in the throes of a semi-revolution, bereft of all political liberties and engaged in a life and death struggle with the system of a most brutal and drastic caution.

Only thirty-three or thirty-four years have passed since then, but what a revolution has occurred in the interval ! To-day the people, broadly speaking, own the soil ; to-day the labourers live in decent habitations ; to-day there is absolute freedom in the local government and the local taxation of the country ; to-day we have the widest Parliament in the municipal franchise ; to-day we know that the evicted tenants who are the wounded soldiers of the land war have been restored to their homes or to other homes as good as those from which they had been originally driven. We know that the congested districts, the scene of some of the most awful horrors of the old famine days, have been transformed, that the farms have been enlarged, decent dwellings have been provided, and a new spirit of hope and independence is to-day amongst the people. We know that for the towns legislation has been passed facilitating the housing of the working classes. So far as the town tenants are concerned, we have this consolation, that we have passed for Ireland an Act whereby they are protected against arbitrary eviction, and are given compensation not only for disturbance from their homes but for the goodwill of the business they have created—a piece of

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legislation far in advance of anything obtained for the town tenants of England. I may add, far in advance of any legislation for the town tenants of any other country.

We know that we have at last won educational freedom in university education for most of the youth of Ireland, and we know that in primary and standard education the thirty-four years that have passed have witnessed an enormous advance in efficiency and in the means provided for bringing efficiency about. To-day we have a system of old age pensions in Ireland whereby every old man and woman over seventy is saved from the workhouse free to spend their last days in comparative comfort.

We have a system of national industrial insurance which provides for the health of the people and makes it impossible for the poor hard-working man and woman when sickness comes to the door to be carried away to the workhouse hospital, and makes it certain that they will receive decent Christian treatment during their illness. (See Hansard, House of Commons, March 7, 1917.)

None the less the Act of the Union did not solve the Irish Question. The sufferings of Ireland had bitten too deep, and the religious cleavage was too wide, for the Irish to be satisfied, as the Scots had been, with complete union with Great Britain. Ever since Catholic Emancipation there has been a strong movement in Southern and Western Ireland for Irish self-government. In that movement there have always been two strains—one a sound and healthy desire that Irishmen should develop their own country along lines of their own through a Parliament of their own; the other a desire inspired by the hatred of England to be quit for ever of the connection with Great Britain. In 1871, however, Nationalist Ireland officially abandoned the ideal of independence and settled down to the demand for Home Rule. From that time till the last few weeks its representatives have stood for the establishment of an Irish Parliament with full powers to deal with Irish affairs, but leaving to the control of the United Kingdom Parliament, in which Ireland was also to be represented, the sole control of such common affairs as foreign policy, defence and trade.

In the 'eighties of the last century Gladstone and the

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Liberal Party were converted to the idea of Home Rule. The obstacles, however, were formidable. In the first place there was a deep-seated suspicion on the part of very large numbers both in Great Britain and Ireland that the demand for Home Rule was only *camouflage* for a movement towards complete independence—a state of affairs which would be fatal to the safety of Great Britain and to the security of the communications of the Empire if the government of Ireland fell into anti-British hands. In the second place there was the determination of the Protestant minority within Ireland itself not to be separated from the United Kingdom and subordinated to a Roman Catholic majority. We need not follow the detailed history of the Home Rule movement. The Home Rule Bills of 1886 and 1893, which were badly thought out and for the drafting of which Irish representatives had no responsibility, failed to pass into law, and the Liberal Party which introduced them was not subsequently successful at the polls. The question then lapsed until it was revived in 1911, after the veto of the House of Lords had been destroyed. This alarmed the Ulstermen as no previous Bill had done because the veto upon which they had hitherto relied for protection was now no more. When the Home Rule Act, therefore, passed the House of Commons they took the desperate course of organising themselves for resistance. A solemn league and covenant not to accept the authority of a Dublin legislature was signed by the great majority of Ulster Protestants, and this was followed by the enrolment of the Ulster volunteers. The Unionist Party then took the disastrous step of supporting them in their resistance. By this time the Government had realised that nothing but coercion by military power would compel North-East Ulster to come under a Home Rule Parliament. The principle of allowing part of Ulster to vote itself out of the Act was conceded by Mr. Asquith, but all attempts at agreement as to the area to be excluded broke down. The situation was

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further aggravated by a movement in the regular army to refuse to force Ulster under Home Rule and by the growth of a Nationalist volunteer force. There was no doubt that the country was on the verge of civil war when the European War broke out, and all sides were glad to get out of a dangerous situation by agreeing to a truce.

During the first part of the war the conduct of the Germans in Belgium and the universal zeal for the war of liberation evoked a voluntary recruiting rally in Ireland, which, despite the ineptitude of the War Office methods of recruiting, led to a great appeasement of the situation and gave real promise of the possibility of a permanent reconciliation both between the two halves of Ireland and between Great Britain and Ireland, at the end of the war. The insane rebellion of Easter, 1916, provoked by Sinn Fein with German assistance, shattered these hopes. The execution of the leaders helped to invest their movement with the halo of martyrdom, and the Sinn Fein, or independence movement, soon became the strongest force in Nationalist Ireland. An attempted settlement on the basis that the Home Rule Act should be immediately introduced and six Ulster counties excluded broke down partly on a disagreement between the parties as to the exact terms of the compromise, but principally because of a rapid growth of public opinion in Nationalist Ireland violently opposed to partition. A year later, however, in March, 1917, the Lloyd George Government again offered the immediate inauguration of the Home Rule Act subject to the exclusion of the six Ulster counties. This was rejected by the Nationalist Party, which walked out of the House in indignation, an action which showed clearly both the growth of Sinn Fein and the strength of the sentiment against partition. In May the Government returned to the charge, and, while offering a slightly modified plan based upon exclusion, suggested that, if that were not acceptable, a convention of Irishmen should assemble to try and find a solution of their difficulties for themselves. The latter

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alternative was accepted, and on July 25 a convention of 95 members, representative of the chief political parties, of the County Councils, the Churches, the Lord Mayors of the great cities, and a number of distinguished men of independent views, assembled in Trinity College, Dublin. The official Sinn Fein organisation refused representation, inasmuch as the establishment of an Irish Republic was excluded from the purview of its discussions. Several of the nominees, however, were in close sympathy with Sinn Fein views. In announcing the constitution of the Convention, the Government promised that if the Convention was able to reach "substantial agreement" it would ask Parliament to give immediate legislative effect to its proposals.

II. THE IRISH CONVENTION

THE Convention sat in secret. No reference was allowed to its proceedings in the press. We are, therefore, dependent upon the Report, dated April 8, for an account of its proceedings.

This Report is an extraordinarily interesting document, and not only does it contain valuable conclusions, but it is an admirable index to the complexities of the Irish Question itself. Broadly speaking, the Report shows that during the deliberations of the Convention opinion crystallised into three groups: (*a*) a central group composed of moderate Nationalists and Unionists from the South and West of Ireland, which advocated a solution on what might be called federal lines, that is to say, Ireland was to occupy the position of a state in a United Kingdom federation of nations; (*b*) an Ulster group, which substantially stood out for the maintenance of the Union, or, if that were impossible, for the exclusion of six Ulster counties from any Home Rule Act; (*c*) an extreme Nationalist group which demanded for Ireland the status of a Dominion.

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It is not necessary to describe the process whereby these groups were formed. By January it had become clear that the Convention was in danger of breaking up in hopeless disagreement. The crux of this stage was the question of customs and excise. The extreme Nationalists demanded that the Irish Parliament should be the sole taxing authority in Ireland, the Ulstermen that the taxing power should substantially remain with the United Kingdom Legislature, the Moderates—whose numbers were then uncertain—were for giving customs to the United Parliament and all other taxing powers to the Irish Legislature. No possibility of agreement appeared in sight. When informed of this state of affairs by Sir Horace Plunkett, the Chairman of the Convention, the Prime Minister wrote a letter saying that the Government was firmly convinced that the best hope of settlement lay through the Convention, and asking that, if the Convention reached a stage when it found that it could make no further progress towards an agreed settlement, representatives should be sent to confer with the Cabinet.

This suggestion was accepted, and on February 25, after a series of meetings with the representatives of the Convention, the Prime Minister wrote a letter to the Chairman in which he set forth the general basis of a settlement which he thought the Convention might agree to, and which if it did the Government would be prepared to accept and ask Parliament to enact into law. In his letter the Prime Minister said :—

It is clear to the Government, in view of previous attempts at settlement, and of the deliberations of the Convention itself, that the only hope of agreement lies in a solution which, on the one side provides for the unity of Ireland under a single legislature with adequate safeguards for the interests of Ulster and the Southern Unionists, and on the other preserves the well-being of the Empire and the fundamental unity of the United Kingdom.

He thought that there was agreement in the Convention

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to provide for the interests of the Empire and the United Kingdom, and he specified the powers which it would be necessary to reserve to the United Kingdom Parliament as being "its suzerainty, and its control of Army, Navy, and Foreign Policy, and other Imperial services, while providing for Irish representation at Westminster and for a proper contribution from Ireland to Imperial expenditure." On the thorny question of customs and excise the Government felt that it was impossible to reach an agreed settlement at this moment. There was much to be said for allowing Ireland some control over its indirect taxation, but it was impossible to make such a fiscal change in the middle of the war, especially as such a change might prove to be incompatible with the federalisation of the United Kingdom, in favour of which there was a growing body of opinion. It was necessary, therefore, to leave over a final settlement of this question till after the war. The Government, therefore, proposed that, while all other sources of revenue should be handed over, customs and excise should be reserved to the United Kingdom Government until two years after the war, and that a Royal Commission should be appointed to examine the financial relations of Great Britain and Ireland, and to submit proposals for adjusting the economic and fiscal relations.

Turning to the other aspect of the fundamental settlement—the securing of an agreement to establish a single legislature for a United Ireland—the Prime Minister thought that the Convention had made some progress towards making possible this result. The Government understood that it had been proposed to give additional representation to the minority by nomination or election, and that it had also been suggested that Ulster interests might be safeguarded by the provision of an Ulster Committee within the Irish Parliament, "with power to modify, and, if necessary, to exclude the application to Ulster of certain measures of legislation or of administration which are not consonant with the interests of Ulster." The

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Government blessed these proposals, and also the suggestion that sessions of the Irish Parliament might be held alternately in Dublin and Belfast, and that certain of the commercial departments might have their permanent headquarters in the latter city.

After dealing with land questions and housing, the Prime Minister's letter concluded :—

There thus seems to be within the reach of the Convention the possibility of obtaining a settlement which will lay the foundation of a new era in the Government both of Ireland and of Great Britain. It is a settlement which will give to Irishmen the control of their own affairs, while preserving the fundamental unity of the United Kingdom, and enabling Irishmen to work for the good of the Empire as well as for the good of Ireland. With all the earnestness in their power the Government appeal to the members of the Convention to agree upon a scheme which can be carried out at once and which will go a long way towards realising the hopes of Irishmen all over the world, without prejudice to the future consideration of questions on which at present agreement cannot be attained in Ireland and which are also intimately connected with constitutional problems affecting every part of the United Kingdom, the consideration of which must be postponed till the end of the present war. This is an opportunity for a settlement by consent that may never recur, and which, if it is allowed to pass, must inevitably entail consequences for which no man can wish to make himself responsible.

This letter, as the Report says, created a new situation, and enabled the Convention to proceed with its labours. By April 5 it had completed its work. By a margin, which on the crucial divisions fell as low as 38 to 34, a majority of the Convention agreed upon a Report which followed closely the lines which had been laid down by the Prime Minister. Two Reports, however, by considerable minorities, were also submitted, one by the nineteen Unionist delegates from Ulster, the other by twenty-two Nationalist representatives. There were also a number of notes by members on particular points.

If the position is to be fully understood it is necessary to summarise the fundamental features in which these Reports differ from one another.

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The Majority Report accepted in substance the principle that Ireland was to occupy a status within the United Kingdom analogous to that of an American or Australian State or a Canadian Province, though with larger powers. Thus it declared at the outset that "notwithstanding the establishment of the Irish Parliament or anything contained in the Government of Ireland Act the supreme power and authority of the Parliament of the United Kingdom shall remain unaffected and undiminished over all persons, matters, and things in Ireland and every part thereof." The Report then specifies the matters in which the Irish Parliament shall have no power to make laws. These were, Crown and succession, making of peace and war, Army and Navy, treaties and foreign relations, dignities and titles of honour, control of harbours, lighthouses, cables, wireless, etc., to meet the requirements of the Army and Navy, coinage and copyright.

The Report then provides for a Senate of sixty-four, constituted partly *ex officio*, partly by nomination, and for a House of Commons of 160. In the House of Commons the Unionists were to be guaranteed 40 per cent. of the membership, partly by the representation of minorities through members to be nominated by the Lord Lieutenant, partly by according additional members to Ulster. The additional nominees were to disappear after fifteen years, the additional representatives of Ulster were to continue until they were abolished by the vote of a three-fourths majority of both Houses sitting together. Forty-two Irish representatives were to be elected to the United Kingdom House of Commons by a process of indirect election by the members of the Irish House of Commons. Customs and excise were to be reserved to the United Kingdom Parliament until the matter could be reconsidered and decided within seven years after the termination of the war. All other branches of taxation were to be left to the Irish Parliament. The principle of an Imperial contribution was approved, though no scheme or basis was

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proposed. A number of other recommendations were made, including the reservation of partial control by the Imperial authorities over Postal Service and Police for the duration of the war.

One other point of importance must be noted. A sub-committee of the Convention was appointed to consider what powers of local defence might be delegated to an Irish Government. On the question of conscription this sub-committee reported as follows :—

29th November, 1917.

Assuming that a scheme of self-government for Ireland be adopted, including the establishment of an Irish Parliament and an Irish Executive Government responsible thereto, we think that it would in practice be impossible to impose a system of compulsory service in Ireland without the assent and co-operation of the Irish Parliament.

As to whether, as an abstract proposition, it would be desirable, by vesting these powers in the Imperial Parliament, to secure united and simultaneous action in this direction in both islands, it is, we think, unnecessary for us to express an opinion, as we think it would be impracticable effectively to enforce such a demand, except with the approval of the Irish Parliament, without which the action and efficient co-operation of the Executive could not be secured.

Indeed, it seems to us a direct consequence of the creation of an Irish Parliament that any measure of this character must be submitted to the Irish Parliament before it could be enforced on Ireland.

We desire to emphasise the fact that the above Report deals only with one aspect of this very difficult and important question, and that we were not able in the time then at our disposal to go into the possibilities of joint action by a common War Council of the two Governments, or as to the effect of there being hereafter a Federal Constitution for the British Isles.

The Report in which this passage occurs was adopted by the Convention. This Report somewhat confuses the clearness of the majority's recommendation of a settlement on the basis of Ireland having what approximates to state rights in a federation of national states. It does not contest the right of the United Kingdom Legislature to impose conscription. It declares, however, that when

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an Irish Parliament is in existence it will be a matter of practical necessity for the Union Legislature to submit such a law to the Irish Parliament before it could be enforced. To do this, however, would in fact be to give the Irish Legislature a veto power over United Kingdom legislation—an arrangement which is unknown in any federation and is quite unworkable in practice. This decision does not seem to have been deliberate, as the Convention adopted the committee's report, but it does not appear to have had any discussion on the subject in question.

The two Minority Reports challenge the fundamental principle of the Majority Report. The Ulster Unionists examined in detail the proposals put forward by the Nationalist leaders in the Convention and the recent growth of Sinn Fein and recorded their conclusion that consciously or unconsciously the real object of the Nationalists was the creation of an Irish Legislature which would not be effectively controlled in practice by the Imperial Parliament. In these circumstances the Ulster Unionists refused to accept any scheme of Home Rule for united Ireland and demanded that if Home Rule were brought into effect the six counties of North-East Ulster should be excluded therefrom. They based this demand partly on the danger of the industrial interests of Ulster being placed under the control of an agricultural and less advanced majority, partly on the belief that Nationalist opinion would never be content with any scheme of Home Rule. "We cannot," they said, "overlook the strong probability that the controlling force in such a Parliament would to-day be the Republican or Sinn Fein Party, which is openly and aggressively hostile to Great Britain and to the Empire. The discussions have proved beyond doubt that the aim of the Nationalists is to establish a Parliament in Ireland which would be practically free from effective control by the Imperial Parliament." They declared that all other countries had fought against this disintegrating

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policy, and adduced as instances the Australian states which had formed a union which was joined by Tasmania, "an island much akin to Ireland in the matter of area," and the U.S.A., which established "at the cost of much blood and treasure National Unity when the Confederacy claimed, like the Irish Nationalists, the right to set up an independent Government." The Report, therefore, declared that, "in any scheme of self-government for Ireland, Ulster cannot participate."

The Report of the Nationalist minority declared for what is in substance Dominion autonomy. "Ireland is a nation," they said, "and it is upon a like foundation that we believe the Irish constitution should be built. There is room for compromise in details. . . . But we think it essential to abide by the principle that Irish affairs, including all branches of taxation, should be under the Irish Parliament." After stating that while they thought "that any settlement founded on distrust of Ireland will fail in its effect, and that the nearer the Irish constitution approaches to that of the Dominions the better will be its prospects," they set forth their own proposals in the following terms:—

42. We propose an Irish Parliament with full powers of legislation in all Irish affairs, subject to the religious safeguards contained in Section 3 of the Act of 1914 (the existing disabilities to be removed in the Constitutional Act), and with powers of taxation, but with no power to make laws on Imperial concerns; the Crown, foreign relations, peace and war, the Army and Navy and other allied matters duly specified.

43. At the same time, we do our utmost to meet the doubts and objections of Unionists by agreeing to the following provisions:—

(1) Generous additional representation in the Irish Parliament.

(2) A guarantee for a reasonable period of Free Trade between Ireland and Great Britain in articles which are the produce or manufacture of either country.

(3) A Joint Advisory Commission to secure co-operation in commercial and postal matters.

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(4) Continued representation in the Imperial Parliament in such a way as to reflect the views of the different parties in the Irish Parliament.

(5) A fixed statutory contribution to Imperial expenses.

(6) Independent Civil Service Commissions.

(7) Suspension for a term of years of the power to raise local defence forces.

(8) Suspension till the end of the war of the powers over Customs and Excise, with an arrangement to be made by joint agreement for the control of Police and Post Office by the two Governments for a like period.

We also agree to the scheme adopted by the Convention for the speedy completion of Land Purchase, and express our concurrence in the Housing scheme.

On the thorny question of conscription their Report was as follows : " As regards the question of conscription, we are ready to take it for granted that no attempt will be made to apply it to Ireland without the consent of an Irish Parliament. Any attempt to impose conscription upon a nation without its sanction is utterly impolitic and unjust, and is bound to end in disaster."

The Convention shows up the cleavage of opinion in Ireland in the clearest light. The Majority, through a generous sacrifice of individual prepossessions, have agreed to recommend a system of Home Rule for a United Ireland, which accords to it substantially the status of a state within a federation, together with special safeguards for minorities. The Ulster Unionist minority stood out for the maintenance of the existing union, or, if that were denied, for the exclusion from Home Rule of the six Ulster counties. The Nationalist minority demanded Dominion status, for the high-sounding declarations as to the powers to be left to the United Kingdom Parliament are meaningless if that Parliament is to be unable either to collect taxes from its Irish citizens or to compel them to military service for the common defence. No representation without taxing powers is a principle of constitutional law no less essential

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than its more quoted opposite. If the United Kingdom had no effective powers either in the sphere of military service or taxation it certainly would not long allow the Irish representatives to interfere with Great Britain. As in the case of the Dominions the Imperial Parliament might be able to claim the constitutional right to pass laws for Ireland, but in practice it would be unable to do so.

Of these Reports we need say little. It is obvious that the line taken by the majority is the only line which could possibly lead to a final settlement of the Irish Question. Subject only to an obscurity in regard to conscription, to which reference has already been made, it provides for Irish self-government, for Irish unity, and for the unity of the United Kingdom. If the Convention produces no other result than this recommendation Irishmen will have good reason to bless its memory, for sooner or later it must prevail. The two Minority Reports are equally uncompromising. They each represent the irreconcilable faction. The Ulster extremists have refused to throw in their lot with the rest of Ireland or to help her to regeneration. Under the influence of fear of Sinn Fein and Roman Catholicism they have rejected the proposal that they should share in the local government of Ireland, even though the authority of the United Kingdom in Ireland for federal purposes is effectively maintained, and their representation therein is fully protected. The Nationalist extremists have been just as obstinate. They have made no real advance towards the only method of satisfying the passionate attachment of the Unionist quarter of Ireland to membership of the United Kingdom, willingness to accept a settlement whereby they themselves would obtain state rights while accepting loyally and without reserve citizenship in the United Kingdom with all the obligations it entails. Lured by the thought of "ourselves alone" and by that specious claim for self-determination which has already led its authors to anarchy and destruction, they have sought to establish an Ireland independent in

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all but name. They have professed acceptance of the principle of union, but on conditions which would make acceptance worthless in fact.

III. THE CONSCRIPTION-HOME RULE CONTROVERSY

THE Convention had barely concluded its labours when the fundamentals of the Irish Question were brought to the surface in a new and acute form. The great German offensive began on March 21. The Convention reports were signed on April 5. The Prime Minister introduced his man-power proposals on April 9. He said that the military situation compelled the raising of large new forces, that it was necessary to inflict serious injury on the national industries of Great Britain by a fresh comb-out and by raising the military age to 50, and that in these circumstances it was impossible to continue to allow young Irishmen to escape the obligations which had been assumed not only by Great Britain but by practically all the other democratic communities in the alliance. He therefore asked Parliament to extend the Military Service Acts to Ireland and to give the Government power to bring them into operation by order in council. At the same time he announced the intention of the Government to submit to Parliament at an early date proposals for the establishment of self-government in Ireland which the House would be invited to pass into law with the least possible delay. It was subsequently made clear that while the two aspects of this policy—namely, conscription and Home Rule—were not dependent one on the other, no active steps would be taken to enforce conscription until the new Home Rule Act had been introduced.

This announcement had an electric effect in Ireland. It evidently came as a complete surprise to a community which had given little thought to the war, was wholly

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preoccupied with its own problems, and had been deliberately inoculated for months with the wildest tales about the malignant intentions of the English Government towards them. In consequence the question of Home Rule, which had held the centre of the stage ever since the Convention had been set up, was immediately submerged in a violent agitation against conscription. The Constitutionalists and Sinn Feiners, between whom the main forces of Nationalist Ireland had hitherto been irreconcilably divided, suddenly came together at a Conference held at the Mansion House, Dublin, on April 18. This conference was attended by Mr. John Dillon and Mr. Joseph Devlin as representing the Parliamentary Nationalist Party, Mr. de Valera and Mr. Arthur Griffith, representing Sinn Fein, Mr. William O'Brien and Mr. T. M. Healy, together with three Labour leaders from Dublin, Cork and Belfast, and met under the presidency of the Lord Mayor. Its first act was to send a deputation to wait upon the Roman Catholic Bishops assembled at Maynooth. As a result of the meeting with the Bishops the Conference issued the following declaration :—

Taking our stand on Ireland's separate and distinct nationhood and affirming the principle of liberty that the Governments of nations derive their just powers from the consent of the governed, we deny the right of the British Government, or any external authority, to impose compulsory service in Ireland against the clearly expressed will of the Irish people.

The passing of the Conscription Bill by the British House of Commons must be regarded as a declaration of war on the Irish nation. The alternative to accepting it as such is to surrender our liberties and to acknowledge ourselves slaves.

It is in direct violation of the rights of small nationalities to self-determination, which even the Prime Minister of England—now prepared to employ naked militarism to force his Act upon Ireland—himself officially announced as an essential condition for peace at the Peace Congress.

The attempt to enforce it will be an unwarrantable aggression which we call upon all Irishmen to resist by the most effective means at their disposal.

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At the same time there was issued the following :—

Statement on Conscription adopted by the Archbishops and Bishops of Ireland on April 18, 1918, his Eminence Cardinal Logue in the Chair :—

An attempt is being made to force conscription upon Ireland against the will of the Irish nation and in defiance of the protests of its leaders.

In view especially of the historic relations between the two countries from the very beginning up to the present moment, we consider that conscription forced in this way upon Ireland is an oppressive and inhuman law, which the Irish people have a right to resist by all the means that are consonant with the law of God.

We wish to remind our people that there is a higher Power which controls the affairs of men. They have in their hands a means of conciliating that Power by strict adherence to the Divine law, by more earnest attention to their religious duties and by fervent and persevering prayer.

In order to secure the aid of the Holy Mother of God, who shielded our people in the days of their greatest trials, we have already sanctioned a National Novena in honour of Our Lady of Lourdes, commencing on the 3rd May, to secure general and domestic peace.

We also exhort the heads of families to have the Rosary recited every evening with the intention of protecting the spiritual and temporal welfare of our beloved country, and bringing us safe through this crisis of unparalleled gravity.

This statement was signed by His Eminence Cardinal Logue and 26 Bishops.

This was followed by another declaration embodying a pledge of resistance to conscription in these terms :—

The Bishops direct the clergy to celebrate a public Mass of intercession on next Sunday in every church in Ireland to avert the scourge of conscription with which Ireland is now threatened.

They further direct that an announcement be made at every public Mass on Sunday next of a public meeting to be held on that day at an hour and place to be specified in the announcement for the purpose of administering the following pledge against compulsory conscription in Ireland.

Denying the right of the British Government to enforce compulsory service in this country, we pledge ourselves solemnly to one another to resist conscription by the most effective means at our disposal.

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The clergy are also requested by the Bishops to announce on Sunday next that a collection will be held at an early suitable date outside the church gates for the purpose of supplying means to resist the imposition of compulsory military service.

The Bishops also request the priests in their respective dioceses to take the publication of these resolutions in the Press as sufficient notification for them to act on.

The significance of these declarations must be patent to all. They have two aspects. In the first place they mean that Nationalist Ireland as a whole has for the moment adopted the standpoint of the Nationalist extremists in the Convention and declared for Dominion status. The declarations "deny the right of the British Government or any external authority to impose compulsory military service on Ireland against the clearly expressed will of the Irish people." They do not refuse military service under a United Kingdom law until Home Rule has been conceded, which would be an intelligible position. They reject the authority of the United Kingdom altogether to require compliance with its laws on this subject, taking their stand on "Ireland's separate and distinct nationhood." They describe an act dealing with a subject which in all unions and federations in the world is in the full control of the central government as "a declaration of war on the Irish nation," and they call upon Irishmen to resist the enforcement of the law by every means in their power. This can only mean, if they have thought out their position that the signatories are determined not only to resist conscription but to reject any solution of the Irish problem on the lines recommended by the majority of the Convention, and to insist on the break up of the United Kingdom.

In the second place these declarations mean that the real leadership has been taken by the Irish Roman Catholic clergy. The Bishops have not only expressed their opinion as private citizens as they were entitled to do; the pledge of resistance has been issued under their authority and they have mobilised the whole organisation of the Roman

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Catholic Church in order to administer that pledge under religious sanction to their co-religionists. This has very likely been done in order to restrain violence. It is none the less significant, for it shows that one of the most important, if not the most important political power in Ireland is the Roman Catholic Church. Religion has always figured in Irish politics. The Presbyterian clergy took no small part in the movement for an Ulster revolt. An assembly of the Presbyterian Church has followed the lead of the Bishops by passing a resolution in favour of conscription and against Home Rule. None the less, this action by religious bodies is bound to have a tremendous effect both upon the prospects of Home Rule within Ireland itself and upon religious toleration everywhere. Religious toleration rests upon the principle that a man's religious beliefs are his own concern and that the state has no concern with them, but only with his conduct as a citizen. But if organised religious bodies intervene in politics it is inevitable that religious beliefs which induce this conduct should become matters of controversy, for they begin to affect in vital respects the life of the community as a whole.

Let us hope that the Mansion House and Maynooth proceedings are not intended so seriously as they appear and that they represent a reaction from the somewhat blunt announcement by the Government of its intention to go ahead with conscription, and an imitation of the example of Sir Edward Carson and his Ulstermen in 1914, which will abate their force when the sincerity of the Government in regard to Home Rule has been clearly shown. There is, however, no use in disguising from ourselves that the situation may lead to serious consequences. Whether they realise it or not, if they stand where they stand to-day, the Nationalist leaders will be drawn into a secessionist movement by the logic of their position as inexorably as were the Southern States when they denied the right of the American Union to prevent the extension of slavery to new territories in the

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West ; like the Confederacy, they will be forced to secession as the only method of escaping the obligations of a legitimate Union law ; like Lincoln, the British Government will be compelled to the use of force as the only method of preserving the Union. The essence of the declarations is the affirmation of the right of Ireland to a national existence separate from that of the Union of which it has hitherto formed a part. So long as they stand, if the issue is not joined over conscription it will be joined over taxation or some other exercise by the Union Parliament of its Union powers. However the fundamentals may be obscured, the Mansion House declarations are a call to Ireland to establish itself as a Dominion by resistance to United Kingdom law.

It may be asked why not settle the Irish Question once and for all by frankly accepting a solution which has worked elsewhere. Some of the reasons have already been given, based upon the experience of a similar experiment from 1782 to 1800. But as we are likely to hear more of this question in the future, it may be as well to summarise them again now. In the first place, Dominion status would not solve the problem in Ireland itself. The work of the Irish Convention makes that clear. Not only Ulster but the Moderate majority declared against it. To adopt the solution would simply mean the partition of Ireland or civil war between Ireland North and South, between Protestant and Roman Catholic. For, if once the authority of the United Kingdom Parliament in Ireland were withdrawn, it is certain that the Protestant minority would refuse to submit themselves to the rule of a Roman Catholic majority which has now shown that its political life is mainly controlled by its clergy and bishops. In the second place it is not a step which any responsible Government could take in the middle of a great war, in view of the public utterances of Sinn Fein and of the past and possibly present connection of some of its leaders with Germany. Dominion status would mean the surrender of all control by the United

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Kingdom Government even in matters of defence to an Irish Government. Would it be consistent with loyalty to the Allied cause to leave the whole control not only of Irish foodstuffs and the manufactures of vital war needs such as ships and aeroplanes to the control of a Government which would almost certainly be in the hands of Sinn Fein, but also of wireless and harbours invaluable to the German submarine? If irresponsible extremists, of whom there are plenty in Ireland, got control of the Government, the communications of the Allies might be cut beyond repair. Thirdly, there is the question of man power. To leave the raising of man power to an Irish Parliament must mean inevitable long delay, and in the present temper of Ireland it is probable that no troops could be raised voluntarily or by compulsion by any Irish Administration for the purpose of service abroad. If the man power of Ireland is to be raised for this war the right way is obviously to use the laws and machinery of the United Kingdom for the purpose. Finally there is a larger aspect of the question. We are to-day fighting two forces which stand across the path towards a true Commonwealth—one is the tendency to autocracy, the other the tendency towards anarchy. In between is the narrow road of union and democracy. We have all begun to see the dangers of autocracy. We are not so familiar with the subtle anarchism latent in the gospel of self-determination. If self-determination means that all educated citizens ought to share in the rights and responsibilities of the village, the county, the state and the empire to which they belong, it is sound doctrine. If it means that every community has a right to think only of itself and to set up on its own regardless of its neighbours whenever it chooses, it is the apotheosis of selfishness and the highway to war. The people of Great Britain have long ago made up their minds that to continue the maintenance of the full union and to refuse the demand of Irishmen for the control of their own domestic affairs would be to capitulate to the autocratic impulse. But for Ireland to

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demand secession, or for Great Britain to give in to Sinn Fein so far as to concede it, and permit the break up of a union which has already lasted for more than 700 years, would be to be false to the lessons that Lincoln taught, and to the principle which underlies the political life and development of the English-speaking communities throughout the world.

There can indeed be no question that the only possible solution of the Irish Question is that put forward in substance by the majority of the Irish Convention—the granting to Ireland of state rights and the acceptance by Ireland of Union obligations. No other solution will create a United Ireland and put an end to the discord between Ireland and Great Britain.

But the bringing into practical existence of a settlement on these lines presents immense difficulties. On the one hand, the Nationalist parties now stand committed both to resistance to the Conscription Act and to any Home Rule Act which will maintain the effective supremacy of the United Kingdom Parliament in federal affairs. On the other hand, they will look at no settlement which involves the partition of Ireland, while the determination of Ulster to resist inclusion in a Home Rule Ireland is equally manifest. Clearly the settlement must be proceeded with as a whole or not at all. To beat a retreat about conscription while introducing Home Rule would be to abandon the unity of the United Kingdom and indefinitely postpone all chance of a united self-governing Ireland while losing Irish man-power for the war. To enforce conscription without accompanying it with self-government on federal lines would be to create a fresh sense of injustice and deprive the Irish people of that practical responsibility for Irish government which alone will eliminate the fundamental causes of unrest.

The future is, therefore, full of doubt and full of danger. Without justice tempered with mercy, without wisdom coupled with a clear grasp of principle, disasters may occur.

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The really hopeful feature of the situation is that both the majority of the Irish Convention and the British Government and Parliament seem to be agreed as to the fundamental basis of settlement. Further, the conscription issue, greatly as it appears to have complicated matters for the moment, may be a blessing in disguise. The settlement of Ireland cannot be kept separate from Ireland's duty to play its part in the war. The decision to extend conscription to Ireland has brought the war home to Ireland as nothing else has done, and affords her the opportunity of showing that if she can be sure of self-government in Irish affairs, she is willing to march shoulder to shoulder with Ulstermen, Englishmen, Scotsmen and Welshmen in this great war for human rights.

The essential thing is that the British Government should stand firmly by the principle it has laid down of enforcing Union rights on the one hand, while conferring state rights on the other. If they do this it is difficult to believe that a solution will not be reached. Nationalist Ireland must come to see that they can never gain self-government in isolation from the rest of the world, and that the only road to real freedom is friendly partnership both with Ulster and Great Britain, both in war and peace. Ulster must come to see that they can no longer expect Great Britain to make itself responsible for local Irish affairs in order that Ulster may have no special responsibility for them, and that the real way out is that they should take a hand in helping Nationalist Ireland to progressive self-government, provided Ireland takes its proper share of imperial burdens, and their own rights in the United Kingdom are maintained. Before the end is reached it may be that the Irish question will be swallowed up in the larger issue of the federation of the United Kingdom. There is no doubt that there is urgent need for the devolution of many of the responsibilities now resting on the overburdened shoulders of the Imperial Parliament on to subordinate legislatures within the United Kingdom

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The growth of public sentiment, indeed, in favour of federation for the United Kingdom as a measure desirable apart altogether from its effect on the Irish Question, is one of the most remarkable facts of the past few weeks. Whether, however, the Irish settlement will be dealt with first, or as part of a general reorganisation of the United Kingdom, we need not attempt to prophesy. The great thing is that the fundamental idea which will eventually produce a solution, that self-government does not mean independence but the assumption of the obligations which attach to membership of the larger union, at the same time as Home Rule is established in local affairs, has at last been authoritatively proposed. We have only to stand firmly for it, to see it eventually prevail.

RUSSIA, GERMANY AND ASIA

IN the first article in this issue the Peace of Brest-Litovsk has been examined in its bearing on the western border nationalities of the Russian Empire, which it has detached from Russia in order to bring them into the new German system of Central Europe. But the effects of the treaty dictated by Germany will be felt farther afield. For the German settlement, following upon the Russian Revolution, has not only mutilated the Russian Empire in Europe; it has loosened the structure of the Empire as a whole. The fate of Asiatic Russia also is in the balance, and the war, which has hitherto been confined in the East to the territories of Turkey and Persia, is extending its influence to the entire continent of Asia.

This indirect effect of Germany's victory over Russia may possibly be more important than others. The western borderlands loom largest to us—they were the most familiar provinces of Russia, and their status has been specifically altered by the terms of peace; but their loss might still leave the Russian Empire standing. And as for Russia proper—the vast country watered by the Volga and its tributaries where Great Russian is the prevailing speech—it has the strength of Antæus. Its language and literature, tradition and religion are beyond the reach of German arms, and whatever political or economic tetter Germany may impose on it for the moment, it is certain to throw them off and survive. The Russian Empire, on the other hand, which consists essentially in

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the command of Russia over the Steppe, is a recent growth, and the war caught it at a precarious stage of its development. In the next few months we may see it disappear, and with it the *status quo* in Asia. But in order to understand its character, and what its disappearance would mean, we must consider the command of the steppe as a political phenomenon.

I. THE STEPPE AS A POLITICAL FACTOR.

THE steppe is a vast open country in the heart of the Eurasian Continent. The Altai and Pamir ranges wall it off on the east from China and India (though it reaches across the barrier into the high plains of Mongolia and Eastern Turkestan); the plateau of Iran or Persia bounds it on the south, and then in succession the Caspian, the Caucasus Mountains and the Black Sea. Westward it marches with Central Europe at the Carpathians, and finds a footing beyond them in the plain of Hungary. Towards the north it is shut in by the forest country of the Ukraine and Great Russia, while east of the Urals the Taiga or wooded swamp that covers the middle course of the Ob and Irtysh rivers, closes the gap between the forests of Russia and the forests of Altai.

This immense region is not, of course, physically uniform. The level is broken by hills, and the land by rivers and inland seas. It might be described in general as a pasture land or prairie, yet in some parts it is so desert that flocks can hardly find sustenance there, while in others it becomes corn land at the touch of the plough. If the conditions of life have been identical over its whole extent—and they have been so historically till Russia established her Empire—that has been due less to the physical character of the country than to the social institutions of the peoples that possessed it. None but the nomads could have been masters of Rumania, the Black Sea Governments and

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Western Siberia for centuries and left them untilled ; and none, perhaps, but they could have succeeded in living even by herdsmanhip in the south-eastern deserts. And yet the nomads were moulded by the steppe before they set their mark on it. In fact, no form of human society has been conditioned so completely as theirs by its physical environment. But the main conditioning feature has not been the geographical structure of the steppe or its economic capacity. It is its openness to traffic—the general absence of obstacles and the existence of easy routes in every direction—that tends to keep peoples who commit themselves to it in a permanent state of vagrancy ; and this vagrancy, once set up, helps in turn to keep the country open by discouraging settlement and cultivation, which are greater obstacles to nomadism than any physical barriers.

The command of this open steppe country is in some respects more like sea power than power on land. Like sea power, it is ultimately indivisible. The whole breadth of the steppe, from north to south, is needed for the nomad's summer and winter pasturage, and as his flocks and families increase, he is bound to come into conflict with his neighbours east and west, for in steppe herdsmanhip there is practically no possibility of intensive exploitation. Such conflicts arise periodically, and the weaker tribe is either pushed off the steppe altogether or decimated and incorporated by the conqueror. And the conqueror of the steppe, like the master of the sea, can operate at will on any of its coasts, for movement across the steppe involves merely the expenditure of time and not the surmounting of obstacles. A mediæval monk once saw with astonishment two armies leaving the central camp of the Mongol Khan, one to invade Hungary and the other Burma. But the length of their range is explained by the fact that the greater part of their journey lay over the steppe, where they would encounter neither mountain barriers nor the walls and towers of settled populations.

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The mobility of steppe power explains the distribution of the Indo-European family of languages in two widely distant areas—Europe on the one hand and Iran and India on the other. These areas, at first sight so remote from one another, both border on the steppe, though at opposite sides of its circumference, and voyagers could carry their speech and religion across it as freely as other Europeans, three thousand years later, carried the English and Spanish tongues across the Atlantic to America.

But mobile as it is on its own element, steppe power has a narrow range and a transitory effect on the *terra firma* of settled lands. The masters of the steppe have repeatedly overflowed into China, Persia, India, Hungary and Russia. But so far as they have been pure nomads they have always failed to hold their own against the settled population. They have disturbed its life, but never modified it in essentials.

Of greater historical significance have been the attempts to control the steppe from the regions outside it. The steppe itself has probably never been the breeding ground of a people, and many of the tribes who have possessed it were nurtured originally in the mountain valleys of Mongolia and Altai. But these incomers from the north-east have been too barbarous to introduce new conditions on the steppe, and have themselves been moulded by the environment. From Iran, on the other hand (to take the borderlands in order), a real encroachment has been made on the steppe since very early times. Agriculture and city life have pushed out along the foothills north-eastward from the Iranian plateau as far as the fertile mountain-ringed basin of Ferghana, and down the course of the River Oxus to its delta in the Aral Sea. This "land beyond the Oxus" is the *alter orbis* of the Oriental world. Civilisation has maintained itself precariously there in isolated oases—each oasis laboriously irrigated and in some cases protected against the nomads by a wall encompassing the entire tract under cultivation. The steppe has

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often claimed its own, and the nomads have overwhelmed the intrusive towns and fields, but the settled population has always reasserted itself and maintained its links with the remainder of the Oriental world. As an outpost of Oriental civilisation it has shown remarkable vitality, but it has been perpetually on the defensive, and its influence over the steppe has never radiated far.

East of Iran the steppe is penetrated deeply by the bays of the Caspian, but the Caspian is a landlocked sea, and, till the coming of Russia, no outside influence reached the steppe across its waters. The steppe dominates it,* and a Mongol army once rode completely round it in a single raid. The Caucasus, which follows next, is too small and mountainous to exercise influence beyond itself. Its people have merely held their own against invaders, and fragments of broken tribes from the steppe have found asylum in its northern valleys. More powerful influences, however, have been brought to bear on the steppe from the Black Sea, which, unlike the Caspian, is accessible to Mediterranean sea power; and in the emporia of the Don and the Sea of Azov and the Dniepr there has been fruitful intercourse between the masters of the steppe and the civilisation of the Mediterranean, especially during those intervals of calm on the steppe which follow the periodical upheavals. There have been at least two such periods—of Greek trade from the sixth to the fourth century B.C., and again of Genoese trade in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries A.D.—when the influence of the Black Sea on the steppe was imposing. Herodotus tells of a Scythian king who was so overcome by the fascination of Hellenism that, unknown to his subjects, he kept a house within the walls of a Greek trading settlement. But the seed was sown on stony ground. When the King's double life was discovered by his tribesmen they put him to death,

* It is remarkable how little the Caspian provinces of Persia have influenced the other coasts of the Caspian.

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and even if one master of the steppe were converted to civilisation the next generation might be overwhelmed by a new swarm of nomads from the interior, trade relations broken, and the whole work of civilisation to do again. Moreover, the seafarers themselves, who could only reach the steppe through the Dardanelles and Bosphorus, were at the mercy of any empire that might control both sides of the narrows, and the extension of the Persian and Ottoman powers across them from Asia into Europe contributed to the decline of Greek and Genoese commerce on the northern shores of the Black Sea. If these land powers could have expanded still farther and brought the steppe itself, as well as the maritime approaches to it, under stable government, they could, of course, have civilised it more effectively than the seafarers had done. But historically it has proved impossible to rule even the western reaches of the steppe from Anatolia or the Balkans. Darius the Persian marched round the west end of the Black Sea, under the guidance of his Greek subjects, to conquer the hinterland of the Greek trading settlements, but he met with discomfiture when he crossed the Danube. There were no towns or fields on which he could lay hold, and in modern times the Osmanlis succeeded hardly better in securing a footing there, though the centre of their power was nearer to the spot. The Osmanlis seized the emporia of the Genoese, took the khans of the Tatars under their protection, occupied a continuous zone of territory from Constantinople to the Crimea, and skirmished with the Russians, Poles and Ukrainians. But they did not alter the social and economic conditions of the steppe, and the nomad continued to occupy it till the Osmanli suzerainty had passed away.

The steppe is also open to influences from Central Europe, but the two regions are only in contact at their extremities, and intercourse has been rare. It has not, however, been ineffective, if Central Europe, as one school

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of philologists holds, sent out on to the steppe those Indo-European emigrants who carried their language to Persia and Hindustan. At one period the steppe was commanded by Indo-European nomads, the linguistic and geographical link between Slavdom and Iran. But a tide of Turanian migration from Altai swept them away, except for a remnant of Ossetians in the Caucasian hills, and we have to reconstruct their former mastery of the steppe from the fact that branches of the same great language have established themselves permanently in the settled regions on either side of it. This complete ethnological change in the population of the steppe within historical times is an example of the instability of steppe power; and the attempts to reduce the steppe to order from the borderlands, which we have reviewed so far, were either transient or confined to narrow limits. Till little more than a century ago it seemed as though the steppe were in an unalterable state of equilibrium—the openness of the country leading the inhabitants to nomadism and the nomadism of the inhabitants preventing the settlement and cultivation of the country—but any such generalisation, which Herodotus or even Gibbon might have been tempted to make, has been falsified by the rise of the Russian Empire.

II. RUSSIA IN ASIA : THE NORTH-EAST PASSAGE.

IN the Russian Empire one of the settled borderlands has for the first time achieved command over the steppe in its entirety. The nomadic lords of the steppe who preceded the Russians drew their power from the steppe itself, and exercised it in transitory incursions into the countries round. The Russians, on the other hand, have

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mastered the steppe by encircling it along its settled marches, and have carried the influence of civilisation into its heart. The military and political expansion of Russia by which this end has been attained began less than four hundred years ago and ended within our own generation. It brought the borderlands into stable relations with each other, and the steppe with them all, and led on inevitably to economic and social developments, which have reached their greatest intensity during the last generation. The equilibrium between the steppe and its inhabitants has at last been shaken. The population is increasing in numbers and changing its way of life, and the face of the steppe is being correspondingly altered. Under the Russian Empire, before it was shattered by the war, steppe and borderlands were ceasing to be different elements like land and sea, and were becoming organic parts of one economic and political whole.

But this action upon the steppe has not always been characteristic of Russian history. Russia came into existence by the spread of a Slavonic peasantry through the forests and along the rivers between the Pripet Marshes and the Neva since about the sixth century A.D. The tribes they ousted were not steppe people, but Finnish forest dwellers; the organisers of the tenth century, who founded the Russian State, were seafarers from Scandinavia; and the religion and culture of Eastern Christendom, which came to Russia from Constantinople, passed across the steppe, as across the Black Sea, without leaving or receiving influences on the way. It traversed the steppe by the waterway of the Dniepr, and thence penetrated by stream and portage through the forest to the river systems of the Baltic and the Upper Volga. Similar influences mounted the Volga from the Islamic world and worked upon the eastern Finns. Bolgari (the predecessor of Kazan), near the junction of the Volga and the Kama, was the counterpart of Kiev in the Volga Basin. The Slavonic Russians and the Finnish "White

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Bulgarians" were converted almost simultaneously—the former to orthodox Christianity and the latter to Islam—about 1000 A.D., while to the south of them paganism and nomadism persisted on the steppe.

The first intimate contact between Russia and the steppe was brought about by the last great historical upheaval of the steppe people. At the end of the twelfth century A.D. a tribal struggle east of Altai gave the command of the whole steppe to the Mongols of Jinghiz Khan. The other nomads were scattered or absorbed, and the new masters swept over the borderlands. Batu, Jinghiz's grandson, crushed Russia in 1238 in the course of a raid into Central Europe, and the Russians remained for three centuries tributary to Batu's descendants, the Khans of the Golden Horde, who ruled the western appanages of the Mongol steppe empire.

Russia temporarily succumbed. Her western territories fell, as they have fallen again, under Central European control, and the Ukraine or borderland of Kiev became differentiated into a separate nationality. At the same time the Khans of the Golden Horde strengthened themselves by adopting Islam, and this led to a union between the nomads of the western steppe and the Finns of the Middle Volga, the former becoming Moslems and the latter abandoning their Finnish dialects for Turkish. Russia, the north-eastern outpost of Christendom, seemed as helpless under the Tatars as the Christians of the Iberian Peninsula under the Moors, but in each case a reaction came which not only recovered lost ground but opened new worlds.

Each succeeded in outflanking Oriental civilisation—the Portuguese by taking to the sea, the Russians by continuing their historical expansion through the forests in the only direction left open to them, towards the north and north-east. The traders of Novgorod pushed along the rivers to the White Sea and the Urals. In the fifteenth century the political balance changed. The Golden

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Horde broke up, while Novgorod and the upper Volga basin were united under the princes of Moscow. In 1552-4 the Tsar Ivan the Terrible conquered the divided Khanates of Kazan and Astrakhan ; and in 1586 a band of Russian adventurers crossed the Urals and put an end to the Khanate of Western Siberia. From this moment the advance was amazingly rapid. The flank of Islam was turned ; no other power stood in the way ; the Russians were hardened to the climate, and a magnificent river-system led them onward—down the Volga, up the Kama and across the Urals to Tobolsk ; up the Ob to the Yenisei ; up the Yenisei and the Tunguska to the Lena, down the Lena to Yakutsk, and then up its eastern tributaries to the watershed that overlooks the Pacific. The Pacific coast was reached in 1638, and the Russians, whose frontier stood at Nizhni Novgorod in 1552, had made “ the North-East Passage ” of Asia in eighty-six years—an achievement which ranks with the Portuguese circumnavigation of Africa.

The immediate result was to wall off the steppe towards the north, for in the seventeenth century the Russians came into contact with China, and a common frontier was established between the two civilised states * ; but the penetration of the steppe from Siberia did not begin till three centuries after the Russians were established there. These first three centuries of Russian dominion in Siberia were parallel in many respects to the early period of French and English activity in North America. The scattered native population was either exterminated or nominally converted to Christianity ; Russian trappers trafficked along the rivers ; trading posts and military stations sprang up ; there was an export of gold and furs, and an infinitely slow transit trade from China in a few luxuries like tea. Exiles of all kinds—heretics, criminals,

* The Chinese Empire was expanding under the Manchus, and these were nomadic conquerors, but they were assimilated to Chinese civilisation as soon as they became a ruling class.

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and political offenders—were sent out to reinforce the Russian inhabitants, but they were swallowed up in the wilderness, and the real colonisation and exploitation of the country was hardly attempted in this period. During the corresponding period in Canadian history the Hudson Bay Territory, with its natural products and accessible coasts and rivers, was more important than the prairie; and in both countries the centre of gravity was shifted from forest to grass-land, and the statistics of population and productivity revolutionised by the construction of a trans-continental railway.

The Trans-Siberian Railway was begun in 1892, built in sections simultaneously, and completed in 1905. Henceforward the main navigable rivers, which run from south to north and are cut by the railway at right angles, became secondary lines of communication, and the east-and-west waterways, on which latitudinal transport had hitherto depended, were superseded. The effect was to concentrate traffic and production in the southern and milder parts of the country, and Siberia, like Canada, became a long narrow zone of life along a trunk line, shading into an arctic wilderness on the north and bounded on the south by an international frontier.

As in Canada, too, the eastern and western sections of the zone have been rapidly differentiated. East of Lake Baikal the building of the railway has jeopardised Russian supremacy. The immensely rich province of Manchuria, across which the railway takes a short cut to Vladivostock, had lain fallow under Chinese rule; but since Russian enterprise opened it up it has attracted something like twenty million Chinese colonists—a population 50 per cent. greater than that of the whole of Siberia proper. Since the Japanese War, moreover, Russia has had to cede to Japan half her interests in Manchuria; the collapse after the Revolution seems likely to eliminate the last vestige of Russian influence there; and in Eastern Siberia, the other side of the Ussuri and the Amur, there are hardly

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a million and a half Russians altogether, strung out along the river-banks. Moreover, these outposts of Russian population are cut off from the main body by a quarter of a million Buriats—a Mongol-speaking people, Buddhists in religion, who alone of the Siberian natives have resisted Russification, and who, since the Revolution, have been organising themselves with a view to national autonomy.

In Western Siberia, on the other hand, a new Russia has been growing up between Lake Baikal and the Urals, for in this section the Chinese frontier bears away to the south, carrying the mountains with it, and from the foot of the Urals to Tomsk the railway gives on to the steppe. During the last twenty years the Russian Government, through the agency of the railway authorities, has been colonising the steppe with Russian peasants. Special rates have been given for the individuals sent by the prospective settlers to report on the land, and for the families themselves if they decided to migrate from European Russia. Conditions, it is true, have been much less favourable than in Canada. The climate is harsher for cattle, crops and men ; the distance is greater to the sea and foreign markets ; the general level of technique is lower ; and the official arrangements have been far from adequate. Yet there has been progress that promises well. The import of agricultural machinery has steadily increased ; Danish pioneers have taught the Siberiaks co-operative dairy-farming ; and the additional railway from Omsk through Perm and Vologda has opened a shorter route for exports to Archangel. But the chief measure of prosperity in Western Siberia * has been the increase of population. Cities have sprung up from nothing in a

* In the following statistics the Governments of Irkutsk, Yeniseisk, Tomsk, Tobolsk, Semipalatinsk, Akmolinsk and Turgai have been included, while Sakhalin, the Coast Province, Kamchatska, the Amur, Trans-Baikal, and Yakutsk have been omitted as falling under Eastern Siberia.

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few years * ; the number of settlers planted by Government alone amounted to 3,124,000 between the years 1893 and 1912 ; and the total Russian population in these provinces increased between 1897 and 1911 from 4,272,000 to over 8,000,000. Western Siberia has become a new Russian dominion with a homogeneous Russian nationality, for the 8,000,000 Russians completely overshadow the 400,000 or 500,000 natives.† The natives are divided among many tribes and are mostly scattered through the inhospitable north. The future of Siberia lies no longer there, but on the steppe south of the railway. The steppe, however, would never have been available for Russian colonisation if it had not fallen under the mastery of the Russian Empire, and this political control was not secured till the steppe had been encircled from the south as well.

III. RUSSIA IN ASIA : THE SOUTH-EAST PASSAGE.

THE conquest of the Tatar Khanates by Ivan the Terrible had opened the way for Russian expansion, not only up the Kama into Siberia but down the Volga

		NUMBER OF INHABITANTS.			
		In 1897.		In 1911.	
Kurgan	10,170	...	35,043	
Kustanai...	...	14,275	...	25,220	
Petropavlovsk	...	19,688	...	43,248	
Omsk	37,376	...	127,865	
Tatarsk	—	...	7,569	
Novo-Nikolaievsk	...	—	...	63,552	
Taiga	—	...	10,306	
Tomsk	52,225	...	111,417	
Barnaul	29,331	...	52,075	
Bogotol	—	...	5,939	
Krasnoyarsk	...	25,126	...	73,482	
Irkutsk	51,533	...	126,689	

† Of these about 200,000 Tatars or Tatarised Samoyeds and Finns in the Tobolsk and Tomsk Governments, and 130,000 Buriats in Eastern Irkutsk, are the only elements with an independent culture. The Kirghiz in the southern and still uncolonised parts of the steppe provinces are not included in the total, the southern boundary of Western Siberia being taken as coincident with the present limits of colonisation.

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to the Caspian Sea ; but the Russian hold upon Astrakhan was at first precarious. When one nomad power on the western steppe disintegrated its place had always been taken by fresh hordes from the east, sweeping everything before them. Once before, in the eleventh century A.D., Russian adventurers had descended the Don and Volga in the slack tide between two migrations, and the following wave of nomads had obliterated their traces. In the seventeenth century, history threatened to repeat itself. The Kalmucks, a group of Mongolian-speaking Buddhist tribes cast adrift by the break-up of the eastern appanages of the Mongol Empire, passed westward over the steppe into the former pasturing-lands of the Golden Horde. Before the year 1700 they had forced the passage of the Volga ; Astrakhan was virtually cut off ; the Russian dominion might have ended, and the western steppe relapsed into the old cycle of its history under new nomadic masters, if the Cossacks had not opposed a more effective barrier to nomad invasion than the garrisons and governors of the Tsar.

The Cossacks were borderers between steppe and forest, who streamed out on to the steppe at the end of the fifteenth century, when the power of the Golden Horde dissolved. In nationality they were mixed from the beginning—Ukrainians in the west, Great Russians further eastward, banded with renegade nomads and fugitives from the settled lands. Their allegiance was equally doubtful—some acknowledged the King of Poland, others the Tsar of Moscow ; they played off the Turk against their Christian overlords, and in practice lived as sovereign communities. Their communal organisation was free but not democratic. The Cossack warriors chose a leader or *hetman*,* whose powers were chiefly limited by the turbulence of his electors ; but the warriors were a privileged caste. The surplus of

* Said to be derived from the German *hauptmann*. *Hetman* is the Ukrainian, *Ataman* the Great Russian form.

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the land they wrested from the nomads was taken up by immigrant peasants, who paid the Cossacks rent in kind and submitted to their government. Up to the Revolution of 1917, disfranchised peasant and dominant Cossack remained sharply divided classes in all the Cossack territories, and little love was lost between the two. The Cossacks of the Dniepr, the earliest and most characteristic Cossack community, actually lived apart in the *sitch*, a fortified island in the Dniepr, half protecting and half tyrannising over the Ukrainian peasantry up to the walls of Kiev. This republican and oligarchic polity was common to all Cossacks ; all, too, were champions of the Orthodox Church, whether against Catholicism, Uniatism, or Islam, and, above everything, they were men of the settled borderlands, sallying under arms on to the steppe to fight the nomad on his own element. They beat him with his own weapons, learning his horsemanship, rivalling his endurance, outdistancing him in their raids, but they have always remained tillers of the soil and dwellers in settled habitations. The unit of the nomadic tribe is the *kibitka* or movable felt hut, the Cossack unit is the *stanitza* or palisaded village ; and a series of these fortified posts constitutes a Cossack "host." The *stanitzas* are generally echeloned along the banks of a river, for the Cossacks have been rivermen since the days when they issued from the Russian forests ; and the rivers running out across the steppe from the forests to the Black Sea, at right angles to the path of nomad invasion, are natural lines of defence. At the beginning of the sixteenth century Cossack "hosts" were already established on the Dniepr and the Don ; new swarms were always breaking away from the parent communities and pushing from river to river ; before the end of the century there was a Cossack "host" on the Yaik, half-way between the Volga and the Sea of Aral. The Kalmucks indeed broke through the Yaik and Volga lines, but the Don Cossacks stopped them completely.

Left to themselves the Cossacks might have developed

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into counterparts, in orthodox Christendom, of the military orders of Western Europe, who enlarged the borders of the Catholic Church in Palestine and the Baltic and set up their own polities in the conquered lands. Instead of this they became instruments of the expansion of Russia, and were incorporated in the structure of the Russian Empire which they helped very largely to create.

The Russian State established its hold over the Cossacks by imperceptible degrees. The Dniepr Cossacks in the sixteenth century were an autonomous Ukrainian republic under Polish suzerainty, but the Don Cossacks seem from the beginning to have recognised the overlordship of the Tsar. The Tsardom and the Cossacks had two political objects in common—the defence of the Orthodox Church and the conquest of the steppe. In the seventeenth century the religious issue led to a struggle between the Dniepr Cossacks and the Polish Crown, and in 1652 the *Sitch* transferred its allegiance to Moscow by a formal treaty. For over a century the relations between the two parties remained unsettled. The Tsars did not respect the Cossacks' autonomy, and the Cossacks leagued themselves with the Poles or the Swedes. But Peter the Great's victory over Charles XII. of Sweden at Poltava in 1709 confirmed the annexation of the Ukraine to Russia, and for the next two centuries the door leading from Central Europe to the steppe was closed. The last Cossack revolt took place in 1773, and after its suppression the Dniepr *Sitch* was dissolved. The recalcitrants fled to Turkey; the majority were settled on the Kuban, to guard the Russian marches against the Moslem mountaineers of Northern Caucasia. Whether loyal or rebellious, the Cossacks were made to serve the Russian Government's aims. At the same date the Yaik Cossacks were reorganised, and all the Cossack communities, while retaining their lands and a certain measure of self-government, were brought more and more under central control. The Cossack "hosts" that have come into existence since then have

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been purely official foundations. The Orenburg and Siberian Cossacks were planted in the eighteenth century to fill the gap along the northern border of the steppe between the Yaik Cossacks and Altai. In the nineteenth century the Trans-Baikal, Amur and Ussuri Cossacks were organised to guard the Russian acquisitions in the Far East. The Semirietch Cossacks were founded as late as 1867 to link Siberia with Central Asia ; and during the present war the Russian military authorities on the Armenian front began to create a new Cossack line in the occupied Ottoman territory. Russian colonists were placed on the lands of the Armenians whom the Turkish atrocities had removed, and the infamous project was only put an end to by the Revolution.

This exploitation of the Cossacks was the vital factor in Russian expansion south-eastward. The Cossack breakwaters dammed up the nomad tide, and in 1770 the Russian Government felt itself strong enough to drive the Kalmuck intruders back to the wilderness whence they came. De Quincey has immortalised the terrible march from the Volga to the Chinese frontier. Russia requited the nomads with nomadic savagery, but this ebb of the nomad tide first brought the central steppe within the pale of civilisation and prepared the way for the colonisation of Western Siberia a century after.

Having settled with Central Europe and the nomads, Russia had still to reckon with the Turks, for the Tatar Khanate of the Crimea held its own with Turkish backing and barred Russia from access to the Black Sea. The Empress Catherine removed this barrier in the Turkish War of 1769-74. The Crimea was detached from Turkey by the terms of peace and annexed by Russia in 1783. For the first time coast and hinterland were united, not under nomad lordship, but under a settled rule ; and for the first time also civilisation, instead of coming up from the sea, came down from the interior. Ports were rebuilt which had not flourished since Genoese or even

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since Milesian days—Kherson in 1778, Nikolaiev in 1789, Odessa in 1792*—and cities like Yekaterinoslav took the place of the Cossack *Sitch*. Here, as in Western Siberia, conquest and colonisation were not simultaneous. The great influx of population began after the emancipation of the serfs in 1861 ; but from that date wheat cultivation was rapidly extended, the minerals of the Donetz basin were opened up, factories and railways sprang into existence, and the Black Sea provinces—a desert only a century before—became one of the coveted regions of the world.

Thus Russia absorbed the steppe up to the foothills of the Caucasus ; but her expansion could not stop there, for in making the steppe her own she had entered into a struggle with Turkey for the command of the Black Sea. After the peace of 1774 the Black Sea ceased to be a Turkish lake, but it did not become a Russian one. The struggle has continued ever since, going slowly in Russia's favour, and the Peace of Brest-Litovsk, which reverses the course of events, is unlikely to be the final decision, for that depends upon the ultimate destiny of Caucasia.

Caucasia, like the Balkans, is a bridge between two continents and an isthmus between two seas, and it is also a meeting place of races and civilisations. The Caucasus Mountains, which traverse it from north-west to south-east, descend slowly to the steppe in a tangle of valleys, inhabited by barbaric Moslem tribes ; but the southern face of the range falls steeply, and the vale of Trans-Caucasia, which lies between it and the Armenian plateau, is the home of more civilised peoples. The western and central districts belong to the Georgians, an indigenous nation which has been in communion with the Orthodox Church since the fifth century A.D. and has preserved its existence against Islam and nomadism ; south of the Georgians there are the Armenians, another Christian nationality with a church of its own ; while on the east,

* It was characteristic that in reviving the Greek names the Russian antiquaries attached them to the wrong places.

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where the vale sinks towards the Caspian Sea, nomads have drifted in from the steppe through Persia and formed a nation of Moslem Turkish-speaking lowlanders, known locally as Azerbaijanis, but called by the Russians "the Tatars of the Caucasus."

Till 1774 Trans-Caucasia was more or less subject to Turkey and Persia, while the Cossack cordon held in the independent northern tribes ; but from this moment the whole region was bound to pass under the control either of the Moslem Powers or of Russia. If Russia did not establish herself in Trans-Caucasia the Christians there would succumb, and Turkey, driven out of the Crimea, would work on the religious sympathies of the Caucasian mountaineers and launch a counter-attack against Russia through their valleys. In the same year, therefore, that the Crimea was annexed the Russian protectorate was established over Georgia, and from that date the incorporation of Caucasia in the Russian Empire was steadily continued till it was completed in 1878 by the Turkish surrender of Batum, Kars and Ardahan. After setting foot in Georgia the Russian Government had two distinct problems to solve—the establishment of a strategic frontier against Turkey and Persia, and the pacification of the Moslem tribes between Georgia and the old Cossack border. The former task was easy, for Turkey and Persia never co-operated and were quite outmatched by Russia in military strength ; the second was an extraordinary achievement which would have taxed the strength of any European country, and Great Britain and France, which have been faced with similar tasks in the Atlas and on the N.W. Frontier of India, have so far declined to emulate it.

The extension of the Russian Empire over the Caucasus made Russia's possession of the Black Sea steppe secure, and brought prosperity to Trans-Caucasia itself. Before the European War the Baku petroleum fields had become one of the chief sources of the world's supply, and the cultivation of cotton had good prospects in the lowlands.

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But Trans-Caucasia has been and always will be more important as a high-road between other areas of production than for what it produces itself; the passage from sea to sea, along the valleys of the Kur and the Rion, is an ancient avenue of traffic between Central Asia and the Mediterranean; and the Russians increased its importance by developing modern means of communication here before they existed on the steppe or across the frontier in Turkey or Persia. The railway from Baku to Poti was the first to be built; after 1878, Batum became the Black Sea terminus, and branch lines were pushed out which, during the present war, have reached Erzerum, Lake Van, and Tabriz. Trans-Caucasia, incorporated to cover Russia's deployment on the northern shores of the Black Sea, inevitably carried Russian expansion forward across the Caspian into the old marches of Oriental civilisation beyond the Oxus.

The lands beyond the Oxus had been swept, like Russia, by the Mongol tide; but they survived the cataclysm, settled down as the appanage of Jinghiz' son Chagatai, and in the fourteenth century produced a world-conqueror and legislator in Timur. They suffered far more from the local disturbances set up on the western steppe by the break-up of the Golden Horde. About the year 1500 the Usbeks, a sub-group of the western confederation, drifted out of their steppe-pastures and settled like a swarm of locusts on the fields and cities to the south. They established themselves there as a parasitic ruling class, sucking out the surplus production of the working population. The country was parcelled out into petty khanates, perpetually at war. Communications between oasis and oasis fell into decay. In some oases, like that of Merv, agriculture itself was rooted out; and, wherever civilisation perished, the Turkmens, a wilder steppe-people than the Usbeks, seized the carcase. The Turkmens chiefly fastened upon the derelict oases between the frontier of Persia and the Oxus. They ranged unhindered over

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northern Persia and made slave-raiding their profession. The only roads which connected the land beyond the Oxus with the rest of the civilised Oriental world were thus permanently blockaded; the wall of mountains—Hindu-Kush, Pamirs, Thian-Shan, Altai—prevented any regular traffic with India and China; the north was bounded by the impassable ocean of the steppe. From the Usbek conquest onwards, the country was extraordinarily isolated. Nothing came from outside to counteract the effects of a vicious system of government, and the economic degeneration was only retarded by the survival of a native commercial instinct and agricultural tradition, which was the product of millenniums and required more than a few centuries to die.

Russia embarked on the conquest of this country after the Crimean War. She approached it first, as she had approached the Caucasus, from the north, and the Usbek Khanates were occupied, between the years 1863 and 1873, by military expeditions dispatched across the steppe from the Ural and Orenburg Cossack lines. But the footing thus obtained was precarious, and the Russians at once proceeded to open up another route from Trans-Caucasia across the Caspian Sea and the wilderness of the Turkmens. The subjugation of the Turkmens took a dozen years—from 1873 to 1886. The nomads were aided in their resistance by the difficulty of the country, for in its southern reaches the steppe changes into a desert of shifting sand; but the Russian general Kaufmann in Trans-Caspia, like Kitchener in the Sudan a few years later, overcame the desert by the railway. A base was established at Krasnovodsk—the point on the east coast of the Caspian where the crossing from Baku is shortest—and from here the Trans-Caspian Railway (which was simply a prolongation of the Trans-Caucasian on the other shore) was pushed into the interior from oasis to oasis. After the immediate military purpose had been served the work was still continued. By 1888 railhead had passed the

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Oxus and reached Samarkand, and in 1898 it attained its termini at Andijan and Tashkend.

The original motive of this Russian advance in Central Asia may have been to revenge the defeat of the Crimean War by threatening India. That view was commonly taken in Great Britain, and the new Russian frontiers towards Persia and Afghanistan were successfully fixed by British diplomacy at a point which kept India out of danger. Yet if Russia's march on India never reached its goal, she had acquired an India of her own in the land beyond the Oxus.

British India and Russian Central Asia are alike in this, that they are countries of ancient Oriental civilisation attached by conquest to European States from which they are separated by a geographical gulf—the steppe in one case and the sea in the other. But the differences are also significant. India with its monsoon climate and vast population falls into the same regional grouping as the East Indies and China. Central Asia, with its five or six millions of inhabitants and its oases set in a zone of desiccation, is more comparable in these respects to Egypt and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. But the chief difference lies in the relation, in the two cases, between the dependency and the ruling country. England and India, after more than a century and a half, remain separate entities in the British Commonwealth, and will remain so whatever developments the constitution of the Commonwealth may undergo. Russia and Central Asia, though their political union was completed less than thirty years before the outbreak of the present war, were already coalescing into a single organism. The Russian conquest cut off Central Asia from India and China more completely than ever, for about 1890 the autonomous Khanate of Bokhara, which had so far only been politically subject to Russia, was included in the Russian customs-area, and the Russian officials took special pains to stop the infiltration of British goods. At the same time a short and easy road was opened along the

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Trans-Caspian Railway between Central Asia and the great world. But this road was exclusively in the hands of Russia, and it was the Government's policy to make Central Asia a Russian economic preserve. Transit trade *via* Trans-Caucasia and the Black Sea between Central Asia and other European countries was practically eliminated by prohibitive duties, and Russian enterprise had the field to itself. The effect on Central Asia of this sudden and intimate confrontation with a huge, alien and vastly more efficient economic body was bound to be revolutionary. For nearly four centuries the economic unit there had not even been the country as a whole but the individual oasis. As communications broke down and security vanished, each oasis had tended more and more to produce the staple food-stuffs, raw materials and manufactured goods for its own consumption ; but now the unit was expanded from the oasis to the whole customs-area of the Russian Empire, offering the productive workers of Central Asia an undreamed of choice of markets and sources of supply. In practice, however, the choice was made for them by the Russian capitalist, for one of the native products of Central Asia was cotton, and the Russian manufacturers were fascinated by the idea of raising a cotton crop here which would make them independent of American imports. The land available for the extension of cotton cultivation (which lay for the most part in the province of Ferghana) was not held in large estates but by peasant proprietors, and in their hands it remained. The Russians encouraged them to abandon the other crops which they had previously grown for their own consumption and to give more of their land to cotton by undertaking to buy their prospective cotton crop before the season and making them an advance on the price. To cover the reduction in the local output of foodstuffs, grain was imported from the Ukraine and Great Russia along the Trans-Caspian Railway, and this could be done so cheaply that the peasant made a considerable monetary profit by the transaction. But the pros-

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perity thus promised him proved illusory. His earnings were not indeed confiscated by the comparatively moderate and equitable Russian taxation system ; but the Moscow manufacturers returned his cotton to him in the form of enticing cotton goods and fleeced him by the new wants they knew how to arouse as effectively as he had been fleeced by Usbek khans and tax-farmers. Russian economic policy during these years was short-sighted. The overstimulation of the demand for cotton goods pauperised the peasant and gave the manufacturer immediate gains at the expense of the future ; the advance system involved buyer and producer in a vicious circle from which neither could escape ; and the annual exchange of bulky staple products put a dangerous strain on the Trans-Caspian Railway, while threatening Central Asia with famine if the railway broke down. The development was unsound, and during the latter years of the period there were serious economic crises. But the situation could only be saved by making the relation between Central Asia and Russia more intimate still. For good or evil, the two countries had become parts of an organic whole, and the Russian capitalist had to discover that he must consider the true interests of the Ferghana peasant if he was ultimately to promote his own. There is no reason, however, to suppose that disaster would not have been averted if the Russian Empire had not been overtaken by the European War.

IV. GERMANY'S OPPORTUNITY.

IN the structure of the Russian Empire the settled lands of Central Asia found a natural place. They formed the last link in the chain which Russia had been steadily drawing round the steppe for three centuries by her north-eastward and south-eastward expansion. When her outposts advancing from the direction of the Caspian met those from Western Siberia in the neighbourhood of Lake Balkash,

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the cordon was complete and the steppe was exposed to concentric pressure from all directions. The Kirghiz-Kazaks, a confederation of Moslem Turkish-speaking tribes, who have occupied the heart of the eastern steppe since the migration of the Usbeks, were not affected by the Russians' first expansion north-eastward through Siberia ; but when Russia made good her position on the western steppe as well and displayed her power by the expulsion of the Kalmucks, the Kirghiz were compelled to acknowledge the suzerainty of the Russian Government. This suzerainty was confirmed during the first half of the nineteenth century by definite treaties ; and when Russia had established herself in the southern borderlands too, she was able to make her authority over the Kirghiz effective. She compelled them, in fact, to submit to the colonisation of the steppe by Russian peasants which has been described in a previous section of this article. The nomads were faced with the alternative of taking to agriculture themselves or suffering extinction ; but the Russian Empire had them in its grip and resistance was impossible. The absolute mastery of the Russian Government over the steppe was symbolised by the construction of two transverse railways across it from Rostov to Baku and from Samara to Tashkend—the last great imperial works executed by the Russians before the War. In 1914 the transformation of the steppe into settled country was in full progress, and as an effort of creative policy it is not unworthy of comparison with the achievements of Rome in Western Europe.

The parallel between Russia and Rome is suggestive. Both were exponents of militarism ; they displayed the same ruthless persistence in beating down barbaric and recalcitrant peoples, and the same largeness of imagination in the highways they constructed to secure their conquests. The Trans-Siberian and Trans-Caspian Railways are the modern counterparts of the great Roman roads, and the position of the Latin colonies in the Roman system is

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curiously similar to the part assigned by Russia to the Cossacks. In each case the imperial power laid hands upon an extraneous organism, assimilated it to itself, and moulded it into an instrument for the assimilation of others. The Cossacks, distinct though they have remained from the Russian peasantry, have been the means of Russifying the tribes of the marches—Bashkirs and Kirghiz, Tungus and Buriats. Even since the Russian Revolution the remnant of the Kalmucks who survive between Don and Volga, and the main body of the North Caucasian Mountaineers, have federated with the Cossacks in a "South-Eastern Union." The spread of a language and a peasantry were the salient features in the expansion of Rome; Russification and the colonisation of the steppe are the characteristic processes of the Russian Empire, and both processes are aspects of the same phenomenon. The Great Russian is identical with the land-hungry peasant, and the nationalities whom the Russian is assimilating or supplanting are also the populations whom the peasant colonist is evicting from surplus or undeveloped land. The land question and the nationality question in the Russian Empire are simply different names for a single social transformation.

But in the Russian case we can only speak of processes where in the Roman we can measure results. The transformation of the steppe depended on the military and political framework erected in the borderlands; till the last Turkmen fastness had fallen in 1886 this framework was incomplete; and less than thirty years after that date it was laid in ruins by the War. The causes of the overthrow were moral, for the Tsardom, like Rome, was an incarnation of violence and injustice as well as a creative power. To us who regard it in its broad outlines, as though from another planet, the Russian Empire appears as a civilising influence; but to the peoples and individuals in the grip of it—an educated Russian dogged by the *Okrana*, a Pole or Ukrainian whose national culture was being

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stamped out, a Kirghiz driven off his ancestral pasturelands, a Turkmen or Daghestani standing among the embers of his burnt-out village, it was the abomination of desolation. Both elements were in it, and if time had been allowed to work, the alloy of evil might have been purged out and the creative element have triumphed. But when the War came, the Russian Empire had hardly entered on the second phase of its history; good and evil were still bound up together, and the fetters of the Tsardom could not be broken without shattering the bonds of the Empire as well.

The Revolution had therefore a centrifugal effect, and there was a widespread reaction against developments which were wrong in method rather than in tendency. Tribes and nationalities in process of Russification tried to reverse the process and return to the *status quo* before the Russian Empire began to transform them. The Buriats who had been taken into the Trans-Baikal Cossack organisation repudiated this privileged status in order to reintegrate themselves with their tribe. The Kirghiz and Bashkirs, who had been driven into greater and greater hostility towards the Russian Government by the colonisation policy, till the friction culminated in the appalling massacres by Russian troops in 1916,* demanded the removal of the Russian settlers and the restoration of their old tribal limits and institutions. The settled population of Central Asia reacted to the deep underlying antipathy between Oriental and Western civilisation, though they too had immediate grievances in the economic derangement, which, like all other evils in the Russian Empire, had been greatly aggravated by the War, and in the monopoly of power by the numerically small Russian element in the cities, which did not cease with the overthrow of the Tsardom. The Central Asiatic provinces moved slowly

* The immediate occasion of the massacres was the resistance of the Kirghiz to the Tsar's order calling up for non-combatant service behind the front the populations (mostly Moslems) that had previously been exempted from conscription.

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towards self-government ; but from the beginning there was an extreme party—especially among the mollahs in the autonomous Khanate of Bokhara—which wished to sever the connection with Russia altogether. In the Caucasus, again, there was an awakening of nationalism, for the Armenians, Georgians and Tatars had all been treated badly by the old régime. The Georgians claimed the political, military and ecclesiastical autonomy guaranteed by the Treaty of 1783 and unlawfully set aside since then by Russia. The Armenians, who had been repressed as progressives by the Tsarist Government and had reason to be dissatisfied with their treatment during the War, seized the opportunity to organise their national life without interference. The Azerbaijanis, who had been kept isolated and unarmed, began to organise too, and entered into relation with their co-religionists in Russia, Turkey and Persia. Finally the Ukrainians, who, like the Georgians, had a violated treaty on which to base their claims, revealed an ambition for complete State independence.

These centrifugal movements were inevitable, but the evils which provoked them were only one aspect of the Russian Empire, and their consequences are already bringing centripetal forces back into operation. Central Asia is discovering that independence means in economic terms starvation, and the Ferghana peasantry must either break up their cotton fields and sink back into being “self-suppliers,” or continue to exchange their cotton against corn. The Trans-Caucasian nationalities have been taught by the Turkish seizure of Batum that particularism may bring political extinction, and that their prosperity depends upon their transit trade. In spite of their conflicting interests they have kept a joint government in being at Tiflis, and aim at constituting a Trans-Caucasian federation as a component part of a federalised Russia. The Ukrainians are finding that the Danaan gifts of Germany are not compatible with Social-Revolutionary agrarian

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reconstruction ; and as soon as they are in a position to place foodstuffs on the world-market again, they will learn that the question of the Straits is unsolved and insoluble for them without the backing of Great Russia. Left to itself, the Russian Empire would probably recover from the War and the Revolution. The borderlands of the steppe would come together again, not as subjects of the Great Russians and the Tsar, but as partners with Russia in a voluntary union, and the steppe would automatically return to order. In this event the political methods of the Empire would improve, but its political tendencies would continue unaltered. The peasant's land-hunger will not abate until he adopts intensive cultivation. The Revolution has probably postponed the date of this development, and the partition of the *latifundia* in European Russia will only bring temporary relief. If political conditions allow it, the colonisation of the steppe is bound to be resumed, and the question of the Straits will become acute again in proportion, since the eastern steppe, as well as the Ukraine, must depend on the Black Sea ports for its access to the world-market. But unhappily the political conditions can no longer be determined by those concerned without interference from outside. The Russian Empire may be likened to a building thrown down by an earthquake. The stones have been shaped to fit, and the architect could build them up again into a stronger structure than the original. But for the moment the architect is dazed and paralysed ; the stones lie on the ground, and till he recovers they are at the disposal of his adversary.

Can Germany lay hands on these materials for a rival construction ? Attention has hitherto been concentrated upon German designs against the outworks of the Russian Empire. The case of the western marches has been alluded to at the beginning of this article, and it is only too likely that, if a German Central Europe is established, it will be aggrandised by the addition of these former Russian provinces. On the other hand, the intervention of

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Germany at the Far Eastern extremity of the Russian territories, which has also been prophesied, is hardly a serious possibility. Between the provinces beyond Lake Baikal and the western frontier of Russia as laid down in the Treaty of Brest Litovsk lies the whole mass of the Great Russian people—a practically homogeneous population of seventy or eighty million souls stretching through European Russia and Western Siberia to the present limits of colonisation on the steppe.* This great nation is indestructible; Germany can never remove it from its seat; at most she can attempt to bring it under her control; but since the signing of peace the capital of Russia has passed from Petrograd to Moscow, not from Petrograd to Berlin. Yet even if the government of Russia from Berlin were feasible, it would still be improbable that Germany could extend her power effectively over regions on the further side of the Russian national territory. Russia herself has been losing her grip on these regions since the completion of the Trans-Siberian Railway opened an avenue for the civilised Yellow Races into Northern Asia. It is inconceivable that Germany could succeed better, with the added distance and the passive resistance of a subject Russia as a further obstacle. To be successful she would have to intervene, not as Russia's mistress but as her ally. That would depend on the goodwill of Russia, and circumstances may be imagined in which Buriat nationalism, Chinese numbers and Japanese power might incline Western Siberia towards a German orientation. Yet the Russian nation is a whole of which the Siberiaks are a small minority, and they would have to

* The only important alien element in this vast territory (with the exception of the Bashkirs, who will be dealt with further on) are the Tatarised Finns of the Middle Volga, whose centre is Kazan. These have an Islamic culture as ancient as the Byzantine culture of the Russians (see p. 533); but, on the other hand, they are more Russified than any other Moslem element in the Empire, and they are too scattered to think of forming a separate geographical entity. While the other Moslem groups have been claiming territorial autonomy, the Volga Tatars have drawn up a very moderate scheme for cultural autonomy only, which they are now putting into execution.

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convince their fellow-countrymen in the European provinces that the menace to Russia from the East was really greater than that from Central Europe. Only so would the conditions be realised for German intervention east of Baikal, and Germany would have obtained them at a price she could not pay ; for if she became Russia's ally she would have to forego interference in her internal development within the frontiers that have been laid down in the Russo-German Treaty. In that case the Russian colonisation of the steppe would go on ; Russia would increase once more in resources and population ; her pressure on the Black Sea and Baltic waterways would be renewed ; and Germany would be haunted by the old nightmare which she fought to dispel. In fact, the steppe is Russia's future. If she keeps it she is invincible, and Germany's prime object of policy after the war must be to extricate it from her grasp. This object cannot be attained by Far Eastern ventures but only by seizing the South-Eastern passage round the steppe which Russia has opened up. Russia's position here is vital but insecure. It depends on political control over non-Russian peoples ; its complete establishment dates from less than thirty years before the War, and during the War it has been shattered. German designs in this direction must be taken in earnest.

Germany has a number of cards in her hand. The first is the independence of the Ukraine, which not only splits the Russian nation but opens a door on to the steppe at its western end. The Ukraine is the natural instrument of Central European against Russian Imperialism, and the Lithuanians, Poles, and Swedes all used it in turn. The second card is the Cossack South-Eastern Union—a federation of the Cossack hosts from Orenburg to the Don. The Cossacks are an element of disunion in the Russian body politic. The Russian peasantry of the non-Cossack territories will hunger after the Cossack reserves of land ; the non-Cossack inhabitants of the Cossack territories will agitate for political rights. If the Bolsheviks remain in

Germany's Opportunity

power in Russia, the Cossacks will be a nucleus of opposition ; if the Bourgeoisie recovers its position with the Cossacks' assistance, the Cossacks' subject population will be a focus of revolution. In either case there will be a feud, in which Germany can intervene.

Germany's third card is the rivalry between Armenian and Georgian. If this were exploited to as good purpose as the older feud between Serb and Bulgar, the road through Trans-Caucasia might be opened, and the breaking down of the barrier between Turkey and the Azerbaijanis would bring Germany's fourth card into play. This final card is the Pan-Turanian and Pan-Islamic propaganda, which has been discussed in an article on " Russia, Turkey, and Islam " in a previous number of *THE ROUND TABLE*. The movement has little inward vitality. Among the nineteen million Moslems of Russia—sixteen million of them Turks—whom it concerns, there are few with the imagination or the ability to organise themselves on such ambitious lines. To most the Revolution has brought nothing more than a bewildered relief at the sudden relaxation of an irresistible moulding force ; they would be content to sink back into the torpor from which they were first shaken by their contact with Russia, yet they would soon discover that the Russian Empire had modified their life beyond recall, and that a civilised partner was henceforth necessary to their existence. Russia's place could never be taken by Turkey, and the Russian influence would inevitably prevail if Turkey and Russia alone were in the field. But Germany, working through Turkey, might build this derelict material into the barrier she needs across the steppe against further Russian colonisation.

At least the indigenous population is the only barrier available, for Germany cannot push the Russian settlers off the steppe by planting Germans there. Her geographical position, social development and Islamic policy put that out of the question, and she must confine her aim to depriving Russia of an advantage which she is unable to make her

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own. This purpose would be served by the establishment of "Kirghizistan" as a State independent of Russia. The northern frontier would be drawn by Germany and placed under German guarantee; and if the State of "Bashkiristan," set up last autumn after the Bolsheviks had defeated the Orenburg Cossacks, could also be detached from Russia and drawn into the German net, a wedge would be driven across the Trans-Siberian Railway * between Russia in Europe and Western Siberia. The Bashkirs and Kirghiz might readily lend themselves to the German design. Of all Russia's Moslem subjects, they have most cause for resentment and anxiety, and they are also the strongest in numbers.† Their capacity for self-government is questionable, but so long as Russia is kept out, a period of anarchy on the steppe would be to Germany's advantage, because it would make German intervention ultimately inevitable. The intervention would be gradual, and would begin with economic penetration. Tatar oil-kings at Baku and Sart cotton-growers in Ferghana, threatened with ruin by the Russian break-down, would find themselves more than compensated by the German market. A pro-German party of material interests would be formed; the Ottoman intermediary would drop out, the Turanian and Islamic *camouflage* would be discarded. The reduction of the independent States to German provinces might not follow for years, but it would be bound to come in the end, as Roman administration came in Western Asia when the Seleucid Empire had been overthrown by Roman arms.

V. CHINA OR INDIA ?

GERMANY has already taken the first steps in this policy, and if she were to reach her goal she would have annihilated the Russian Empire. But would she be

* The Omsk-Perm line, however, runs outside the Bashkir boundary.

† The Bashkirs number nearly two millions, the Kirghiz nearly five.

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contented even with this immense success ? The south-eastern passage which Russia opened for the encirclement of the steppe points on to China and India. Would Germany follow the lure, and, if so, in which direction ? The question is still hypothetical, but it deserves discussion.

The road to China is the line of least resistance. The terminus of the Trans-Caspian Railway in Ferghana lies at the foot of the pass leading over the Thian Shan mountains to Kashgar ; the branch from Tashkend to the Semirietch territory heads for the gap between Thian Shan and Altai where easy gradients lead from the steppe to Mongolia ; and both routes have been famous in history. Nomad conquerors from the plateau, silk merchants from China, and those smuggled cocoons which were the origin of sericulture in Europe, travelled along them from east to west, while in exchange they carried Middle Eastern civilisation towards China. Islam spread through Eastern Turkestan as early as the tenth century ; it penetrated China proper in the thirteenth, under the Mongols, when Bagdad and Peking were for a moment post-stations of a single empire, and took root especially in the provinces of Kansu and Yunnan. At first sight it might seem as though Germany would only have to build on to the Russian railway system and push ahead with her propaganda. The homogeneous Moslem inhabitants of Eastern Turkestan are "Turaniens" under foreign rule ; the scattered Moslems in China are lost tribes of the Pan-Islamic brotherhood. But these advantages are unreal. Islam has never flourished in China. It has had to adapt itself profoundly—more profoundly, far, than in India—to the native civilisation, and when it has refused to adapt itself it has been repressed. The great rebellions of the nineteenth century were drawn out for years * and ended in partial extermination. Whatever their numbers were before, the Chinese Moslems have dwindled since then to less than ten and possibly less than five millions. They survive on

* Yunnan, 1855-73 ; Kansu, 1864-77.

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sufferance, excluded from the precincts of many towns ; and the Moslems of Eastern Turkestan, where the rebellion had a racial as well as a religious character, have been kept by the Chinese Government since its suppression under effective military and administrative control. A Turanian or Islamic propaganda in " Sin-Kiang " would be inimical to China, and the Chinese Republic would be driven into the arms of Japan. Yet Germany, whose penetration of Russian Central Asia depends on a Turanian-Islamic policy, could not reverse this policy at the frontier and pursue the larger prize of friendship with China by betraying discontented Moslems and Turks. She would risk the collapse of what she had built already, with little prospect of achieving the wider success. For a German penetration of China through her continental back-door would arouse Japan, Great Britain, the United States, and the other maritime Powers to counter-activities, and the great navigable rivers give the entrance from the sea an overwhelming advantage over the entrance from the steppe.

Even, therefore, if Germany appropriated the " South-East Passage " of the Russian Empire, China, like the provinces east of Lake Baikal, would probably have little to fear ; but there would be a more serious threat to India. The Indian Moslems number nearly seventy millions, more than 20 per cent. of the population of the peninsula.* Loyal though they are to the British Commonwealth, their sense of Islamic solidarity is strong. The road, too, lies across the purely Moslem countries of Persia and Afghanistan, where Germany's Islamic policy would be an assistance and not an embarrassment to her advance ; and Germany would have the geographical advantage of a double line of approach. She could converge by the

* The Germans expect great advantages to themselves from the *rapprochement* between the Indian Moslems and the Hindus. They fail to see that this tendency, on the side of the Moslems, implies a withdrawal from Pan-Islamism towards Indian Nationalism, while if Pan-Islamism reasserts itself as an aggressive Turanian-German movement from the other side of the N.W. Frontier, the Hindus will rally to the British Empire.

China or India?

Bagdad * and Trans-Caspian railways on the Iranian plateau, just as Russia used the Trans-Caspian and Trans-Siberian railways to encircle the steppe. Such an advance would still be difficult, like the alternative advance towards China, for it is always difficult to open a passage across barriers to a terminus in the hands of a hostile Power; but, while in the case of China Germany has only modest commercial advantages to gain at the risk of collision with Japan under unequal conditions, she would be striking in India at the British Commonwealth, and the fruits of a mortal blow would be world-dominion.

The lure of India might therefore lead Germany on, and we must admit on our side that our position is not invulnerable. When we first went to India, the land-bridge between India and Europe was held by strong Oriental Powers, and our only rivals were the maritime nations. But we eliminated these rivals and supplanted the native governments, and from that moment the land-bridge became our preoccupation. Any Power dominant on the continent of Europe henceforth threatened the N.W. Frontier of India too—Napoleon, for a brief period after the Peace of Tilsit, and Russia for nearly a century after 1815. We warded off Russia by supporting the surviving Oriental Powers as buffer-states. The present frontiers between the Russian Empire and Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan were practically drawn by British diplomacy, and the fact that we could draw them showed that our policy was a success. But situations never remain stable. By the beginning of the present century Germany was opening a second land-route to India from Europe and making a field for German exploitation out of the British buffers. Russia, at the same time, was expanding economically beyond her diplomatic frontiers and drawing the commerce of Northern Persia into the Russian railway-system debouching at Batum; while British interests were growing

* The Bagdad Railway would give Germany an important advantage even if her control of it extended no further than Mosul.

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in Southern Persia, the Gulf, and the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates. A change of policy followed the change in the facts, and in the Agreement of 1907 Great Britain and Russia re-defined their respective interests in the Middle East and co-operated to defend them against any third party. This did not, however, exclude a similar agreement with Germany, and an unimpeachable German source has recently testified to the efforts we made in this direction between 1907 and 1914. If the proposals finally agreed upon had been ratified and faithfully observed, the political equilibrium of the Middle East would have been restored, and a generation of peace might have followed, like that which resulted from the delimitation of the Afghan frontier in 1885. But Germany ruined this policy by making war, and during the War the position has again been altered profoundly. Turkey's abandonment of neutrality drove us to protect our interests by arms ; India ceased to be isolated from Central Europe by a buffer zone ; and the British Empire in the Middle East, like the Russian Empire on the steppe, was forced into direct contact with German military power. This was a grave commitment, even with Russia as our ally ; but at the critical moment Russia has broken down. Her Empire has fallen asunder, and we are left to bear the double burden alone.

It would be wrong to exaggerate the immediate danger. We have the immense advantage of being first in the field, and from the purely military point of view we have improved upon our pre-war position. Germany has still to establish herself in Trans-Caucasia and Central Asia before she can strike at us, and if she strikes she will find us prepared. No doubt she can cause us grave embarrassment. The reactionary party in Bokhara and the tribes of Afghanistan and the N.W. Frontier are more easily roused to fanaticism than the more civilised Moslem peoples. The Amir's policy of loyal neutrality has already been made difficult by the presence of German emissaries ; there is a pro-German party in the country, which has doubtless raised its head



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since the Russian pressure has been removed from the northern border, and Germany has increased her prestige by the seventh article in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, in which the contracting parties pledge themselves "to respect the political and economic independence and the territorial integrity of Persia and Afghanistan." Steps are already being taken to restore economic relations between Persia and Turkey ; and the transit trade with Persia by the Trans-Caucasian and Trans-Caspian railways, which Germany coveted before the war, could no longer be hindered by Russia if these lines of communication passed under German control. Under these circumstances the appearance of comparatively small German or Turco-German forces east of the Caspian might raise a storm ; but the Middle Eastern front could never during this war become the main theatre of operations, and the idea of a great German army disembarking at Batum, marching into the interior, and letting loose an Afghan avalanche upon the Indian plains, though it is being advertised by the German Propaganda, can hardly be entertained by the German General Staff.

On the other hand, the substitution of German for Russian military power on the Afghan frontier, even if it made no material difference to the course of the war, would be a heavy blow to the British Commonwealth if it were perpetuated in the peace settlement. For such a peace would only be signed if Germany retained the will and the power to reject the League of Nations. In that case the peoples of the Commonwealth, and not least the people of India, would be charged with the guardianship of a land-frontier from the Mediterranean to the Pamirs, on a line remote from the reservoirs of man-power and the centres of industrial production. The competition of armaments would continue ; and Germany would have the advantage of pursuing a destructive aim, while we should be striving, with the enemy at our gates, to keep an established order in being.

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Thus the fate of the Russian Empire touches the British Commonwealth only less than Russia herself. Every side of our imperial and foreign policy would ultimately be affected if Russia's "South-East Passage" passed permanently into Germany's hands, and it is one of our essential conditions of peace that Germany shall renounce that design. Yet even if these countries are given the genuine possibility of self-determination, we shall remain vitally interested in the course they follow. Our traditional policy in the Middle East is the maintenance of a neutral zone between Europe and India, but the whole Asiatic continent is concerned in the vicissitudes of the steppe and its borderlands. The latest revolution there has upset our dispositions, and we can only restore them if the command of the steppe returns to strong and friendly hands.

INDIAN POLITICS

I. THE POLITICAL RECORD

Riots in Bihar

THE religious animosity between Hindu and Mahomedan, always smouldering among the ignorant masses, is particularly liable to burst into flame at the annual festival of the *Id*, which was due to take place in September. At that season pious Mahomedans celebrate the episode of Abraham and the contemplated sacrifice of his son. In commemoration of this event the Prophet Mahomed prescribed a solemn sacrifice. The exact texts are open to varieties of interpretation, but the proper animal for sacrifice was probably the camel or the goat; the cow was little known in Arabia, and is certainly not specifically ordained by the Arab Prophet. In modern India conditions are different, and it has become the usual practice to offer up cows as *Id* sacrifice. The reasons for this are partly economic, for the old, worn-out cow costs little, while its sacrifice is accepted as bringing grace to five of the celebrants, whereas a goat benefits only one. The flesh is eaten and the hide and other parts of the carcase are sold, so that the net cost of the sacrifice is inconsiderable. A not unimportant subsidiary reason, however, is the obstinacy of the lower class Mahomedans in resisting the constant pressure of Hinduism to refrain from cow sacrifice.

To the Hindu the whole affair is painful in a measure which is not easily recognised by outsiders; his intense

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reverence for the cow is offended by every incident of the ceremony. His horror when a cow is ostentatiously led through the streets to be sacrificed, his loathing of the manner in which it is put to death, the thought that men are imbruing their hands in its blood and gorging on its flesh—all these compose a picture which causes profound distress to every good Hindu. The result is to kindle widespread and bitter ill-feeling at the time of the ceremony, at least throughout Northern India. Where Hindus predominate, the Mahomedans find it prudent to conduct the sacrifice secretly. Where, on the other hand, they are the more powerful, the Mahomedans are given to flaunting the ceremony in the eyes of their neighbours. As a consequence a serious strain is often entailed on the powers responsible for keeping the peace, and great conflicts are only averted by much labour and tact on the part of the officials, both European and Indian.

In few parts of India is the Hindu sentiment stronger than in Bihar ; and apparently the rural Hindu population over a large area in that Province determined to put an end for good and all to the cow sacrifices in their midst. As the *Id* of 1917 approached, towards the end of last September, a widespread commotion broke out without a shadow of warning in the Shahabad district. The preparations, although effectively concealed from the officials, must have been long and careful, for over hundreds of miles the rural population rose simultaneously and stormed every village in their midst which was occupied by Mahomedans. The disturbances took place at a time when their suppression presented special difficulties. The country was in flood, owing to late and heavy rains, and the rice fields are peculiarly impassable at that season, whereas the road communications in the area are scarce.

Full details of the riots have since been recorded in a series of trials at which the ringleaders have met with judicial punishment which cannot be called excessive. At the time the extent of the outrages was probably exag-

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gerated in popular estimation ; that whole villages were destroyed, that a considerable number of men were killed, that women were insulted, mosques violated and the sacred Moslem books destroyed with contumely, is beyond question. The local police were powerless to deal with outrages perpetrated over a large area with extraordinary swiftness. Troops were sent to the scene with all rapidity, but their transport was slow, and the cavalry in particular found it practically impossible to cover the rice swamps with the same speed as the mobs whom they were pursuing. It was thus about ten days or a fortnight before the outbreak was finally suppressed.

It is unnecessary to comment on the details of what happened. They were not unnatural episodes in the widespread determination to prevent the ceremony which the Hindus had always regarded with loathing. It is difficult to say to what extent any of the leaders of the people, in the sense of the local landed magnates, were cognisant of the conspiracy, and, in fact, it is fruitless now to discuss the mechanism of the commotion. If any lessons are to be drawn from what happened there are three obvious warnings among them. The first is the extraordinary swiftness with which a popular rising can take place, and the *bona fide* element of surprise in it. The second is the depth of the racial and religious bitterness which still persists, and the burden which it casts on those responsible for the maintenance of peace and good government. The third is the sharp divorce between the vast ignorant masses of the people and those who claim to represent their interests, for at the time the Nationalist Party, embracing the leading politicians of both religions, were honestly doing their utmost to retain an atmosphere of amity and union.

The Release of Mrs. Besant and Its Effects

The release of Mrs. Besant from internment by the Government of India, referred to in your issue of

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December last, was the signal for a renewed agitation in the Moslem Press for the release of Mahomed Ali. This Moslem journalist had been interned under Lord Hardinge's administration on grounds more serious, because more closely connected with the war situation, than those alleged in the case of Mrs. Besant herself.* No sooner was that lady restored to liberty than she threw herself into the agitation for the release of the interned Mahomedan and obtained a personal audience with Lord Chelmsford. Mohamed Ali, however, was not released, and the advanced Moslems have since been joining in increasing numbers the Home Rule Movement of which Mrs. Besant is the recognised exponent.

Then followed an incident in the Legislative Council of India, which, coupled with the release of Mrs. Besant, led to results likely to prove of permanent importance. In opening the session of the Legislative Council at Simla, Lord Chelmsford had made an appeal for moderation on the part of the unofficial members, in view of the pending visit of Mr. Montagu. During the hot weather Simla is the headquarters of the Punjab Government as well as of the Government of India, and whenever the Imperial Legislative Council meets there the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab sits as an ex-officio

* Extract from the proceedings of the meeting of the Indian Legislative Council held on September 26, 1917.

The Honourable Mr. Jinnah asked :—

“(a) Will Government be pleased to state what is the result of the inquiries made into the cases of Mahomed Ali and Shaukat Ali ? ”

“(b) Do Government propose to release them ? ”

The Honourable Sir Wm. Vincent replied :—

“Restrictions under the Defence of India rules were imposed upon Messrs. Mahomed Ali and Shaukat Ali not merely for violent methods of political agitation but because they freely expressed and promoted sympathy with the King's enemies, thus endangering the public safety. The Government of India have made further inquiries regarding these persons, and on a careful consideration of the information and opinions received, and on a re-examination of previous papers, the Government of India are not satisfied that the attitude of these persons has materially changed in this respect, or that these restrictions can safely be removed.”

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member of that body. Sir Michael O'Dwyer, the strong and popular holder of that office, availed himself of this position to deliver a speech, to which exception was taken by the Nationalist members. Sir Michael is an Irishman of Nationalist stock in whom the virile races of the Punjab have found the type of masterful ruler they best understand, and Sir Michael himself is proud of the Punjab and of its manly traditions. During the first year of the war he handled a difficult and even critical situation with conspicuous firmness, ability, and success. Thanks largely to his personal influence the Punjab remained throughout the war what it had been from the spacious times of Henry and John Lawrence, not only thoroughly loyal, but the main recruiting ground of the Indian Army. It has, in fact, yielded more recruits than all the other Provinces put together.

Sir Michael O'Dwyer delivered a speech in which he sang the praises of the fighting races of the Punjab, as indeed they deserve to be sung. In doing so he was unable to resist the temptation to contrast the warlike effort they had made with the conduct of the Nationalist leaders, particularly those of Bengal. And, furthermore, he had some strong things to say with reference to the duty of Governments to govern. The speech was a long one and far exceeded the time limit accorded by the standing orders. It was constantly interrupted by appeals from Nationalist members to the Legal member (who was acting as President of the Council) to enforce the rules. As, however, these rules are often relaxed in favour of unofficial members, the President did not see his way to interfere, and the speech, which had been carefully prepared, was delivered from beginning to end. It was received by the Nationalist Press throughout India with a storm of indignation. Representations were made by Nationalist members to Lord Chelmsford, who, at the next meeting of the Council, complained that his appeal for moderation had been ignored by one of his own officers. His speech

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was regarded by both sides as a sharp rebuke to a high official, and Sir Michael O'Dwyer rose to express his regret if he had said anything to hurt the feelings of the Nationalist members.

The effect, however, on the European community throughout India was as sudden and dramatic as it was unexpected in Simla. Sir Michael O'Dwyer's speech had found an echo in many breasts wherein a feeling of soreness had already been raised by the action of the Government of India in overruling the decision of the Government of Madras to keep Mrs. Besant interned. The first symptom of the storm from this new quarter was a strong speech delivered in the Legislative Council by Sir Hugh Bray, the representative of the Chamber of Commerce of Calcutta. The speech was moderate as well as strong, and, in a memorable image, Sir Hugh Bray declared that the European community were prepared to pull in double harness with the Nationalists, but, considering the vastness of the interests at stake, were not prepared to be dragged along behind the cart. Some oil was then thrown on the troubled waters by Lord Chelmsford, who again addressed the Legislative Council, and in doing so paid a tribute to the high qualities of Sir Michael O'Dwyer.

This did not, however, arrest the new movement. Some thirty years ago the agitation over the Ilbert Bill had brought into existence in Calcutta an association for the defence of European interests in India. In after years, and in the absence of any threats to the privileges enjoyed by Europeans, this body had dropped the word "defence" and had called itself simply the European Association. Its membership had shrunk to a few hundreds; but, backed by most of the English-owned papers, the Association now issued a new appeal. Branches were formed all over India, and the Association is now reputed to include a membership of some 8,000 Europeans, none of whom, of course, are officials. A representative meeting was quickly organised in Calcutta. The speeches were, with exceptions,

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temperate in tone, a result due to the moderating influence of men like Sir Hugh Bray, Sir Archie Birkmyre, Mr. Erskine Crum, Colonel Pugh, Mr. Arden Wood, and others. One speaker only took upon himself to make the unpardonable statement that the members of the Civil Service, though unable to join the association or express their feelings, were behind the movement. The statement carries its own condemnation, for obviously no one outside the service is entitled to speak for a body which cannot speak for itself. The statement was all the more flagrant as the motion before the meeting was one condemning the action of the Government of India. It was nothing short of an outrage on the loyalty of public officials for an irresponsible speaker to suggest what was not the fact, that they were tacitly supporting a movement in opposition to the policy of the Government whose servants they are. It is surely essential in the interests of the service itself, as well as of the public, that officials should be left to stand, as they themselves would wish to stand, strictly outside the arena of party conflict.

Generally speaking, however, the tenor of the speeches was not out of harmony with the declaration made by Sir Hugh Bray in the Legislative Council at Simla. Except for the temporary excitement provoked by the Ilbert Bill, the unofficial European in India has paid little attention to Indian politics till the last few months. Outside the municipal affairs of the few large cities, he has grown used to leaving matters of government to officials, except where official action touched his own business. The Scottish captains of industry and commerce at Calcutta have attended to trade and the manufacture of jute with scarcely more reference to public affairs than they would have bestowed if their business had been situated in Brazil or the Dutch East Indies. Political discussion has been practically confined, so far as non-officials were concerned, to the handful of journalists who conduct the Anglo-Indian Press. The situation of the last few months

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has not been rendered more easy by the acrid controversy in which the British as well as the Indian journals have indulged.

The Montagu Mission

It was thus to an atmosphere somewhat highly charged that Mr. Montagu and his colleagues arrived in India. They passed from the ship to the train at Bombay, and hastened without delay to Delhi. It may not, perhaps, have attracted much notice in England that in the Pronouncement of August 20 Mr. Montagu's intention of consulting the Provincial Governments as well as the Government of India was briefly stated. As progress towards responsible government must obviously begin in the sphere of the Provincial Governments this was as it should be. The Provincial Executives had accordingly set to work to prepare their reports for the Secretary of State. The time, however, at their disposal was woefully short, and considering the gravity of the questions before them and the extent and variety of the information required for their proper solution it is much to be regretted that they could not have begun their work twelve months before.

At Delhi began the long drudgery of receiving memorials from numerous organisations. The procedure adopted was as follows. The memorial was presented by a deputation which might include any number up to about fifty. The presentation of each memorial took about twenty minutes. They were received by the Viceroy and Secretary of State in person, and a great part of the morning and afternoon of most working days was consumed by these functions. Under Indian conditions this expenditure of time was unavoidable. A private interview (of about an hour in the case of the more important deputations) was then accorded to some five or six members of the larger deputations. Selected individuals, moreover, had long interviews with Mr. Montagu and his

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colleagues. The memorials presented were innumerable, but it is easy to classify them. To begin with they can be divided into those in favour of advance towards responsible government and those against it. Of the latter, the most important and forcible are those of the non-Brahmin movement which is strong in the Deccan and much stronger in Madras. The Brahmins are the purest remnant of the Aryan conquerors who descended upon India some thousands of years ago. They were white men, who began to mingle their blood with the older and darker races of India, but stopped the process at a certain stage by forbidding intermarriage except amongst themselves. It is not uncommon to meet Brahmins, especially in Kashmir, whose skins are white as those of Europeans. Hence the caste system of India in which the Brahmins established their present Levitical position. With their own philosophy and religion they incorporated the numerous indigenous forms of idol and phallic worship much as, but to a far greater extent than, the practices of paganism were incorporated with Christianity in the dark ages. The result is Hinduism in its present form, which includes the Brahmins, the non-Brahmin castes, and also to some extent the out-castes, which last alone are in number more than the whole population of the British Isles.

There are ceremonies connected with birth, marriage and death which to the peace of mind of the Hindu are of much greater importance than similar ceremonies to Christians of the Roman and Greek Communions. To the performance of these ceremonies the service of a Brahmin is essential, except amongst some of the lowest of the out-castes. They are recognised as having a monopoly of religious knowledge, and to some extent they have extended that monopoly to secular knowledge as well. Accustomed for ages to memorise the Hindu Scriptures, they have developed memories which for retentive power would put that of Macaulay to shame. This gives them an immense advantage in any system of examinations, and therefore,

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coupled with the intense clannishness of caste, in obtaining Government employment. In legal work their advantage is even greater. To a large extent they have been able to monopolise Government service and the legal profession, and by the non-Brahmin elements their position is viewed with increasing jealousy. In the south of India this jealousy has been intensified by the extent to which the Brahmins have been able to preserve the older and more rigid traditions of exclusiveness. An out-caste is "untouchable," and this in Southern India is interpreted to mean that an "untouchable" may not come within 40 yards of a Brahmin lest the latter should suffer defilement, which can only be cleansed by elaborate ceremonies. Such is the spiritual power of a Brahmin that an "untouchable" who sees a Brahmin coming down the road must remove himself from it for 40 yards until he has passed. An educated member of a depressed caste told the present writer that as a boy it often took him two hours to traverse a short length of road to school, owing to the necessity of evading the proximity of passing Brahmins, and on reaching school he was punished for being late. And yet he was a strong upholder of the caste system.

Still, in spite of his extraordinary spiritual power, the ruling position which this power, coupled with superior education, gives to the Brahmin is increasingly resented. Even when armed with the vote the non-Brahmins do not trust themselves to resist this influence. In Southern India they regard Home Rule as equivalent to Brahmin rule. They are content, they say, with the rule of the British. They will not, however, accept the rule of the Brahmin backed by British bayonets. Rather, they say, let the British clear out altogether, and leave the non-Brahmin majority free to deal with the Brahmins for themselves. In any case they claim communal representation, by which they mean that a non-Brahmin can only be represented by a non-Brahmin. As an elector he is not

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to be allowed to vote for a Brahmin at all. Otherwise they fear that, such is the spiritual and secular influence of the Brahmin caste, Brahmins will be able to control the individual voter and dominate all elections.

Another group of memorialists who refused to sign the Nationalist creed was composed of the bigger landlords and a large number of the Moslems, particularly in Northern and Eastern India. Not so definite in their statements or so united in their views as the non-Brahmins of the South, these conservative elements were roughly united by the fear of government falling exclusively into the hands of the Hindu *literati*. The older-fashioned Moslems, alarmed at the possibilities of Hindu intolerance, were profoundly distrustful in practice of the ideal union which some of their more advanced leaders were attempting to effect with the Congress party. Many of the landed aristocracy also took fright at the imminence of political changes, the outcry for which they had always regarded with amused scepticism. To whatever reforms they might, for the sake of a quiet life with their lawyer friends, pretend to assent, they had in their hearts no intention of allowing the politicians to interfere between them and their tenantry, or to imperil their hereditary prestige in the State. They were conscious that they would not shine, with no practice in public speaking, in popular assemblages. They were aware that they had not given their sons a training which would enable them to hold their own in politics with the professional men of the middle classes. At the last hour, therefore, came hurried consultations and associations of these two communities—great landlords and conservative Mahomedans—and hastily concerted memorials which would undoubtedly have gained, both in support and in coherence, if their framers had induced themselves to recognise earlier how fast matters were moving.

Memorials which favour an advance towards responsible government are naturally, under existing conditions, far more numerous than those which oppose it. The prin-

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ciples which underlie them are in fact reducible to the two distinguished in the article on this subject in the December number of THE ROUND TABLE. As there pointed out, elected members were admitted to the Legislative Councils by the Morley-Minto reforms. The Executives remained as before responsible to the Secretary of State, and in order to secure their position enough British officials were given *ex-officio* seats in the Legislative Councils to enable them to vote down the elected members. Of course this provokes a desire on the part of elected members to be able to vote down the officials. The scheme put forward by the Indian National Congress and the All India Moslem League last year is the expression of that desire. It demands the reduction of the official voters to a proportion which would render their presence useless as a safeguard to Government, and therefore superfluous. It further demands that any motion twice passed by the Council within 13 months shall be binding on the Executive, the veto notwithstanding. No means are provided whereby the Executive can carry measures such as in their opinion are necessary. In Provincial Councils the budget is also to be placed under the full control of the Council. The Executive is none the less to remain on paper responsible to the Secretary of State as at present. The elected members are thus to have an almost unfettered power of dictating the policy of the Government, without any responsibility for seeing that an Executive is kept in existence with adequate powers for discharging the duties of government.

The defects in these proposals, which in one shape or other are reflected in most of the memorials in favour of self-government, need no underlining. But for these defects the memorialists are scarcely to blame. Their proposals are after all the ultimate logical sequel of the Morley-Minto constitution. It established legislatures with no executive authority of their own, but with a very wide power of criticising and influencing the Government.

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If this was a step towards free institutions, what was the next stage of advance? Obviously an elective majority empowered to impose its orders on Government, to dictate its policy and in the end to control supply. Meanwhile the Executive is to remain responsible to the Secretary of State. The majority of the Executive Council are not to be leaders of the elective majority in the legislature and as such able to command its support. They are to be appointed in fact as well as in name by the Secretary of State, and to remain responsible to him for the good government of the communities entrusted to their charge, subject to the orders of the Secretary of State. At the same time they are to be obliged to execute the orders of the elected members of the legislature, which at times they and the Secretary of State will honestly believe to be contrary to justice and good government. As self-respecting men the executive councillors will resign an impossible position, and how is the Secretary of State, while agreeing with them, to fill their places? These proposals have all the appearance of a natural step in the evolution of popular control. In fact, they lead straight to a deadlock. Responsibility for carrying on the King's government is left to the Executive. At the same time it is to be bound by the orders of a legislature upon which is laid no vestige of responsibility for seeing that government continues. At any moment they can bring it to a standstill. But to create a Government of their own they are given no power.

Such a system must operate to destroy a sense of responsibility in electorates and those they elect. It is just because this sense is at present too little developed that the problem cannot be solved by granting complete self-government outright. The crux of the whole problem is to develop that sense; and it can be developed, not by lectures from English publicists, nor even by teachers in schools, but only by imposing on electorates real responsibilities and those as heavy as they can bear at any one time. Without exer-

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cise no muscle of the body and no faculty of mind or soul will develop.

The Imperial Government holds that if the whole burden of responsibility were imposed on the multitudinous races, religions and castes of India at one stroke they would simply be plunged into anarchy—as in Russia. If so, then it follows that the one genuine road of advance is to impose on Indian electorates some real responsibility proportioned to their strength and to increase the burden as that strength develops. This means in practice the institution of electoral legislatures with Indian executives directly responsible thereto, upon which specific functions can be devolved. For all other functions the existing Provincial Governments would remain responsible to the Secretary of State until the new elective authorities had proved themselves able to assume them. As the word has already figured in these discussions it is well to add that in India the principle has been nicknamed *dyarchy*.

In this principle of specific devolution some Europeans and Indians in Bengal felt that the solution of the problem might lie. After several conferences they succeeded in agreeing on twelve points, to which some sixty-four Europeans and ninety Indians appended their signatures. These twelve articles were prefaced by a memorandum propounding by way of illustration a scheme to the details of which none of the signatories were bound, and the whole was presented as a joint address from Indians and Europeans to the Secretary of State. The twelve points to which the signatories agreed were as follows :—

(1) To accept the pronouncement of the 20th of August as common ground, within the limits of which the discussion can take place ;

(2) That, having accepted the pronouncement, we are not only free, but also bound to consider the new situation created thereby with open minds ;

(3) That the existing provinces need not be assumed to be areas suitable as a basis for responsible government, but such areas must be settled at the moment when the first instalment of responsible government is granted ;

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(4) That the first steps towards responsible government cannot be taken in the sphere of the central government ;

(5) That, during the period of transition, governments of two types must co-exist, the one responsible to electorates for specific powers, the other to the Secretary of State for all other powers ; that the responsibility of each must in fact be a real one, and their powers must be sufficient to enable them to discharge that responsibility efficiently ;

(6) That a share of the consolidated revenue of the Province should be handed over to the Provincial State Governments, proportionate to the cost of the functions transferred to them ; in addition to which should be handed over certain specific powers of taxation, such as would fall on the Provincial State electorate itself ;

(7) That further additions to the powers of Provincial States, and to their share of existing provincial revenues, should be considered by Commissioners reporting direct to Parliament, at intervals of, say, seven years, such interval to be specified at the outset ; and that in the intervening periods no demand for further executive powers, or for a further share of existing revenues, should be entertained ;

(8) That legislation passed by Provincial State Governments affecting commercial and industrial undertakings should be reserved for the sanction of the Secretary of State ; and a limit of time should be laid down, within which representations from the interests affected can be received by him : and further, that instructions to this effect should be included in a schedule attached to the Act of Parliament in which the scheme of reforms is embodied ;

(9) That the Provincial Governments, responsible to the Government of India and the Secretary of State, shall have power to do or repair public works, upon which the value of invested capital depends, neglect of which is due to the default of Provincial State Governments, and to charge the cost thereof to the revenues assigned to the Government in default ;

(10) That the Government of India must have the right to recall powers which have been abused or neglected ; and in extreme cases to suspend the Governments of Provincial States. Such powers shall always be subject to the sanction of the Secretary of State and of Parliament ; but in cases of emergency the Government of India may exercise the power, subject to subsequent sanction of the Secretary of State and of Parliament ;

(11) That (a) wherever industrial and commercial interests are located, adequate representation should be accorded ; (b) adequate representation should be accorded to Mahomedans, land-holders, and minorities generally ;

(12) That the specific points to which our agreement relates and the outlines of the scheme sketched in these proposals be laid down in

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an Act of Parliament : but that all questions within those outlines, relating to franchises, constitutions, powers, finances, and such like details be remitted to not more than five Commissioners named under the Act, to be dealt with in India by the Commissioners, in consultation with Governments and People, the arrangements of the Commissioners to be given the force of law by Orders in Council.

The Indian National Congress

Meanwhile the action of the Government in first interning and then releasing Mrs. Besant had secured for her the triumph of her remarkable career. The Indian National Congress was due to meet at Calcutta in Christmas week, and Mrs. Besant became a candidate for the President's chair. The proposal was highly distasteful to the old guard of the National Congress, who had retained control when the great split took place in 1907 at Surat. But the desire to present an unbroken front while the Secretary of State was in India prevailed, and at a conference between the various sections at Allahabad Mrs. Besant was accepted unanimously as President.

Some difficulties then arose from the fact that Mr. Montagu's visit to Bombay was timed to coincide with the meeting of the Congress at Calcutta. As the Nationalist leaders at Bombay could not be in both places at once, a proposal was actually mooted at the eleventh hour to transfer the Congress to Bombay, in the hope of welcoming the Secretary of State at one of the meetings. It was, however, wisely abandoned.

In avoiding an appearance of public division Mrs. Besant's handling of the Congress was masterly. She opened the proceedings with an address which in length exceeded even the limits to which tradition has accustomed the Indian National Congress. Issued as a book, it covers more than 100 pages of print. With great dexterity she secured the withdrawal of the various amendments which had been tabled, and the scheme adopted at Lucknow a

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year before was reaffirmed. The result reversed the position created at Surat ten years ago. It left the extremists, who had then seceded under Mr. Tilak, in complete control of the Congress Organisation. In its origin the Congress aspired to be the germ of an Indian Parliament. The position is now taken by Mrs. Besant and her supporters that every member of this vast assembly is bound by the resolutions of the majority. The idea of the incipient parliament has thus vanished, and, if the doctrines of Mrs. Besant are to be accepted, the Congress has now developed into a close political league, organised and disciplined on the same principles as the Labour Party in Australia.

It was perhaps inevitable that the National Congress should be driven to form itself into a caucus, wedded to a rigid programme. It was not surprising that the Moslem League, in its anxiety that Mahomedans should share in the fruits of a successful Hindu agitation, should officially adhere to several of the doctrines in the Congress creed. But the outcome will be a very narrow channel for the expression of Indian nationhood. It will mean the suppression of powerful minorities and the creation of a new oligarchy. It provides little guarantee for the aspirations of the non-Brahmins and many other communities with clearly defined interests of their own. In particular, it leaves unsettled, in spite of a perfunctory formula adopted by some of their leaders, the claim of the Mahomedans to effective communal representation and a substantial share in the loaves and fishes of government. It constitutes an unsatisfactory medium for the ebb and flow of new and often crude national ideas and aims. It thus provides an argument, outside all other considerations on the merits of reform, for the creation of real popular assemblies, in which Indian politicians can be invested with real responsibilities, and where the views of minorities cannot be extinguished once for all by a summary vote.

In the first weeks of the New Year, however, some very

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outspoken criticism of Mrs. Besant's handling of the Congress began to appear in the *Allahabad Leader* and elsewhere in the National Press. These murmurs came chiefly from a section of Brahmins who had all along disliked the proposal that Mrs. Besant should preside. They were more an echo of previous discontent than a revolt against the discipline which she threatened to impose, though the latter element also came in.

The Princes' Conference

Meanwhile the rulers of Native States have been realising that they are faced by a new situation. The second conference of Princes met the Government at Delhi in October. Before dispersing they appointed a committee consisting of the Maharajahs of Bikanir, Patiala and Alwar, and the Jam of Nawanagar, dear to English hearts as Ranjitsinghi, Prince of Cricketers. The leading politicians of British India were summoned to their councils. For the first time in history the future relations of British India to the Native States were discussed by their Princes with Nationalist leaders. The results were submitted to the Viceroy and the Secretary of State in February by a larger body of Princes who gathered at Delhi for the purpose.

Mr. Tilak in Central India

The remarkable tour made by Mr. Tilak through Berar and the Central Provinces to raise funds for his mission to England remains to be noticed. It has bulked very large in the Indian Home Rule Press. Supported throughout by the legal practitioners, he succeeded in raising upwards of £6,000. One striking feature of the movement was his appeal to religious feeling. Prominence was given to his work on the Vedas, and he was even, it seems, represented by some of his admirers

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as a divine incarnation. Mr. Tilak, who is himself a high-caste Brahmin, apparently made a special appeal to religious teachers urging them to modernise their doctrines and to combine them with political propaganda. Appeals to the students were less frequent than is usual in his speeches. Recently the students at the colleges had threatened to strike unless they were allowed to take part in political movements. The decision of the Government to meet the strikes by closing the colleges had, however, induced the parents to check the movement for themselves.

Another feature of the Extremist campaign has been the evident attempt to sweep the villages into the Home Rule movement. The peasants are assured that under Home Rule land revenue will be reduced, forest regulations repealed, licences to bear arms given to all, taxes reduced and police supervision relaxed.

This raises the most difficult aspect of the new policy, the political education of the Indian peasant, of whom, to our shame be it spoken, the merest fraction can read and write. An organised political agitation working on their ignorance would probably emerge in the form of a no-rent or no-revenue campaign, or of some violent racial or religious upheaval. If the peasant is to understand public affairs they must be discussed with him. But the practical question how to distinguish genuine discussion based on facts from violent propaganda based on illusions is difficult indeed.

Certainly the Home Rule movement is no longer limited to the intellectuals. It has extended to the middle classes and may soon affect the mass of the cultivators. It is already creating practical difficulties for Government officers. In the Deccan agricultural officials are finding it difficult to collect the villagers for discussion. More serious still is the fact that villagers are abstaining from meeting the settlement officers. The attempt to import political unrest into the rural districts and to invest political propa-

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ganda with a religious sanction is no new phenomenon. It has been met in the past by dealing vigorously with the principal agitators. However anxious Government may be to treat it now with more tolerance and as a legitimate form of constitutional agitation, the difficulty with which it will find itself confronted is that in the absence of any body of moderate Indian opinion trained to appreciate and to defend the elementary necessities of orderly government the officials are the only people who would be competent to conduct a counter propaganda, and they are, under the present system, compelled to preserve silence.

II. THE PRESENT POLITICAL POSITION

Varieties of Opinion in the Public Service

EVENTS have moved very rapidly in India during the last few years, under the influence partly of agitation from within but largely also of world forces without. The spirit of democracy has grown in strength both in the West and in the East ; and India too, protected though she is and largely cut off from the turmoil and strife of the outer world, has felt and been moved by this same spirit. And behind the forced convictions, the flatulent oratory, the mock ideals, the intrigue and self-seeking and personal ambitions, which are at least as characteristic of professional politicians in India as elsewhere, there is a real and genuine feeling for the need of some form of national self-expression.

Up to the end of the nineteenth century the Government of India, released in practice from the control of policy exercised by Parliament in the days of the Company, was devoted to the welfare of the people and the efficient administration of the country. It was not showy, it was rather suspicious of the popular voice ; it did not suffer

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fools gladly and was impatient of political claptrap. It believed its first duty was to maintain law and order, and though perhaps cold and unimaginative it achieved its purpose with a considerable measure of success. It was a benevolent despotism in which there was some show of consulting Indian opinion, but it acted in reality on the belief that the Government of India as represented by its British officials was the best judge of what was good for the people of India. It enforced with a firm but, at the same time, kindly hand what it believed to be for the people's good. There was little real agitation, and the term "bureaucrat" had not yet become one of abuse.

In the first decade of this century political agitation assumed more serious proportions. Violence and anarchical conspiracy succeeded to academic discussion, and Lord Morley as well as Lord Minto saw that reforms were urgently needed. The reforms they granted wore too much the appearance of concessions wrung from unwilling hands. It makes no difference to the argument that they were not so wrung and were not regarded as such by the Secretary of State and the Viceroy. The point of importance is that Indians regarded them as concessions hardly fought for and with difficulty won. The Morley-Minto Councils were created. These Councils have, indeed, secured a wider ventilation of opinion, and the power of asking questions and moving resolutions is one which enables the first lessons in popular government to be learned. But this power has not been wisely used by the Indian members of the Councils, who have for the most part confined their energies and eloquence to petty questions or unimportant resolutions. The Local Governments have been ready to welcome friendly criticism. They have listened with exemplary patience to hastily considered, and at times unpractical, proposals of the non-official members of Council, and have rarely exhibited, in the face of extreme exasperation, impatience or intolerance. The attitude of the non-official member has been

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less correct. He has given the impression that his aim has been to embarrass rather than to help, and, as in municipal committees, larger questions of policy have received but little attention and have been dismissed after short discussion, while minor points, in which perhaps some official has not acted with discretion, have never failed to be the subject of heated controversy. And yet, in spite of an imperfect use of the powers conferred upon them, the non-official members cannot be altogether blamed for the attitude they have adopted. They know that in the last resort they are always up against an official majority, and they feel that, however righteous they may believe their cause to be, unless it happens to suit the executive it can have no chance of success. This has created an atmosphere of constraint in the Councils, and the proceedings strike an impartial observer as divorced from reality. There is no real freedom of debate ; the " official majority " is, as it were, the Great Moghul of deliberation, and exercises a paralysing influence which is often no less galling to officials themselves than to the non-official members. In his farewell speech to his Council the late Lieutenant-Governor of the United Provinces laid particular stress on this point, though at the same time he claimed for the Councils some real educative value. Their proceedings are felt to be generally sterile and irritating, even when in individual instances the personal tact or magnetism of the President mitigates the sense of constant antagonism.

As a result of the Morley-Minto reforms agitation no doubt became less violent in the sense that there were fewer outrages ; but it soon assumed a much subtler form and spread deeper and more widely. Administration became increasingly difficult, Government was everywhere opposed and decried, racial feeling grew in intensity and the legend of an oppressive bureaucracy was invented and run to death. Officials were exposed to an incessant storm of vehement and irresponsible abuse in the public

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Press and in private discussion, though outwardly there was often a semblance of harmony. "Bureaucrat," a term harmless in itself, came to be one of sinister meaning—it came to signify all that was evil and, in the latest phase, to be denounced as a form of Prussianism which must at all costs be destroyed. Indeed, the recent speeches at the Congress, if they are to be taken at all seriously, seem to portray an unholy alliance between British officialdom in India and German tyranny pitted against British democracy and Indian Home Rule.

The Morley-Minto reforms have admittedly failed to satisfy the growing political consciousness of India. It is important to recognise and admit this failure, as the only hope of any real solution depends on a bold scrapping of inadequate machinery and courageous reconstruction on broader and saner lines. While the Government at Simla were in sore perplexity and inclining to drift, their officers were separating into two schools. The one is directly descended from the benevolent despotism of former days. It did not advocate any policy of repression, such as Germany would have avowed, and not only avowed but carried out with a high hand. It felt, and rightly, that the British if they tried could very easily stem the tide of disorder. If they tried, they could very easily repress. They had the grit and the strength; but they knew that it was not worthy of British traditions, that it was perhaps the line of least resistance, and certainly was not the path to glory. This school demanded the maintenance of law and order, really strong and firm government and a vigorous dealing with what was called sedition. It wished the Government of India to take itself seriously as a Government, to give the provinces a lead and to frame a policy on firm and definite lines.

By the other school it was argued that both as a matter of history, and as stated categorically in our pledges from the Throne, we held India in trust for the Indian people, and that we had set their feet, however timidly, in the path

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which leads to self-government. According to this school our policy should be to Indianize the public services—to introduce a large and logical scheme of local self-government and to pursue a policy as generous as was compatible with even tolerable efficiency and with the safety of the Empire.

Widely apart as these schools of thought appear to be, they were at one in seeing the necessity for a definite policy and in expecting such a policy from Simla. All this time the Government of India appeared to have no policy at all. They seemed to be merely drifting, and hesitant concessions alternated with ill-timed exhibitions of so-called firmness. The Indian felt that his claims were being ignored ; the British official that he was in danger of being sacrificed.

The Government of India have largely themselves to blame—they ceased to govern, they abrogated their first function, and lived from hand to mouth. The reason was not the weakness in the personnel, but the fact that Simla had no policy whereby it could test measures applied to practical situations. For the most part the Government of India displayed much amiability towards Indian aspirations, rather supercilious and academic, perhaps, and coloured by an inclination to consider the political questions of the day from a very remote and detached standpoint. The politicians distrusted this cold-blooded attitude of apparent aloofness, while the public services were getting rapidly disheartened by uncertainty as to its meaning. A few acts of apparent severity created the impression among Indians that the Government was out for repression, and the attitude of the average district official (there were many brilliant exceptions) came to be that India was no place for him to live in ; he must simply act as the expediency of the moment directed, leave the country at the earliest possible opportunity and never send a son or relative to its shores. Simla did not appear to take either the people or its officials sufficiently into its confidence. One can now see that

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during these last two years the necessity for framing and announcing a definite policy was appreciated by the Government of India, though they perhaps underrated the urgency, and was being pressed by them upon the Home Government. But this had never been stated, and the few public utterances made merely perplexed and disappointed both the politicians of India and the rank and file of the public services.

At any rate, these last two years of friction which have tried exceedingly the temper of both Indians and Englishmen might have been avoided had a little more frankness and confidence been shown. The Government of India can hardly shelter themselves behind the war. Indeed, it is the war itself that, by bringing home to the whole British Commonwealth of nations the need for a general reconstruction of the fabric of Empire after the war, finally forced the Government of India to see the necessity for a declaration of policy. It has been argued that a reasonable line of action would have been for them to say that nothing should be done till after peace. That, at any rate, would have been a policy, but it is a policy which the Government of India did not adopt. It would have been a mistake from two points of view. *First*, when the time came for decision after the war, the tale of Indian unrest and indifference would have become known in the West, whilst the early and premature enthusiasm in the English Press for India's deathless heroes would have waned, and the English people might then have said that India deserved no special treatment, and that there was no necessity to include her in the programme of reconstruction. *Secondly*, such an indefinite delay would naturally have exacerbated the present ill-feeling, and the existing attitude of comparative indifference to the war might have developed into active unrest.

Fortunately at the eleventh hour the goal of our policy in India was defined. To any generous mind it is inconceivable that any other pronouncement could have been

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made by British statesmen. It is entirely in accordance with British traditions and policy in the past and especially with her avowed policy now towards smaller nations and dependent states. Except by reactionaries, it had long been admitted that we were trustees for India and not merely her rulers, and although the Government of India seemed to lack any defined policy, they had as a matter of fact introduced far more Indians into the public services ; they had given Indians a measure of local self-government ; municipalities and even district boards were being to a considerable extent removed from official control ; and Indians were fully represented on all public advisory bodies. Unfortunately all this constructive policy had been carried out piecemeal ; there was felt to be a lack of unity and cohesion and, indeed, of political principle in the concessions that were made. Concessions were not so much needed as a form of government which would enable our professions to be properly worked out.

The late Professor Seeley, in his book on the expansion of England, declared that as soon as India exhibited any feeling of nationality the day of British domination would be gone for ever. The surprising fact in the situation now is that the expression of this feeling has taken the form of a demand for Home Rule within the British Empire, not for the severance of India's connection with Great Britain. It is inspired by a wish, while remaining within that Empire to remove a galling sense of inferiority engendered by submission to an alien yoke. It is sometimes argued that in reality the Indian politician does not care for the Empire. Many quotations from speeches can be made to show that the welfare of the Empire, or the pride of belonging to it have but little place in his thoughts. "Who cares about the British Empire ?" blurted out a responsible leader six years ago ; and the view of the Public Service Commission that it is necessary to retain in certain departments of the public service a preponderance of British officials finds no favour with the politician. All that the Indian politician

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appears to mean by the British Empire is a shadowy, far-away and little-felt abstraction, which will come to the aid of Indians in time of war and protect her borders from invasion. They demand the privileges but refuse to accept the obligations of Imperial partnership. And yet it surely counts for something that some tie, however slender, is professedly desired with Great Britain, and that Indian national sentiment is lisping in British Imperial numbers.

From the lessons of history one might have expected a demand for complete separation. The absence of such a demand except from a few anarchists is evidence that our rule has not been repressive; it has trained the people, it has given them knowledge of Western political ideals and methods, it has sown the seed of democracy, it has produced dissatisfaction with alien rule in so far as it tends to create that galling sense of inferiority which cannot exist in any truly democratic state and least of all in the British Empire. Indeed, the present discontent with alien rule is at once the justification for and the logical result of the methods we have adopted in governing this country. The case for self-government is not to be based on the present fitness of Indians to manage their own affairs, nor yet on fanciful pictures of India as the ancient home of flourishing republics, but as their great leader, Mr. Gandhi, says, on the fact that it is a demand for the right of national self-expression; it is in essence the feeling of the growing child that he cannot for ever be tied to the leading strings of his parents. One is surprised, not that this feeling has arisen in India, but rather that it has been so long in coming.

How comes it that these aspirations, so natural in themselves, have been viewed with some coldness by the older school of officials? To answer this question let us consider a little more closely the point of view which distinguishes the older from the younger school. The one may be described as the school of efficiency, the other as that of political progress, and both have the interests of India at heart. The former may with justice point to the

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unreason of its critics. Trained in the high traditions of their order, the public services in India are second to none in integrity of purpose and efficiency. In their hearts the detractors know that a poor country is administered with thrift, that India is not exploited for the benefit of England, nor taxed for England's gain. The bureaucracy is blamed for not stamping out plague, malaria, famine, and the like, and for not educating a far greater proportion of the population. Such critics pretend not to remember, though they very well know, the substantial strides that have been made in recent years in all these directions, in the spread of education, the conquest of famine, and the combating of plague and malaria, often in the face of obstruction and prejudice, openly or covertly encouraged by the politicians who clamour for political reforms. The exponents of efficiency distrust hastily considered constitutional reforms, of which the consequences may be incalculable. They entertain grave doubts as to the Indian capacity at present to digest the strong meat of political responsibility. They are not indeed unsympathetic towards Indian aspirations. They merely contend that the actual state of affairs obtaining in the country should be taken into careful consideration and that the time is not yet ripe for any great advance towards democracy.

This view urged by the older school cannot be lightly ignored by anyone who looks the facts in the face. Mahomedans and Hindus are at present fundamentally antagonistic communities. Union on the political platform is belied by such outbursts of violent hostility as those which only a few months ago spread terror throughout several districts of Bihar. Between the Mahomedan and the Hindu masses there is no sign whatever of any real *rapprochement*, but rather that they are drifting further and further apart. The reiterated charge that Government has exploited religious antipathies and fostered divisions to promote its power is devoid of truth.

The majority of Indian political leaders scarcely inspire

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confidence ; they are facile—too facile—speakers ; they can kindle a brief enthusiasm in the hearts of half-fledged students or sentimentalists of neurotic temperament ; but there is rarely any power of coherent thought, invective is preferred to logic, and appeal is made to the emotions rather than to reason. The long array of hackneyed resolutions at Congress meetings, the annual domination of a mere catchword—"sympathy," "co-operation," "emasculatation" "bureaucracy"—the bitter unreasonableness that is constantly displayed, are features of political life in India which may well dismay a lover of efficiency and cause him to doubt the ability, even the honesty, of those who use these methods.

To reply that these are characteristics of politicians all the world over hardly affects the argument. Moreover, the masses care not one whit for politics ; Home Rule they do not understand. They prefer the English district magistrate. They only ask to remain in eternal and bovine quiescence. They feel confidence in the Englishman because he has always shown himself the "Protector of the Poor," and happens to be neither Hindu nor Musulman, and because he has acquired a reputation for honesty. His prejudices are not their prejudices. It is, of course, an easy retort that the masses do not know what is good for them and that their subservience to an English magistrate is simply the outcome of centuries of submission to a dominating caste. And although it would be absurd to argue that because the masses do not desire a change and because the demand for reform comes from a very small section of the population, therefore reform is not required ; yet the belief of many Englishmen that they and they alone stand between the masses and real oppression is one which cannot be overlooked and which indeed has much to support it. The people—*i.e.*, the Indian masses—are at present to all intents and purposes unrepresented. The Members of the Councils do not in any real sense represent them, still less do the mere agitators. The district officials have always

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been, and still are, looked upon as protectors of the peasants, and have always been ready to fight their battles for them. One has only to consider for a moment the lengths to which landlords would go, if they were unrestrained by firm revenue officers, or the callous indifference that is sometimes exhibited by Indians to the general sufferings of others and to the feelings of those inferior to them in social or caste status. In their determination not to hand the masses over to the unbridled tyranny of a Brahmin oligarchy, the bureaucrats genuinely believe that they are serving the best interests of the people. It is idle not to attach due weight to the relentless power of the Brahmin and the extent to which he is feared by the non-Brahmin. A few centuries are as nothing to him, and the British occupation of India is but an interlude of less importance to him or to his faith than was the conversion of India to Buddhism centuries ago. There is little trace of Buddhism in India now, and the Brahmin believes that in times to come there will be little trace of us. Meanwhile he is willing to use all the weapons he finds ready to hand to secure Brahmin domination, and for the time being finds some use for political agitation. It is felt acutely in Madras and by many Mahomedans all over India that Home Rule means the rule of Brahmins. Finally, there is in the mind of the professional administrator considerable distrust of the practical ability of the Indian to manage his own affairs. There are, of course, brilliant exceptions, but the general experience is that without careful supervision the Indian official is not so efficient either as a judge or an executive officer as his English *confrère*, though he has very often the making of an exceedingly good officer and with more responsibility would, of course, develop. There is some fear, too, that in the absence of English supervision the present high standard of probity may fall. The school of efficiency fears that it has been called upon to accept without a challenge electorates and all the other paraphernalia of democracy, and that the members of the public services are being

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asked to become midwives at the re-birth of the second-best. The experiments so far tried have not been attended with very great success: for example, the very large measure of local self-government extended to the United Provinces by the Municipalities Act of 1916. The Municipal Boards have tended to become debating societies, while the work of practical administration has been neglected. Moreover, the debating society itself is not a real one, but is split up into factions, meetings of groups are held privately at the houses of members, and business is done in holes and corners. Small wonder, then, if the demand for self-government is viewed by the older school with a marked absence of enthusiasm.

This negative and critical attitude is so easy to defend. The facts seem so largely on its side, so long as they are viewed within a range no wider than the district or the Province. But exponents of mere efficiency fail too often to consider its ultimate effects on those they administer as well as upon themselves.

The habits formed in *mofussil* * stations do not conduce to intellectual activity. In the districts officials are immersed in the details of daily routine. Too often overworked, they easily slip into grooves and come to think of the hours spent in recreation and at the club as worth living rather than those in which they are conscientiously transacting administrative detail. Too sharp a line is drawn between official duties and social obligations towards the people of the country. Efficiency is taken to mean office work in which there is often but little to remind the doer of the thoughts and feelings of the people for whom it is done. Social obligations have come to mean amusements entirely cut off from Indians, with the exception of an occasional and somewhat patronising "reception." The result has been unfortunate from both sides. This

* *Mofussil* is equivalent to the English phrase "in the provinces" and means any part of India outside the three great Presidency towns—Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras.

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efficient administration tends to become rigid and out of touch with facts of human nature which because less palpable are not less real. Administrators themselves become inelastic and self-complacent. They lose the sympathy with political aspirations that is characteristic of Western countries. The official has too little time for thought and not seldom loses the inclination to think, at any rate to think in terms of the minds of those he claims to rule. He yields to the belief that official methods must be right and becomes impatient of criticism. There is some unwillingness to move with the times, a tendency to rest on old traditions, or, at any rate, a refusal to revise or spring-clean those traditions.

The hopeful feature, however, is that these tendencies are diminishing rather than increasing. The younger members of the public services not brought up in memories of the Mutiny, and reared, perhaps, in the present-day atmosphere of the English Universities, are more receptive, more capable of realising what is moving in men's minds. They have more sympathy with the violence of adolescence, which as boys at the University they felt themselves, and are consequently more in touch and in sympathy with democratic ideals.

From the side of the ruled also too much "efficiency," as we know it in India, is a dangerous thing; if you are always hearing the noise of the Government machine it gets on your nerves, and you may be excused for wishing to smash it. For efficiency in India has not reached the perfect state when the governed hardly realise there is such a thing as government. At present there are many unduly irksome restrictions, many irritating and unnecessary regulations which tax even the extraordinary patience of Indians. All this they feel, though they do not say so to officials when they pay their visits of ceremony. It is time to realise that a people cannot live on efficiency alone.

The progressive school sees clearly that there is an imperative need for change, that the existing system does

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not provide a soil sufficiently fertile to nurture the young and tender plant of Indian political aspiration and that the continuance of the present system would lead rapidly to disaster. The most enthusiastic will admit that there must be a temporary setback in efficiency, and that in the interval there will be a period of sore travail for India ; but they hold that that period of inefficiency must be boldly faced, so that out of it may emerge an India that will have learned how to cut her own clothes to suit herself.

In speaking thus of " efficiency " it is not meant that firm government must cease. There is perhaps no country in the world where firm government is more necessary, but the day has come when it must take on a more human form and become less mechanical. It is not meant that the British Government has ever been cruel, oppressive, or despotic. Indeed, it has invariably been benevolent almost to a fault. But the time has arrived when it is not sufficient to say, like the strict parent to a growing son, " You must do this, you must not do that." Some freedom of choice must now be given to the peoples of India and the dawning sense of political responsibility must be encouraged and developed.

There is in the mind of the professional administrator a great distrust of popular government. He seems to think that popular government means absence of discipline, lack of self-restraint, licence. But, though it has hideous evils of its own, popular government and good government are not mutually exclusive.

Is there anything in this point of view but a sentimental political faith ? Has it any support from existing facts ? There are two at least—(1) the rapid growth of belief in popular government all the world over ; (2) the *impasse* to which the Government in India has been reduced in spite of its justice and its efficiency. The plain fact is that no system of government can exist indefinitely on a basis of prestige. A rule which engenders a sense of inferiority in the ruled has no living roots and must wither

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in the end. That is why the progressive school, in the face even of Indian facts, accepts popular government as the only sane goal of British policy in India. Knowing the conditions of the country, it still maintains that the gradual introduction of popular institutions to India is the only way of giving her people what every people worth the name must sooner or later claim, the right to national self-expression.

Whither has the argument led? In brief it is this. The first attempt to introduce reforms by Lord Morley has failed. With the system of government as an administrative machine there is little fault to be found, except that perhaps the machinery, and certainly pride in the machinery, is too much in evidence. And yet our Government has failed politically by attempting to rule without defining and declaring the ultimate ends to which it is looking. The educated Indian is ceasing to trust it. But the reason for this mistrust is not a failure to hold the balance between Indians and Europeans, nor even a sensitiveness which the thick-skinned Englishman scarcely appreciates. The root reason is that the system, however admirable as a piece of mechanism, is driven by a motive power and guided by hands that are not Indian. It is felt to be rigid and inhuman in its operation. The maxim,

For forms of government let fools contest,
Whate'er is best administered is best,

will not apply to communities in which the political soul has begun to grow. The official, too, has suffered incalculably from the lack of policy in the Central Government. Small blame to him if he has grown stiff and formal and has adopted a rigid adherence to rules he hates, when he does not know exactly how he stands with the Government of India. He, before anyone, has need to be told what are the ends which the Government he serves has in view.

The only possible remedy has at length been applied.

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The goal of policy has now been proclaimed, and the Secretary of State is here to discuss with the Government of India what steps can be taken in that direction. No graver or more difficult charge has ever been laid on British statesmen in India. In the pronouncement of the 20th of August which contains his instructions the policy of opportunism is once for all renounced. It inaugurates an era in which our policy in India must be based on principles clearly thought out. In a great measure those principles are implicit in the terms of the pronouncement itself. Any increase in power accorded to the people or to those they elect must be coupled with a real responsibility for the measures they initiate. From the outset they must be made responsible for their own failures and their own mistakes. The electorates must be made as wide as possible. Even so they will be small, but however small they must be real, that is to say direct.

The scheme must allow for the diversity of Indian conditions. It must be capable of adaptation to the widely different conditions of each Province. A system which imposes the same constitution on Madras, Bombay and the Punjab will be wrong from the outset, and time must be given for results to mature and be read.

The views of all parties must be listened to, and indeed they have been. But no settlement by universal consent is possible. That way madness lies, the madness that is plunging Ireland to her ruin. Parliament must in the end make up its mind what to do, do it, and go on doing it until Indians are, at length, able to assume the whole burden of responsible government for themselves. On any other terms there will be in the East an India as more tragic as it is more vast than Ireland itself.

India. March, 1918.

THE UNITED KINGDOM

A CRITICAL QUARTER

THE record for the three months from the middle of February to the middle of May must necessarily be brief, for the chief events of the quarter, so far as the people of Great Britain are concerned, have not been in Great Britain but on the Continent. Our domestic happenings have been little more than a response to the movement of events in France and in the East of Europe. In this it forms a striking contrast to the preceding quarter, when opinions rather than events tended to dominate the scene. The intellectual restlessness and the "war-aims" discussions which characterised the fourth winter of the war have been succeeded by a sudden awakening to the stern realities of the international situation. Many illusions have been shed in the process; but the spirit of the country is sounder and healthier now, despite the sorrow and the sacrifice, than at any time since the beginning of the war. The humiliating collapse of the Bolshevist negotiators and the new advance in Russia, closely followed by the great German offensive in the West, have brought us back almost to the mood of 1914.

But it is 1914 with a difference. The country is more alive to realities and more grimly determined to see its cause prevail: but experience has taught it to be more cautious in its estimates and expectations.

There is a change, too, very significant but difficult to analyse, in its attitude towards the Government. Its

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predecessor in 1914 enjoyed the unanimous support and almost lighthearted confidence of a united people. The present Government still enjoys the support and confidence not of all—for it has bitter antagonists on each wing—but of a great majority of the people : its driving power is recognised and welcomed : its success in promoting unity amongst the Allies and, in particular, the establishment of a unified command on the Western Front commend it to those who know what internationalism means in practice and have its promotion most at heart. It is well known, moreover, that the German Government desires and is working for its overthrow. Finally, the alternatives proposed by its enemies at home are plainly unacceptable. Nevertheless, an attitude of reserve is noticeable both in the country and the House of Commons, which, though undoubtedly to some extent fostered by a spirit of petty intrigue, has its main roots in the feeling that the Prime Minister has not always remembered the full extent of his moral responsibilities or given the country the kind of leadership and inspiration which it deserves and demands. This feeling is vague and inarticulate and, in some degree, unreasonable : for a people has no right to expect a Lincoln or a Gladstone to be available at call. Nevertheless, since it exists in wide quarters, it must be recorded : and it must be added that it has been accentuated by a development which has recently attracted much notice.

The matter in question is the unsatisfactory and ill-defined character of the relationship between the Government and the Press. The appointment of Lord Beaverbrook to be Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and Minister of Propaganda was referred to in the last issue of *THE ROUND TABLE*. Two other proprietors of newspapers, Lord Northcliffe and his brother Lord Rothermere, had also been appointed to official positions in or under the Government. These appointments gave rise to considerable criticism and uneasiness, both on the ground of the fitness of their holders for the work assigned to them and of the

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inconvenience, to use no stronger word, of the relationship thus set up between the Government and the newspapers controlled by these new public servants. The dissatisfaction found expression in two debates in the House of Commons, in which Mr. Austen Chamberlain, in particular, pleaded strongly for the maintenance of the traditional independent relationship between the Government and the organs of public opinion. The Prime Minister defended the appointments on the ground that he had chosen the best men he could find, and declared that their holders had disconnected themselves wholly and absolutely from all direction and responsibility for the control of the policies of the newspapers with which they had been hitherto associated : but the general result of the debate was unsatisfactory and inconclusive ; and the wider issues of this admittedly difficult question still remain unexplored. Since the debate took place one of the Ministers concerned, Lord Rothermere, has resigned, his retirement being announced a day or two before the affairs of his Department were to be discussed in the House of Lords. His place as Secretary of State for the Air Force has been filled by Sir William Weir, who has shown his technical qualifications for the appointment by his work as Director of Aircraft Production at the Ministry of Munitions.

If all this caused some uneasiness, particularly among those who value judgment and discretion, rather than bustle and advertisement, in the conduct of affairs, public opinion has been little disposed to accept the claims put forward by one wing of the Government's opponents, who have carried their antagonism to the Government's military policy to the extent of questioning the principle of civilian control over the armed forces of the Crown. No democratic Government in war-time, as President Lincoln's record abundantly proves, can avoid causing heart-burning and exciting controversy by its decisions on contested matters of military policy. But it is deplorable that such inevitable disagreements should be canvassed in public or should be used to

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weaken the Government at a time of crisis : and still more that they should lead to intrigue and insubordination by influential soldiers and their supporters. The feeling that such methods were being resorted to was undoubtedly mainly responsible for the sweeping majority secured by the Government in their debate on General Maurice's letter on May 9. On the other hand, it is all the more necessary that the Government should do nothing which could in any way weaken its moral authority or the confidence of the nation in the complete singleness of its motives.

Party politics are still in abeyance, but the General Election which is expected late in the year is casting its shadows beforehand and all sides are quietly occupying themselves with preparations. The Labour Party, as usual, is the most active, and it enjoys the advantage over its opponents of having drawn up a programme of its own on the problems of Reconstruction, a subject which is occupying more and more attention in the minds of the rank and file of the nation. The economic implications of the principles at stake in the war are being increasingly recognised, and will undoubtedly dominate our domestic politics for years to come.

The Labour Party has also added to its laurels by the successful holding of the Allied Socialist Conference towards the close of February and by its association with the uncompromisingly democratic War Aims memorandum which resulted from that gathering.

The Budget was introduced on April 22. The income tax was raised to 6s.—a smaller rise than was anticipated—and the super-tax from 3s. 6d. to 4s. 6d., with a reduction of its level from £3,000 to £2,500. No extra burden has, however, been laid on the lower range of incomes, and the new allowance of £25 for a wife and the raising of the maximum income to which such allowances apply will act as a relief to a large class of small income tax payers. A tax on luxuries has also been introduced : but the schedule has not yet been worked out and will be awaited with interest.

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In the industrial sphere there is little that is striking to be recorded. The three-cornered dispute between the Government, the Amalgamated Society of Engineers and the other engineering unions, to which reference was made in the last issue of *THE ROUND TABLE*, was still unsettled in the middle of March and dangerous possibilities were in prospect. But the German offensive put a sudden end to the controversy and a second ballot of the A.S.E. recorded a substantial majority in favour of the comb-out. A less acute controversy of a similar kind with the miners was brought to a similar conclusion.

Great interest continues to be taken throughout the country in the principles of the Whitley Report, which, it will be remembered, advocated the establishment of National Joint Standing Councils, composed of equal numbers of employers and Trade Union representatives, in the well-organised industries. A sincere effort is being made to give effect to its recommendations in many industries. The Parliamentary Secretary of the Ministry of Labour was able to state on April 23 that negotiations had already taken place in 26 industries, covering 3,000,000 workpeople. In twelve of these industries schemes were being drawn up, in five agreement as to the actual constitution had been reached, and in one case—the pottery industry—a National Joint Council had actually been set up.* Moreover, the Government itself has taken action with regard to an important section of its own employees. On May 14 an Admiralty circular was issued informing workmen of the Royal Dockyards and other naval establishments that the Board of Admiralty proposed to set up shop Committees and a yard Committee in each such establishment, the members on the workers' side to be elected by ballot. No action has, however, yet been taken as regards the largest class of Government servants, the postal employees. It is, moreover, unfortunate that the Report should have confined

* The constitution of the Council is given in full in an appendix to *Past and Future* by "Jason." (Chatto and Windus.)

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itself to the enunciation of principles without working out in more detail the method of their application. The practical test must always be the detailed application of a principle in concrete cases. Neither the constitution nor the functions nor the powers of these Committees have been considered in any detail by the Whitley Committee, and their recommendations must, for the moment, be considered rather in the light of pious aspirations than practical proposals. Progress is, therefore, not unnaturally slow. Meanwhile the Whitley Committee have issued further reports on Works Committees and on less well-organised industries, the latter recommending an extension in the powers and scope of the Trade Boards, in order to facilitate the application of the system to new industries and to accelerate the fixing of minimum rates when the Boards have been set up. A Government Bill on the lines proposed may shortly be expected.

The food situation has undoubtedly been alleviated during the period under review. Rationing has been introduced for meat and butter or margarine and has worked with almost surprising smoothness. The food queues which were common in the winter months have disappeared, and the nation has accommodated itself more easily than was expected to the rations allowed. Lord Rhondda and his Under-Secretary, Mr. Clynes, and their able staff of administrators, have undoubtedly bettered anticipations and almost earned popularity by their handling of the problem.

The same cannot be said about shipbuilding, which has been the source of a good deal of anxiety. A speech by the First Lord of the Admiralty early in March revealed a serious decline in the output of merchant shipping. His criticisms of masters and men produced counter-criticisms of the Government from both parties in the shipyards. As a result, Lord Pirrie was appointed Director of Shipbuilding Construction. Even before his appointment had had time to take effect, however, there had been an appreciable improvement in the monthly output.

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The Representation of the People Act has assumed its final shape by the rejection of Proportional Representation, an issue which had been left over after the passing of the Act. Proportional Representation will now apply to University constituencies alone.

The chief legislative event of the period has, however, been the new Military Service Bill, under which, as a result of the German offensive, the military age was raised to 50 and in certain specified cases to 55, and a large number of exemptions cancelled. The main proposals of the Bill met with little opposition so far as Great Britain was concerned, although some of its detailed arrangements, which were regarded as too arbitrary, were drastically amended in response to criticism. On the whole, however, Parliament accepted the decision of the Government, as being alone in a position to measure the relative value of different forms of contribution to the national effort. Moreover, Sir Auckland Geddes, the Minister of National Service, who piloted the measure through the House, has shown himself throughout to be thoroughly alive to the non-military equally with the military aspects of the question. The controversy over the Bill arose, therefore, not on its main provisions, but on its application to Ireland. Ireland had hitherto been exempt from the operation of the compulsory clauses of the Military Service Acts. Under the new circumstances that had now arisen, which involved making such large new demands on the people of Great Britain, the question arose again for consideration and the Government decided that it was impossible, both on the ground of constitutional principle and of justice to the people of Great Britain, to continue to exempt Ireland from the working of the compulsory system. On Tuesday, April 9, Mr. Lloyd George made a statement to that effect, adding that, in the absence of any machinery for enrolment, some weeks must elapse before the proposals could come into force and that, when the arrangements were complete, the Government would put the Act into operation by Order

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in Council. A record of the subsequent course of events, together with a study of the issues involved, will be found elsewhere in this number.

Two memorable speeches from members of the War Cabinet remain to be noted. On May 11 Mr. Barnes, the Labour member, when introducing delegates from American Trade Unions to a mass meeting at Kennington, said :—

Labour was convinced that the United Kingdom Parliament was now up against a difficulty that demanded the easement of its burdens and the handing over of much of its work to subordinate Parliaments.

The work that lay before us, after the war, of social reconstruction was tremendous. Difficulties that had been great in the past would be immeasurably greater in the future, because of the better organisation of employer and employed, and we had to find the means of getting these difficulties solved. To do that we must have not only a United Kingdom Parliament, but Parliaments in closer connexion with industrial problems than an Imperial Parliament could be. Therefore the problems of Ireland and of social and industrial reconstruction were allied. Ireland must have its Parliament, so must Scotland, so must Wales, and so must England. Ireland demanded its Parliament to satisfy a feeling of nationality. Labour demanded its Parliament in order to get a fuller and freer life. That meant that Ireland would have to be dealt with as part of a federal scheme of devolution, much on the lines of the American States.

Three days later Mr. Austen Chamberlain addressing the Women's Unionist and Tariff Reform Association was pressing the same point.

Do you think that it is possible . . . confronted, as we are, by an overwhelming rush of problems . . . for one Parliament to deal with all these questions for the whole of the United Kingdom, or even for Great Britain without Ireland, and at the same time to discharge its functions as the mother of all the Parliaments throughout the British Empire—the one real Imperial authority in the whole of this vast collection of States and Dependencies ? For my part, I am convinced that such a task is too great for any Parliament, and that unless we can find means, not merely to gratify the desire of Ireland for some kind of Legislature for itself, but to evolve Legislatures for other parts of the United Kingdom to undertake

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large portions of those duties and functions which have hitherto been discharged by the Parliament at Westminster, the whole machine will break down from overwork. The work which it is necessary for us to do will not be done: questions in which large sections of our countrymen are interested will not be considered, and the whole Parliamentary system will be in danger of falling into contempt and being superseded by some revolutionary form of activity such as we have seen in other countries where Parliaments did not exist or did not possess the confidence of their countries.

This is no longer an Irish problem only. Though it is first and foremost an Irish problem, it is an English, Welsh, and Scottish problem.

Since this question was first mooted by Mr. Childers in 1880 there have always been a handful of specialists who have urged that Provincial Devolution is necessary not merely or even primarily as a solvent of the Irish Problem, but as the only means of relieving the growing congestion at Westminster. How serious that congestion is can be seen by reference to an article on this question published in the issue of *THE ROUND TABLE* for December, 1911.* In Great Britain and especially in England there has been, and still is, a curious absence of public opinion on the subject. The truth is that the average Englishman is slow to make up his mind whether a proposal is feasible or necessary until it is reduced to a scheme, and the details are before him for discussion. The Ministry of Reconstruction has grown to considerable dimensions. A number of officials and committees at work there must be preparing numerous and far-reaching measures of reform which will have to be considered after the war. Mr. Barnes and Mr. Chamberlain unite in declaring that such measures are needed, but cannot be considered and disposed of by one Cabinet and Parliament for the British Isles. Surely it is pertinent to ask what the Ministry of Reconstruction which has all these measures in preparation has to tell us on the subject. Are Mr. Barnes and Mr. Cham-

* Since republished in the Introduction to *An Analysis of the System of Government throughout the British Empire*, Macmillan, 1912.

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berlain right or wrong in thinking that Provincial Devolution is the only remedy ? And if they are right has the Ministry of Reconstruction prepared a report on the subject and a scheme of Provincial Devolution for the public to consider ? If the Ministry has no report on the subject and no such scheme in readiness, then the sooner a strong Royal Commission is appointed to prepare one the better. Opinion on this vital subject cannot develop and come to a decision until the public have before them some definite and authoritative proposals to consider. And the public should be able to consider those proposals before the Cabinet commits itself to the outlines.

London. May, 1918.

CANADA

I. THE FIRST THREE MONTHS OF UNION GOVERNMENT

THE Union Government came into power on December 17, 1917, and the new Parliament assembled on March 18, 1918. For several reasons the intervening three months may be regarded as critical. A Coalition Government has been on trial for the second time in the history of the Dominion. During the fifty years since federation was effected by the first coalition a real fusion of Canadian parties has become no easier to accomplish. Partisanship in Canada has a vigour due possibly to the long absence of a real division between the parties in respect to policy. When Parliamentary debate descends to a mere contest between the "ins" and the "outs" argument is replaced by invective and ideas by personalities. It is perhaps not unfair to say that in the absence of consistent party policy we have been content too often to leave our political affiliations to be settled by heredity, with the result that a fusion between liberal and conservative possesses some of the difficulty involved in the adjustment of a family feud.

Union Government, however, is a *fait accompli*, and perhaps it is not too soon to say that the achievement marks the close of an epoch. For the first time in half a century two national parties are in conflict on a vital fundamental issue. It is refreshing to observe that the new House, honestly divided as it is between two opposing

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and sincere types of opinion, possesses a better temper and is more constructive than the expiring assembly of last summer, in which the process of realignment was unconsciously being carried on. The new era has not been introduced without effort, and the work of consolidation is perhaps not complete. Insurgence on the one hand and suspicion on the other are not infrequently seen in the new Unionist Party. The Press, which now supports Union, is reluctant to abandon old party tactics. But the last three months have proved both the courage and sincerity of Union Government, and the statesman who brought it about may well be proud of having discerned the possibility of uniting two historic factions for a great task, and of having shown the diplomacy and patience essential to such an end.

The period through which we have just passed was crucial for another reason. The Union Government was put in power by a country wearied with the lassitude and confusion of the preceding year. Voluntarism in the army had become a spent force and the spontaneity of our effort from 1914 to 1916 was in danger of flagging. The country needed to find its "second wind." It was the duty of Union Government to give the necessary lead ; to perform the infinitely difficult task of making up arrears.

The country looked to the new Government for leadership, and the initial period was therefore critical because of the very breadth of the charter which the Government received. The approbation won in the election by the principle of Union was, of course, overwhelming ; but the implied mandate was embarrassing in its very insistence. The Government was returned with definite instructions to govern. Its friends and its enemies, from different motives, set before it a utopian ideal. On October 18 the Prime Minister had given his new Cabinet an extensive programme. He pledged them to further taxation of war profits and private incomes, the reduction of Government expenditure, the grant of the franchise to women, the

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improvement of means of transportation, better provision for the care of returned soldiers, reform of the civil service, the abolition of political patronage, and, above all, the vigorous prosecution of the war. The broadest interpretation was placed by the country on this statement of Unionist policy, and the programme, it may be said, was accepted by the electorate as the very minimum of what might be expected.

Before 1914 we commonly thought of war as an affair of armies and navies, in which the private citizen could discharge his obligation by cheering. Now we have found that war tends to eliminate the private citizen, and to leave untouched no side of state organisation. Under its strain two weaknesses of our national life have been exposed—those of particularism in outlook and individualism in action. The first is, of course, an evil inherent in any federal system, and we know it to be a defect in the qualities of the Anglo-Saxon race. A glance at the map of Canada, however, will show to what extent geography alone is an obstacle to national solidarity. Union Government or any other Government pledged to vigorous action will discover that Canadian unity is only in process of attainment, a fact which in ordinary times speeches and books about the country have served to obscure. Under war conditions when the closest co-operation and greatest concentration of effort are demanded of the State we can see how laborious it is on a frontier three thousand miles long to weld into one effective whole a group of local communities divided one from the other by historical origin or race, or religion, or types of industry, or by varying degrees of social progress. It is significant that in such a vast country a daily newspaper can make an appeal only to its own locality. When it is asked why Canadians are often unable to think in terms of the British Commonwealth the answer is this: when Nova Scotians, British Columbians, and Ontarians, not to speak of the citizens of Quebec, can think readily in terms of the Dominion of Canada we

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shall have made no little progress. National consciousness and solidarity are prerequisites of any imperial unity which is worth the having.

The Union Government was faced on its formation with conflicting demands from different sections of the country. The first reassuring sign that the cause to which the nation as a whole was committed must have precedence was in the evident decision with which a Cabinet composed of protectionists from the East and free-traders from the West was prepared to postpone discussion of the tariff—the only question which had really agitated Canada for many years before the war—until a more propitious time. So much for an example of negative action. On the positive side the Government was confronted with urgent problems all of which to an unusual degree demanded national unity. Of these, second in importance only to the supply of fighting men was the task of stimulating agricultural production in order that Canada might discharge her obvious obligation as a victualling nation. In the prosecution of this undertaking it was necessary under our constitutional system to act through the Provinces. The Government therefore arranged Conferences with the Provincial agricultural authorities in which technical discussions were held on such questions as increased acreage, farm labour, transportation, tractors, while an important meeting of Provincial Premiers and Ministers was convened largely for the purpose of discussing the broader aspects of the agricultural programme. There have been such conferences before in Ottawa but it is doubtful if the Provinces have ever been brought into touch with the Federal Government in such a workmanlike fashion. It is only by such a policy of conscientious co-operation that the difficulties bequeathed to us by geography and our constitutional system can be overcome; when this is the case the federal system of course becomes a powerful ally in the spontaneity of effort and healthy rivalry among the Provinces which it can stimulate.

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The second traditional Canadian weakness—in a moderate form as healthy as the spirit of local independence—is our national quality of individualism. Perhaps for this geography is again partly responsible. At all events in more easy-going days the Canadian was apt to regard Government as something which had no right to invade private life. The Government meant “Ottawa,” something very remote and unrelated to ourselves, where a body known as the Cabinet was in rather ineffective operation. What happened did not, however, very much matter, because we were very prosperous and there were few questions of state for the settlement of which the individual citizen felt his share of responsibility. That day has gone. Last summer the Military Service and the Income War Tax Acts taught us that the State could make a levy on both life and property. Since the election the Union Cabinet has been making it increasingly apparent that there is now a force which governs. Expressive of the new spirit is the scheme of National Registration by which every Canadian of both sexes over sixteen years of age will be required in a few weeks, under severe penalties for non-observance, to answer questions which will determine the manner in which he or she can best serve the State. There is to be no element of compulsion except in the actual collection of this information, but that in itself is an impressive demonstration of the Government’s determination effectively to concentrate on the task before it the human power of the nation.

The Regulations of the Canada Food Board—a newly constituted body superseding the office of Food Controller—have also recently brought home to the individual his true relation to the State. We have been slow to arrive at the stringent food regulations which have been in force for some time in European countries. In the first place, where food is seen on all hands in apparent plenty, public opinion until educated to the point of grasping their necessity is loth to accept drastic measures for restriction in its consumption. Secondly, a misconception as to the

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functions of the Food Controller deprived that official of the necessary public sympathy until it was discovered that his purpose was not to reduce the cost of living but to save food. Now that the public is better informed on this point the Government has been able to establish general acquiescence in its effort to restrict the consumption of exportable foodstuffs and to prevent waste, with the result that to this end adequate regulations have now been issued.

There has been no effort to place Canada on a ration system simply because such a plan would be impossible of enforcement in a sparsely settled country in which certain sections are without adequate means of distribution. Again, to fix the prices of commodities unless the entire process of their manufacture is under state control is thought certain only to check production. A system by which wholesale and retail dealers in comestibles are being placed under licence by the Food Board is expected to achieve the necessary results.

In the interest of economy in foodstuffs the Union Government has finally accomplished the suppression of the trade in intoxicating liquor throughout the country. In all the Provinces—save one—the sale of liquor has for some time been prohibited. The restricted manufacture of and inter-provincial trade in liquor, however, were permitted by Federal law until a final order-in-council was passed in March supplementing the provincial legislation and in effect making the Dominion, with the exception of the Yukon Territory, virtually “dry” from May 1, 1919, when the prohibition statute of Quebec comes into force. National prohibition has been brought about technically as a war measure, but it is unlikely that the inevitable movement of reaction after the war will be strong enough to lead to a relaxation of the existing laws.

Two important conferences were called during February by the War Committee of the Cabinet ; one with Labour leaders and the other with representative women from all the Provinces. The two gatherings were not related ;

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the former was arranged for the purpose of discussing the industrial questions with practical working men, and the latter to consider with the women the many forms of their war work. The conferences have, however, something in common. Neither the women of Canada nor Canadian Labour are as yet effectively organised on national lines, and neither class has hitherto come into close relations with the Government. On previous occasions Labour deputations on various subjects have been heard by the Dominion Cabinet, but never before had the Government summoned of its own accord a large group of Labour leaders to discuss policy with them, nor had women ever been called into closer co-operation. Now the Canadian Cabinet includes for the first time a member who is himself a labouring man. On the important new war bodies Labour is fairly represented. The first woman to be appointed to a Dominion Government Board has received a place on the body which is to administer the National Registration scheme. The Union Cabinet, in fact, has met the aspirations of Labour and of women more than half way, and, it would seem, has in a sense undertaken their political education.

An important piece of new machinery has developed out of war conditions—the Canadian War Mission at Washington. In time of peace we have felt the need of a Canadian representative at the American capital. Technically the British Embassy is there to serve Canadian as well as British interests, but in practice its personnel is necessarily out of touch with affairs in the Dominion. For Canada to use this avenue of approach to the United States Government often causes delay, and this, of course, in time of war is a serious matter. The Canadian War Mission has been erected primarily to deal with questions of war trade, many of them in the form of triangular problems affecting Canada, the United States and our European allies. It was established with the full consent of the British Government. Inasmuch as the appointment of an accredited representative of the Dominion

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at a foreign capital, however, is beyond our powers as a State within the Empire, the instrument giving the Mission its authority is careful to save the situation by empowering the Chairman "to represent the Cabinet and the heads of the various Departments" at Ottawa and to conduct negotiations "with the heads of the Departments or other administrative branches, committees or commissions or other officials of the Government of the United States." The Chairman, therefore, is not officially regarded as representing his own *Government*, nor, technically, is he permitted to treat with the *Government* of a foreign State. It remains to be seen whether the Canadian War Mission at Washington will develop after the war into a permanent High Commissionership. The institution might well prove of lasting value. The experiment would seem, at least, to resemble closely those measures in British constitutional history in which common sense has proved more constructive than mere logic and precedent.

As has been said above, the War Mission was formed largely for the purpose of giving adequate representation in Washington to Canada in the settlement of the many trade problems which are constantly arising. The Canadian side of this subject has been put in the hands of a body known as the War Trade Board, recently established at Ottawa by order-in-council and given wide powers in such matters as the regulation of imports and exports, discrimination between essential and other industries, direction of priority in the distribution of fuel and raw materials. The economic relation of the Dominion to the United States is so important under abnormal conditions that the establishment of the Board has come none too soon.

The most radical trade regulations which have yet been issued in Canada are those governing the packing industry. These permit a maximum of eleven per cent. profits on capital, but in the narrow definition placed on "capital" and in the fact that in any given year only two per cent. of the gross value of sales can be retained the regulations

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are rather more severe than those in force in the United States. Under earlier war conditions the profits of the packing houses were large, but the wisdom of these regulations is questioned by many. An adverse balance of trade renders doubtful any action which might check the expansion of business. The regulations, however, can probably be regarded as in some measure experimental.

A reference should be made to the Union Government's battle with political patronage. The Prime Minister promised in October that appointments to the outside Civil Service would be placed on a competitive basis like those in the Inside Service. An order-in-council was issued in February pointing out that such a reform must wait for embodiment in an Act of Parliament, but in the meantime an effort was made to get clear of the grosser abuses of the patronage system by extending as far as possible the operation of the Civil Service Commission—a body which for some time has efficiently controlled appointments to the Inside Service. The long-promised Civil Service Act has just been introduced granting a full measure of reform. It will, however, take more than Acts of Parliament to kill patronage ; we have long been given to the practice of considering the qualification of an appointee as of secondary importance to his personal interests, and in this the importunate constituent has sinned as greatly as has his too-accommodating Member. But corrective legislation will at least have an educative effect on both.

Related to the suppression of patronage in appointments is an order recently passed by which the functions of the War Purchasing Commission are extended to cover nearly all purchases made by Government departments. The Commission was established in 1915 to check abuses in war contracts. The recent order, through the wide extension of the Commission's powers, places the whole matter of Government contracts on a just and workmanlike basis.

In the many orders-in-council which have been passed in the last three months the Government has rightly placed

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a liberal construction on the powers conferred by the War Measures Act, 1914. We may speculate as to how many of these "war measures" will survive the emergency which called them into existence. It is to be hoped, however, that the scope of State action in Canada has been permanently widened, and that we shall not recede from the higher standard of administrative efficiency which the Union Government has already set.

II. QUEBEC AND THE DRAFT

FOR three weeks Parliament has been sitting, and apparently there is substantial cohesion among Unionists in the Cabinet and in the House of Commons. The Unionist majority, which was 45 before the votes of soldiers in the United States, Great Britain, France and elsewhere were counted, is now 70. Approximately 93 per cent. of the votes of soldiers were polled for the coalition and for conscription. In Prince Edward Island, where the civilian vote gave all four seats to the Opposition, two have been transferred to the Government by the ballots of soldiers. In Nova Scotia, where the Opposition had a majority, all but four of the sixteen seats have been taken by the Government, in Ontario eight, and in the four Western Provinces two constituencies are represented by supporters of Sir Wilfrid Laurier. Thus between the Ottawa River and the Pacific only ten seats are held by the Opposition. The Government had a popular majority of 362,008 over the official Opposition, and of 264,216 over Liberal, Labour and Independent candidates. The total civilian vote for the Government was 841,499, and for the Opposition 683,662. Over 46,000 civilian votes were cast for Labour candidates, and over 15,000 for candidates who disclaimed connection with any party. The total military vote for the Government was 206,626, and for all other candidates 15,016. The vote for Labour candidates does not fairly

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express the strength of organised labour in the industrial communities. So strong was the feeling for conscription that many Labour Unionists voted for the Government who in an ordinary political election would have supported the official nominees of Labour. The Government, however, is showing a disposition to co-operate with the Labour leaders. While there are only two representatives of Labour in the House of Commons, Hon. Gideon Robertson of the Senate has been admitted to the Cabinet and a seat in the Commons will be found for an Under-Secretary of Labour.

Thus far the session has been uneventful, save for debates on the riots in Quebec and the distribution of Imperial honours. The trouble at the ancient capital began with an attack upon three officials engaged in enforcing the Draft. A young man named Mercier who had been exempted was found in a pool-room without his certificate. Reluctant to accept his explanation, the officials put him under arrest. A mob collected, pursued the officials, and dragged them out of the police station in which they had sought refuge. The station was wrecked and one of the officials badly injured. On successive nights there was rioting in the streets, and property to the value of \$150,000 was destroyed. The City police were helpless or passive. Mr. Lavigne, Mayor of Quebec, is a Liberal member of the House of Commons, who strongly opposed conscription in his campaign for election. He claims that public feeling was so inflamed by the arrogant and provocative behaviour of officers engaged in enforcing the Military Service Act that rioting became almost inevitable. In any event mobs on successive nights practically took possession of portions of the city, broke into hardware shops, armed themselves, and from roofs and lanes and from behind snowbanks fired upon the troops who had been called out to reinforce the police. It seems to be agreed that the troops bore insult and attack with patience and steadiness until there was no alternative but to drive the

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mobs from the streets. A machine gun was brought into action, with the result that four civilians were killed and 45 wounded. Among the soldiers eleven were wounded by the guns, revolvers and missiles of the mob, but none fatally. Many arrests of rioters followed, but most of these were released by Mr. Justice Langelier without objection by the military authorities. Seven suspected to be ringleaders are held for trial, and energetic measures are being taken to get at the sources of the outbreak.

The chief French newspapers protest against the use of troops from Ontario and the English Provinces, but the answer of the authorities is that reinforcements were necessary, that the few French-Canadian soldiers at Quebec could not command the situation, and that there was no alternative but to go outside the Province. It is freely acknowledged that the French-Canadian soldiers were as faithful and resolute in dealing with the mobs as those from elsewhere. It is also alleged by French-Canadian newspapers that greater harshness has been displayed in enforcing the Military Service Act in Quebec than in the other Provinces. The truth is that in Toronto the very same measures have been applied as in Quebec. In Ontario, as in the French Province, enforcing officers have entered factories and places of amusement, and have even disturbed social dinners in pursuit of deserters. No doubt there is an impression in Quebec that the Province has had exceptional treatment, but the facts do not support the suspicion. There is unquestionably a general and formidable feeling in Quebec against conscription, and it is therefore difficult to secure tribunals or enforcing officers to put the law into effect.

The debate in Parliament was precipitated by Colonel Currie, who commanded the 48th Highlanders at Ypres. He was strongly supported by a group of Conservative members from Ontario. Colonel Currie argued that the Draft was being feebly enforced in Quebec, that under the law only 5,000 men had been secured in the

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Province, and that of these 3,500 were English-speaking. He urged, too, that Mr. Bourassa, the French Nationalist leader, should be interned and his newspaper, *Le Devoir*, suppressed. This demand, it must be said, is generally supported by the Press of the English Provinces, which has not been convinced that adequate energy has been displayed in applying the Draft in Quebec. The country, however, is impressed by the Prime Minister's explanation and defence. He pointed out that exemptions were granted so freely in Quebec that thousands of appeals became necessary. This involved delay, but 30,000 of these appeals would soon be heard and those improperly exempted would be put into uniform. He declared that during the last six months 47,000 troops had been sent oversea, and insisted that the Act would be enforced fairly and uniformly in all the Provinces. For the future also the Government had taken power by order in council to designate areas where the military may supersede the civil authority, and in such areas disturbers would be tried by court-martial. Furthermore, those engaging in riots or resisting the law would immediately become subject to draft. A feature of the debate was a measured and moderate statement by Sir Sam Hughes in which he described the persistent efforts which he had made to form oversea regiments in Quebec and the character of the influences by which he was baulked and defeated. He placed the responsibility chiefly upon expatriated ecclesiastics from old France, animated by vengeful hostility to political leaders in the French Republic and acting in collusion with German agents in the United States. Sir Wilfrid Laurier hinted at a secret organisation operating in Quebec of which he as yet had no complete knowledge. He was convinced, however, that the instruments chosen by the Government to enforce the Draft could not be acquitted of responsibility for the rioting and were unfitted for such delicate and responsible duties. Of one of these he said that he was as well known in Quebec as Barabbas was in Jerusalem. He said that he had opposed

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conscription for Canada because he had common sense, but since the law had been enacted it must be enforced. In this he was as unequivocal as Sir Robert Borden, and he was as unequivocal, too, in declaring his devotion to the cause of the Allies, and his desire ever since the war began that Canada should put its utmost strength into the conflict. The general feeling throughout the country is that the Government was strengthened by the debate, but at any time Parliament may become unmanageable if efforts to enforce the Draft in Quebec are relaxed.

Before the rioting there seemed to be a distinct lessening of tension between Quebec and the English Provinces. A resolution submitted to the Quebec Legislature was debated with such reserve and dignity that the best effect was produced throughout the country. The speech of Sir Lomer Gouin, Provincial Premier, was singularly prudent and conciliatory. It is true that he laid the chief responsibility for any existing friction upon the other Provinces and was resolute in defence of the claims and interests of his own people. But that was to be expected. In what he said, however, there was no flavour of provocation. He proclaimed complete loyalty to the constitution, but demanded for Quebec its rightful place and authority within the Confederation. Whatever may be said of Sir Lomer Gouin's attitude towards conscription or his devotion to the interests of his compatriots, he commands the respect of English-speaking people alike for his personal qualities and the strength, wisdom and capacity which he displays in administering the affairs of his own Province.

III. TITLES IN CANADA

THE debate on honours arose over a resolution introduced by Mr. W. F. Nickle, member for Kingston, against granting further hereditary titles in Canada. As was expected, Parliament was overwhelmingly in favour of

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the resolution. There are few hereditary titles in Canada and even knighthoods are not common. But there has always been a feeling against these distinctions as undemocratic and not indigenous to this country. They are objectionable to all those who quarrel with "Imperialism," and even to many sound Imperialists. Not a few of those who hold titles profess to have accepted the distinction with reluctance and to be indifferent as to whether Parliament approves or condemns. There is, however, very little sympathy with those who would have it understood that they submitted to Imperial pressure. There has been little title-hunting in the Dominion; nor have many men been coerced into baronetcies and knighthoods. That there has been any general purchase of decorations is beyond belief. A few persons may have sought eagerly, and even been willing to offer a consideration, but assuredly they have not been numerous. We have no House of Lords, nor does a title give any social precedence in Canada. Precedence belongs to Lieutenant-Governors, judges, military officers, members of the Senate and House of Commons, and members of the Legislatures. But for the time and probably for all time Parliament has expressed the feeling of Canada towards hereditary titles, and it is certain that in the future even knighthoods will not be freely distributed.

A number of causes explain the immediate temper of Parliament. (1) A baronetcy conferred upon a subject who has been under continuous newspaper attack as drawing excessive profits from the business in which he is engaged. His profits have not been greater than those of many other manufacturers and traders, while his public services have been invaluable. But for various reasons he was singled out for attack and the critics were fortified by his acceptance of an hereditary title. (2) The intimation that two or three hundred decorations under the new Order of the British Empire were to be distributed throughout Canada. (3) The accentuation of democracy by service and sacrifice in the great war. There is the further reason that

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differences of opinion about the merits and services of those selected for titular distinction are inevitable, and when so few are chosen many will criticise the choice. Moreover, the feeling against titles in the Western Provinces is stronger than in older Canada and the West is influential in the new Parliament. During the debate Sir Wilfrid Laurier hinted that history would reveal why he accepted a title. Another speaker suggested that Sir Wilfrid succumbed to direct pressure by Queen Victoria. In any event, the Liberal leader expressed complete sympathy with Mr. Nickle's motion, and scouted all titles, small and great. He offered to put his own in the marketplace and make a bonfire of it, and invited his fellow knights to do likewise. Sir Robert Borden produced an order in council adopted by the Government on March 9th for submission to the Imperial authorities requiring that no honour or titular distinction, save in recognition of military service during the war, should be conferred upon a British subject resident in Canada except upon the advice of the Prime Minister of Canada, and that hereafter no hereditary title should be conferred upon a British subject resident in Canada. To this decision of the Canadian Government the Imperial authorities will be asked to agree. The Prime Minister does not anticipate that assent will be withheld.

It was revealed during the debate that in 1902 the Laurier Government addressed a memorandum to the Imperial authorities urging that titles should be granted in Canada only upon the advice of the Canadian Government. But Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, in reply, conceded that over honours for services of a political or administrative character in Canada the Canadian Government should have complete authority, but he suggested that for those "whose purely Imperial, political or municipal services or public services of a charitable, literary, or scientific character are held to merit recognition" it should be enough for the Governor-General to submit his recommendations to the Canadian

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Prime Minister and forward such observations as he might have to offer to the Colonial Secretary. The request, which was made in 1902, the Borden Government now renews. Unquestionably the feeling of Canada is that hereditary titles should not be conferred upon Canadians resident in the country, and that other titles, if granted at all, should be granted only upon the advice of the Prime Minister of Canada.

Canada. April, 1918.

AUSTRALIA

I. THE SECOND REJECTION OF CONSCRIPTION

TO understand the position in Australian public affairs to-day it is necessary to look back over a considerable stretch of events. The student will find **THE ROUND TABLE** article in No. 26 (March, 1917) on the first Conscription Referendum helpful in estimating the present situation.

The first Referendum was possibly almost inevitable in the political circumstances which gave rise to it. The divergence between the political parties in Australia was so great, their class-antagonism so pronounced, and the Labour machine was so exclusively adapted to serve the interests of Labour only that the formation of a truly national Government was practically impossible. Further, the Labour party—then in power—was by no means at one with itself on questions of fundamental importance, such as patriotic duty and Australia's national obligations in the war. A deep rift was widening between the older school of Labour leaders, who had raised the Labour movement to its remarkable pitch of success in Australia, and the newer school of industrial extremists, who were gradually capturing the Labour leagues and getting control of the party political machine. Mr. Andrew Fisher, of "last man and last shilling" fame, had handed over the reins of government to his former second-in-command, Mr. W. M. Hughes, the last hope of the older school; and the new Prime Minister, after delivering his soul, with characteristic vigour, upon the wrecking tactics of the extreme section

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of Labour, had followed Mr. Fisher to England. He went there to transact very important national business, relating to the sale and transportation of Australia's products and the financing of war measures, but also, no doubt, to fortify himself by accurate information and personal knowledge for the war policy he had to carry through in Australia against strong and bitter opposition within his own party.

Returning full of zeal for the principle of universal service, the Prime Minister found himself faced with the most stubborn obstacles in his Cabinet and in the Parliamentary party—especially in the Senate. The Referendum proposal (1916) was the utmost to which he could screw up the party, after the most strenuous efforts. The alternative—a direct appeal to the country—was blocked by the constitutional difficulties of obtaining a double dissolution, which was absolutely essential because of the strongly adverse attitude of the Senate to the Prime Minister's proposals. In a matter of such great national urgency it would, perhaps, have been too much to expect a political leader to see that the longer, constitutional process would prove in fact much shorter and more effective than the apparently swift and sudden method of a quite unconstitutional Referendum (technically described as "extra-constitutional"). And this first Referendum might indeed have given Australia an effective war policy had it not been for the series of blunders in the campaign (see ROUND TABLE article referred to above). On October 28, 1916, Australia came within an ace of giving the most striking vindication of democracy—by making, as a democratic nation, that supreme sacrifice which has ennobled so many individual lives in these years of war. It may justly be claimed that she would have done so under wiser leadership; but, then, the raising up of strong and wise leaders is just the kind of vindication that our Australian type of "advanced democracy" seems chiefly to need.

The main positive effect of the first Referendum campaign was the split in the Labour party which gave the

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Prime Minister the independence he so courageously asserted at that time, and left him with a remnant of the party—which assumed the name “National Labour” though it had, in fact, only a fraction of the organised Labour of Australia behind it. This merely served to keep Mr. Hughes in power for the time being, by favour of the Liberal Party, which gave ungrudging support so long as the business was confined to the prosecution of war measures.

The position was one of extremely unstable equilibrium, which was bound to be upset by the first wind of circumstance. Just when the life of Parliament was nearing an end the invitation from the British Government to Australia to take part in the Imperial Conference was received. A National Labour and Liberal coalition was formed after some delay and a good deal of bargaining, with the object of obtaining a postponement of the General Election until after the Conference, so that such a deputation might be sent to it as would represent at least the majority of the Australian people. This object was defeated by the “Official Labour” majority in the Senate, which thus forced the General Election upon the country; and the Coalition Government took the momentous step of foregoing all representation at the Conference.

The General Election of May, 1917, has proved to be the turning-point of Australia's fate. The Coalition Government went to the polls on a “win the war” cry, but without a policy adequate to that ambitious phrase. Practically the whole body of “win-the-war” politicians had been supporters of the conscription proposals of the first Referendum, and neither then nor since has the party been able to put forward any effective substitute for that policy. Yet the party decided to put conscription definitely on one side, as having been made impossible, at any rate for the time being, by the Referendum decision and the exceedingly useful political designation, “Win-the-War,” came simply to mean that the Government would un-

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doubtedly keep things going as well as it possibly could under an absolutely stultifying restriction.

One leading politician (Sir William Irvine) stood out for the more heroic course, and maintained his independent right to advocate compulsory service as the only effective means for the winning of the war. The other leaders and practically all the rest of the Coalition party sacrificed their personal convictions to the decision which the people had given, and to what they conceived to be the political interests of the party. It was not possible, however, merely to put the conscription issue aside as an irrelevant issue: the Coalition had either to go to the polls with conscription explicitly in its programme—in which case the election would, of course, have been fought upon that issue—or it had as definitely to exclude conscription from the programme upon which it asked for election. Its opponents, knowing the conviction of the Win-the-War candidates, naturally took good care to exact specific declarations on this specific issue, and most of the candidates pledged themselves definitely on the point. The representative pledge is that given by the Prime Minister as follows :—

The Government will not enforce or attempt to enforce conscription, either by regulation or statute, during the life of the forthcoming Parliament. If, however, national safety demands it, the question will again be referred to the people. That is the policy of the Government on this question. (Bendigo, March 27.)

In his numerous election speeches he gave the same promise again and again in characteristically vehement and picturesque forms. Moreover, he himself and most of his followers made it perfectly clear that they meant by the contingent reference to the people not another election, but another Referendum.

The present most deplorable humiliation of Australia is a direct consequence of the fundamental insincerity of a "win-the-war policy" which did not demand power to put into effect the one method by which the party believed

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that such a policy could be made effective. The sweeping victory of the party at the polls made it certain that it could at least have put up a splendid fight for a free hand to carry on Australia's part in the war; even had it lost, it could have done much more in opposition for the welfare of Australia than it has actually been able to do in office. This statement is made with the fullest appreciation of all the strong arguments put forward as to the dangers of putting the industrial extremists of Labour into power during war time. Sound democratic theory and ordinary adherence to principle pointed one way; but faith in principle yielded to fear of the consequences, and the moral advantage of position began definitely to shift to the other side. A bid was made for the votes of that section of the community which neither wants revolutionary internal changes nor cares much about Australia doing her part in the war; and the dead weight of this ignoble section of public opinion which ought to have been forced by a bold Government policy to make its choice between Official Labour without conscription and the Coalition with conscription—has made progress impossible ever since.

A period of stagnation followed upon the establishment of the present Government in place if not in power. There has never been any question about the Coalition party's will to prosecute war measures to the best of its ability; but it could do little more than barely "carry on," hampered at every turn by embittered opponents and by the limitations it had accepted. The patriotism of the community was semi-paralysed by the impotence of the Government. The demoralising processes of voluntary recruiting (in its secondary stages) went on, with all their futility of threadbare impassioned appeals, glorified circus tricks, vulgarising advertisements, and lamentable waste of energy, only redeemed by the untiring persistence of the Commonwealth Director of Recruiting and his able staff of workers. There developed in those families which

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had gladly done their duty and had in many cases suffered irreparable loss a deep-rooted feeling of bitterness towards those other families which refused to do their part ; and both among the families which had made the sacrifice and among others as yet untried but equally willing, a strong aversion to supporting voluntarism further at the cost of the flower of the nation's youth.

The Government had gambled on one or other of two events : an early victory for the Allies or a disaster which would make it possible to raise the question of conscription again. Meanwhile its attitude had to be practically to "wait and see" which of these events would happen. Its opponents offered an anticipation of what would occur by affirming that the Prime Minister would seize the first opportunity to bring in conscription. By this means, when the grave emergency eventually did arise, they actually succeeded in discounting much of the Prime Minister's passionate appeal to the nation.

Sir William Irvine, after waiting long enough for the Government to formulate a strong policy, launched a special campaign of his own ; and, though he stood politically alone and was looked upon with much disfavour by both political parties, he met with such success in several States that the Government was forced to listen to his voice. He strongly opposed the taking of another Referendum on conscription, believing that course to be contrary to the principles of responsible government as applied to such a question. He urged the Government to take full responsibility, to put a measure through Parliament giving it the power of compulsory enlistment, and then to go to the country on that issue.

When the demoralisation of Russia's armies reached a disastrous climax and the facts of the Italian defeat became known the Prime Minister stated that the time for action had come ; and he hastened to forestall any counter-proposal by announcing that the Government had decided to take another Referendum. The speech with which he

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opened the campaign (Bendigo, November 12) shows, on rereading, with what clearness he grasped the significance of the war situation ; but he gave neither Parliament nor the people an opportunity to discuss the situation on its merits, so as to arrive at the best way for Australia to meet it. Apparently he expected the whole country to see the facts as he saw them, or at least to see them through his eyes, and hoped to carry it with him on a wave of anxiety and patriotic revival. He did not reckon with loss of confidence both in himself and in his Government ; and with a certain growing coldness to his impassioned appeals. The terms of the proposal for this " Reinforcements Referendum " were as follow :

1. Voluntary enlistment is to continue.
2. The number of reinforcements required is 7,000 per month.
3. Compulsory reinforcements will be called up by ballot to the extent to which voluntary enlistment fails to supply this number.
4. The ballot will be from among single men only, between the ages of 20 and 44 years (including widowers and divorcees without children dependent upon them).
5. The following will be exempt : (a) Persons who are physically unfit for service ; (b) Judges of Federal and State courts, and police, special and stipendiary magistrates ; (c) Ministers of religion ; (d) Persons whose employment in any particular industry is declared by the prescribed authority to be necessary for the supply of food and material essential for the war ; (e) Persons whose religious belief does not allow them to bear arms ; but this objection will only exempt them from combatant service ; (f) Persons, the calling up of whom for military service would, because of their domestic circumstances, cause undue hardship to those dependent upon them.
6. The Government will prescribe the industries essential to the prosecution of the war and the national welfare of Australia, and a special tribunal will determine the amount of labour necessary for their effective operation.
7. Where a family is or has been represented in the Australian Imperial Force by the father or a son, or by a brother, one eligible son, or brother (as the case may be), shall be exempt.
8. Eligible males of families which now are or have been represented at the front shall not be balloted for until after eligible males of families not so represented have been called up.
9. All ballots shall be so conducted that families will contribute as nearly as practicable *pro rata*, and that in no case shall the sole

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remaining eligible member of a family which is or has been so represented be called up for service. Males under the age of 20 will be exempt, in addition to the one eligible male over that age.

10. In determining the *pro rata* contribution regard shall be had to all members of the family who have joined the Australian Imperial Force, irrespective of age.

11. Ballots will be taken by States, on the basis of the proportional number of eligible persons in each State.

12. The tribunals for deciding exemptions will be constituted by magistrates specially appointed ; and an appeal will lie to a Supreme Court judge.

The following were disqualified from voting :

(a) Every naturalised British subject who was born in a country which forms part of the territory of any country with which the British Empire is now at war, except a natural-born citizen of France, Italy, or Denmark, who arrived in Australia before the date upon which the territory in which he was born became part of Germany or Austria ; and (b) Every person whose father was born in an enemy country.

The question put to the people was :

Are you in favour of the proposal of the Commonwealth Government for reinforcing the Australian Imperial Force oversea ?

It was at first exceedingly doubtful whether the Government intended to accept full responsibility for its proposals and to stake its existence upon them. It was strongly urged to do so by those most in earnest about the prosecution of the war, while, on the other hand, certain powerful newspapers—anxious at whatever cost of principle to keep the present Government in office—described any disposition in that direction as sheer quixotism. The point was apparently settled at a Cabinet meeting on the train journey to Bendigo on the day of the above-mentioned speech, and the decision arrived at was stated by the Prime minister in his peroration thus :

We who were elected on a Win-the-War policy tell you plainly that the situation in Russia and Italy is such that without the power

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to ensure reinforcements we cannot give effect to the policy which you approved with such enthusiasm last May. I tell you plainly that the Government must have this power. It cannot govern the country without it, and will not attempt to do so.

This statement is to be specially noted in view of subsequent developments.

The Referendum campaign proved for a second time the folly of submitting such an issue to a direct vote of the people. It is true that the worst blunders of the previous campaign were not repeated, but others took their place. The Government agreed that no more than the usual military censorship should be exercised upon the Press ; but, as a matter of fact, one of the most telling features of the "No" propaganda was the production (on platforms) of galley-proofs of matter censored on its way through the Labour printing press. The official substitute for censoring was to be drastic action against the publication of statements calculated to mislead the voter, but this again operated most adversely to the Government's own case. It gave rise to a number of somewhat farcical legal proceedings in which the Government failed to secure a conviction. The Prime Minister conducted the campaign characteristically, with quite unnecessary bitterness, using the offensive epithets Disloyalist, Sinn Fein, I.W.W. indiscriminately against his opponents. His misdirected zeal reached a climax in Queensland, where he prohibited the publication of certain statements about military statistics by the Premier and the Treasurer of that State, and afterwards, when these statements were given publicity through the State Parliament in a special "Hansard," first had the copies of "Hansard" seized by the military authorities and then prosecuted the Premier of Queensland (by no means to the disadvantage of the latter) for having made the statements. Further, in connection with this episode and some rough treatment at the hands of a Queensland crowd, the Prime Minister instituted offhand a Commonwealth Police Force to

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protect Federal interests where these might be in danger of suffering under the existing police systems of the States. It is not necessary to deny the seriousness of some of the matters attacked by the Prime Minister; the point to be observed is the recurrence in new forms of the bad tactical methods which marred his conduct of the first Referendum campaign.

All the cross-currents of personal interests and prejudices again revealed themselves. The feelings of women-voters especially, but also to a considerable extent of men, were worked upon by appeals to their now much fuller knowledge of the horrors of modern war. They were asked whether they would condemn any man to such horrors against his will; and to the question thus put, those at whom the appeal was specially directed—whether thinking of their own men or of others—had only one answer. Many alleged, as sufficient reason for voting “No,” advice received from their sons or brothers or husbands at the Front.

Very active opposition was organised in several of the States by the authorities of the Roman Catholic Church. The new Archbishop of Melbourne, Dr. Mannix, formerly Coadjutor, was the head and front of this activity. He was specifically recognised by the Prime Minister as the leader of the “No” forces, and he now takes credit for having turned Victoria at least from “Yes” to “No.” The fact of his thinly veiled utterances and the complete failure of the Government to deal with them as seditious and treasonous have been a most sinister feature of the situation. He is an Irish Sinn Fein zealot, with a deep hatred of the British Commonwealth and especially of England. His deliberate policy, in which he has had disquieting success, is the inculcation of an Australian Sinn Fein attitude of mind among the more ignorant or gullible of the community, for whose support he angles with a certain crude demagogic cleverness. His method is cynically indirect. He exhorts his following to “put Australia

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first, the Empire second," but succeeds in making it quite clear that he actually means *the Empire nowhere*. Any references he makes to German militarism and German methods of warfare always carry the innuendo that Great Britain is nearly, if not quite, as bad. His most notorious phrase is "a sordid trade war," in description of the British cause. He pays lip-homage to the principle of voluntary enlistment—if only because the people of his Church have their representation of brave Irish blood in the A.I.F.—but he makes it perfectly plain that there is, in his view, no obligation on the part of any man to offer himself for service; he hints that it is mere quixotic chivalry for any young Australian to go upon what loyal citizens regard as the path of supreme duty in these times. The reason why it is considered important to state his attitude at such considerable length is that the influences of which he is spokesman have in fact effectually succeeded in stopping the flow of Irish Roman Catholic recruits, and were largely responsible for the great "No" majority in December. It is essential to add, however, that some of the most prominent and distinguished Roman Catholic citizens have come out unequivocally on the side of allegiance to the Allied cause.

As in the first Referendum campaign, the most damaging opposition to the Government's proposals was based upon criticism of the statistics adduced in support of these proposals, and of the number of men asked for per month. The Ministry had made no careful study of the figures they used, and even the tables produced by their military advisers would not bear close investigation and analysis. These facts were publicly demonstrated in the above-mentioned legal proceedings against the Queensland Premier during the campaign. To the mere politician it may be a small matter that Australia's contribution to date was estimated at figures varying from 300,000 to 400,000 men, according to the audience and the particular object in view; but it happened to be a point of supreme importance to serious voters endeavouring to answer

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responsibly the question put to them by the Government. Again, the 16,500 per month—so desperately needed in 1916 that twice that number was demanded for October of that year, and men rushed into camp to anticipate the country's mandate—had given place to 7,000 in 1917, although the war-situation was stated to be so very grave. Might there not be something, after all, in the anti-conscriptionist contention that the 4,000 per month actually obtained by voluntary enlistment in 1917 was sufficient to meet the need? No incontrovertible statistical evidence was forthcoming; and not nearly enough was made of the fact that the 48,000 men obtained in 1917 had mostly come forward in the earlier part of the year. The clause to the effect that "in any month only the number actually required (if less than 7,000) will be called up or enlisted," was not given sufficient prominence; yet it involved the really fundamental principle that effective warfare cannot be carried on with a definite liability specified beforehand, and was at least one step back to the solid ground of responsible representative government.

It is a disconcerting fact that the anti-conscriptionists, who did not succeed in producing a single argument of weight upon the principles involved (the arguments as to "freedom" and "the sacredness of human life" were typically unreal in view of the Prussian menace staved off by conscript France, England, Italy, and America), should have won by so large a majority, even without the German vote. The final figures were: *Yes*, 1,015,159; *No*, 1,181,747; majority for *No*, 166,588.

The figures for the several States were:—

		Yes.	No.
New South Wales....	..	341,256	487,774
Victoria	329,772	332,490
Queensland	132,771	168,875
South Australia	86,663	106,364
Western Australia	84,116	46,522
Tasmania	38,881	38,502
Territories	1,700	1,220

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The honourable position of Western Australia cannot be passed by without a word of appreciation.

The fact must not be overlooked that the overseas soldiers returned a small *yes* majority (*Yes*, 91,642 ; *No*, 89,859 ; majority, 1,783), and when it is remembered that many of them voted *No* for reasons which, however mistaken we may consider them, command our respect and admiration, it becomes all the more tragically significant that the soldiers asked for adequate reinforcements and the stay-at-homes "turned down" their appeal. This makes December 20, 1918, a black day indeed in the annals of Australia ; and though Labour leaders exulted over it and are insistent that "the conscription issue is dead" and must be buried out of sight and mind if there is to be any getting on with Australia's business, it must remain the darkest blot upon our national character till somehow we shall expiate it in days to come.

II. THE POLITICAL SEQUEL

THERE was, however, something even worse to come in the political sphere. Behind everything in the anti-conscription case was a fundamental distrust of the Government. Large numbers of Labour men, whose loyalty and patriotism cannot be questioned, affirmed that nothing would reconcile them to trusting this Government with the powers conferred by a compulsory system. They were convinced that their political opponents would use the powers of conscription in the interests of "the master-class" and to the detriment of the worker. They believed, and stated, that the restrictions specified in the Referendum proposals were temporary expedients ; and, in particular, they warned the married men that their turn would surely come, not realising that thousands of clear-sighted, patriotic married men supported conscription in order that they might rightly know when their turn had come. They

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ridiculed the assumption that the Prime Minister and his colleagues would keep their Referendum pledge and go out of office in the event of a "No" majority; and the facts in connection with this most crucial test lend great force to the general distrust and suspicion which constitute the one valid excuse for the "No" vote. These facts throw back upon the Government and its National Party the greater burden of responsibility for the present discredit of Australia in the eyes of the world,

The Government was, according to vehement asseverations made during the Referendum campaign, to be out of office within twenty-four hours of an adverse result; but in the actual event the decision was first delayed for as long as possible after the adverse result was seen to be beyond any possibility of doubt, and even then resolved itself into one in favour of a most lamentable process of political manœuvring. Organs of the Press identified in interest with the Government began to canvass a variety of alternatives to the straight and narrow course of honesty. Gradually it emerged that neither Government nor party meant to relinquish office if this could by any plausible means be avoided; and their supporters began to persuade themselves—with just enough justification to make it certainly a sore temptation—that the paramount patriotic duty was to keep the Official Labour Party out of power.

The Government, having first decided to refer the decision of its fate to the party—though, indeed, much was made throughout the affair of the fact that it was the Government and not the party which had brought about the whole situation—the Prime Minister, with his unenviable skill in handling political difficulties, succeeded in obtaining as the one tangible result of a first long meeting of the caucus, a vote of confidence in himself as leader of the party, "carried by an overwhelming majority." This effectively ensured that he would not be made the scapegoat.

When the caucus resumed on the second day (January 4) there were perceptible signs of stiffening on the part of a

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minority, partly, no doubt, due to pressure of public opinion applied in the interim. The proceedings at this second meeting, of which a good report appeared in the Press, are of special importance to this review of the position. The following resolution was first carried, again "by an overwhelming majority" :—

That this party, in view of the recent declared attitude of the Official Labour Party on the vital questions of the conduct of war and peace, declares that in the interests of the country and the Empire it will not support any course of action that will hand the government of the country to the Official Labour Party.

Sir William Irvine who, by implication, must have voted against this resolution, stated the case very plainly as it appeared to him. He described the Government's Referendum pledge as "a clear, definite and welcome assertion of the principle of government responsibility," and stated his conviction that "in an issue vital to the national honour and safety of the Commonwealth no other course was possible." In his judgment the Government had said in effect to the electors, "You must choose between our party with conscription and the Official Labour Party without conscription." He said that he considered all members of the party to be bound in honour by the pledge, and that, therefore, no ministry could be formed from the Nationalist side of the House. He stated as the only two possible alternatives : "Either the government must be handed over to Mr. Tudor's party (Official Labour), or the National Party in Parliament must take full responsibility for its policy, even if that should necessitate an appeal to the constituencies." In the end he moved a motion to that effect, but "received little support."

The caucus had by this stage arrived at the view that the Government was acting unfairly in attempting to fasten on to the party full responsibility for the pledge, seeing that the party had in fact neither been consulted as to the taking of the Referendum nor as to the giving of the

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Referendum pledge; and the following resolution was passed :

That the matter be left in the hands of the Government to take whatever steps it deems advisable with a view to giving honourable effect to the pledge given by it to the people of Australia. (Carried with seven dissentients.)

Sir William Irvine was not slow to point out a possible, or even a probable, conflict between this resolution and the previous one (defining the attitude of the Nationalists to the Official Labour Party). His view was that to give honourable effect to the Referendum pledge, a dissolution was practically necessary so as to give the Official Labour Party its opportunity to formulate a policy and see whether that policy actually had the support of a majority of the people.

The next stage can be most succinctly stated in quotations from official statements emanating from Federal Government House :

(January 8.) Mr. Hughes waited upon His Excellency the Governor-General this morning, and tendered his unconditional resignation as Prime Minister. At the request of His Excellency, Mr. Hughes will continue the administration pending the issue of a new commission. During the course of the day the Governor-General sent for and discussed the political situation with Mr. Tudor, Sir John Forrest, Mr. Cook, Mr. Watt, Mr. Higgs, Mr. Poynton, and Mr. Wise."

(January 11.) "On January 8 the Prime Minister waited on the Governor-General and tendered to him his resignation. In doing so, Mr. Hughes offered no advice as to who should be asked to form an Administration. The Governor-General considered that it was his paramount duty—(a) To make provision for carrying on the business of the country in accordance with the principles of Parliamentary government; (b) to avoid a situation arising which must lead to a further appeal to the country within twelve months of an election resulting in the return of two Houses of similar political complexion, which are still working in unison. The Governor-General was also of the opinion that in granting a commission for the formation of a new Administration, his choice must be determined solely by the Parliamentary situation. Any other course would be

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a departure from constitutional practice and an infringement of the rights of Parliament. In the absence of such Parliamentary indications as are given by a defeat of the Government in Parliament, the Governor-General endeavoured to ascertain what the situation was by seeking information from representatives of all sections of the House with a view to determining where the majority lay, and what prospects there were of forming an alternative Government.

As a result of these interviews, in which the knowledge and views of all those he consulted were most freely and generously placed at his service, the Governor-General was of opinion that the majority of the National party was likely to retain its cohesion, and that therefore a Government having the promise of stability could only be formed from that section of the House. Investigations failed to elicit proof of sufficient strength in any other quarter. It also became clear to him that the leader in the National party who had the best prospect of securing unity among his followers, and of therefore being able to form a Government having those elements of permanence so essential to the conduct of affairs during war, was the Right Honourable W. M. Hughes, whom the Governor-General therefore commissioned to form an Administration."

There are two points to be particularly noted in this latter memorandum: (i.) The fact that "Mr. Hughes offered no advice," taken in conjunction with the fact that "the Governor-General sent for and discussed the situation with" half a dozen others. This point was much discussed at the time, and it was ridiculed in Parliament by the Opposition. The point is an important one, as bearing upon Mr. Hughes's direct responsibility for what followed, and on his practical interpretation of the Referendum pledge. But in the absence of knowledge which has not been revealed it cannot be discussed here. (ii.) The other point to note is the astuteness with which the Prime Minister had succeeded in predetermining the Governor-General's decision by means of the first two resolutions passed by the caucus of his party. This was the indirect way in which the Prime Minister became responsible for what transpired.

The fact is that "honourable effect" could only be given to the Government's pledge by Mr. Hughes himself interpreting the Referendum result as a defeat of the

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Government upon the issue most vital to its policy, only to be redeemed by a constitutional appeal to the country upon that policy and that issue as one indivisible whole.

In any case the final responsibility definitely rested with Mr. Hughes. In explaining the precise constitutional position, a correspondent, "Lawyer," of the *Age* newspaper stated :

There is no doubt whatever that the Governor-General was right when he requested Mr. Hughes to form a Ministry. It is quite another question, however, as to whether Mr. Hughes was right in accepting the invitation to form a Ministry.

It is an obstinate fact, against which all waves of excuse must break themselves in vain, that Mr. Hughes and all his Cabinet colleagues without exception returned to office after having explicitly stated that they must have the power of compulsion to ensure reinforcements, that they could not govern the country without it, and would not attempt to do so. Any attempt to excuse or justify must necessarily resolve itself into the veriest quibbling.

When Parliament met in the middle of January, the Government was challenged by the following motion of No Confidence, moved by Mr. Tudor :

That the House protests against : (a) the repudiation of the pledges of the Prime Minister and of other Ministers ; (b) the political persecution of public men and other citizens and the press under the War Precautions Regulations during the recent referendum campaign ; (c) the deprivation of statutory electoral rights of Australian-born citizens by regulation behind the back of Parliament ; (d) the general administration of public affairs ; and wishes, etc.

To have been effective this motion should have been confined to its clause (a). The fact that it was not indicates either unpardonable blundering on the part of the Opposition or else more political finessing—this time on the other side, to manœuvre members of the coalition party into the position of voting against the prime charge (a).

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This motion was, of course, lost on a division entirely on party lines.

A whole article might well be written on the reasons which influence those who believe (as one writer has extremely expressed it) that "the entry of the extreme Labour Party into power at present would be a national disaster as tragic as the Bolshevik ascendancy in Russia." But the proper venue for argument on this question is a public contest before the electorate. In a democratic system there is no alternative to the community itself deciding such questions ; any other course leads inevitably, as we in this country have had ample opportunity of realising, to a last state much worse than the first. If the conviction of the Coalition was that the Official Labour Party must be kept out of power at whatever cost, there should certainly have been no pledge given at the Referendum, or rather no Referendum should have been taken in 1917, since the pledge was in fact implicit, by all the principles of responsible government, in the taking of it. But once it was taken, the issue was of such supreme importance that the popular decision upon it should have brought into power a Government in consonance with the declared will of the people. That is what links the present position so closely with the last General Election, and makes it certain that only a General Election, contested upon basic convictions, could clear up the ugly situation.

The people of Australia, by means of the two Referenda with an emasculated General Election sandwiched between, have succeeded so far in evading the necessity to accept the political consequences of their decisions upon the supreme issue. The present Government has been driven to the repudiation of its pledges on the plea of necessity. The position of moral advantage has been quite gratuitously conceded to the Official Labour Party, which gives no promise whatsoever of being able to provide good government, especially in time of war. All this means a political outlook which is dark indeed.

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But there is hope in the absolute dimensions of the "Yes" vote, which would in itself be a thing to be proud of, if so much did not depend on the fact that, however large, it is still only a minority. This million of voters is the raw material of a real Australian Win-the-War party. It is practically compact upon the war issue, while the "No" voters include many who really belong to its ranks. The problem—and there is no use in shutting one's eyes to its desperate difficulty—is how this great body of "Yes" opinion is to find for itself adequate representation and effective practical expression. And the problem is not only desperately difficult ; it is also desperately urgent.

III. AUSTRALIA'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE WAR

THE relation of this sorry story of political failure at this stage of the world crisis is a painful duty. Democracy rejects the tutelage of an autocrat or a class which may sometimes be efficient and even occasionally benevolent. Its method is to place on every citizen his share of the responsibility for the actions of the community, and it must therefore bring every section face to face with reality. It relies on their beating out together the means of co-operation and co-ordination. It contemplates difference of opinion, and that through such difference a more complete and satisfactory synthesis may be achieved. The process is a difficult one. It involves far greater calls on both citizenship and leadership and far heavier sacrifices from all than a more autocratic form of government. It discards authority and learns by experience, some of its most effective lessons being its bitter failures. It would therefore be treacherous to the best interests of the Australian democracy if the discreditable nature of the situation into which it has thrown itself were concealed. But exaggeration, no less than concealment, would prevent the true lesson being drawn from the experience. The

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enemies of the Entente can derive no satisfaction from the conduct of the British Dominions during the war. This has been marked by unswerving loyalty and by unquestioning acceptance of the leadership of Great Britain. The responsibilities of the Empire in its fight for freedom have been willingly shouldered. There has been no whimpering at losses, no tendency to slacken when the position seemed unfavourable, no captious or jealous criticism of leaders. The quality of the military effort has been remarkable. There are no soldiers on any front who surpass the Dominion troops in physique and aggressive fighting power. Among the Dominion troops the Australians have held a most honourable place. New Zealand holds the record for the number of troops sent in proportion to population, but Australia is probably second, and it has maintained in the field more units than all the rest of the Dominions put together. Up to December 31st, 1917, 310,000 men had been embarked from Australia. It should be remembered that, besides having five Divisions of all arms in France, Australia has the equivalent of a cavalry Division in Palestine. Apart from other miscellaneous units on land it has a large air force and a naval contribution which includes a battleship and several cruisers and smaller ships.

The military administration of these forces is strenuous and efficient. There is none of the slackness supposed to characterise democratic control and ideas of discipline are the reverse of those introduced by the Bolsheviks. This is proved by the fact that in proportion to the total number of troops who have been members of its armies, Australia maintains a greater number in the fighting-line than any other army, including that of Great Britain. This seems especially creditable in view of the great difficulties involved in placing a soldier enlisted in Australia into the line in France.

The total war expenditure of Australia will amount by June 30th, 1918, to £248,000,000, of which £52,000,000

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will represent increased taxation, £48,000,000 loans in London, and £148,000,000 loans raised in Australia. In addition about £10,000,000 has been raised for patriotic and kindred funds connected with the war.

After being about eight months on Gallipoli and two years in the line in France the *morale* of the Australian troops is higher than ever it was. Their efficiency as a fighting force has secured for them the commendation of the military leaders of the Allies and a high reputation with the Germans. The qualities of the "Anzacs"—these new Elizabethans faring from the further ends of the new world to this Great Adventure in the old—are typical Australian qualities. They are not the possessions solely of those at the front at present. A fresh Australian army would be animated by the same restless energy and reckless courage. The spirit of keenness and determination which inspires the Australian force is characteristic of the whole Australian people.

The failure has been a political one. In the heated atmosphere of party politics the finest passions may run to seed, and in Australia they have been drawn into a barren sectarian struggle and wasted. The machinery of democracy has proved itself difficult to adjust to the needs of war. Every question has been affected by hostile feelings developed during a social conflict not unjustified in itself but not as momentous in its importance as the struggle against Germany. Thus, though there is no party in Australia which is not hostile to Germany, and few who do not regard the winning of the war as the most important of all national tasks, Australia has failed to put its utmost weight into the struggle. This article shows that the blame lies equally on the two political parties. The Labour Party finds its refusal to entrust great powers to the Liberal Party justified because of the repudiation by the latter of its pledges; while that repudiation was provoked by the hostile attitude of the Labour Party towards every concrete project for the prosecution of the

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war. The people as a whole are responsible for putting the conduct of affairs into the hands of men who were below the average level of the community and in whom they had little confidence.

The political failure, however explicable, is crucial. It shows that our national instinct of self-preservation is dulled. It indicates the presence of the cardinal vice of popular government—a willingness for victory accompanied by a hesitation to make the sacrifices individual and collective which are necessary to secure victory. It illustrates the peculiarly Australian fault of Irresponsibility. There is much in our history which will account for this irresponsibility. It is the fault of youth. Youth's glorious virtues are displayed by the Australian fighting men at the fronts. The Australians at home in the duller routine of politics ingloriously display its failings. And this tendency has been encouraged by the defects in our system of Imperial organisation. Australia has never been brought face to face with the realities of her position ; and when the people have been asked to give a critical decision they have shown that they do not grasp the facts upon which their security depends. It is to be hoped that their present humiliating experience will teach them the truth. It is to be hoped also that outside Australia the lesson will be learned by those who concern themselves with the future organisation of the Empire, and that the Dominions will never again be lulled into security by receiving carelessly the benefits of the Imperial power without sharing the responsibility for the way in which this power is used or incurring to the full the sacrifices by which alone it may be maintained.

Australia. March, 1918.

NEW ZEALAND

THE GERMAN COLONIES IN THE PACIFIC

THE masterly exposition of war aims and peace terms which Mr. Lloyd George addressed to the Trades Unions' delegates at Westminster was hailed in New Zealand as the most welcome of New Year messages. The Prime Minister's candour and courage, his abjuration of the familiar prophecies of smooth things in favour of a clear summons to set the teeth and face the facts, had a stimulating and bracing effect for which we are all the better. New Zealand continues in the fourth year of the war to talk as bravely as ever about seeing it through, but she was thankful nevertheless for the help which such a message supplies in the faithful discharge of her task. But our second thoughts have been mainly concentrated on a single point which has had a stimulating effect of a less pleasant character, though perhaps at least equally wholesome.

What is to be the future of Germany's lost colonies in the Pacific? The question is one which was but little discussed in New Zealand during the first three years of the war because everybody took it for granted that only one conclusion was possible. Before the war the policy of Asiatic exclusion was perhaps the one public question of the first importance which commanded the substantially unanimous support of all parties, creeds, and classes. Since the beginning of the war, or, at any rate, since the war had proceeded far enough to enable the Germans to reveal their true character, their exclusion from the

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Pacific has been approved with the same unanimity and an even greater intensity of feeling. There is, moreover, this distinction between the two cases—that with regard to the colour question even the least imaginative of us could see that the policy of a white Australasia, though a life-and-death matter for the democracies affected, was not only one which the Empire as a whole was not equally concerned to promote, but one which considerations arising out of the Japanese Alliance might make it very reluctant to sanction. Such reflexions may have inspired the more broad-minded of our people to moderate the peremptoriness of their demand for the exclusion of Asiatics, but there is no parallel in their attitude to the German peril. The peril of Australasia is regarded as the peril of the whole Pacific, and the peril of the whole Pacific is not considered to be distinguishable from that of the whole Empire.

As to our special interest in the matter there are no illusions. Though our remote position and the rapidity with which the Germans were hustled out of the Pacific have given us a complete immunity from the reign of terror which their submarines have established in European waters, the popular mind fully appreciates both the nature of the danger from which the British command of the sea has saved us and the indispensable condition of future exemption. It realises that there is nothing whatever at present to justify the assumption that there will be any “change of heart” in Germany after the war. Restored to its old positions in the Pacific and profiting by past experience, German ambition would not strike again until it was really ready. From New Guinea, Samoa, and other points of vantage Germany would be provided with her cruisers, her submarines, and her air fleets to strike at our commerce and even to raid our coasts when the preparations for the second great Day were complete. The restoration of German territory in the Pacific would represent so far as we are concerned

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a German victory. It would, therefore, from our point of view be an ignominious surrender of which, except under the pressure of defeat or of an indecisive result practically indistinguishable from defeat, we had assumed that Imperial statesmanship could not possibly be guilty.

In his address to the Chambers of Commerce Conference on November 28, after referring to the attention paid to the matter by Sir Joseph Ward and himself when they were in England together, Mr. Massey said :

We lost no opportunity of impressing this upon the people at the head of affairs in the British Government and the Imperial War Cabinet : That any proposal to give back the islands with which we are more concerned, Samoa and German New Guinea, and other islands formerly in German possession—I am not interfering with what has been done by the Japanese—would be very bitterly resented by the citizens of the British Empire in the South Pacific ; and in saying that I believe we have succeeded in impressing the British statesmen with our point of view. We are not thinking so much of the value of these islands—and undoubtedly these islands and New Guinea are of great value—but if Samoa were given back to Germany, what would happen ? It would mean that Samoa would be the headquarters of a German fleet, and they would establish there a wireless station and a submarine base. It is just as well that the British Government has been told already that we are not going to have the Germans back in these islands in these seas if we can possibly help it, and if any opportunity is given to Germany to reoccupy these islands there is likely to be serious trouble among the people of these Dominions, and among the people of New Zealand particularly.

The only objection taken to this statement was that at the crisis of the Empire's struggle for life it would have been better to avoid the appearance of threatening to make trouble if we could not get all our own way at the Peace Conference. The meeting to which Mr. Massey's speech was addressed indicated its appreciation of this point by the resolution which it passed on the subject. As submitted the resolution ran :

That the New Zealand Government be asked to stipulate when peace negotiations are in progress that as a basis of future security in the Pacific, German Samoa be retained as a British possession.

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But the words "endeavour to arrange" were substituted for "stipulate," before the resolution was adopted. It would certainly ill become us to attempt to dictate. It is only as a small part of the Empire that we have taken a share in the war. It is the Empire that must see the fight through and the Empire must settle the terms of peace. It must even be conceded that it was not New Zealand but the Empire that took Samoa. It is unfortunate that our representatives should sometimes seem to overlook the point, since it is one on which the Imperialists of the Mother Country may feel a delicacy about correcting them, while the Anti-Imperialists may find in it another argument against the one-sidedness of the existing system. As the *Evening Post* pointed out, when our delegates to the War Conference were arguing to British audiences that we were entitled to insist upon the retention of Samoa because we had taken it, New Zealand on her own account could no more have taken Samoa than she could have taken Heligoland. New Zealand supplied the necessary military force and supplied it with a creditable promptitude, but she required the help of Australian warships to escort it across 1,500 miles of ocean, and even so, the joint enterprise would have been futile if, either in August, 1914, or at any time since, the British Navy had failed to hold the Channel and the North Sea. The taking of Samoa was really an admirable example of Imperial co-operation of which the meaning and the moral are entirely lost in the loose talk about New Zealand's individual triumph. A special voice as to the disposal of Jerusalem might as reasonably be claimed by the English counties whose Territorials took a leading part in its capture, or by the Indian States whose troops have been detailed to guard the Mosque of Omar. The joint fruits of common labours to which the men on any particular spot have, as a rule, contributed, less than the far larger numbers toiling out of the limelight miles away, cannot be parcelled out as though they were the prizes of a competitive hunting expedition.

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The whaler's rule that the getting in of the first harpoon determines the right to the prey is a rule that protects the rights of the ship and not of the individual. The paradoxical principle of ancient warfare that "as his share is that goeth down to the battle, so shall his share be that tarrieth by the stuff; they shall share alike"—a principle only practicable under conditions which had reduced the shirker to a negligible quantity—carried the demands of true brotherhood to their logical limit. The procedure now suggested would violate the fundamental requirements not merely of Imperial unity but of reasonable and equitable co-operation. It would reduce our much talked-of Imperial brotherhood to something less than a "half-faced fellowship." An Empire could no more exist than a tribe or a pack on such terms. It is not Imperialism but Separatism to argue that the supply by New Zealand of the soldiers to take and garrison German Samoa has given her the right to determine its destiny. As it was really the forces of the Empire that cleared the Germans out of the Pacific, so it is by nothing less than the interests and desires of the Empire as a whole that the question of their re-admission must be determined.

Our special interest in the question really gives us a much better right to speak. A special interest cannot, of course, be allowed to prevail against the general interest where the antagonism is clear and unmistakable, but a special interest is always entitled to special consideration before its claims are overruled. The balancing of the interests of the various parts of an Empire which spreads all round the world is obviously a problem of great complexity. Less than thirty years ago the exchange of a tiny, barren, and crumbling islet in the North Sea for the German interests in Zanzibar and its Hinterland seemed a good bargain to one of the shrewdest and staunchest of Imperial statesmen. Thirty years hence it is possible that, if in the settlement following the present war Britain surrendered Samoa in order to get Heligoland back, she might be considered to have made as bad a bargain as

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Lord Salisbury's seems to-day. But speculations of this kind, of which the moral might seem to be that things have such a way of getting into the saddle and riding mankind that chance is a better guide in human affairs than reason, are of no practical value unless as a warning against too close a bondage to existing conditions and an inducement to long views and a cautious use of the imagination. What is of real and indisputable importance is that there must be a great future before the Pacific, and from its central position and its excellent harbour Apia promises to be one of its commanding points. The strategic and commercial importance of German New Guinea in its relation to the development of an ocean which, according to Mr. W. M. Hughes, "sooner or later must become the balancing centre of the world's trade and development," is still less open to question. When the immense capacities of this great ocean have been thoroughly exploited and all its fertile islands and borderlands fully occupied and cultivated, its commerce and industry should multiply a hundred-fold and its white inhabitants be numbered by millions instead of thousands. Are these millions to be divided into two armed camps and to devote a large part of their energies to preparations for war and its actual prosecution? If Germany is to get her colonies back this question will have to be answered in the affirmative. The preparations for the next great war will begin in the Pacific with the declaration of peace, and Germany will start with immense advantages which the entire disregard of the lessons of the last three and a half years and the supineness of our statesmanship will have conceded to her. That, at any rate, is how it strikes the Australian and the New Zealander, and that is why from their point of view the war will have been lost if it results in the restoration of German power in the Pacific.

Of course, to say this does not imply that it would not be our duty to submit with as good a grace as possible to the best terms that the armed forces of the Allies and their

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diplomacy at the Peace Conference were able to obtain. For that reason Mr. Massey's prophecy in November of the "bitter resentment" with which we shall greet the restoration of Samoa to Germany was itself resented as too sweeping. But the new danger which has since developed within the Empire itself would make a repetition of the language less open to exception now. If after fighting every inch of the way with all the resources at their command the Imperial authorities were forced into a settlement which was as little to their liking as to ours, we should have to follow their lead and bow to the inevitable. But we are certainly under no obligation to follow their lead without a murmur if they wantonly seek to throw away the advantage to the Empire which the wickedness of its enemies, the valour of its forces, and the kindness of fortune have placed in its way. "Magnanimity in politics" may be, as Burke says, "the truest wisdom," and even in international politics magnanimity carried to the point of quixotism may have its uses. But a quixotism which reserves to one party all the luxury of renunciation and gives to another the privilege of paying for it is really a dangerous form of self-indulgence. In the case of a private trust vicarious magnanimity of this kind may easily lead the estate into bankruptcy and the trustees into jail, and where the trust is on an Imperial scale it is likely to prove as dangerous to the coherence of a great Empire as the little minds whose anti-Imperial tendency Burke deplored.

We all recognise the high ideals of the British Labour Party and the disinterestedness of its outlook upon international affairs. A British colonist who desires to retain his active membership in the race from which he has sprung is of necessity an Imperialist. Almost as inevitably democracy is forced upon him in the free air of a country where life is not burdened by the dead weight of custom and convention characteristic of older civilisations and where everything, as Plato said of ancient Athens, seems

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“ready to burst with liberty.” The combination of democracy and Imperialism which we thus owe to our position has divided our sympathies in the politics of the United Kingdom, making us Radicals in its domestic affairs and Conservatives in regard to its foreign policy. But this contradiction seemed to have disappeared when, under the spell of war, the British Labour Party became one of the most powerful of recruiting agencies and democracy invaded even the House of Lords. For practical purposes the members of the Labour Party had apparently become as good Imperialists as anybody else ; and, that being so, we could not object to their objection to a term which certainly has undemocratic associations. But to find that their objection seems to be not merely to the name but to the fact of Empire, and that they base upon it a rigid rule against annexations anywhere and of any kind has given us an unpleasant shock. We should like the hard-headed champions of British Labour to understand that, if they are democrats, so are we ; we are really no more disposed to territorial greed or megalomania or hymns of hate than they are ; that the retention of the German colonies in the Pacific is not to us a matter of flag-wagging or seeing red ; and that we regard it entirely from a cold, unsentimental, common-sense, business standpoint. On the principle that prevention is better than cure we wish to keep out of these waters the plague which the naval power of the Allies has expelled, and our motive is not aggrandisement but self-protection, the desire not to dominate but to live in peace and quietness.

What is the exact status proposed by the British Labour Party for Germany's colonies in the Pacific has not been made clear to us. The cabled report of the repudiation by the British Trade Union delegates to the Inter-Allied Socialist Conference of their French colleagues' proposal for the complete restoration of these territories to Germany seems to justify the abandonment of our worst fears. The idea, perhaps, is that the same international authority

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which is to take over the African colonies should be given jurisdiction here. We should be sorry indeed to see the Empire exchanging the substance of possession for such a shadowy security as this. If the experiment were needed to provide for the conflicting claims of any of our Allies, the case would, of course, be different. But neither the benevolence which seeks to placate Germany by offering her a share in what, under the most favourable conditions, is a dubious and risky enterprise—a *condominium*—nor the false modesty which refuses to take the boon that the kindness of fortune and the needs of self-defence have placed in our hands seems to us to be sound business.

Mr. Lloyd George's suggestion that the choice of the natives concerned shall be made the criterion in each case is also regarded as unsatisfactory. Not that there is any desire on the part of a people which, on the whole, has treated the Maoris well to ride rough-shod over the interests of any other native population, but that such a population is not considered to be an incorruptible or infallible judge of its own interests, and that broader and higher and perhaps more permanent interests are also regarded as entitled to consideration. That British rule would be infinitely preferable for the natives to German rule, and that it would be preferred by them if the issue were fairly submitted and clearly grasped, is not doubted, but when the merits of the question are beyond dispute, why resort to a process which can make them no clearer, will be attended by some risk, and will certainly not carry conviction to the defeated claimant? Is the proposal inspired by sound statesmanship or by mere dialectics and a delusive desire to appear consistent? Is it intended to confound the Kaiser or to conciliate the British Labour Party? In the last case is the rule of the Supernational Authority to be among the alternatives submitted to the choice of the natives? Or is the rule of any other Power besides Britain and Germany to be so submitted?

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Mr. Massey touched the matter with his usual common sense in a speech at Southbridge on January 10 :

I should be prepared to trust the natives of Samoa to say which flag they would live under, provided there was no German gold or German influence to affect their decision. Gold is a great power amongst the natives. It is not a fair question to ask a native race whether they would prefer to be under German or British rule. The natives of Samoa are not the only people concerned in this matter. Why should we not have a say with regard to the future government of Samoa ?

The contrast between German gold and British honesty might be supplemented by other sinister influences. A question intimately affecting the welfare of millions for centuries to come might be determined by the opinion of native connoisseurs as to the relative merits of kava, lager beer, and British spirits—or even of British prohibition. President Wilson's formula really seems, as the critic of the *Otago Daily Times* remarks, to promise the natives all the protection that they need without any difficulties of this kind :

There must be a free, open-minded and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon the strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the Government whose title is to be determined.

Our principal newspapers have with more or less emphasis taken the same line as our Prime Minister : “ The only flaw in an admirable speech ” is the judgment of the *Evening Star* (Dunedin) on Mr. Lloyd George's proposed application of the principle of self-determination. The article, which appeared on January 8, proceeded as follows :

The projected methods of the disposal of the enemy's overseas possessions are crude if not perilous. The proposed basis of territorial settlement is the right of self-determination or the consent of the governed. This principle is more or less feasible in respect

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to the future settlement of the European territories now under the heel of a merciless military power . . ., but it appears to be hopelessly impracticable if it were applied to those occupied countries whose native inhabitants are still groping even in the twilight of pre-war civilisation, and whose knowledge of international commerce is almost confined to the exchange of a shipload of cocoanuts for a sackful of ornaments "Made in Germany."

The question of their administration can hardly be left almost entirely to the caprice of the native inhabitants. . . To put the matter plainly, the security of the Pacific must be the basis of the final territorial settlement of Germany's oversea colonies. The South African Union, the Commonwealth of Australia, New Zealand, the United States of America, and the Dominion of Canada are all vitally concerned in the disposal of the German colonies in the Pacific. They have had enough of the German menace and require a guarantee of dependable freedom from strategic competition.

The addition of Great Britain to the nations named would provide the ideal Supernational Authority for the purpose, nor could we reasonably resist the inclusion of Japan. For educative no less than for protective purposes the inclusion of one or more foreign states in the scheme would be of inestimable value for the Dominions. We are still readier to assert rights than to shoulder responsibilities, but association with independent sovereign States would impose a wholesome check upon a tendency which is inevitable while the only other party is the much-enduring and never-complaining Mother Country. The experience would help us to rise to the dignity of the station to which we have been called, and quicken the pace of our march to full nationhood.

New Zealand. March, 1918.

THE UNITY OF CIVILISATION

I. THE TURN OF THE TIDE

THE fifth year of the war opens under conditions far more encouraging for the Allied peoples than could have been hoped for three or even six months ago. The period of anxious suspense and severe trial which inevitably intervened between the collapse of the Eastern Front and the moment when American military help could become effective closed definitely and dramatically on July 18. The Allied attack on that day marks the opening of a new phase in the war—a phase in which the military superiority of the Allies will become more and more accentuated until, according to all human reckoning, they must achieve their final purpose of disabling and discrediting the military domination of the enemy. How soon or how late that day will come no man on either side can say. It depends on many factors, military, political, economic and moral, of which the last named, as the enemy statesmen are well aware, carries by no means the least weight. But what can be said, and is being said, by those in the best position to judge on both sides is that the German purpose of securing an early peace by a decision on the Western front has proved unattainable and that the prospect of a German victory, although it has by no means vanished, has at least receded into the distance. “An early peace,” wrote the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, the ablest and most clear-sighted of German newspapers, in its general review on the occasion of the fourth anni-

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versary of the war, "an early peace is, as matters have now shaped themselves, highly improbable. There is little sense in allowing ourselves to be deluded as to the prospect which confronts us. We can no longer reckon on the campaign of this summer, though it will certainly inflict new blows on the enemy, bringing about the end of the war. We shall have to go on fighting next winter and in all probability next summer also, and the reinforcements flocking daily across the ocean from America, which cannot fail to feed the war as a dying fire is fed by flinging on it fresh coal, will not make the struggle easy. America is in a frame of mind which, in its rude colonial vigour, exceeds anything which Europe has hitherto experienced in the way of enthusiasm for the war, and her losses have so far been but slight. Until this mood has been worked off—and this will take at least a year—we on our side have little prospect of reaching a basis of negotiations for the conclusion of peace." No words could point more clearly to the failure of the two great German bids for a rapid decision—the unrestricted submarine war planned in the winter of 1916-17 and the Western offensive planned in the winter of 1917-18—or reveal more emphatically the sense of painful apprehension with which the unexpected resisting power of the Franco-British troops, despite their inferiority in numbers, and the first effective intervention of the American advance guard are beginning to fill the mind of the average thinking German.

The events of the last month have indeed brought about a new and unprecedented situation. For the first time since the beginning of the war the German military leaders have no fresh hopes with which to delude and inspire their people. Hitherto, in some fifty months of fighting, the German people has been sustained, from one milestone to the next, in the words of a distinguished German onlooker,* by some "fifty great illusions from 'the war

* Walther Rathenau, article in the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, July 5, 1918.

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will be over in three months,' 'the English cannot raise an army,' 'the French can never face a winter campaign' to 'England will collapse in February, 1918' and 'peace this summer'—each illusion vanishing painlessly at the coming of the next." But now, at last, the chain of illusions seems to be snapped. American man-power, American shipbuilding capacity, American resources to sustain the weaker Allies, are facts which the German public cannot ignore or deny; and the reinvigoration of the Allies on the Western Front is being accompanied by developments in the East which, whatever course they may take, can hardly fail to make further demands on Germany's military resources and drive home the fact that the Treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest, far from inaugurating a peaceful settlement and opening the door to German commercial and industrial penetration, have merely served, like their Napoleonic precedents, to remind the peoples on whom they are imposed of the meaning and value of national freedom and independence.

Meanwhile, in Germany itself, by a happy accident, the true nature of the constitutional position has been unmasked at a moment which, had the immediate future been foreseen, would have been the last to be selected for the demonstration. On June 24 the German Foreign Secretary, in a general review of the situation, ventured to predict, in words which, as we have seen, had become almost axiomatic a month later, that there was no hope of a purely military decision or of a speedy end of the war in Germany's favour. The military party inside and outside the Reichstag was loud in its protests. The Chancellor, as whose personal assistant, according to the Constitution, the Foreign Secretary holds his post, made haste next day to explain away the offending sentence; and Herr von Kühlmann lamely followed suit. Nothing more happened for a fortnight, nor was there any indication that the Foreign Secretary had forfeited the confidence of the Reichstag majority whose support he had hitherto con-

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spicuously enjoyed. On Saturday, July 6, the Foreign Secretary paid a visit to Army Headquarters, where the Chancellor had already been staying for some days. On Monday, July 8, he was back again in Berlin, and no longer Foreign Secretary. The Vice-Chancellor, Herr von Payer, who had had telegraphic information from the Chancellor, communicated the news to the party leaders in the Reichstag, and on July 11 the Chancellor, on his return, addressed the Main Committee stating that the change was of personal not of political significance and was due to the fact that Herr von Kühlmann did not enjoy the confidence of "other factors"—that is, of the Army leaders. That there was a personal side to the change cannot be doubted; but its political significance may be judged by the fact that the name of the new Foreign Secretary had been suggested for the post in Junker journals at intervals for over a year previously and that the Chancellor himself, besides being 75 years of age, has had little experience of foreign policy. Admiral von Hintse has not yet made his *début*, nor can he do so before the full Reichstag till it meets once more in November, but both the mode of his appointment and his previous record involve a definite rebuff to the Reichstag, administered almost on the anniversary of the famous Peace Resolution of July 19, 1917, when it attempted to assert its claim to share in the conduct of foreign affairs. That the rebuff passed without a storm, and almost without a protest, illustrates the degree to which Germany is under the sway of the prestige of the military caste.

The events of the first fortnight of July, in fact, revealed to the world, if it did not already know it, that not Hertling, the civil statesman, but Ludendorff, the brains of the German General Staff, is the real ruler of Germany; and in the remarkably candid speech which he delivered on July 18 in the Austrian Herrenhaus Count Czernin revealed the fact that this rule extends not only over Germany but over the Dual Monarchy. Austria-Hungary, he made it clear, is not her own mistress with regard to the issues of

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peace and war ; even if she desired to make peace, she could not, for she is not in a position to prevent the passage of men and goods through her own territory to Germany. Austria-Hungary is, in other words, a state without frontiers, which means a state without independence. Mittel-Europa, in fact, so much acclaimed by "progressive" opinion in Germany and Austria in the earlier stages of the war, is already in existence. The military and economic unity, so often proclaimed as desirable on the platform, is an accomplished fact. It is one directing mind that from the "Great Headquarters of the German Army" controls the policy of Germany's allies by doling out or withholding their supplies ; that is pursuing the systematic destruction of the industrial life of Belgium, Poland and Northern France, the exploitation of Roumania, the subjection of the Baltic Provinces, the humiliation of Finland, the methodical robbery of the Ukraine ; that supplies Germany's waning industrial output with the slave labour of prisoners and deportees (whether from occupied Belgium, France or Italy or from "friendly" Finland, Ukraine and Russia is of little moment) ; that has drawn off the flower of German manhood to die on foreign soil in a nominally "defensive war" and surrounded Germany itself, in Mr. Hoover's striking phrase, "with a periphery of starvation" ; that, if its power is not broken and its purpose defeated by a power and a purpose as clear-thinking and as firmly knit as its own, will yet succeed in fastening its yoke upon the rising generation throughout Central and Eastern Europe and with replenished resources and yet deadlier armaments will once more, when the hour is propitious, renew its challenge to civilised society for the mastery of the world.

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II. THE LESSON OF UNITY

THE civilised world has learnt, through four years of painful apprenticeship, the only way in which this challenge, whether now or in the future, can be met. It has learnt the value of unity. The sole means by which the military rulers of Germany could have won the war between the first and second battles of the Marne was by dividing the Allies. It is the sole means by which they can win it yet ; and it is the sole means by which in the future any similar power could be enabled to involve the world in another conflict like the present. The strength of Germany lies in her unity of purpose and her unity of control. Her weakness, which will become more visible as her military prestige diminishes, is that this unity is based, not upon consent but upon constraint, and, in the case of the non-German peoples at least, upon harsh and painful domination. The strength of the Allies lies in the justice of their cause and in the moral purpose and enthusiasm of their peoples. Without these, ill-organised as they were, they could not have endured one year of such a war, still less four. Their weakness lies in their engrained and traditional independence, their unfamiliarity with the processes of co-operation, their suspicion and distrust of large scale organisation, which makes them reluctant to accept common standards and common controls, their preference for interpreting even the ideals and purposes which bind them together in their own individual and personal fashion. The very spirit of exalted patriotism and independence which the war has called forth has rendered more difficult the task of those whose duty it is to make the contribution of each member of the great association of peoples allied together against the enemy of civilisation effectively available for the equal service of all.

The first four years of the war have taught us many of

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the lessons of unity, but there is much more yet to be learned. Let us see where we stand.

Unity has come about as it has been felt to be needed. The sphere in which the practical need for unity has so far become most clearly manifest to the allied peoples is that of military operations. In the early stages of the war such attempts at military unity as the Allies made were unsuccessful. Common plans of attack were framed, but they were left to the independent execution of each national unit. The separate moves were not properly synchronised; their success and the use of it depended on local capacity and resources: and there was no common reserve to be used where it was most needed. As the war went on and the strength of Germany's position, with her interior lines and facilities for moving troops from one front to another, became more manifest, communication between the Allies became more frequent and intimate; it developed into more regular consultation and then into the establishment last autumn, after the Italian retreat at Caporetto, of an inter-Allied War Council with a permanent military secretariat at Versailles. Thus a regular thinking department for military purposes was brought into existence, but so far without any unified acting body to correspond to it. After the British retreat on March 21 the further step was taken and General Foch was entrusted with the sole strategic direction of the operations on the Western Front. Unity of action in the vital military sphere was thus secured by the willing acquiescence of all the Governments and peoples concerned.

In the naval sphere the menace of the submarine has exercised the same influence on organisation as German victories in the field. The British and American navies, from the moment of America's intervention in the war, have operated in the crucial areas under a practically single command; and it is an open secret that the greater measure of success achieved against the submarine in the Atlantic than in the Mediterranean has

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been due in large part to the unity of naval command in the former theatre. On sea, as on land, professional conservatism and traditions of independence have made it difficult to frame a well-knit and scientific organisation against the scientific barbarism of the enemy; but the lesson is being learned and its results are beginning to show themselves.

Another and perhaps, in view of future problems, an even more important sphere in which unity is steadily being achieved is that of economic organisation. It is worth while going into closer detail here; for, as current controversy not in this country alone attests, the Allied peoples are as yet too little conscious both of the tasks which confront their rulers in the economic domain and of the steps that have been taken to deal with them.

Here also, in the first two years of the war, co-operation was informal and almost haphazard, each problem being considered as occasion arose. The economic aspects of war organisation seemed to belong so exclusively to the domestic side of the work of each of the Governments concerned that they were slow to recognise the international bearings of the matters involved. Once more, however, the submarine has proved itself an unconscious agent of human progress. Until the submarine menace became acute the Allied Governments and peoples were living and thinking, as it were, in two compartments. In matters of military, or, as they liked to say, of war policy they thought of themselves as allies: their attitude towards one another was one of mutual helpfulness and anxiety to be of service. In matters of economic policy, in the early days of the war at any rate, they thought of themselves as competitors; their attitude towards one another was still dominated by the pre-war habit of mind. It was recognised indeed in the abstract that Prussianism had introduced into economic relations the same spirit of ruthless and unscrupulous aggression against the military and political aspects of which the Allies were striving together

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in the field. But the practical consequences resulting from this were not generally understood. It was not till the scientific piracy of the U-boat campaign revealed the full scope of the Prussian purpose and threatened the Allied peoples with starvation and economic exhaustion that unity on the economic front was seen to be an imperative need. The shortage of shipping and the consequent shortage of available supplies of raw material, foodstuffs and other necessities made it inevitable for the Allied Governments to devise joint measures for the relief of their own and the neutral peoples from the menace of famine and impoverishment.

Inter-Allied economic organisation, as it now exists, has grown up from small beginnings. The first joint body set up was the Commission Internationale de Ravitaillement, which is described in one of the reports of Lord Balfour of Burleigh's Committee. This body, true to the ideas which were in vogue in the earlier stages of the war, was not a joint executive. It was simply a department of the British Government acting as an agent for all the Allies in all matters relating to the purchase of supplies in the United Kingdom. For this purpose it had attached to it delegations from each of the Allies. It collected and co-ordinated the demands of all the Allies transmitted to it through these delegations, and it ascertained from the executive departments of the British Government how far these demands could be met. It was thus not itself an executive department. The actual placing or approval of contracts for the Allies in the United Kingdom remained in the hands of such executive departments as the Ministry of Munitions and the War Office. As time went on its functions as a co-ordinating agency were in a measure extended to include the whole British Empire and even, in certain cases, neutral countries, but it has remained a consultative body—a general clearing-house of information—without any very closely defined sphere of action or authority.

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Real joint action could not grow up in economic matters so long as the economic power of the Alliance was concentrated chiefly in one of its members—namely, the British Empire. Joint action must grow out of a mutual pooling of resources, and in the first two and a half years of the war in the economic sphere it was inevitable that it should fall chiefly to the British Empire to contribute and to the European Allies to receive. The tendency was for the British Government to assume responsibility for supplies to the Allies not only from the British Empire but from neutral countries also; for instance, the British Sugar Commission became responsible for practically the whole supply of sugar to the Allies and the British Government became largely responsible for all war-supplies to Russia. It was not until the United States entered the war that this situation was fundamentally altered. During 1916, however, two more definitely inter-Allied bodies were created—the inter-Allied Chartering Executive controlling the chartering of neutral shipping by the British, French and Italian Governments, and the inter-Allied Wheat Executive, responsible for the supply of breadstuffs to Great Britain, France and Italy. These two bodies still continue their functions. A measure of consultation and joint action in regard to purchases of war material and supplies from the United States was also secured by committees in New York and London. All these activities had a background of inter-Allied financial agreements too intricate to be enlarged on here, but no inter-Allied financial authority was set up.

The entry of the United States into the war has given an immense impetus to the concentration of authority in definite inter-Allied bodies. Finance and shipping had first of all to be co-ordinated. These were the arteries of Allied supplies—the limiting factors to the Allied war programme. An inter-Allied Commission on Finance and Supply has been set up under the chairmanship of the Assistant-Secretary of the United States Treasury. It sits alternately at Paris and London and fixes the require-

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ments of all the Allies for supplies from the United States for a definite period in advance. These requirements are met by an organisation at Washington similar to the Commission Internationale de Ravitaillement in London—the Allied War Missions in the United States acting in conjunction with a committee of the War Industries Board of the United States Government. An inter-Allied Maritime Transport Council, also sitting alternately in Paris and London, is charged with the duty of distributing the Allied Merchant Marines *plus* the neutral ships chartered by the inter-Allied Chartering Executive, to the best advantage. The deliberations of this Council have revealed the necessity of a much more detailed consideration in advance of the Allied supply programmes, and a number of inter-Allied Programme Committees are now in process of constitution covering all the important branches of raw materials and war supplies in general necessary to the conduct of the war. In addition a Central Munitions Council is being formed to co-ordinate the Munitions programmes of the Allies, and as a result of Mr. Hoover's recent visit an inter-Allied Food Board has been formed with its headquarters in London. This Board was preceded by a Committee of Allied specialists formed some months ago to inquire into the food needs of the various Allied countries on a scientific basis. This Committee presented its report last spring, and the inter-Allied Food Board is thus able to enter on its functions with a definite, scientific, and impartial programme before it, and without having to go through the long preliminary business of adjusting conflicting demands which sometimes renders the operation of such joint executives little if at all more satisfactory than the ordinary process of diplomatic negotiation.

The inter-Allied Commission on Finance and Supply, the Programme Committees and the Munitions Council are and will be mainly bodies charged with the formulation of policies rather than with their execution. The actual control of the resources necessary to fill the programmes laid

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down by them has to be discharged by other inter-Allied bodies in the same way as the inter-Allied Food Board has to carry out the programme of the scientific committee which preceded it.

The predominant position of the British Empire as the source of raw materials, and of the United States as the source of food, has during the past year tended towards a division of functions between the two Governments on these lines. The course of events has, however, shown clearly that inter-Allied action in both spheres is essential if friction is to be avoided. The British Empire has no monopoly of any raw material except jute; the United States is very far from having any monopoly in food, though the proximity of the United States to Europe and the shortage of shipping have forced Europe to rely mainly on her during the past year for meat and other foodstuffs. An inter-Allied executive is already in operation for nitrates, for which we are dependent upon a neutral country, Chile, and it is probable that similar executives for tin, wool and other commodities will shortly be set up.

It is probable that, growing out of the work of the Programme Committees, similar bodies will be instituted during the coming months to deal with every commodity for which the Allies are either interdependent among themselves or dependent upon neutral countries, where it is essential to prevent competition in purchasing. In the case of supplies from Allied countries these joint executives act purely as consultative bodies, the sovereign control over its own national resources remaining in the ultimate resort in the hands of each Ally. In the case of supplies from neutral countries they act more nearly as executive bodies in the strict sense of the term. Each member is, of course, controlled by instructions from his Government, but a considerable measure of discretion is necessarily left to him, and the decisions of the executives tend to become final, subject

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only to appeal to the War Cabinets of the Allied States and in the last resort to the Supreme War Council at Versailles.

To this list should be added the inter-Allied bodies dealing with the problems of the blockade, prohibition of trade with the enemy, and the substitution of Allied for enemy firms in important lines of trade in neutral countries.

Through these joint bodies, through other less formal methods of consultation arising out of their deliberations, and through the exercise of the sovereign power of each Ally, stimulated and harmonised by their recommendations, the Allies are controlling freight rates and the prices of all important commodities, are distributing between themselves by agreement instead of by competition the limited output of the industries and the agricultural and mineral production of the world, are substituting Government control of certain great international businesses for the private power exercised over some of the chief necessities of life and industry in time of peace, and are providing machinery for the settlement round a table of problems which used to be dealt with ineffectively, and even dangerously, by diplomatic trade bargains, threats of tariff wars, or the secret agreements of international syndicates.

Thus, while Germany has been exploiting and enslaving her satellites and victims within the ring of her military power, the Allies have been engaged, under the spur of necessity, in building up a fabric of international economic organisation devised not for aggrandisement but for mutual aid, which will stand ready as an integral part of the new order to meet the needs of the free peoples at the moment of peace. From the Paris Conference, which, as Lord Robert Cecil has recently stated,* “was a defensive agreement of those then engaged in the war to secure their own peoples against starvation and unemployment during the period of reconstruction and to provide for

* Interview reported in *The Times*, July 19, 1918.

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the restoration to economic life of the ravaged territories," the Allies, now enlarged from eight to more than three times that number of nations, have moved forward along a line of policy at once more effective for their purpose and more closely in harmony with their own declared principles. Unity on the economic front does not mean, for us as for Germany, the rule of the strong or the supremacy of individual or national selfishness. It means conscious association to relieve the necessities and to bind up the wounds of the members of the League, and most of all of its weaker members. No clearer exposition of the principles underlying the policy has been given than in the statement, referred to above, by Lord Robert Cecil. "Our aim," he declared, "must be a comprehensive arrangement of liberal intercourse with all the members of the association by which each one of us, while preserving his own national security, may contribute to meet the needs and aid in the development of his fellow-members."

In such a partnership there is no room, as Lord Robert Cecil went on to say, for jealousy or for suspicion; and it follows from this that there can be no room for Germany under her existing rulers who sow jealousy and suspicion whithersoever they go. "A complete change of mind and purpose in her Government," as he truly said, "are the necessary preliminaries to her admission to participation in our economic partnership." But "if she abandons her old ways and her restless and aggressive policy, if she ceases to use economic policy as a preparation for further war, we shall not be slow to recognise the change." In any case, whether Germany takes part or not, it is possible to look forward with confidence to "the time, which is not far off, when we shall meet round the council board to discuss in detail the economic association which will combine the resources of the civilised world in the joint work of reconstruction and the restoration of prosperity."

But much still remains to be done before this aspiration can be realised even between the Allies themselves. In

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spite of all the machinery of inter-Allied co-operation which, as we have seen, is being devised in one department after another, full unity has not yet been achieved in the economic conduct of the war. There is still a disposition both among peoples and governments to cherish pre-war prejudices and to think along pre-war lines rather than to make service to the cause of the Allies the one touchstone by which economic no less than military policies should be tested. There is a lack of grip in the central direction, both in the Alliance as a whole and in the British Commonwealth, which, due though it is, like so many of our failures in the war, mainly to want of imagination, acts as a perpetual encouragement to the enemy in his moments of depression. For forty years the German public has been taught to despise its English-speaking adversaries as a crowd of shopkeepers and money worshippers, who would surely fail in a test of endurance and self-sacrifice against the trained citizenship and soldiership of Germany. That belief is rapidly waning before the achievements of the amateur troops of Great Britain, the Dominions and the United States; but nothing is more serviceable to the German authorities in their efforts to promote its survival than actions or utterances which indicate unwillingness on the part of any of the Allied peoples to make their economic power fully and freely available for the attainment of a righteous and lasting peace. Of policies, however well-meant, which look to any other end than this, it can be said with certainty that they tend to prolong the war and to lower the *morale* of the Allies. Such policies are of very different kinds, but they all tend towards the same result. Those who in the name of national economic interests, whether it is the producer or the consumer that is mainly considered, hesitate to cede anything of their sovereign control over national resources or to call upon their peoples for the last measure of sacrifice of comfort with a view to the maximum concentration of war-power, are committing them to a long war of

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average effort instead of inciting them to a supreme and, maybe, final effort for the campaign of 1919. Those who preach "business as usual" with an unregenerate Germany are sapping the spirit of the Alliance by exciting the suspicion that the economic power of the British Empire is to be used, on the morrow of the war, solely with an eye to commercial profit. Those, on the other hand, who use language which seems to deny the very possibility of Germany's regeneration, are also weakening the Allies' *morale* because they offer no hope of attaining real peace and harmony in the new age beyond the war.

The economic side of the mechanism of the war has been dealt with at some length because nothing can better illustrate the immense and irrevocable change which has taken place in the organisation of the processes of civilisation during the last four years, or reveal more clearly the degree to which the Utopian projects of 1914 have been exceeded by the working realities of to-day. Such a modest experiment, for instance, as the International Institute of Agriculture at Rome, offspring of the brain of one of the shrewdest and most far-sighted among the pre-war prophets of internationalism, David Lubin, sinks into insignificance beside the Napoleonic "food strategy" of his compatriot Mr. Hoover and the vast network of organisation necessary for its effective execution. The economic association between the Allies has in fact, by force of circumstances, long since ceased to be a mere accessory to their military operations. It has become a political fact, an international phenomenon, of the first magnitude; and as such it provides perhaps the most striking illustration of the need for unity in still another department, the political.

To speak of the need for political unity between the Allies may seem somewhat paradoxical: for what could be a greater proof of unity of policy than their steadfast persistence in comradeship throughout the vicissitudes of such a war as this? On the fundamental issue of the

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war complete unity exists and has existed from the beginning. Prussianism is the enemy of civilisation and must be rooted out. On that point there has not been and there cannot be any divergence of view in Paris, Rome, Washington, or London, any more than in Athens, Corfu, or Havre. Yet the object of Allied policy, thus stated, is negative rather than positive; and the whole course of the war, as is shown no less in its political than in its economic developments, has emphasised the importance of the constructive work which will remain to be done when the purification of Central Europe has been achieved. As the war goes on, problems of reconstruction, as in Russia, become inextricably intertangled with questions of immediate military policy; and the Allies are liable to fall short of their opportunities and even to fail in the fullness of their ultimate achievement unless they have thought out in common a measure of general agreement as to the new order they are fighting to establish and unless they are in constant and intimate counsel together as to the best means by which this end can be attained. From this point of view the establishment of the Supreme War Council at Versailles and the arrangement of a monthly meeting between the Premiers of France, Italy and Britain was an event of far-reaching importance. But much yet remains to be done before these occasional meetings can bear the fullest fruit. Means could be found, for instance, to mitigate the disadvantage arising from the physical and constitutional difficulties which preclude the presence at Versailles of the Chief Executive of the United States; whilst, on the other hand, it should be possible, at this stage of the war, to set on foot some common organisation for the pooling of ideas and of information and for the continuous study and discussion of the problems and developments arising out of the international situation. It is an open secret that there is already much interchange of information between the intelligence departments of the various Allies. Indeed it is obvious that no joint military,

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naval or economic effort could be made if such interchange were lacking. Is it so great a step from this close *liaison* work to the establishment of something more akin to a joint inter-Allied intelligence bureau charged with the preliminary study of those international facts and events which are the raw material of all foreign policy? At a time when events are moving so fast, and seem likely before long to move faster still, a body of this kind would seem capable of rendering most useful service by bringing an all-round knowledge and experienced judgment to bear on each development as it arises and so preventing the possibility of misunderstanding and delay.

But these efforts and projects of organisation are but temporary and ineffective makeshifts if beneath the surface, below the play of forces directed by governments and parliaments, a deeper and more enduring unity is not in process of formation. The deepest lesson of the war is not the need for an Allied General Staff: or for an international food and shipping strategy: or even for a League of Nations or for "a Parliament of Man, a Federation of the World." It is the need for moral and spiritual unity: for a new world within to match the new world without. At bottom what this war betokens is the breakdown of a civilisation. It is the collapse of an order of society. It is the end of an epoch of human history—the epoch that opened with the discovery at the end of the eighteenth century of the means for vastly increasing the material wealth of mankind, and closed abruptly at the beginning of the twentieth because the governments and peoples of the world had used these discoveries, predominantly and with increasing concentration, to forward designs dictated by individual or national selfishness. Prussia led the way down the decline: and to her the judgment of mankind, which future ages will confirm, has already apportioned the blame. But Prussia did not sin alone. She merely applied and perfected, with devilish knowledge and relentless and inhuman persistence, the faith and practice of

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contemporary European society. *Machtpolitik* is no monopoly of the German General Staff. It is known and practised also nearer home in many an office and workshop ; and "business is business" has proved no less adequate a cloak than "war is war" for the domination of the strong and the oppression and impoverishment of the helpless. The future historian, looking backward from 1914, will find omens of the coming storm no less in the writings of men like Cobden, with their easy gospel of alliance between God and Mammon, than in the brutal frankness of Bismarck and the polished cynicism of Bülow ; and it will rank as one of the strangest and most tragic ironies of history that the characteristic philosophy of the nineteenth century, an age reputed to be at once so rational and so virtuous, should have drawn the modern world inexorably down the easy slope of self-interest into the depths of evil and unreason, experience of which alone, so it seems, can avail to teach men the fundamental laws of life. The only true and enduring foundation for the new order and for the League of Nations which already in men's minds has become its symbol is the conscious adoption by both governments and peoples of standards of conduct and methods of dealing which, discarding the shibboleths of the counting-house, look not to profit and aggrandisement but to mutual service and self-sacrifice. With clean hands and a pure heart the peoples must enter the temple of peace, or the League of Nations will remain, as the Germans still regard it, an idle or hypocritical phrase, and the lesson not of the nineteenth century but of nineteen centuries will have been learned in vain.

III. THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

THE outward and visible symbol of the unity of civilisation to which the peoples are looking forward is the League of Nations. The name is much on the lips of statesmen, allied and enemy alike, and of writers in

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the press ; but opinion is divided as to its interpretation. Let us briefly consider the project in the light of the foregoing argument.

The League of Nations is generally discussed as a means for rendering war impossible in the future. The watchword of its advocates is "Never Again." No one can fail to sympathise with their intention, and the various schemes for conciliation and arbitration with an international sanction which are being worked out by international lawyers and others are worthy of the closest attention by governments and peoples alike. But at first sight it would seem that such projects are open to the charge of being either too ambitious or not ambitious enough. They are too ambitious if they expect to harness the vast economic forces of the modern world, the ambitions of political power which have so long furnished the main incentive to statesmanship and the opportunities constantly offered in this age for aggressive action by new developments in the science of war, in the light trappings of paper constitutions—schemes for conciliation councils or arbitration courts charged with the interpretation of an international code which has not yet become a part of the conscience and considered will of the civilised world. They are not ambitious enough if they stop short at arbitration and conciliation and leave untouched the larger material and psychological questions that lie behind—the competition in armaments and the colonial and commercial antagonisms which constitute the main material causes of war in the modern world and the feelings, habits and philosophies which have served as its psychological breeding ground. Two things, in fact, are necessary over and beyond, and indeed as the basis of, any judicial and arbitral machinery if the League of Nations is to be a reality and not a sham. First, it must organise its collective power, and especially its economic power—a power which will be all the stronger because it serves no selfish purpose but the common interests of civilisation. Secondly, it must aim not only at the pre-

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vention of war but at the elimination of its causes ; and to that end it must establish agencies by which the statesmen and representatives of the various peoples may be brought regularly into conference for the discussion of problems of mutual concern, so as to create the indispensable basis of trust and confidence without which no human organisation can achieve enduring results. Material and moral power, in other words, must be enlisted behind and beyond the legal and diplomatic guarantees of peace which it is proposed to establish.

Moreover, the aim of the League is unduly narrowed if it is envisaged as an organisation which will be created at leisure after the war is over in order to prevent the recurrence of such events as those of July 1914. The majority of the peoples of the world are already organised in an alliance ; their association is indeed, as we have seen, more intimate than could have been conceived possible of any alliance four years ago. This association, by whatever name it be called, will not, indeed cannot, for reasons of preservation be dissolved at the moment of peace : it is necessary in order to supervise the measures of international reconstruction which the condition of all the belligerent countries at the close of the war will render imperative. There will be work enough lying ready, in Europe, Asia and Africa, for the organised agencies of civilisation without waiting for the emergence of the formal occasions of dispute to deal with which the machinery of the League is in some quarters alone supposed to be called into action. Not that occasions of dispute will be wanting in the transition period after the war if the world does not arm itself beforehand with means of neutralising the friction which must arise, especially in the economic and financial sphere. It is in the first few years, perhaps in the first few months, after the war that the possibilities of international co-operation will be most severely tested. Never in history has a group of nations attained so real a sense of mutual confidence and unselfish aspiration as the

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present Alliance ; nor ever have nations even contemplated so full a measure of joint executive action as has gradually been made possible through the existence of this spirit and through that alone. If the peoples and their statesmen cannot preserve that spirit and utilise that unified machinery for meeting the problems of reconstruction there is small hope for the future of international organisation ; but if the ordeal is successfully survived the way will be paved for more permanent developments.

What kind of international organisation the world will demand or require when the transition period is over and the war-time controls are finally relaxed, it is still too early to say. The most helpful analogy as regards the political possibilities of international co-operation is provided by the recent history of the relations between the several members of the British Commonwealth. The Imperial War Cabinet may well serve as a model for the arrangement of periodical consultative gatherings between the Premiers and Foreign Secretaries of the various Powers ; while the Imperial Conference and the meetings of bodies like the Empire Parliamentary Association provide examples of international organisation of a looser and less organic type, affording valuable occasions for the meeting of mind with mind, even on problems admittedly not within the range of the deliberations of a central authority. Moreover, in the permanent Commissions set up to advise the Imperial and Dominion governments on matters of interest to each and all of them, and in the reports of bodies appointed for a temporary purpose like the Dominions Royal Commission we may see an adumbration of what may be achieved in the future by the collaboration of experienced public servants and disinterested students of affairs in finding timely remedies for problems which might otherwise have been the occasion of conflict. If the peoples pursue this path occasions of co-operation will reveal themselves at every turn : questions of health, of communications, of the conser-

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vation of resources, of currency and finance, of the contact of race with race, of industrial and social legislation, to mention only a few, afford obvious examples. Such are the practical measures by which, as we can now discern, the unity of the civilised world can and will be attained ; but each and all of them presuppose a foundation of mutual confidence and comradeship far transcending the vague and ineffective sentiment which passed for internationalism before the war.

But it is not the purpose of this article to discuss the details of the international organisation which will ultimately spring from the blood and ashes of this war. The war is by no means ended yet ; and only when it ends in victory will humanity be free to pursue the quest of the yet greater and more enduring triumph which lies beyond it. There is indeed an element of danger in thinking too much about the building of the structure of international peace and justice and not enough about the immediate and indispensable need of clearing the ground for its foundations. Our present task is threefold. We have first to defeat, finally and decisively, the German outrage on humanity ; for it is idle to talk of improving and consolidating international law unless we vindicate it *now* in face of its deliberate and long-planned violation by the German Government, and idle to dream of basing a new order on "the organised opinion of mankind," to quote the key-sentence of President Wilson's last speech, unless we enforce it *now* as clearly and completely as President Wilson demands. We have, secondly, to liberate the subject peoples of Central and Eastern Europe, the unhappy victims of the German and Magyar doctrine of national ascendancy and the unwilling instruments of Hohenzollern and Hapsburg ambitions ; for there can be no hope of lasting peace without justice, no hope of real unity in Europe without the freedom of its peoples. And our third and final task, the fulfilment of which will follow from the fulfilment of the other two, is the overthrow of Prus-

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sianism ; for Prussianism is the sheer negation of all the basic principles on which the new order is to rest ; as long as it retains its power there can be no place for the governments it inspires or the peoples it controls in any League of Nations which is not patently a sham ; and the unity of civilisation must remain a dream unless Prussianism is so unquestionably defeated and discredited in this war that the people it has poisoned with its brutal doctrines and mesmerised with the glitter of its military triumphs in the past awake at last to the necessity of repudiating it and so bringing themselves morally into line with the free nations of the world.

Clearly, then, it is more important at this moment to concentrate our minds on the winning of the war than on devising the ultimate organisation of a new international system thereafter. But this argument does not equally apply to the question of the existing machinery of inter-Allied co-operation with which this article has mainly dealt. For that system of joint administration is not only itself the provisional framework of a permanent structure of international fellowship ; it will not only be required to meet the needs of civilisation in the transitional period after the war ; it is also the means by which alone, as experience has taught us, the war is to be won. To recognise this fact, to accept wholeheartedly the restrictions on national independence which the system entails, to assist its smooth working and especially to foster the spirit of mutual confidence without which it cannot work at all by banishing every thought of selfish national interest in the military, economic or political field—that is the primary duty of all the Allied peoples and their statesmen. So will the Alliance maintain the character and fulfil the function of a real League of Nations, making the organised opinion of the world's free peoples prevail by means of their organised power.

AMERICA'S WILL TO VICTORY

THE inquiring historian would probably search in vain through the annals of the past for an exact parallel to the rapid change in the general outlook of the American people that has occurred in the fifteen months since the United States entered the War. Prior to 1914 the interest of nearly all Americans was centred upon domestic problems. In an active sense American foreign policy was confined practically to Latin America and the Far East, but only a very limited attention was paid even to the affairs of these regions by the general public. Politically, the rest of Asia, Australia, Africa, and Europe was virtually non-existent. The European War in its initially wide ramifications and growing sweep aroused very many Americans to a realisation of the fundamental interdependence of the modern world, but the people as a whole did not grasp that their cherished ideals and their material welfare—in fact, the very persistence of their free institutions and their prosperity—could possibly be jeopardised by events in remote lands. Except to the immigrants from Eastern Europe—and they were not in a position either to enlighten an uninterested public or to influence policy—the Balkans, Austria, Hungary, Bohemia, Poland, the Ukraine, and Russia were but names of outlandish places of whose strange doings the Press intermittently had some dramatic account or which figured as the background of some romance or drama. Little that was accurate or pertinent was known even about the institutions and spirit of France, Italy, and Germany. As an

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English-speaking people, Americans were naturally somewhat better informed about Great Britain and Canada, but they had only the vaguest ideas about South Africa and Australasia and they were in a state either of dense ignorance or of gross misunderstanding regarding India, Egypt, the Crown Colonies and Protectorates and, naturally also, the function and ideals of the British Commonwealth as a whole. These mists have by no means been entirely dissipated. Strange misconceptions still float around like heavy poisonous gases in the lower levels of enlightenment where prejudice and tradition have taken firmest hold. But the general educational process has been a most rapid one. There is an element of real humour in the situation. Names of remote peoples and places that only very recently meant nothing whatsoever to the man in the street now trip lightly and knowingly from the tongue like those of the very oldest friends; the enmities of yester-year, a heritage accepted rather than assumed, have dropped from the consciousness of the majority, and the traditional foe, towards whom no genuine hostility was usually felt, has become the spiritual brother and the loyal companion in arms.

I. NATIONAL UNITY

AT the outset of America's belligerency there was no very clear conception of the real issue and its vital bearing upon America's future. To all but a very small minority, who have very keenly realised the peril to which all free peoples were exposed, the war was a wanton and ruthless intrusion upon their peaceful lives and America's participation in it a most deplorable necessity. The general attitude was decidedly negative. Accordingly, as the occasion of America's belligerency was Germany's arrogant invasion of unquestionable rights on the high seas,

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the most natural procedure seemed to be to assert these rights by assisting the Allies against Germany. The full significance of President Wilson's positive programme did not immediately penetrate the popular consciousness. For a considerable time the Allies were not generally regarded as America's allies and their cause was not identified and merged with America's cause. This aloofness has now entirely disappeared from the popular mind. The fundamental similarity of purpose animating the anti-German defensive coalition and the essential identity of their various grievances are fairly completely realised. The average man now identifies America's cause with that of her Allies and regards it as inseparable therefrom. He demands unity of purpose and action because he perceives, perhaps still somewhat vaguely, that the fate of the United States is ultimately quite as much dependent upon the defeat of Prussianism as is the future of France and Italy, who are in exposed positions and must perforce be the outer bastions of the democratic world if they are to preserve their freedom.

Many factors have contributed to this change. President Wilson's constant insistence upon positive principles of international right has evoked an earnest response. He has been ably seconded by members of his Administration, notably by Secretary Lansing, who has on numerous occasions lucidly explained the real issue at stake. In addition, very effective work was done in the Press and on the platform. A vast educational campaign was undertaken and successfully executed by public and private agencies, such as the Committee on Public Information, the National Security League, the American Defence Society, the League to Enforce Peace, the National Board for Historical Service, and the American Rights League. Literally millions of pamphlets have been distributed and thousands of speakers have toured the country explaining the gravity of the crisis. But Germany herself has been an even more convincing teacher. The treaties forced

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upon Russia and Roumania combined with the course of events in Poland, the Baltic provinces, and the Ukraine have concretely and conclusively demonstrated to all but the wilfully blind what defenceless peoples have to expect from the votaries of military force who at present dominate Central and Eastern Europe.

This educational process has resulted in a unity of sentiment such as was unknown in any one of the previous wars in which the United States was engaged. The Revolution bore largely the character of a civil war, so evenly divided was the population and so bitter were the feelings between patriots and loyalists, between Separatists and Unionists. Then the War of 1812 was strenuously opposed by New England, almost to the verge of secession. Further, while there is no question that the Mexican War of 1846 and the war with Spain fifty-two years later were expressions of the popular will, yet in both cases there was an earnest and outspoken minority in opposition. This is not the case in the present crisis. That there is no overt opposition and comparatively slight surreptitious obstruction is primarily due to the fact that the people are united in purpose and will not brook such actions. The process of integration has been quickened by the war and has resulted in marked moral and mental unity.

This unity is distinctly genuine. It is not imposed from above by a policy of repression on the part of the authorities, but springs from deep social forces. During the prolonged and, in the opinion of many, unduly protracted period of American neutrality it was constantly and confidently asserted that the "melting pot" had proved a failure, and that it had not succeeded in fusing the refractory material from many countries into one integrated whole. No one denies that there are and must be flaws, but, apart from this, the criticism was beside the mark and ignored the true function of the "melting pot." Its chief concern is not the immigrant, but the immigrant's

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child. While the fusion point of the latter is low, the former is necessarily of much more obstinate substance. No one at all versed in psychology would contend that mature immigrants could generally become completely Americanised in spirit, and could constitute an integral part of American society. However loyal they might be to the United States, it still was broadly true that *coelum non animum mutant qui trans mare currunt*. The inevitable effect of the war during America's neutrality was a fairly general but by no means complete alignment of the sympathies of the foreign-born according to their national origins. Under the circumstances such polarisation was inevitable. At the same time, the native-born Americans felt it incumbent upon them to be restrained in their utterances because of the neutrality enjoined by the Government. Thus, a non-representative and strident minority of little influence and power was able to give a distorted impression of utter disunity and irreconcilable disharmony.

The presence of a large foreign-born population—approximately one-seventh of the whole—unquestionably gives rise to serious problems. Their gravity was emphasised by events during the period of neutrality. These experiences have proved conclusively that the immigration of the past two decades was excessive in that the numbers could not be effectively absorbed. The saturation point had been clearly passed. These experiences also directed attention to one vital phase of the problem that had been largely ignored. Americans had hitherto insisted that the doors be kept wide open because they wanted their country to continue to be the haven of refuge for all those fleeing from religious, political, and economic oppression. The spirit was a noble one, but it was not realised that this liberal policy fomented continuous social unrest and threatened to undermine the very foundations of the American polity. Had more attention been paid to the relation between the rising tide of immigration and the

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declining birth-rate of the older stocks, the door would probably have been partially shut. Moreover, the flow of new arrivals led to constant competition between the fresh immigrants with their lower standards of life and those that had risen from the lower levels to American standards. This resulted in marked social instability. The American-born workman was driven from one occupation to another. There was establishing itself in the labour world an undemocratic social stratification of considerable rigidity in which the hewers of wood and the drawers of water at one end of the scale were the most recent immigrants, while at the other were the skilled workmen, engineers, machinists, and foremen of American birth. The contrast between conditions in America and those in England is striking. An American who visited the Mother Country for the first time during the war, when asked what was his deepest impression, replied that it had been an unfailing source of surprise to him that the men who did the rough work in Great Britain spoke English. More and more are native-born Americans objecting to doing crude manual labour, partly because they lose caste by working side by side with the non-English-speaking immigrant, partly because they need a higher wage to maintain their established standard of life. Unless this process is checked, no completely genuine and sound democracy is possible. This problem is not solely domestic in character ; it has important international ramifications, for, after the war, questions of emigration and immigration are destined to play a large part in the inevitable social and political readjustments and in the attempts to control them by systematic reconstruction.

As has been pointed out, however, the chief material of the "melting pot" is not the immigrant, but his child. This child, whether born in America or transplanted there in early youth, presents many problems, but the question of his Americanisation is settled automatically by the public school and by his dominating environment.

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If he speaks the language of his parents at all, it is generally in a broken and halting manner, and often, as a result, family life is somewhat undermined since the parents, in turn, are usually equally deficient in English. His Americanism is absorbed in the public school and streets and tends to be assertive in character. He resents any attempt to differentiate him from his fellows and firmly rejects all affiliations with his parents' birthplace because they establish such differences. "Annunziata" of the Italian family is literally transformed by the public school into plain "Nancy." These fundamental social facts were not sufficiently appreciated in the critical days of neutrality either by American or by foreign observers, and hence the marked national unity conclusively revealed since America's belligerency has been a surprise to many. This unity has, however, been made more complete by the war itself. The very fact that the United States was at war integrated sentiment since the Americans are an intensely patriotic people, even to the brink of excessive nationalism.

Sectional differences were also overestimated by those who fretted at America's prolonged neutrality. There is, naturally, considerable sectionalism in so huge a country whose regions differ markedly in cultural and economic development. But the ensuing differences of opinion on public policy are like family quarrels that vanish in the presence of the common enemy. Moreover, there is no doubt that the apathy of the Middle West and Pacific Coast towards the war in 1914-1917 was greatly exaggerated. Whatever of it may still persist is a very negligible quantity. In fact, the spirit of the Middle West is now, if anything, more determined than that of the more sophisticated East, in which a small measure of lassitude is discernibly due, on the one hand, to the strain of four years of keen interest and, on the other, to a fuller realisation of the very serious obstacles that must be overcome before the goal of their aspirations can be reached.

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The effect of this integrated national sentiment and this intense patriotism has been to engender an almost universal bitterness towards all obstructors of the national will and especially towards the public enemy. There is firmly established a relentless and even fierce feeling against Germany and all things German. This has taken firm grip, and is destined to be a force of great influence in future international relations, both political and economic. Attempts to exorcise it by appeals to brotherly love will be futile in the main, though probably not quite fruitless, unless the German system is completely changed and the international outlook of the German people radically altered. At the present moment this sentiment has produced a grim determination to defeat Germany's aims, cost what it may ; and, in domestic affairs, it has led to a crusade against everything connected with the enemy. For instance, in many schools the teaching of German has been prohibited. Furthermore, Americans who before April, 1917, were pro-German are looked upon with suspicion, and not infrequently have been virtually ostracised by their former associates. In most instances their standing as guides of public opinion has been impaired, if not entirely lost. The people, further, have demanded a vigorous prosecution of all who by word or deed have tried to hamper the conduct of the war. In some instances the sentences imposed were apparently excessive, but the fault—if fault there be—lies not with judge and jury, but with the people who demand the eradication of everything that savours of sedition. It is a form of social tyranny, to this extent democratic that it is the will of the overwhelming majority, in some respects highly deplorable, but in reality not of serious import, as these long-term sentences will probably in most instances be commuted when the national peril has passed. This suppression of dissentient voices is not by itself a pleasing phenomenon, but it does not stand isolated. To isolate it is to lose sight of the bigger morality that dwarfs the

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lesser. For this intolerance of opposition is the inevitable and comparatively insignificant by-product of an unalterable will to victory. This is its essential significance.

II. THE PROMISE OF THE FUTURE

THE American people are naturally optimistic. This sanguine temperament is the inevitable product of their past with its record of extraordinary material accomplishment. This development was the result of indomitable energy and restless enterprise applied to the unrivalled and seemingly inexhaustible resources of a virgin continent. As the latter factor was generally somewhat underestimated Americans had deemed themselves a chosen people, apart and distinct from Europe, with a higher level of average intelligence, education, and well-being. That the United States was the greatest nation in the world and in the long run invincible was an accepted fact, not admitting of argument. This provincialism was fostered by the way history was taught in the schools. While the average American knew that France had in some measure aided in the Revolutionary War, he had no idea of the extent to which French sea-power had contributed to Washington's ultimate success. He had never been taught that there was any serious fighting outside of America's continental limits and that Great Britain was also faced by a strong European coalition. Similarly, he did not learn that the War of 1812 was, in reality, only an insignificant episode, with a very inconclusive ending, in a great life and death struggle upon which the fate of Europe's liberties depended. He is apt to have the impression that America swept the British Navy off the sea at a time when American merchantmen were unable to leave their blockaded ports. As a result of their history, both real and legendary, Americans are a proud people and intend to maintain their record of invincibility. If this record were broken, those respon-

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sible for the failure would have to face implacable judges.

With pride there went a certain complacency and occasionally even a lamentable braggadocio, but also robust self-reliance and buoyant self-confidence. These received a rude shock when the slow pace of America's war preparations became evident. There were ominous criticisms of the Government in the autumn of 1917 and the early months of 1918, when the disparity between expectation and accomplishment revealed distinct weaknesses in the Administrative system. Comparisons with the speed and extent of the efforts of America's associates and opponents caused many a misgiving and many a searching of the heart. A new spirit of humility came over the people, and with it a firmer determination to play a part commensurate with America's aims and resources. This was manifest both in voluntary efforts and in goading on the Administration to greater speed. The necessity for both was concretely manifest when the German offensive gained headway in the spring and demonstrated that there was still left considerable vigour in a foe that been lightly regarded as already half-beaten. Then, for the first time, was it realised that upon the United States would fall in increasing measure the burden of supplying the manpower without which a clean-cut, definitive decision was impossible.

The German offensive caused considerable worry, but no despondency. Naturally, there was marked relief when the Austro-Hungarian drive failed. Italy's brilliant recovery from the Caporetto disaster was a strong moral tonic and further served the important purpose of arousing popular sympathy with Italy, whose cause and conduct have never received their full measure of appreciation in America.

The future historian will have considerable difficulty in gathering the details of America's voluntary aid in winning the war. Gradually more and more women and men

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have left their ordinary vocations and are devoting their time without compensation or reward to war work of various kinds. This spontaneous effort deserves high praise and demands especial mention in two particulars. In the first place, the voluntary conservation of foodstuffs, not to overcome any domestic scarcity, but only so that America's Allies should be adequately supplied, is very widespread and effective. Wheat especially has been sparingly used, and in other respects also the appeals of the Food Administration have met with a generous response. Even more conspicuous has been the success of the appeals of the Red Cross for voluntary contributions to its war chest. In June of 1917, during one week's campaign, over £21,000,000 were raised for this purpose, and eleven months later £34,000,000 additional were secured from the public. When it is remembered that the latter sum is approximately one-sixth of the National Government's peace budget, the magnitude of this free offering can be grasped. It is literally unique. The American people are thoroughly sound and are willing to make any sacrifices authoritatively suggested or demanded. They have responded generously to all appeals, they have loaned their money freely, and they do not object to higher taxation. At some of the inconveniences of war-times—they have up to now scarcely been more than inconveniences—there is some good-natured grumbling which finds vent and partial satisfaction in such phrases as "Damn the Kaiser!" The serious complaints do not come from this source, but rather from dissatisfaction that America is not as yet doing enough to overcome the Prussian scourge.

Widespread impatience of the leisurely pace of the war preparations, justifiable irritation at the Administration's failure to appreciate the importance of the time factor, disappointment that America has failed to take full advantage of the flying start gained in supplying the Allies for over two years and instead had in many instances started afresh

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in what seemed to be an untimely quest for perfection, combined with the patent gravity of the military situation, led to an Administrative reorganisation in Washington and to a marked acceleration of the military programme. Nothing less would have satisfied a keenly disappointed people. Up to March 1, 1918, exclusive of some marines, only 282,731 Americans had been sent abroad, and of these a very large proportion were non-combatants.* Coincidentally with the German offensive, the pace was immediately greatly increased, and in the next four months 721,740 additional men were either in Europe or on board ships bound there.† Including 14,644 marines, the total American force sent to Europe since the outbreak of the war up to July 1, 1918, aggregated 1,019,115. As the casualties, the losses at sea and the troops returned, amounted to only 8,165, this entire force was at that time virtually intact.‡ It should, of course, be remembered that this number embraces all the units that go to make up a complete modern army, and that consequently it includes a considerable proportion of non-combatant elements, such as the Medical Corps and the Supply Service, constituting all told in this case approximately

*May	1,718	October	38,259
June	12,261	November	23,016
July	12,988	December	48,840
August	18,323	January, 1918	46,776
September	32,523	February	48,027

282,731

† March, 1918	83,811
April	117,212
May...	244,345
June	276,372

721,740

‡ The total casualties reported up to July 3, 1918, were:—

Deaths from all causes	...	4,246
Wounded	...	5,960
Missing, included prisoners	...	465

10,671

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32 per cent. of the whole. Thus, towards mid-year 700,000 American troops were at or near the battlefield. Of these 251,000 were then actually at the fighting line. The American soldier had already shown his mettle in various minor engagements, at Cantigny, at Belleau Wood, at Vaux, but his military part had so far been relatively insignificant. It takes four months to train an infantryman, and, as General Maurice has said, "it takes far longer than four months to train an entirely new battalion, and as the size of the military formation increases, the time required to fit it for the field increases also." While it would, therefore, be unwise to overestimate the immediate influence of the American Army on the balance of military power, still it is bound to prove an appreciable factor in the remainder of the 1918 campaign, both in a military and in a moral sense. The knowledge that this is only a small increment of American man-power must stimulate the Allies and dishearten the enemy.

The question of reserves, reinforcements and actual increase of the expeditionary force has not been neglected. When the programme of transportation had been accelerated to the extent of sending to Europe by mid-year 400,000 more men than had been contemplated, the time-table for calling troops to the colours was also simultaneously advanced. The intention had been to call out 100,000 a month, but instead 200,000 were summoned in April and 300,000 in each of the two following months. Thus by mid-year there were in the army, including all units, 2,171,000 men.* This is a remarkable expansion, almost

* This number includes many non-combatants, such as officers doing purely administrative and clerical work in Washington, the medical service and the engineers. Exclusive of the Sanitary Corps and the Army Nurses, the Medical Corps had grown since the outbreak of the war from 900 to 24,000 officers and from 8,000 enlisted men to 148,000. Furthermore, according to Secretary Baker's official statement of June 28, upon the completion of some new units of engineers, there will be over 45,000 Americans engaged in railroad construction and operation in France. It is also interesting to note that 22,000 freight cars and 1,600 locomotives have been made in America for military use in France.

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a ten-fold one in fifteen months.* Although the recent spurt can probably not be kept up, the general pace is to be maintained. It is officially stated that the Army will comprise 4,000,000 men by the end of the year. This, however, is probably an over-estimate. The essential thing is that no limit is placed upon America's contribution in men. President Wilson was in complete accord with popular sentiment when he said on May 17 :

I have heard gentlemen recently say that we must get 5,000,000 men ready. Why limit it to 5,000,000 ? I have asked the Congress of the United States to name no limit, because the Congress intends, I am sure, as we all intend, that every ship that can carry men or supplies shall go laden upon every voyage with every man and every supply she can carry.

The very fact that 1,000,000 men were conveyed to Europe with only a very small loss of life demonstrates the military failure of the submarine as used by Germany. This experience has definitely relegated the submarine as an agent in the destruction of commerce to the minor part played by the raiding privateer and frigate of the eighteenth century and the Napoleonic Wars. Just as in those days the loss of merchantmen by capture was very heavy and was overcome by new construction, so now, after strenuous efforts, the British and American shipyards are jointly just about out-building the destruction effected by the submarine. The economic drain is unquestionably a serious one and the scarcity of shipping is a distinct handicap, but so long as new vessels can be turned out more quickly than those in service are sunk, the submarine

	April 6, 1917.		June 28, 1918.	
	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.
Regular Army	5,791	121,797	11,363	514,376
National Guard in Federal Service	3,733	76,713	17,070	417,441
Reserve Corps in Actual Service... ..	—	4,000	131,968	78,560
National Army	—	—	—	1,000,000
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
	9,524	202,510	160,403	2,010,377

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cannot radically alter the fundamental facts of sea power as they were before 1914. After several false starts, the American ship-building industry has finally fallen into its stride. The fabricated vessel built of finished parts assembled in the shipyard is a demonstrated success, at least for these times of emergency. From now on the output bids fair to be an increasingly large one, though probably not quite so large as the forecasts of those directing the enterprise would indicate. In the four months from March to June inclusive, the production of the American yards was somewhat less than that of the British ones, but the American curve was on a decidedly upward grade and the total output for the entire calendar year, estimated at somewhat over 3,000,000 deadweight tons or somewhat less than 2,000,000 gross tons, will probably exceed that of Great Britain.* On July 4 alone, in celebration of the national holiday, there were launched 95 ships of 474,464 deadweight tons—just about as much as the submarines had been sinking in an entire month. This was, of course a most exceptional day, but it gives some indication of future output. It may confidently be claimed that the submarine problem has been solved and that this obstacle to ultimate victory has been overcome.

By mid-year the initial delays and difficulties in nearly all other lines of war production had also been overcome. The production of aeroplanes, rifles, and machine-guns was on a large scale and was increasing rapidly. Quantity production of heavy ordnance, where the greatest difficulties had been encountered, was also just beginning.

		1918.	
		British Yards in Gross Tons.	American Yards in Deadweight Tonnage.
March	...	161,674	172,611
April	...	111,533	160,286
May	...	197,274	25 ,241
June	...	134,159	280,400
		<u>604,640</u>	<u>872,538</u>
			or between 523,000 and 582,000 gross tons.

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In addition, Nature promises to be most bountiful. There is every prospect that the wheat crop will yield nearly 900,000 bushels, and the outlook for corn (maize) and other foodstuffs is likewise excellent. As the Canadian wheat crop is expected to yield 345,000 bushels, there should be ample supplies for the Allies. Finally, the cotton crop bids fair to be of exceptional size, 15,000,000 bales as contrasted with 11,000,000 in 1917.

III. THE CONCEPTION OF VICTORY

IT is an indisputable fact that the American people as a whole are firmly convinced of the ultimate triumph of their cause, and that their will to victory is firm and unflinching. President Wilson's message of June 14 to President Poincaré quite accurately stated :

It is their fixed and unalterable purpose to send men and materials in steady and increasing volume until any temporary inequality of force is entirely overcome and the forces of freedom made overwhelming, for they are convinced that it is only by victory that peace can be achieved and the world's affairs settled upon a basis of enduring justice and right.

Victory is, however, an elastic term. It is largely a subjective concept. What, then, would the American people regard as victory ? The average American would probably not be able to define its nature in concrete peace terms, but in general, what is wanted is the elimination of the Prussian menace by discrediting Germany's military caste through defeat, the restoration of Belgium, Serbia, and Roumania, the emancipation of the subject nationalities of Germany and Austria-Hungary from economic and political exploitation by alien rulers, the freedom of Russia and her former border provinces from Central European domination, and, finally, as the corner-stone of the new international system, the creation of a League of Nations

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to establish the reign of law throughout the world. This entire comprehensive programme has been preserved intact. To Americans the war is still the war that is to end war. Not even the calamitous course of events in Eastern Europe has weakened the will to this end nor lessened the general expectation of its ultimate attainment.

While it is not adequately realised that Russia's disintegration has created the most formidable obstacles to the establishment of a stable international future, yet the chaos there has brought the crucial question of German ascendancy in Europe to the front and has concentrated attention upon the entire Slavic problem. This has led to a clear definition of American policy towards Austria-Hungary, whose subject nationalities must first be emancipated if these closely related problems are to be settled satisfactorily. In his peace programme of January 8, 1918, Mr. Wilson stated that the peoples of Austria-Hungary "should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development." While this general statement distinctly implied a reversal of previously announced policy, it was in full agreement with Mr. Lloyd George's more specific announcement made three days before. To the uninitiated, the tergiversations of Allied policy towards Austria-Hungary since the formal declaration of January 10, 1917, in favour of the liberation of the Slavs, Roumans, Czechs and Slovaks from foreign domination was an incomprehensible mystery until the Austro-Hungarian peace manœuvres of 1917 were disclosed. Even now the sequence and connection are not quite clear. But apparently when the illusion of a separate peace with the Dual Monarchy was entirely dispelled the Allies reverted to their sounder original position and no one of them more categorically than the United States. On May 29 the State Department announced that the nationalistic aspirations of the Czecho-Slovaks and the Jugo-Slavs "have the earnest sympathy of this Government." As this statement could be and was variously interpreted, Secretary Lansing on

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June 28 cleared up all uncertainty by the further and explicit announcement that the position of the United States was "that all branches of the Slav race should be completely freed of German and Austrian rule."

In another respect also Mr. Wilson has clarified his policy. Fifteen years ago in a critical account of his historical work it was pointed out that

Wilson's style is that of the man of letters, of the artist, not that of the scientist. . . . It corresponds closely to his intellectual nature, and is admirably adapted for the description of the human element that is in past politics, and this is the subject which seemingly interests him most. He suggests rather than defines; we gather impressions, not clear-cut conceptions. He gives us the atmosphere rather than the sharply drawn general lines. What his style lacks is precision; he seems unable to formulate a conception concisely.

Despite his artistic temperament and his marked inclination towards somewhat ambiguous generalities, President Wilson has a keen practical sense and when brought face to face with realities he usually knows how to meet the situation without really doing violence to his fundamental principles. In the important address of January 8, 1918, he stated that one of the fourteen essential conditions of a stable peace, in fact the first in order, was :

Open covenants of peace openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind, but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.

Shortly after this explicit statement, the question arose of changing the Senate's rules. In this connection, Senator Borah proposed an amendment to the effect that all treaties should be considered by the Senate in open session unless two-thirds of the members should decide to close the doors. This amendment, in itself certainly not very radical, was ultimately defeated by a vote of 50 to 23. The size of this adverse vote was in part due to the publication of a letter from President Wilson to

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Secretary Lansing. Herein he said, under date of March 12, 1918 :

When I pronounced for open diplomacy I meant not that there should be no private discussions of delicate matters, but that no secret agreement of any sort should be entered into and that all international relations, when fixed, should be open, above board, and explicit.*

This distinction between negotiation and policy is sound, but there still remains the knotty problem of devising means for real democratic control, and the establishment of policy by full parliamentary discussion and debate. In connection with the proposal to neutralise Egypt, Lord Cromer said :

A point is already gained by the advocates of any political idea when they can label their pet theory with an epigrammatic ticket of this sort. The mere appellation gives their proposal the appearance of involving some sound and statesmanlike principle . . . Large numbers of people who are engaged in politics are often too much occupied with other matters to inquire carefully whether the particular phrase in question embodies, as may at first sight appear, the elements of a sound policy based on the true facts of the situation, or whether, as is not unfrequently the case, it is a mere tinsel covering beneath which some glaring fallacy may lurk.

It is fortunate both for the world and for the United States that, however high be the stars to which President Wilson has attached his aspirations, yet he will not rashly adopt any specific proposal until he has assured himself that it will really accomplish its purpose and overcome the friction of a very real and imperfectly adjusted world.

* 65 Congressional Record, p. 8,293.

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IV. THE MEANS TO VICTORY

IN view of America's former aloofness from the affairs of Europe, it is but inevitable that some of the fundamentals of the changing situation should not be quickly or fully grasped by the average man. He is still seeking his bearings in unfamiliar waters and knows neither the turns or twists of the channel, the strength and direction of the tide and current, nor the local peculiarities of wind and weather. Everything is strange to him. Hence, it is not generally realised that the Russian collapse means the removal of one of the balance wheels of an extremely intricate system and that, in consequence thereof, all European problems and also those of the Middle and Far East have assumed an entirely new aspect. Nearly everything that had been settled by the diplomacy of the nineteenth century is in consequence in a fluid state and many established policies must be revised in the light of the new situation. With the power of Russia paralysed, not only are France's and Italy's positions in Europe fundamentally altered, but, in addition, the Balkans, Turkey and the Dardanelles, Persia and China present problems quite different from those of 1914.

These vital facts are self-evident to Europeans because they have lived with these problems year in and year out. Americans, however, have to labour before comprehending them. But, while not fully appreciating the gravity of Russia's disintegration—without which the war would, in all probability, have been brought to a satisfactory conclusion last autumn—American opinion underestimates, on the other hand, some favourable factors, because attention is so closely centred on the Western front. The full significance of the Allied control of the Seven Seas and the extent of the resulting economic distress in Germany are not generally understood. The value of

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this control of the outside world in constraining Germany to make satisfactory terms is not entirely comprehended. Secretary von Kühlmann had in mind these vital factors, which no conceivable military successes on the part of Germany could directly touch, when he said on June 24 that the war could not end "through purely military decisions alone and without recourse to diplomatic negotiations." So long as the Allies control the seas, the United States and the British Commonwealth cannot be invaded and can effectively cut the Central Empires off from the outer world.

The full use of the economic weapon during the war has met with complete approval in America, but there is no general understanding of the importance of keeping the weapon suspended over Germany's head and of threatening to continue its use indefinitely until the full aims of the Allies be secured. Such a threat and the necessary organisation to make it effective seem to many Americans to imply the possibility of an incomplete military victory and a denial of the better international order that is to be the outcome of the war. The purpose of the original Paris Economic Conference of 1916 was widely misunderstood in America and the present proposal is stigmatised by some as "defeatist." Yet, it surely is preferable to shorten the war and to gain the same ends by economic pressure, actual and threatened, than by mere force of arms. There is, however, prevalent in non-official circles a certain fastidiousness about this proposal which is all the more strange as American history, perhaps better than that of any other country, affords cogent proof of the potency of this weapon.

The chief argument advanced in the 'eighties of the last century by the German advocates of colonial expansion was that, unless new lands were secured abroad in which the German emigrant could settle under his national flag, German civilisation was destined to play a decreasingly important part in the future world. It was pointed out that yearly some two hundred thousand people left

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the Fatherland, mainly for English-speaking countries, and that these emigrants were not only definitely lost to Germany, but that their children became completely denationalised and thus contributed to the growth of rival civilisations. If this process continued, the argument ran, the world would in a century be dominated by a few large groups, the English-speaking and the Russian primarily, and such countries as Germany, France, and Italy would then have sunk to relative insignificance comparable to that of a Holland or a Sweden in the world of 1880. The German colonial movement did not solve this problem to any appreciable extent, but emigration was stopped by other means.

The growth of industry under the stimulus of the protective policy adopted in 1879 enabled Germany to keep her growing population within her borders, where ample employment was found for them. But, as a result, Germany became increasingly less self-contained and more dependent both upon outside sources for raw materials and foodstuffs and upon foreign markets for the disposal of her surplus wares. This dependence of Germany upon the outside world places a powerful weapon in the hands of the Allies. Its effectiveness can be lessened only to some extent by Germany's attempts to secure economic control of European and Asiatic Russia. While this vast area has untold economic possibilities, their development will take considerable time, and a revival of Russian national feeling might in a day undo the work of years. At best, a diversion of economic interest towards the East would be a *pis-aller*, a hazardous experiment that could not compensate for the assured advantage of the commercial relations existing before the war with the European West and the overseas world.

The relation of tariffs and the migrations of peoples is a fascinating subject that deserves the closest study. Some of the most complete manifestations of this close connection are to be found in the United States. For

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instance, as a result of the high tariff on cigars and the comparatively low duty on leaf tobacco, a section of Cuba had been transferred to neighbouring Florida, where the transplanted cigar-maker plies his trade. Similarly, the high duty on cigarettes has led to the extensive manufacture of Turkish and Macedonian tobacco in the United States. Some of the best-known Egyptian firms have established branches in America, and a considerable number of dealers and workmen skilled in handling this type of tobacco have settled permanently in the United States. In general, the tariff has stimulated immigration, as many found it profitable to employ their skill and experience within its protective barriers. It was, of course, not the purpose of the American tariff to attract the citizens of other countries, but these magnetic qualities of the protective system are susceptible of such use.

Such attraction will be all the more powerful in the case of countries situated as the Central Empires will be after the war. It is admitted by German economists that as a result of high taxation and of the difficulties of re-establishing normal industries, there will be a marked tendency towards emigration from Germany, which, unless rigorously checked, would reach large dimensions. But the German Government cannot advantageously check this normal movement unless they are able to find employment for the demobilised soldiers. If the Allies refuse to open their markets and deny access to their raw materials, emigration can be stayed only at the cost of economic regression. The price will be a general decline in the standard of life, decreasing national vigour, and probably a stationary or diminishing population. If, on the other hand, Germany raises the gates and allows her people to depart they will be lost to Germany and their children to *Deutschtum*. In other words, if the Allies make full use of the power they possess, Germany must either submit or retrograde. If they persist and Germany remains obdurate, the only alternatives for her are an indefinite continuation of the

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present economic misery in only a somewhat tempered form, or more or less extensive depopulation and the ultimate denationalisation of her children's children. This would spell the doom of *Kulturpolitik*. For the Allies, and especially for the English-speaking peoples who have spread themselves over such wide spaces, there is some peril in the use of this weapon. But in case of dire necessity it is far better to run risks that, once realised, can be guarded against, than to permit Germany to establish her hegemony over Europe and to continue to threaten the freedom of the entire world.

The grave situation in Eastern Europe emphasises the value and importance of this weapon. There is such a thing as physical impossibility. At the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, when the nature of England's obligations towards Belgium was being debated, Gladstone wrote to Bright that they were not unlimited, and that, if Prussia and France combined to violate the Treaty of Neutralisation, "the sole or single-handed defence of Belgium would be an enterprise which we incline to think Quixotic." If the impossibility is genuine, as it would have been in this hypothetical case, the maxim, *ultra posse nemo obligatur*, is valid. When, however, this precept is used selfishly to rid oneself of disadvantageous duties, it is profoundly immoral, but scarcely more so than to assume obligations that can obviously not be executed. For this reason British statesmen generally refused to incur responsibilities for the protection of States that could not be reached by naval power. The existing paralysis of Russia and the possible continuation of this state for an indefinite period would under the old conditions have made it impossible for the Western Powers to assume guarantees towards Eastern Europe. Owing to lack of physical contact, they could not have been made effective. But the increased economic interdependence of the world has changed this situation. The fact that the Central Empires cut off the West from Eastern Europe is still a

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very serious obstacle, but it can to some extent be counteracted by economic pressure upon them. To be fully effective this pressure must, however, be world-wide in scope. Its mechanism cannot be created in a day. Systematic and permanent organisation is essential if this weapon of the present League of Freedom and its lineal successor is both to secure and to maintain a satisfactory peace.

New York. July, 1918.

THE SPIRIT OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

I.

THE Russian Revolution, one of the consequences of the world-war, is as disturbing in its results as the war itself, and at first sight even more disconcerting. It has an emotional quality distinct from and yet akin to that of the war. It brings out with a crashing violence the undertones of the war, undertones that, vaguely heard, awakened obscure hopes and indefinite fears. Playing on that volume of emotion aroused by the war it has repeatedly changed the incidence of hope and fear, broadened and narrowed perspective, or created a confusion of thought that may or may not be a preliminary to broader vision. The War and the Revolution cannot be thought of apart. They are two aspects of the same struggle, which to so many is as much a mental as a physical struggle. And the apparently extraordinary disparity of these two aspects is a real impediment to a clear perception of the ultimate aims and purpose of the multifarious conflict in which we are engaged.

The present phase of the Russian Revolution is one of disaster and ruin. It suggests a condemnation, more especially since it seemed in its dangerous development to be a very possible factor of our defeat, of the crushing of our sorely strained hopes. It provokes final and categorical judgments. Yet even into these bitter judg-

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ments doubt creeps, and the suspicion arises, a very well-founded suspicion, that the events of the past year, impressive as they are to the imagination, are still but an episode in a process whose range escapes calculation. And indeed the present phase of the Russian Revolution is anything but a fixed state, a final crystallisation. It is a phase, an episode in the gigantic process of the reconstruction of Eastern Europe.

There has never been a Revolution like the upheaval that has taken place in Russia. Analogies drawn from the French Revolution explain only secondary characteristics, not the main trend of events. The old regime in Russia finally fell owing to its incapacity to deal with the complex political problems raised by a modern war. The further course of the Revolution was determined by the rapid disintegration of a great army. The old regime indeed collapsed through its own ineptitude. The test of the war revealed its inherent weakness. The mutiny of the Petrograd garrison was the slight but significant touch that made it topple over in ruin.

There is no need either to justify or to condemn the Revolution. The complete and overwhelming condemnation of the old regime is that it collapsed as it did. It fell not through rebellion, not through a frontal attack, but simply because its vitality, its power, its utility, were exhausted.

The calamity is not that the old regime fell, but that the Russian State was so largely identified with the old regime. The autocracy was blind to the future. The order of succession to the Crown had drifted into chaos. But a much more important order of succession, that which involved the character of the new regime that must inevitably follow, was left entirely out of account by those who to the very last clung so blindly and desperately to autocratic power. The old regime left hardly any room for the development and training of the forces that must succeed it as a power responsible for the existence of the State.

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And when the old regime fell under the strain of a great war it involved in its ruin the whole of that political structure over which it had so jealously asserted its monopoly. The ruin was not and cannot be final, because the Russian State was not wholly identified with the old regime, still less is it solely the creation of the autocracy. But the Revolution was so disastrous because in completely liberating all the forces opposed to the old regime it exposed to violent attack all those functions which had been exercised by the autocracy and its agents—that is to say, practically all the principal functions of the State. And this at a time when an aggressive neighbour was directing its efforts to the defeat and destruction of the power of Russia.

II.

A BRIEF analysis of events from March, 1917, onwards will make this clearer.

The sudden and complete collapse of the old regime was entirely unexpected. There was grave discontent throughout Russia, but there was no revolutionary organisation worth speaking of. The Duma, which during the preceding months had given strong expression to the growing popular feeling, was intent on the prosecution of the war. It demanded a change of system, but it did not demand, nor did it expect, a catastrophic, revolutionary change. From 1915 onwards it had urged the formation of a "government enjoying the confidence of the country." Towards the end, particularly during the last three months of the old regime, the Duma, or rather the Progressive Bloc of central parties that dominated the Duma, had taken steps to prepare for the introduction of responsible, parliamentary government. Further than this the aspirations of the Duma did not go. Now the Duma contained the only trained politicians in the country outside the Government. And their training was limited, for while for ten

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years they had had liberty to discuss legislative measures and thus to gain a practical insight into the structure of the State, they had never been allowed to share the responsibility for the execution of these measures. Moreover, most of their proposals for reform had been rejected, and their scathing and trenchant criticism of Government policy had been ignored.

The most the leading members of the Duma dared hope for was that they might be granted a share in the responsibility for the development of the existing structure of the State. They had never seriously faced the possibility that the old regime would suddenly abandon all its functions. They had laid no plans whatever for assuming the whole burden of responsibility. When the Petrograd mutiny broke out they were completely bewildered, and when it became obvious that Nicholas II. must abdicate, they struggled hard to secure a certain breathing-space by urging that his brother Michael should assume the Regency. They did not succeed. They could not stem the rising tide. The howls of the Prebrazhensky soldiers when Miliukov announced to them the Duma Committee's decision to offer the Regency to Michael Alexandrovich were the first clear warning that the Revolution was going to take its own fatal way.

The responsibility of forming a Provisional Government was thrown on the Duma Committee. But from the very first day it was faced with a rival, reckless, energetic, perfectly sure of its aim. The oppression of the old regime had given rise to an extreme Socialist movement in Russia. The revolutionary tradition in Russia is predominantly Socialistic, the reason being that Socialism for the last half-century has been the most advanced political doctrine in Europe. It attracted the imagination because it was proclaimed as the gospel of the oppressed masses, it offered a simplified conception of history as a struggle of classes, and in Western Europe, from which the Russian educated class borrowed its political theories, it had become in its

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Marxian form the accepted dogma of revolutionary mass movements.

The Socialist parties had been very prominent in Russia during the revolutionary movement of 1905. In the subsequent reaction they were severely suppressed ; leaders and followers were executed, imprisoned, exiled or hunted into banishment abroad. Their organisation was driven underground, and after about 1908 the remnants of the Socialist parties maintained an obscure and tenuous existence in Russian public life, and exerted little direct influence. In the fourth Duma they were represented by two small groups, of which one was led by Kerensky, the other by Chheidze. The failure of the first Revolution and the demolition of the Socialist parties sobered the more moderate, demoralised a great many of the weaker elements and led to an extraordinary development of that sinister interplay between the Socialist underworld and the underworld of the bureaucracy (the Okhrana or Secret Police), of which the career of the *agent provocateur*, Azev, is the most notorious illustration.

The collapse of the old regime was the opportunity of the Socialists. They had not brought about the Revolution. The Revolution came of itself. But the Socialists were quick to seize the opportunity. Restraint was removed. Here were masses waiting to be led. And these experienced agitators leapt into the breach and took the lead. The principal party leaders were not on the spot, but there were hundreds of subordinates who rushed from their obscurity and, intoxicated by the unlooked-for opportunity, hastened to carry out the cut-and-dried party plans.

The Duma Committee for the provisional conduct of affairs was formed on the afternoon of March 12, the day of the outbreak of the mutiny. On the evening of the same day a number of Socialists met in another room of the Taurida Palace and founded the Council of Workmen's Deputies, a kind of local Socialist parliament, which two days later became the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers'

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Deputies. This Council included, besides the initiators and prominent members of all the Socialist parties, representatives of the soldiers and workmen of Petrograd in the proportion of one to every 1,000 workmen and one soldier to every company. The original Council of Workmen's Deputies was a revolutionary syndicalist organisation that had a brief existence in the autumn of 1905. The great and decisive innovation in March, 1917, was the introduction of soldiers, and that was due to the Bolsheviks, who even then had a perfectly clear conception of their goal.

This Council or Soviet was the powerful rival of the Duma Committee. As regiment after regiment filed through the Duma, Socialist agitators vied with members of the Duma for the mastery over the armed crowd. And it very soon became clear that for these masses the Socialistic appeals to class hatred were more effective than the call to patriotic instincts. The Provisional Government came into being as the result of a fierce struggle, ending in an unsatisfactory compromise between the Liberal and Constitutional Duma Committee and the Revolutionary Socialist Soviet. Kerensky was the mediator between the rival bodies. He was Vice-President of the Soviet and he became the representative of the Socialist groups in the first Provisional Government.

III.

THE programme of the new Government was the last word in democracy. The Provisional Government was to carry on the administration of the country until the preparations could be completed for convening a Constituent Assembly which should decide the form of government. This Assembly and also the local government bodies were to be elected on a basis of universal adult suffrage and proportional representation. The police were everywhere to be replaced by a militia organised and con-

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trolled by the local government bodies. All the liberties were proclaimed. In a word, the programme represented an advanced form of democratic government. There is no doubt that some of the moderate Duma men would have preferred a less precipitate concession of all the imaginable liberties. But they could not help themselves, and in any case no other type of programme was possible in the circumstances. The whole tradition of the Russian democratic opposition demanded the immediate adoption of a democratic programme at the earliest opportunity.

There were two features of the programme, however, that could only be regarded as ominous. They were enforced by the Soviet, and were only yielded by the Duma Committee after a hard struggle. One was the total omission of any declaration of a vigorous war policy. The second was the proviso that the Petrograd garrison should not be sent to the front, but should be kept in Petrograd as the guard of the Revolution.

The abdication of Nicholas II. on March 15 deprived the old regime of its last vestige of moral support. On the following day his brother, the Grand Duke Michael, refused to accept the crown, pending the decision of the Constituent Assembly. Thenceforward the whole responsibility for the government of Russia and the conduct of the war lay on the newly-formed Provisional Government.

Now before proceeding to trace the further course of the Revolution it is necessary to make certain reservations. The disasters that followed might have been foreseen, and indeed by shrewder politicians were foreseen, but that by no means implies that they could have been avoided. It must be remembered that the Russian Revolution was in the most real sense a Revolution, that it involved the complete collapse of an oppressive system of absolute government over a huge area, that over this huge area no new forms of administration were in readiness to take the place of the old, that the Revolution took the leaders of all parties unawares, and that the new organisation had to be improvised on the

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spur of the moment in accordance with the theories of government that had been advocated for years by the democratic Opposition. Further, it must be remembered that the traditional political structure of Russia collapsed in the midst of the greatest war Russia had ever waged, and that this seemingly imposing and menacing fabric toppled over in a moment as the result of a mutiny of private soldiers. It is perfectly obvious that such a sudden release of elemental forces from age-long control could not in a short space of time be interpreted in rational forms, in a rational political system, that the actions and plans of individuals and parties could not but play a subordinate part as determining factors, and that the scope of that great process of rational unfolding, of national self-determination in the broadest sense, extends far out into the unknown future and cannot be measured by the values and standards even of this our generation of herculean effort and most turbulent motion. Further, in apportioning praise and blame to the persons and groups who are active in the Russian Revolution it must be remembered that none of them really led, none of them really could lead. All they could do was hastily to devise temporary schemes for the guidance of the extraordinary complex of newly awakened irrational forces that are groping their way through immense suffering to some new national reason, to some new order of corporate existence. The leaders were profoundly influenced by the contagion of the mass movement. Their theories and methods were strongly coloured by the moods and impulses of the crowd. Their programmes, their cries and watchwords supplied a form of words, a borrowed speech, a pathetically inadequate language for vague and surging emotions that were striving to become articulate. We have heard much of the ideals of the Russian Revolution, but we simply do not know what these ideals are, for the watchwords imposed by party leaders to-day are obsolete to-morrow, and the vast process of national change in its onward sweep leaves behind it a

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wreckage of words that have lost their emotional content, of programmes that are now but bleaching skeletons of popular passion.

IV.

TO return to the Provisional Government and the Soviet. The Provisional Government bore the responsibility for carrying on. The Soviet accepted only a very limited responsibility for the support of the Provisional Government. It is clear that the Soviet, or rather the extreme left wing which in the long run dictated the Soviet's policy, was biding its time. It left the Government to administer the country as best it might, to close the door to reactionary influences, and also to maintain intact all the liberties, so that the ground might be prepared for a social revolution. In the meantime the Soviet proceeded rapidly to organise its forces. The Provisional Government had no strong, separate organisation of its own. The Duma Committee was not capable of multiplication and extension, the Soviet was. The Socialists organised not only their own parties. They everywhere organised Soviets on the lines of the Petrograd Soviets. The only strong non-Socialist party, the Cadets, swiftly and successfully developed their own organisation, but they did not and could not set up anything corresponding to the Soviets. The Soviets were founded on a class basis. The Provisional Government represented no class, but the nation as a whole. But it had no strong representative organisation behind it. The Duma had been elected on a limited franchise, and the great authority it had won during the months of suppressed discontent that preceded the Revolution quickly faded in the democratic atmosphere of the new time. It ceased to sit, most of its members passed into the Administration, and the Duma became a shadow, until, during the Kerensky regime, it was dissolved

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by the Government under pressure from the Soviets. The suggestion was sometimes made that the Provisional Government should be supported by a consultative or legislative body consisting of the members of all four Dumas, the first two of which were certainly thoroughly democratic. But for some reason this suggestion was never carried into effect. It was only in the twilight of his power that Kerensky conceived the belated idea of calling together a kind of national representative organ which he called the Provisional Council of the Republic.

There were two main elements, then, in the Revolution—the democratic and the Socialistic. This distinction later acquired supreme importance. The Conservative parties fell into the background and, as an organisation, played no active part. The Provisional Government was in programme and spirit thoroughly democratic. Now it is difficult, in speaking of the Provisional Government and the Soviet, to avoid giving the impression that they were rival bodies of equal status. Formally this was not so. The Government was formed as the result of a compact between the Duma Committee and the Soviet, and the Soviet was represented in the Government by the Minister of Justice, Kerensky. But the Soviet showed from the first a strong disposition to exert many of the functions of the Government, and it was not long before it claimed the right to exert “control” through its appointed representatives in all the Government departments. There was, in fact, a very marked rivalry in which the Government, hampered by a sense of national responsibility, was continually worsted by the very impulsive and aggressive Soviet.

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V.

YET the Provisional Government did at first enjoy enormous prestige which it might have translated into terms of real and effective power. It did not do so. Why? Here is one of the most curious problems of the Revolution. The Russian people were willing to be governed, eager to be led and guided. Why did the Provisional Government not guide it to a happier issue? The reason did not lie wholly in the character of the members of the new Government. It is true that the Premier, Prince George Lvov, was a great disappointment. He had gained a high reputation as organiser of the Zemstvo Union, which had done a great deal of auxiliary war work. But as Premier he was singularly colourless and impersonal. He was a non-resister by temperament, a firm believer in the virtue of moral suasion, an interested and optimistic spectator rather than an actor. In Cabinet meetings he was a passive chairman, always anxious to avoid dissension, and the other Ministers used to complain that they never knew his real views on any subject. Of these other Ministers four were Cadets—Miliukov, Shingarev, Manuilov and Nekrasov; one was a Socialist—Kerensky; one, Vladimir Lvov, a Nationalist; two, Guchkov and Godnev, Octobrists; while Tereshchenko, like the Premier, was non-party, and Konovalov, a Moscow manufacturer, was a Progressist, with leanings to the Left.

But the grouping within the Cabinet was not on party lines. There were practically two groups, one led by Kerensky, the other by Miliukov. Kerensky secured the support of Nekrasov, and these two, in cases of dispute, generally won to their side the Premier, Tereshchenko and the Conservatives, while Miliukov was left with Shingarev and Manuilov in the minority. The two chief men in the Government, then, were Miliukov and Kerensky—the

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one a historian, set, firm, experienced, with matured and informed political convictions, thoroughly versed in international politics ; the other ardent, fluid, mobile, impressionable, with vague emotions and aspirations as yet imperfectly articulate, with quick intelligence, but no solid foundation of knowledge. It was a remarkable contrast of character, and this contrast of character quickly came to mean a conflict of tendency. Miliukov was for firmness and caution. He considered that the Revolution had gone far enough for the time being, and that the chief aim of the Government should be to secure what had been gained and to carry on the war with more spirit and energy than the old regime had displayed. Kerensky was for movement. He was absorbed in the Revolution, very sensitive to the popular mood, and, for a time at least, only vaguely conscious of the immense implications of the war, to which, under the old regime, he had been coldly indifferent, if not openly hostile. And by his impetuosity, his alertness, and by the help of that adroit wire-puller, Nekrasov, he succeeded in gradually gaining the ascendancy over the stubborn, clear-headed, but not very agile Miliukov.

But the rivalry between Miliukov and Kerensky was not purely personal, nor does it in itself explain the lack of firmness, the lack of bold initiative displayed by the Provisional Government. There were deeper reasons. The Government faithfully carried out its democratic programme. It did affirm all the liberties. It abolished capital punishment, declared the independence of Poland, restored the constitution of Finland, established local government on a universal suffrage basis, conceded language rights to all the nationalities, confirmed liberty of speech, liberty of the Press, liberty of assembly, did, in fact, with most scrupulous fidelity, carry out the letter of its programme. And it did so not merely because it was bound by a pledge, but because its members were filled with a genuine enthusiasm for liberty. They rejoiced in the general joy, and if some of them perceived the difficulties

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and dangers, they retained for a long time the conviction that liberty was in itself a cure for all ills of the body politic, past, present and to come. That was the attitude of Miliukov. That was the attitude of nearly all the members of the Provisional Government. They and the men around them represented the most mature political wisdom of the nation. But they had spent their lives in opposition to an oppressive régime, and liberty was to them as the breath of their nostrils. They exulted in the opportunity of affirming it, and most of them believed in the intuitive wisdom of the people as firmly as any revolutionary Socialist.

But, and this is the essential point, the faithful execution of this broad programme of liberty rendered the Government in a curious sense passive, and undermined its authority. The first Provisional Government was dominated by the will to release rather than by the will to govern. It enjoyed for a time great authority, in the first place because it was a Government. The Russian people was accustomed to be ruled, and the Provisional Government inherited what was left of the authority of the Governments that had preceded it. Further, this authority was greatly reinforced by the fact that the new Government was a revolutionary Government and its leading members had long been known as champions of liberty. It wielded authority in virtue of its moral prestige, which was its greatest asset. If the Revolution had not taken place in time of war this moral prestige would have sufficed to carry the Provisional Government safely through the period requisite for convening the Constituent Assembly.

But the circumstances of the time demanded of the Government an active policy for the translation of moral prestige into continuous and effective authority. Yet this is just what the Provisional Government was debarred from doing, on account of the temperament of its members, the spirit of the time, its declared programme, and the conditions of its origin. It would not and could not apply coercion, or if it did it applied it only with great reluctance,

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and then almost exclusively to representatives of the old régime. Any attempt to employ coercion in relation to those who, in the name of the Revolution itself, from the first tried to undermine the Government's authority, would have been decried as a symptom of reaction, and would indeed have been repugnant to the sentiments of most of the members of the Government. The principle of Government coercion had been discredited by the excesses of the old régime, just as the idea of the State had been obscured in the minds of the people by its identification with a crushing tyranny. "You don't know how to be a Government," said Kerensky to other Ministers who were temperamentally incapable of any personal assertion of their exalted position. And he himself later tried to affirm in sonorous and menacing phrases that asset of moral prestige which the Government actually possessed, but which during his régime it was already rapidly losing. Yet Kerensky was more violently than anyone opposed to the employment of coercion.

This point must be emphasised because it is of the highest importance in view of all that followed. Here on the one side was a Coalition Government, endowed with responsibility and, at first, with real authority, but lacking any strong organisation of its own and deprived by its own policy and its own temperament of the means of enforcing and extending its authority. And on the other side was the Soviet perpetually suspicious, active, aggressive, unceremonious, keeping the Government to the letter of its compact, agitating among the masses, and in particular strengthening its own position enormously by agitating among the armed masses of soldiers and so securing a monopoly over the chief instrument of coercion, and in addition most persistently and energetically developing its peculiar organisation throughout the country. And the power that the Soviets so rapidly acquired over the masses was used as a means of forcing the Government to concession after reluctant concession.

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VI.

IT is worth while to look more closely into the nature and policy of the Soviets. The Soviets were a kind of class parliament formed by the Socialist parties. Russian Socialism is rather a labyrinth, but broadly speaking there were two main types of Socialists—the Social Democrats, who were Marxians, and the Socialist Revolutionaries, who had a Marxian programme for the workmen, and a non-Marxian programme of land socialisation for the peasantry. But each of these parties was subdivided into several groups. The Social Democrats were divided into Mensheviks, who, generally speaking, may be described as evolutionary Socialists of a Revisionist type, and Bolsheviks, or extreme Revolutionary Socialists, whose aim was to establish by force the dictatorship of the proletariat. The Social Revolutionaries, again, were divided into several factions, the more moderate of which resembled the Mensheviks, while the extremists resembled the Bolsheviks. These subdivisions were further complicated and multiplied through differences of opinion about the war. There were “defencist” and “defeatist” Mensheviks, and “defencist” and “defeatist” Social Revolutionaries. The extreme wings of both groups were violently defeatist. Moreover, it must be remembered, in estimating the mental attitude of the Socialist parties, that while the Cadets and the other Liberals drew the inspiration for their constitutional and democratic ideals from England, the Socialist leaders drew their inspiration from German Social Democracy. They were soaked in German Social Democratic literature and many of them had spent years in Germany or in close association with their German comrades. This fact by no means necessarily implied sympathy with German war aims, but it did imply on the part of most Russian Socialists a particular sensitiveness to the German mental atmosphere

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and a corresponding lack of sympathy for the English spirit. And in relation to the world war this was a significant circumstance.

For the war was, in fact, the question on which the whole development of the Revolution turned. The Revolution was not in its origin a social revolution. It only became so much later. It began as a mutiny. It was as great a surprise to the Socialists as to anybody else. They were quick in assuming the proprietorship, in claiming, so to speak, the copyright. But that does not alter the fact that the Revolution began as a spontaneous movement directly provoked by the suicidal ineptitude of the old regime. What the Socialists did was to turn the Revolution to account for their own purposes, to impose upon the chaotic popular movement their own aims, their own ideals. But the agents of the Revolution were not the proletariat in the strict sense. They were soldiers, able-bodied men aimed for the defence of their country. In Russia the soldiers were, in the bulk, either peasants (the large majority) or workmen. But these were just the classes the two chief Socialist parties, the Social Revolutionaries and Social Democrats, had been trying to get into movement for years. And here they were under arms, and the soldiers of Petrograd had of their own will mutinied and overthrown the Government. What could be more tempting for ardent Socialists than the idea of securing control of an army that had demonstrated such remarkable capacities, and making it the instrument not merely of a political but of a social revolution? The opportunity was there. Liberty of action was secured. The Provisional Government, which might be supposed to object to such dangerous use being made of the army, was bound by its compact not to interfere with agitation, and was in any case intimidated by the first effects of violent Socialist agitation among the Petrograd regiments who were brought one after the other into the Duma during those exciting days when the new Government was being formed.

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A campaign of class war among the armed peasants and workmen—that, stripped of all ambiguities, was the task the Socialists set before them. This must be stated clearly, because it was this definite and passionate purpose that led in the end to the break-up of the army and the establishment of the Bolshevik régime. It would be absurd to suppose that all the Socialist intellectuals who took part in the Soviet realised this purpose from the first. Many were simply carried away by the gregarious imperative of party feeling, by the inertia of their own past, by the intoxication of the mass movement. Then there were cool evolutionary Socialists who saw that the conditions were not ripe for the triumph of Socialism, that a premature and superficial success gained by wielding uneducated, untrained masses might ruin the Socialist cause, and they therefore counselled moderation. And there was a minority of “defencist” Socialists who perceived the danger of an agitation that by disorganising the army might expose the country to a catastrophic defeat.

But in an unrestrained mass movement the extremists have a great advantage. They are the most reckless, unscrupulous and destructive in their methods. They can make the most forcible appeal to the coarser instincts of the mob. And, in particular, the Socialist extremists in Russia were most skilful in combining the presentation of a clear-cut, simplified Socialist ideal with a very powerful appeal to the impulses of suspicion and hate. These extremists were Bolsheviks. Their aim was clear, their purpose definite, they knew from the beginning what they wanted. The other Socialists were in a state of mental confusion. They knew perfectly well that it would be madness to go as far and as fast as the extremists wished. But they had not the courage of this particular conviction. They were Socialists. They professed adherence to the essentials of the extremists’ creed. They were working on the same material. They had to maintain a clear distinction between their own aims and the aims of that indeter-

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minate body known as the *bourgeoisie*. To secure contro over the masses they had to foment class feeling, to attack the *bourgeoisie*, to discredit the aims and motives of the moderate parties of the Revolution. But then the extremists could do that so much more effectively. And there arose a competition in demagogy. To control the crowd, even to restrain the crowd, the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries had to pretend that their aims and attitude hardly differed from those of the Bolsheviks. And often it was not only pretence, not only the mere doping of the crowd which the devotees of mass-suggestion consider to be one of the essentials of politics. The difference between the more moderate Socialists and the Bolsheviks was not a difference of creed. They all at bottom confessed the same faith, they all used the same language. The difference was one of methods, of pace, of speed, and when in the heated atmosphere of endless meetings in streets, factories, barracks, halls and camps the masses became responsive to demands that rapidly grew more extreme, many of the more moderate Socialists reconsidered their views as to the speed the Revolution might assume. They were carried away by their own demagogy, by the response of the masses, and by the incessant push and urge of the Bolsheviks. They said many extravagant things of which they afterwards bitterly repented. After all, they were inexperienced, worse than inexperienced, in State affairs. They had a pretty thorough knowledge of conspirative politics, many of them were extraordinarily well versed in the intricacies of revolutionary theory. But imagine these men and women flocking back to Petrograd from remote prisons, from dreary and colourless Siberian exile, or from interminable all-night debates in the back-streets of Geneva, and suddenly finding those "masses" of which they had dreamed aimed and waiting on their words. This experience was certainly not conducive to steadiness of outlook. And remember, too, that among these returned revolutionaries there were not a few who through disap-

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pointment, privation, inherent weakness, or the blighting effect of their own theories, had lost their personal honesty, had accepted as a reward for the betrayal of their comrades a miserable pittance from the Secret Police, or had acted as German agents during the war.

The policy of the Soviets was throughout a policy of latent or active Bolshevism. Not that Gotz, Lieber, Dahn, Tsereteli and the other moderate Socialists who for several months led the Soviet realised or desired this. When they awoke to the Bolshevik danger they tried hard to prevent this extreme and ruinous development of the Revolution. They acted as brakes and buffers, but the Bolshevik spirit was the real driving force. At first the Bolsheviks were in a very small minority, and they had to act indirectly, either by egging on muddle-headed moderates to proclaim their creed, or by pricking the Soviet into some compromising course of action that for fear of the crowd it dared not afterwards repudiate.

But it was the war, the dominating fact of the war, that gave the Bolsheviks their chief power. They quickly perceived that their best weapon was the disorganisation of the army. And in this policy the Soviet played readily into their hands, for the simple reason that the majority of the Soviet leaders were "defeatists," or, if not defeatist, so tepidly, so timidly, so conditionally pro-war, that their "defencism" was defenceless against the unrelenting aggressiveness of the ardent advocates of immediate peace. And so it came about that the history of the eight months during which Russia was ruled by the Provisional Government was the history of the steady and systematic disorganisation of the army. Of course, the Germans stimulated this process in every possible way, and scattered their money and their secret agents all over Russia. But the process was possible because Russian Socialists laboured under the incredible delusion, the rank heresy from the Marxian point of view, that the disorganisation of a great peasant army, the exposure of their country to a ruthless

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enemy, was the equivalent of the social revolution of which they had dreamed. To such disasters led the infatuation of men whose natural faculties had been starved in the underworld of Tsarism. Their action could only be destructive, for they had lived so long amid bitter abstractions and negations.

VII.

THE disorganisation of the army, then, determined the course of the Revolution. By March, 1917, the great majority of the able-bodied men of Russia had been called to the colours. The losses during the war had been very heavy, but a large army with strong reserves was preparing actively for the spring offensive. Never had the Russian army been so well supplied with munitions as at that moment, and the commanders were confident of being able to deal the enemy a heavy blow in conjunction with the Allies. That blow was stayed by the Revolution. There was no intrinsic reason why it should not have been delivered soon after the Provisional Government was established. It could not be delivered because propaganda was already at work, and affecting the army.

On Thursday, March 3, a leaflet was issued by the newly-formed Soviet with the heading "Order No. 1." This order was the source of all the trouble that followed. In peremptory terms it called on the soldiers to cease saluting their officers, the titles by which officers were addressed were declared abolished, officers were reduced to the position of technical experts on the actual conduct of battle, while all other affairs of each unit were to be managed by committees of soldiers. The whole aim of the "order" was completely to undermine military discipline and to make the officers suspects in the eyes of the soldiers. True, the disciplinary regulations under the old regime had been excessively severe, and gave officers sufficient

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opportunity for bullying, if they were so disposed. But in the course of the war these rules had not been administered with abnormal rigour, and in thousands of cases officers and men were on excellent terms. "Order No. 1" struck a severe blow at the organisation of the army, and aroused a storm of indignation among the pro-war elements, on account both of its contents and of the unlawful and barefaced attempt by the Soviet to assume authority over the Army. In the face of this storm the Soviet drew back a little, and its leaders lamely protested that it was intended to apply only to the Petrograd garrison. But in the meantime copies of the document had been despatched in large quantities to the front. The mischief was done. The poison had begun to work. It is worth noting that the men who drafted this order, Nahamkis (Steklov) and a lawyer named Sokolov, at that time described themselves as Bolsheviks. Two months later Sokolov recovered his senses and went to the front to preach defencist doctrines to the troops. While doing so he was beaten within an inch of his life by soldiers who had become very thoroughly imbued with the spirit of "Order No. 1."

The next step was to undertake a peace agitation. The ideas which animated the Soviet were formulated, now vaguely and cautiously, now with bitter emphasis, in a long series of speeches, articles, resolutions and official manifestoes. These ideals were first proclaimed as a Socialist policy in relation to the world-war at an International Socialist Conference held at Zimmerwald in Switzerland in September, 1915, with the Swiss Socialist, Robert Grimm, in the chair, and Lenin, Zinoviev, Radek, Ganetsky, Chernov, and several French, Italian and Swiss Socialists among its members. The Zimmerwald theory was that the war was simply a conflict between the capitalists and imperialists of the chief belligerent countries, that the big financiers had sent the proletariat to slaughter in order to grab territory and still further to enrich themselves, that Germany was not specially to blame for the war, no

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more to blame, at any rate, than England, and that the only way to end the war was for the proletariat of all lands to rise and overthrow its exploiters. In other words, revolution was to be the substitute for war.

The Petrograd Soviet did not adopt the Zimmerwald interpretation *in toto*. But it did adopt the Zimmerwald formula, "peace without annexations and indemnities on the basis of the self-determination of the peoples." For the moment the Soviet, relying on the powerful influence of the Russian Revolution, was content to use this formula as an instrument of moral suasion in the belligerent countries, not as a weapon of coercion against its own Government. The trouble was that the Bolshevik ferment was working, and the Soviet could not consistently adhere to the middle line it had chosen. Its tepid defencism was continually being overborne by the rabid defeatism of the Bolshevik minority. Its tactics in relation to the army, its assertion of the principles of political agitation within the army, drove the Soviet into a position diametrically opposed to that of the active and convinced supporters of the war. No phrases about "the resolute determination of the Russian proletariat not to allow its new-won liberties to be trampled on by the imperialists of any country" could disguise the fact that the whole policy of the Soviet was undermining that spirit, that discipline without which national defence is impossible.

To the agitation against the officers succeeded agitation against the generals. Some warning words of General Alexeiev's on the danger of the decline in discipline aroused a violent protest in the Soviet. Nahamkis declared in the Soviet on March 27, "The former Headquarters of the Tsar at Mogilev has now become a centre of counter-revolution. Mutinous generals, refusing to submit to the will of the Russian people, are carrying on a counter-agitation among the soldiers. We have demanded of the Provisional Government that it should outlaw these mutinous generals who sacrilegiously dare to raise their

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miserable hands against the Revolution. . . . No officer, no soldier must obey him, but every officer, every soldier, every citizen has the right and duty to kill him before he raises his hand." This was not an official declaration, but it was the kind of thing that was said in the presence of the soldiers of the Petrograd garrison, and was shouted thousands of times over in depots and regiments of the line throughout Russia. Is it any wonder that the discipline of the troops gradually gave way, that the army ceased to fight ?

It is necessary to dwell on this particular aspect of Soviet or Socialist agitation, because it was decisive. It was the existence of undisciplined armed masses that made all kinds of social experiments possible, that stimulated the workmen to demonstrate, to strike, to advance demands they would otherwise hardly have dreamed of making, that aroused the peasants from their apathy, and aggravated their desire for the land. The driving power of the Revolution was a great army, loosed from its normal allegiance, diverted from the military object from which it was brought into being, and made to serve as the instrument of a form of civil coercion that ultimately developed into open civil war. "The front must be brought into the interior of the country," cried one excited Social Revolutionary. The first all-Russian Soviet Congress, held in June, in drafting the appeal for the International Socialist Conference, insisted on the necessity for a breach of the party truce with the belligerent countries, and on an onslaught by the proletariat of all lands on their Governments with the object of bringing about the cessation of the war. The moderate Socialists who then controlled the Soviet only vaguely realised what this meant. But the Bolsheviks knew, without a shadow of doubt, and consciously worked for the substitution of civil war for war between the nations from the very beginning of the Revolution, until in Russia they finally succeeded.

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VIII.

IT is impossible here to give a detailed account of the Revolution, to dwell on the vacillations of the Soviets, on their changing relations with the Government, on the recoil of their leaders when they began to realise the consequences of their own precipitate action and the growing danger of the Bolshevik movement. One or two significant facts may be noted. The first is the receptions accorded respectively to Lenin and Plehanov. Plehanov was the founder of the Russian Social Democratic party and its chief theorist. He had led the Mensheviks in the split with the Bolsheviks who had followed Lenin; and from that time on Lenin and Plehanov had been the protagonists of rival factions among the revolutionaries in France and Switzerland. At the beginning of the war Plehanov took up a strong defencist, a patriotic position. Lenin declared himself an internationalist and defeatist, and took a prominent part in the conference at Zimmerwald. When Plehanov returned from exile he was welcomed at the Finland station with bands and speeches and cheering crowds. But in the Soviet he not only had a cold reception, but he was not even admitted as a member of the Soviet, though the custom was that the veriest underlings of the Socialist parties became members of the Soviet almost as a matter of course immediately after their return from exile. Lenin, when he returned with his party through Germany a fortnight later, was also received at the station with jubilation, and although his first speech in the Soviet was met with jeers and regarded as the raving of a madman, he was made a member of the Soviet, and took part in its deliberations until the July insurrection. And the reason for this marked distinction was not so much the fact that the Soviet leaders were at best only feeble defencists, as simple fear of the crowd. The soldier masses, excited by the

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perpetual agitation for peace "without annexations and indemnities," a formula which being unintelligible was therefore sacrosanct, and at any rate meant that they were to engage in the cheerful game of politics instead of fighting, were wholly indisposed to listen even to the greatest Socialist leaders if these insisted on the primary necessity of carrying on the war with vigour. Lenin was a queer fellow, but at any rate he was for stopping the war at once. And so the Soviet leaders, cringing to their source of power as courtiers cringed to the Tsar, treated their own leader and teacher as an outcast, and admitted to their midst a man who despised their pusillanimity.

Equally characteristic was the Soviet's reception of the French and British Labour leaders. The coldness of this reception bordered on hostility, simply because the Allied Socialists urged a vigorous prosecution of the war for the defence of democracy and the protection of the Russian Revolution itself. On the other hand, the Swiss Socialist Robert Grimm, the President of the Zimmerwald Conference, who was ultimately expelled from Russia by the Provisional Government for his proved relations with the German Government, and an Austrian prisoner of war, the Socialist writer, Otto Bauer, were treated in the Petrograd Soviet as intimate friends and comrades. And yet if a word must be chosen to condemn this attitude, it was not intentionally treasonable, it was childish. In theory the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries who led the Soviet were not necessarily anti-patriotic, but even when they found themselves in a responsible position they could not subordinate to the stern exigencies of the war the theoretical and personal sympathies they had developed during years of debate in revolutionary coteries abroad. The atmosphere of their doctrine was Central European.

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IX.

IN the life of the Provisional Government there were four phases, each of which lasted about two months and terminated in an *émeute*. For the first four months Prince Lvov was Premier, for the second four months Kerensky. Each crisis was in essence a military crisis—that is to say, the real determining cause was the disorganisation of the army, the struggle over the burning question of war and peace. And here it must again be emphasised that although German agents undoubtedly exploited Russian disorganisation, though they helped with money, and though their hand is visible in the curiously un-Russian system and method by which the breakdown of the army was effected, yet the process was not in itself a result of German action, but of the history, the political structure, the social conditions of the peoples assembled on the great Eurasian plain.

The first crisis occurred early in May. The Government was trying to maintain a vigorous war policy and to preserve the army. Guchkov, the War Minister, resigned because “the forces of destruction were operating much more rapidly than the forces of construction.” The Government in a note to the Allies spoke of “war till victory.” The Soviet furiously protested. Armed troops filled the streets and demonstrated menacingly against the Government. Miliukov, who was chiefly responsible for the offending phrase, was jettisoned, portfolios were redistributed. Tsereteli, Skobelev and Chernov joined the Government as representatives of the Soviet, and Kerensky became Minister of War. A compromise was effected. The Government hesitatingly adopted the formula of “peace without annexations and contributions,” and the Soviet was induced to lend its support to the effort to induce a democratised army to fight a defensive war on these principles.

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The next two months were marked by an extreme application of the principle of moral suasion. The pro-war parties, including the Cadets, Right Social Revolutionaries and Plehanov Social Democrats, carried on a vigorous patriotic campaign. Volunteer units were organised under the name of "death battalions." The Soviet admitted that attack was a necessary element in defence. Kerensky made a tour through the army, addressing enormous meetings of soldiers and, particularly on the South-Western front, imploring them to take the offensive. Finally the offensive was launched on July 1. The picked units, the death battalions and the Czecho-Slovaks, did wonders and shattered the Austrian right wing. But there was an ominous sign. A large number of soldiers, demoralised by Bolshevik propaganda, sullenly refused to fight. The spirit of the army, unsupported by organised discipline, was recklessly squandered. The best and most active elements were sacrificed. The army was seriously weakened by the offensive, and all the time the Bolshevik propaganda, unrestrained by any form of coercion, had been steadily increasing in strength.

On July 15, simultaneously with an Austro-German counter-offensive in Galicia, a Bolshevik revolt broke out in Petrograd. The Government was helpless. It was saved only by the indifference of the Petrograd garrison, which had no desire to fight for anyone, and by the efforts of a small band of volunteers, consisting of Cossacks, wounded veterans and Black Sea sailors. Prince Lvov resigned, Kerensky became Premier, and the Government was reformed. The Soviet itself had been surrounded by a threatening crowd of Bolshevik sailors from Kronstadt, and had been saved by the Cossacks. Tsereteli left the Government and returned to the Soviet to fight the Bolsheviks. In Galicia the demoralised Russian army retreated in a disgraceful panic. Kornilov, appointed a week or so before commander of the front, took strong measures on his own responsibility, shot down deserters

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and so checked the *débâcle*. The Government had to approve his measures.

Then followed the Kerensky period. The reaction against the Bolsheviks was strong. The Government did use coercion to a limited extent. Several Bolsheviks, including Trotsky and Madame Kollontai, were arrested ; Lenin and others escaped into hiding. General Kornilov was appointed Commander-in-Chief. The tone of the Soviet grew more chastened, and under the pressure of internal difficulties and the shock of the Galician rout the preparations for an international Socialist Conference at Stockholm, which had been so ardently debated before the Bolshevik insurrection, were almost forgotten.

Kerensky's method of government was peculiar. He realised that there was a serious conflict between the Soviet parties on the one hand and the so-called "bourgeois" parties on the other. He also realised that the triumph of the extreme "bourgeois" parties would mean reaction and that the triumph of the extreme Socialists or Bolsheviks would be equally dangerous in another sense. His aim was to effect a compromise between the moderate elements on both sides, and to assert the absolute supremacy of the Provisional Government. To this end he assumed in his public declarations a tone of stern authority, and evolved a curious and rather clumsy imitation of the language of pre-revolutionary State documents. But just as he used up the spirit of the army by exploiting the ardour of volunteers without creating a background of organised discipline, so he squandered the moral prestige of the Government by a series of vehement and menacing assertions which, since they were not followed up by corresponding action, created an effect of impotence. He shrank from creating the machinery of coercion, he shrank from the simple duty of establishing a force to uphold the authority he so loudly proclaimed. He saw the elements of the situation, but he did not know what to do with them,

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how to mould them. He had no real initiative of his own, no constructive capacity.

This was demonstrated in a most remarkable manner at the Moscow Conference of State held towards the end of August. A more thoroughly representative body, one may imagine, has never been assembled in any nation. The leading men and women of all the chief parties and groups were gathered in the Great Theatre—the Soviets, Army Committees and groups associated with them on one side, the Duma Deputies, Generals, manufacturers and zemstvo and municipal workers on the other. There was a disposition to unite. A strong and wise man would have made the Assembly an occasion effectively to affirm and organise the unity of the nation. The warning speeches of Generals Alexeiev, Kornilov and Kaledin made a deep impression. Yet Kerensky let this amazing opportunity pass without taking a single practical step. He closed the congress with a painful jumble of indiscriminate and hardly intelligible threats, and then collapsed in hysterics. The conference dispersed, shocked and thoroughly alarmed.

The unsatisfied demand for a restraining force led to the tragic Kornilov episode and a very serious Government crisis. Kerensky called the Soviet to his aid, declared Kornilov a traitor and had him arrested. Thereafter, distraught and unprotected, he was exposed to the full force of the Bolshevik campaign. The Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries in the Soviet, alarmed at the decline of their own power, helped Kerensky to patch up another Coalition Government. Too late, a sort of temporary parliament was convened under the name of the Council of the Republic. The Bolsheviks openly preached sedition. Most of their arrested leaders had by this time been released from prison. Kerensky did nothing to oppose them. An incurable impressionist, he had not the intellect, the knowledge or the will to clothe his vague and emotional conceptions of government in flesh and blood. Meantime

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the army and fleet were going to pieces, and the Germans had made secure their hold on the Baltic coast.

When the Bolsheviks on November 7 captured the Soviet Congress and attacked the Provisional Government in the Winter Palace they found no one to oppose them but a handful of cadets from the officers' training-schools and a few women soldiers. Kerensky escaped. All the other members of the Government were arrested. The Bolsheviks seized the supreme power.

In justice to the successive Provisional Governments it must be said that their scope of action was limited by the obligations they had undertaken when the first Revolutionary Government was formed, and that they were haunted by the dread of a relapse to the old regime. The extent of the geographical area over which the Revolution operated imposed on the Government a task that was almost superhuman. And the man of pre-eminent genius who might have controlled the surging popular forces did not appear. In any case eight months is a short period, a very brief phase in the history of a revolution of such magnitude.

X.

THE Bolsheviks, led by the cold and stubborn fanatic Lenin and the clever adventurer Trotsky, solved the problem of power in a reckless and simplified manner of their own. They cared little enough for Russia, their aim was to bring about a world revolution. They attracted the soldiers by the promise of immediate peace, the peasants by the promise of the immediate socialisation of land, and the workmen by the promise of the immediate establishment of labour control in the factories. They forthwith created an armed force and ruthlessly applied coercion to their opponents. The Bolshevik idea of the triumph of the masses over their exploiters, over the *bourgeoisie*, spread like an epidemic through the land and for a time rendered

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futile every attempt at resistance. The Bolsheviks seized the opportunity, before the army had dispersed, to create a Prætorian guard of their own, and then, masters of the situation, proceeded to carry out their social experiments.

The Bolsheviks carried out their promises. They did make a peace that placed the richest parts of Russia under the control of German Imperialists and created in the rest of Russia a state of perpetual civil war. But, at any rate, the Army broke up finally and the soldiers drifted back to their homes. The Bolsheviks did proclaim the confiscation of private estates and of monastic and crown lands, but no system was devised for the partition of land among the peasantry. The result was an orgy of plunder and destruction in which the worst instincts of the peasantry found vent, but which brought them not the slightest economic relief. Indiscriminate land grabbing simply led to a strikingly unequal distribution of the land of private estates among the peasantry, and thence to further conflict between villages and individual peasants. The workmen were given control over the factories, or the factories were nationalised. But the workmen proved incapable of managing the factories they controlled or of inducing themselves or their comrades to work with any energy. And in spite of the enormous sums spent by the Bolshevik Government on subsidies for the payment of wages to workmen who toyed with their work, the factories closed down one after another, and the workmen drifted into the streets. The store of manufactured goods swiftly declined, paper money became valueless, and there was practically nothing to give the peasants in exchange for their produce. Add to this the fact that communications were cut by civil war or German occupation, that transport, which had been overstrained by the war, had now sunk into a deplorable condition, and that the suggestion of anything like a normal circulation of goods sounded like bitter irony, and it becomes intelligible that the masses in a few months began to realise that the Bolshevik peace was considerably

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worse than war. The food shortage became appalling, and punitive expeditions were sent into the country to extort corn from the peasants.

That is the material side. The system of rule is in theory a dictatorship of the proletariat exercised through central and local Soviets of workmen, soldiers and peasants. The propertied classes are disfranchised, also the educated class in so far as its members do not accept the Bolshevik creed. But workmen, too, and peasants who elect non-Bolsheviks find themselves forcibly disfranchised. And in fact Bolshevik rule is a clumsy autocracy exercised by Lenin and Trotsky through the Red Guard or Red Army they formed during the period of the dissolution of the Regular Army. The Red Army, which is incapable of resistance to an organised and disciplined force, terrorises the population, and serves as the instrument of a tyranny more immediately cruel, more openly unscrupulous than any that the Ministers of the old regime could have conceived or exercised. That the Press is completely gagged, that liberty of action is a matter of purchase or evasion, that corruption runs riot, that justice is a legend, that human life has become almost as valueless as the rouble in an epidemic of murder and massacre—these are the cold facts of the Bolshevik rule, and their sinister significance is not mitigated by the fact that by skill, contrivance or sheer inertia it is possible under such conditions to exist, if not to live. And it speaks well for the fundamental humaneness and decency of the Russian people that with all these powerful incitements to evil the actual quantity of brutal excess has not attained far more astounding dimensions.

Yet in the idea and intention of the leaders, at any rate of Lenin, the Bolshevik regime is a genuine experiment in Socialism. And the fact that this extraordinary man and some of his followers believe in it is the only power that gives such a bizarre and revolting system a show of credibility. It matters not to Lenin that, having

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yielded in the essentials of national existence to German dictatorship, he finds himself subjected to continual German pressure, that he is actually a pawn in the Germans' hands. He has known all along that his reign will be brief, but he is intent on making a Socialist experiment on such a scale and of such contagious power as to provoke a social revolution in the most advanced capitalist countries. Decrees are poured out, plans of industrial and political organisation on communist lines are published in hundreds in the now bulky code of Soviet law. It matters nothing that in Russia they are so much waste paper, or that the attempts to apply them only increase the terrible anarchy and reduce the triumphant proletariat to prostration. The ideas, thinks Lenin, will gradually leaven the masses of Russia and perhaps bear fruit at some later date. But more important still, they will, in that strange excitement that emanates from the martyrdom of Russia, stimulate the awakening aspirations of the Western proletariat, and help to determine the outlines of that order which the triumph of the world-revolution will bring to birth.

Lenin—the inhuman, immoral, petty, intriguing Lenin—coldly and bitterly and inexorably possessed by his single abnormal idea, regards the world-war and the destruction of Russia as mere incidents in the practical realisation of his theory. He is a remarkable product of the Russian autocracy. He is strong in this extraordinary power of abstraction, in his capacity for ignoring at least one half of human nature. But this, too, explains the disastrous consequences of his rule in Russia and its certain failure. From the point of view of the Russian people Bolshevism is not so much a doctrine or a political system as a strange mood, a mental phase through which the people had inevitably to pass in emerging from such an autocracy to attain the full stature of conscious nationhood in a modern world. The terrible experience of Bolshevism and German domination are driving into the

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popular mind the elementary lessons of organised national life with a force wholly beyond the range of any mere formal or imitative teaching.

XI

FOR the Russian Revolution is the awakening of a great people. It is a testing of latent powers under extraordinary conditions. It is as though the Russian people were determined to throw off the tutelage of the West and of its own leaders, and to discover a way of its own. No one could pass through the Revolution without marvelling at the perpetual talk and inquiry, the perpetual conflict of ideas, often crude, always picturesque. At every street corner, in every home, in every railway carriage, the great debate went on unceasingly. Men, parties, principles, methods were tried and tested with unwearying energy. War, international politics, local administration, religion, art, morals were subjected to a frank discussion that could only seem preposterous to the sober peoples of the West. The experiment of extreme Socialism following on the Tsarist autocracy afforded an immense scope for an inquiry in which the whole people engaged. And the inquiry was not merely theoretical; it was practical. With a strange childish zest, the people groped its way among human institutions and the laws of nature, recklessly ignoring received opinions and the dim light of a semi-conscious experience, separating and reuniting, destroying and clumsily attempting to rebuild, determined to accept nothing on authority, but to discover its own particular reaction on the visible world. The Revolution is, in fact, a stirring up of an immense fallow land of reserves of human capacity, with results which only later generations will be able to estimate.

Workmen broke away from their employers, soldiers from their officers, peasants rejected the idea of a superior

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class of landowners. Nationalities released from a highly centralised control started off on adventures of their own into new spheres of ideas and political and economic relations, often enough only to fall under the domination of Germany. The people of Southern Russia tried by a violent experiment to discover whether they were, as they had been told, a separate Ukrainian nation or not. The Tatars experimented on the question as to whether their most vital cultural and economic affinities were with Turkey or Russia. And everywhere the laggards, the apathetic, those who were disposed to acquiesce in things as they were, were caught up in the general whirl, forced to see, to learn, to test their likes and dislikes by the hard experience of varied possibilities.

For the Russian *intelligentsia*, too, for the educated class, this has been a cruel testing time. They were thrown into direct contact with the people. The barrier of the bureaucracy was broken down. Power and responsibility were thrust upon them. Their hoarded theories were flung into direct contact with the unenlightened instincts of the people. Monarchists, Cadets, Social Revolutionaries, Bolsheviks, mystics and positivists, worshippers of the people and worshippers of power, all were tried, all were catechised, from all were demanded enlightenment and practical guidance. Bound down to inaction under the old regime, the *intelligentsia* had sought mental satisfaction in the construction of elaborate theories, and somehow, in the course of the Revolution, the people, in its manifold collective action, practically explored every nook and cranny of these elaborate theories. It was an extraordinary mingling of Russian culture in its varied aspects with the real life of the whole people, with the elemental instincts which, in the long spaces of history, supply the effective impulse for national organisation. The *intelligentsia*, hitherto isolated, was moulded and kneaded into the popular consciousness, permeated this consciousness and was permeated by it, saw its theories at work, saw their

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strange and erratic modifications in the thought and action of the Russian people. And the claim of the *intelligentsia* to national leadership was subjected to the most cruel test of all. After eight months of experiment the people dethroned an *intelligentsia* that had proved to be as inexperienced in action as the people itself was inexperienced in thought. The *intelligentsia* were treated as pariahs by the people whom they had idealised, for whom they had thought and worked their life long. Yet perhaps this cruel test was the most effective of all. For after this new and more bitter separation which brought to both sides disaster, it is true, but also a chastening view of realities, the compelling necessity of a working reunion, on a common national basis, of a disillusionised *intelligentsia* and a people now finally convinced of its incapacity to walk alone, emerges as a sign of returning national health.

XII

THE recovery of Russia is certain. What form the process will assume in its later stages it is difficult for human reason to discern. The Revolution has been a shock to the Western mentality. It has baffled the Allies, and baffled the Germans. From the point of view of temporary strategic calculations it has seemed to many an unmitigated calamity. But if the world-war be regarded as a great process of social and national transformation far transcending purely strategic considerations, then the Russian Revolution will be seen as one of the most vital factors in the creation of a new world society, as the imposing assertion by a gifted people, inhabiting a vast area containing a large proportion of the world's natural resources, of a claim actively and independently to participate in the establishment of a world-civilisation. And if we have not learnt it through the war, then at least the Russian Revolution may teach us that our powerful

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Western civilisation unmodified, unrevised, cannot become the civilisation of the world, that in the presence of the fierce and tragic conflict of the peoples of the West over its dominant principles, the awakened and awakening peoples must, in adopting its marvellous mechanism, test its spirit and adapt it to their very varied needs. Consider the infinity of possible reactions in Russia whose own civilisation in the epoch now past grew up under the mingled influences of the Mediterranean South, the European West, the Middle East, and China.

For the impulse of the Russian Revolution, that strange, confused awakening of social and national aspiration, that scathing revision of all the elements of social structure, has swept across the Eurasian continent from the Baltic to the Pacific, from the White to the Black Sea. It has shaken the homes of ancient civilisations that had no part in the upbuilding of modern Europe. The modern Western civilisation that we once thought in the first flush of our technical triumphs we might impose on them intact is being now borne to them in the light of the Russian experiment, the Russian revision. The way in which China and India will enter into the new world-civilisation, whose type we are now struggling to discern in war, will be largely determined by what is happening and what will happen in Russia.

More than that, we cannot be sure as to the possible reaction on Europe. First of all, there is the narrower question as to the effect of the Revolution on the course of the war. True, the collapse of the Russian army gave Germany a temporary military superiority over the Allies. But what is equally certain is that the extraordinary vagaries of a Russia defeated, divided, and ruined have had an extremely disconcerting effect on the systematic and securely self-confident strategists and politicians of Germany. And whether or not Russia recovers soon enough again to take her place in the war with a regular army—which is a very moot question—the effect on German plans

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of her reckless experiment in self-determination is of very sensible military advantage to the Allies. And the influence of that very peculiar and very powerful Russian contagion on the peoples who are cramped up in the narrow spaces of Central Europe cannot be wholly left out of account as a possible auxiliary to our military pressure on the Western front.

But that is by no means the chief point to be considered. The question of the possible influence of the Russian Revolution is of importance to us not so much in relation to the immediate military conflict between Germany and ourselves as in relation to the problem of the world-civilisation. The Russian people has engaged in a very striking experiment for its own purposes, its own needs. But it is necessary for us to scrutinise very closely the results of that experiment. The Revolution has exposed secrets of the social structure of which we were only dimly aware. It has submitted our own most advanced theories to a severe, if not a thorough, test. It has given full rein to powerful forces that are latent in other societies. It has reviewed with astounding frankness our confirmed habits, our innate prejudices, our cherished institutions, our calm sense of achievement. This Russian experiment was actually a practical test of our own civilisation. And as such it is a warning.

This warning is coming home to us, and will be brought home to us in a variety of ways. It will be well if it can be appreciated intellectually. The war has sharpened our faculty of self-criticism, but the Revolution, which opens up the ultimate implications of the war, should stimulate this faculty to the most intense activity. The Russian people has suffered not for itself alone. Its search and its suffering are already an immensely important contribution to the upbuilding of the world-civilisation. And the lessons it has learned are lessons that we, for our own sakes and for the sake of the work before us, need to read without prejudice and with unceasing alertness. Those who have

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passed through the Russian Revolution will never look on Western civilisation with the same eyes again. They have seen the veil of appearances torn away, and they know of other things and are uneasy.

For this and for a hundred other reasons the Allies, who are fighting for the liberating principle of civilisation, are deeply concerned in the recovery of Russia. And for the sake of what they certainly know to be of permanent value in the achievement of modern Europe they cannot but lend their aid in the recovery, so that from the mingling of that tragic and illuminating Russian experience with the process of reconstruction in which we are involved there may emerge a wisdom and a power sufficient to bear the burden of the higher civilisation that shall make the peoples of the world in spirit one.

That Russia is and will be Russia is a fundamental fact. One can perceive some of the probabilities and possibilities of the immediate future. The people, exhausted by its great experiment, will demand order, will turn for rest to many of its former habits of thought. Possibly a dictatorship may be necessary for a short time in order to render possible sheer physical recuperation. Perhaps there may be a period of constitutional monarchy as a concession to bewildered sentiment. Decentralisation and a satisfactory solution of the agrarian problem are obvious conditions of stable government. Granted the removal of artificial impediments through the defeat of Germany, the nationalities, taught by bitter experience the danger of isolation, will drift into economic and political reunion with the biggest people of the plain, no doubt after taking all precautions to guarantee their national rights. And Russian culture will develop with a new vigour and assume new depth. All this, of course, not without constant friction, repeated disappointment, and frequent perturbations. But Russia will be Russia.

And when Russia is outwardly Russia again she will not be, either in structure or in mood, simply a replica on a

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large scale of any one of our Western States. For the ideas and experiences through which she has passed during the Revolution will leaven her life, and in a society more orderly, more firmly compact and yet free, will spring out in novel forms, and will find curious application in her institutions, her economic methods, her literature, and even in the religion that will again be a power in her life. A nation with such fresh and newly-released energy, a nation that, half blindly now but with a wisdom rapidly maturing in harsh experience, is exerting such a will to discover the real bases of its national existence, must become in our collective civilisation a power of an entirely new quality, and will be a fecund source, of anxiety perhaps, but also of great intellectual and moral stimulus to the peoples of the West who are fighting their way out into a world of new and broader endeavour.

THE BETTER GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM

WE are fighting for the principle that public opinion shall control public affairs. The method of applying that principle to the governance of whole nations was first realised in this country. In England was lit the candle from which beacons of freedom have been kindled throughout the world. The English initiated the practice of governing themselves. And yet, in the years which preceded this war, their actual conditions of life in their home-country compared unfavourably with those in the oversea Dominions and in the United States. More disquieting still was the feeling that in many respects they were worse than those of peoples whose rulers openly denied the doctrine of popular control. What spiritual life could the blessings of freedom bring either to the millions in these Islands who were under-fed, under-clothed and under-housed, or to the thousands gorged with an over-abundance of material things? The social framework had not been remodelled to fit vast and far-reaching changes in life, nor yet to satisfy juster conceptions of the duty owed by each to all. Whole classes were living in a state which offended an awakening public conscience.

The blame for these evils could not be located or assigned to any one man or body of men. No candid person believed that the prevalent evils could be cured without invoking the aid, guidance and authority of the State. The defects of the social fabric were such as nothing short of corporate action could redress. Yet no

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one felt that adequate action was in sight or indeed that the Government of this country was capable of setting it in motion. The people first dedicated to the principle of self-government were signally failing to do justice between class and class, or to prove themselves masters of their own fate. Good government is in truth no substitute for self-government. Yet institutions purporting to be free must be judged by something more than their flowers and leaves. Where the fruits of justice and good living fail, it is time to look to the roots. The chances are that the real sap of public control is ceasing to flow.

For the moment war has strangely abated some of the evils which afflicted this country. Its horrors have awakened the public conscience. For the first time in the history of England the necessities of life are distributed with some reference to social justice. A wholesale consumption of capital is producing a fungoid prosperity. We are for the moment a people forced to divide and devour our seed. But this counterfeit plenty will aggravate the difficulties and dangers which will follow the peace. The need for reform, for wide and far-reaching adjustments in the law and machinery of government, will be tenfold greater than before the war. The work to be done will be infinitely heavier, and whether the power of public opinion will be able to effect these changes becomes a question more urgent than ever. So far the answer given to that question has been the old and well-worn expedient of extending the franchise, of multiplying the number of people qualified to issue a mandate. But the question whether the existing machinery of government can give effect to their mandates, or even raise the points upon which mandates are really required, has scarcely been asked and has certainly as yet received no answer. And yet the question is no new one. For the last forty years thoughtful observers have been noting the fact that Parliament was becoming less and less able to meet the demands made upon its time by a population which was

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growing in size and still more in the intricacy of its organisation. It is about that time since Mr. Hugh Childers penned the following remarks :—

Towards the close of the Parliament of 1874 I began to be impressed with the hopelessness of getting through the work of the United Kingdom with one legislative body sitting at Westminster.

I was present during the greater part of the long debates of that Parliament when Ireland blocked the way ; and I was in the chair for half that all-night sitting in committee on the South African Bill, which clearly showed how an overworked House of Parliament could be still more crippled in its powers of work.

All this set me thinking whether time for adequately discussing at Westminster the often neglected affairs of the Empire might not be better obtained by relegating to inferior legislative bodies the purely local affairs of each of the three kingdoms than by artificial restraints on the liberty of debate, always distasteful to Englishmen—which had begun to be suggested in many quarters. The congestion of Parliamentary work was not, it is true, unwelcome to those who, through fear of change, were glad to minimise the legislative work of the House of Commons, but it was dreaded by the Liberal majority, who felt that legislative and administrative reform were falling into arrear, and that every year was making matters worse. These impressions gained more and more power over me, and were strengthened by what I saw during annual visits to the United States and Canada. I had special facilities for watching the action of Congress and the State Legislatures in the former, and of the Dominion Parliament and the provincial Legislatures in the latter. Again and again I asked myself how it is that our race in the great Republic and in the greatest of our Colonies requires and fully occupies all this Parliamentary machinery (between forty and fifty legislative bodies, most of them with two Chambers each), while we imagine that we can adequately transact the business of England, Scotland, and Ireland, and the Imperial affairs of the whole Empire with one Parliament only. I reflected how imperfectly and hurriedly, and often badly, that business was transacted. . . .

I had, meanwhile, spent some time at Berlin and elsewhere in Germany, and I had had special opportunities for studying the relations of the central Parliament at Berlin with the Governments and Legislatures of the kingdoms and States which make up the German Empire.*

* *The Life of the Right Hon. Hugh C. E. Childers*, by Lieut.-Col. Spencer Childers, Vol. II., pp. 230-2.

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The contrasts which Childers saw in 1880 remain to be stated in the figures of to-day. In Germany there is, in round numbers, about one government to every 2,500,000 souls ; in Switzerland one to every 170,000 ; in the United States one to every 2,000,000 ; in Canada, one to every 800,000 ; in Australia, one to every 700,000 ; in South Africa, one to every 1,200,000. In the United Kingdom 45,000,000 people are served by a single executive and legislature which have also to control the external affairs of a quarter of mankind.

The historical reasons for this startling contrast between the parent country and its colonies have a bearing on the practical issue. All these countries are the product of unions between previously separate units ; for even in the United Kingdom, Scotland and Ireland once had parliaments and governments of their own. In the new countries the separate units retained their provincial governments, which proved indispensable when the industrial conditions of nineteenth century civilisation increased beyond measure the legislative and administrative burden imposed upon governments. One cannot, for instance, imagine that the needs of society in the United States could be met to-day by a single government, though little is there left to public authorities if private enterprise can possibly supply it. Relieved as it is by forty-eight State governments (leaving aside the governments of territories) Washington is still overburdened with work. In America the State governments survived because society was comparatively free from external pressure. Canada and Australia were even more free, and followed the American example. The parent country stood between them all and the menace to freedom from Spain or France. It was pressure from Europe concentrated on the British Isles which compelled the union of England and Scotland. The federal patent, invented eighty years later by America, was not on the market, and no one conceived the alternative of preserving the Parliaments of England and Scotland, of creating a

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common Parliament for Great Britain and of relegating thereto customs, foreign affairs, defence and other interests common to both kingdoms. In 1799 the external pressure was intense. A condition of anarchy in Ireland was, as in the present war, jeopardising the safety of the whole Commonwealth. The American patent, though in the market, was not understood, and the Irish Parliament was simply abolished. The destruction of the Scottish and Irish Parliaments resulted in an over-centralised system of government, utterly unequal to the burden which the industrial revolution was about to lay on it.

Six years ago the whole subject was examined in the introduction to a now forgotten book entitled *An Analysis of the System of Government Throughout the British Empire*,* and as since 1912 the pressure on Parliament has steadily increased, its conclusions cannot be regarded as obsolete. Readers will do well to consult the volume itself, but a brief summary of the results may be given here for the purposes of this article.

The writer began by analysing the distribution of parliamentary time in the years 1904 to 1908, which for certain reasons were the most typical he could find. The average session he found covered about 140 working days in the year. Of these he estimated that close on 38 were needed for finance, despite the fact that only a small proportion of the 150 votes were really discussed; 7 days were needed for discussions on the Address, even when abbreviated by the use of the closure; 4 more were required for motions for the adjournment, 3 for declaratory resolutions, votes of censure, etc., 9 for the abstract motions of private members. Besides all this one day had always to be reckoned as blank, while one was devoted to the ceremonies of prorogation. In actual practice 68·3 days had been devoted to all these various purposes. Of the time available for legislation, 14 days had been spent on private members' Bills. There was thus less than

* Published by Macmillan & Co.

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60 days in a session available for Government legislation.

He next examined the handling of Government legislation from 1900 to 1909. In this decade 388 such Bills were passed, of which 60 were finance measures. The remaining 328 occupied 483 days, of which 10 principal measures consumed 207 days; 318 Bills were thus passed in 276 days. Such feats, as the writer shows, are only rendered possible by the growing skill of the Parliamentary draughtsmen in framing clauses which will not provoke amendment because their real meaning is concealed. "The truth is," he remarks, "that no deliberative assembly can turn out 318 Acts in 276 days unless it can be dissuaded from debating them."

More interesting still is his treatment of the 115 measures mentioned during this decade in speeches from the Throne. Now the mention of a Bill in the Royal Speech is strong *prima facie* evidence that the responsible executive in office considers it necessary to the public welfare. Of such measures no more than half were passed in the same session, and more than a quarter were never introduced at all. And the argument that Bills lost or abandoned were mentioned only as window-dressing will not hold. Of eighty-four Bills which the outgoing Government had failed to pass their opponents adopted thirty-eight, and of these lost no less than seven. And meanwhile they were piling up large arrears of their own.

To two measures of importance he specially refers. Lunacy was mentioned three times from the Throne and Scottish Education twice, and yet these measures were only disposed of in eight years. A table is also given showing the appalling waste of time and money on public inquiries to whose results Parliament has failed to give effect. The outstanding instance is the Local Taxation Commission appointed in 1896, which reported in 1901. In eleven years no attempt had been made to give effect to this costly report, the findings of which, of course, became obsolete.

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Public Health is one of those matters upon which science has made notable progress. The Public Health Act passed in 1875 has admitted defects ; but Parliament is impotent to remove them.

But if the insufficiencies of a particular series of Acts like the Public Health Acts can be proved to demonstration, it can hardly be questioned that the present legislative output is but a trickle in the desert to the requirements of the departments.

It is, indeed, obvious on the face of it that a great deal of our statute law is out of date. The sale of patent medicines, with all their attendant evils and attendant frauds, is regulated by Acts of the reign of George III. or at best by the Pharmacy Act, 1869. Certain parts of the Public Health Act, 1875—that, for instance, dealing with the disposal of sewage—have been left untouched for thirty-six years. Purity of water supply is safeguarded only by an Act of 1878. Dental quacks flourish under an Act of the same year. The traffic in obscene publications is controlled by inadequate Acts of 1824 and 1857. The whole law relating to public entertainments is hopelessly antiquated. An unqualified chemist is only prevented from prescribing for his customers by the Apothecaries Act, 1815. These are all subjects which have been profoundly modified by the changed conditions of modern life, by the advance of science, by the increase of education, by the gradual, inscrutable changes of habit and fashion. They are just as important to the well-being of the community as the questions which win or lose general elections. But because they are non-political they are thrust perpetually into the background, and nothing but the heroic pertinacity of a conscientious minister can secure them even the perfunctory attention of the Cabinet and of Parliament.*

We know what the industries of this country have suffered from the habit of using obsolete plant. Now laws in a modern progressive State fill the same place as machines in an industry. The likeness between them is more than analogy. Statutes are literally the instruments with which an administrator works. He is limited by the courts to the powers they confer, and apart from his own skill and efficiency the work he can do depends upon how far they are fitted to the facts he is set to control. The facts of our

* *An Analysis of the System of Government Throughout the British Empire*, pp. xxviii-xxix.

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public life are dangerously out of control because Parliament leaves the executive to work with obsolete tools.

Rather than admit the obvious limits to its power of transacting business Parliament has accepted remedies destructive of government by discussion and fatal, therefore, to the law of its own being. We have always believed that control of Supply is the essence of our political system. The following passage will show the real state of the case :—

Under the Standing Orders, at the conclusion of the proceedings on the last day but one allotted to Supply, the Chairman proceeds to put the question upon all the votes outstanding in Committee. The sums voted under this provision—that is to say, voted without a single word of debate—have been as follows :—

	£		£
1900 ..	3,591,877	1906 ..	15,727,746
1901 ..	67,706,671	1907 ..	50,844,895
1902 ..	12,088,571	1908 ..	33,157,478
1903 ..	5,231,117	1909 ..	57,836,901
1904 ..	31,124,231	1910 ..	52,615,286
1905 ..	50,619,241	1911 ..	67,046,752

It is perfectly true that the amount of discussion required for a vote cannot be measured directly by the number of millions involved ; but it is significant that the figures show a very decided tendency to increase. In any case they demonstrate that the limit of time at present imposed by the Standing Orders involves a very severe curtailment of debate. The process may certainly be carried further, but the process itself is the negation of Parliamentary government.†

Lastly he deals with attempts to expedite business by the closure :—

It might have been expected that the figures of the ordinary closure would vary, roughly, in inverse ratio to those of the guillotine. This is to a certain extent true ; since the years in which the ordinary closure was most frequently applied were 1902, when the Education Bill was only partially guillotined, and 1909, when the Finance Bill was not guillotined at all. But, taking a broader view

† *An Analysis of the System of Government Throughout the British Empire*, pp. xxxiii—xxxiv.

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of the figures, we may say that there has been a marked advance in favour of the guillotine, but that there has not been a proportionate diminution in the use of the ordinary closure. The Government have not discarded one weapon in favour of another; they have found it necessary to keep both in active use. That is one significant fact. The second is this, that the newer weapon is devised for the purpose of carrying legislation, and for no other purpose. The ordinary closure is useful enough as a means of foiling obstruction on the particular question before the House, or of preventing a Bill from being "talked out." But it is of comparatively little use for the purpose of meeting not merely obstruction, but full and well-informed debate on the details of a Bill. The guillotine is a brutally efficient weapon; but it is also, by universal assent, clumsy and unsatisfactory. It does not hasten Parliamentary debate; it merely dispenses with it. It leads inevitably to Acts of Parliament which are ill-drafted and possibly inconsistent. Its adoption as a regular incident of Parliamentary life is the supreme admission that the House of Commons is incompetent to perform its legislative work under existing conditions.

The selection of amendments by the Speaker or Chairman—the so-called "Kangaroo" closure—is a more refined expedient. But it adds omniscience to the many qualities already demanded of the Chair; it leads to unseemly and unprofitable wrangles between the Chairman and disappointed members; and it contains untold possibilities of blunders in the way of neglected consequential amendments. It is too early yet to speak as to its efficiency. On the few occasions when it has been applied it has been applied drastically. But, like all forms of closure, it hastens Parliamentary procedure only by making it superfluous. There is something to be said for government by an autocrat; and there is something to be said for government by a deliberative assembly. But there is little indeed to be said for government by an assembly which is not permitted to deliberate.*

Parliament has in fact resorted to those "artificial restraints on the liberty of debate" the danger of which Childers foresaw and dreaded.

In the Ministry of Reconstruction attention is now being given to the reorganisation of Government Departments. But, as every thoughtful official is aware, no administrative machinery, however perfect, will give

* *An Analysis of the System of Government Throughout the British Empire*, pp. xxxvii—xxxviii.

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efficient results unless the political authority under which it works can supply the requisite executive and legislative decisions. Human no less than material machinery requires not merely a force to move it, but adequate appliances for harnessing and applying the force. All Niagara will not drive the street cars and factories of Buffalo and Toronto until turbines and dynamos and lines enough to generate and distribute the power are equipped. The vast unrealised force of British democracy has but one obsolete dynamo which cannot develop the power required by its administrative machinery. A great volume of that power goes roaring down the rapids, magnificent, but useless, because unharnessed.

Parliament is unable to deal with the needs of the British Isles because those needs are too many and various. No one assembly could possibly consider and decide all the questions calling for decision in so vast and complicated a society. There are not enough days in the year nor hours in the day. But the House of Commons is further handicapped by its enormous size, which is partly due to the fact that there is only one body in which to represent any interest too wide for a county council to handle. 670 members sit in the present house. The next will contain no less than 707, a number sufficient to man one central and four provincial assemblies. And every one of those bodies would be more efficient than the House of Commons, if only because each of them would then be of manageable size.

The growing difficulty of passing the measures needed for efficient government is largely responsible for the tendency of British politics to decline from the plane of statesmanship to that of the demagogue. In recent years proposals have been less and less considered on their merits and more and more from the standpoint of mere sentiment. And the reason is obvious. Parliamentary time is so precious that ministers will not look at a measure likely to provoke the opposition of a vested interest unless there is

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a wave of sentiment behind it. But measures most vital to the public interest, the reform of local taxation, of the poor law, or of land-title, do not from their nature evoke storms of enthusiasm. Potential majorities in favour of passing such measures may exist, and yet in the present congestion of business their passage may be blocked by a vested interest or a reactionary clique. Ministers simply dare not risk the loss of parliamentary time involved. They dare not expend in debate the time without which public opinion cannot be brought to realise the vital necessity of such reforms. Take the registration of land-title. A few years ago a Lord Chancellor agreed with his predecessor in public debate that the present system of transfers costs the country £4,000,000 a year, which would all be saved by a proper system of land registration. The popular feeling which carries a scheme of old age pensions or national insurance cannot be raised by a subject like this ; and without it no Government dares to expend the time needed to wear down the expert opposition of the legal profession. With all the technique at their fingers' ends, lawyers can prove to a logical nicety that effective registration of land-title is a thing which can only be achieved in the course of generations. And yet, given a sufficient staff of judicial commissioners, the ordinary layman will continue to believe that a complete record of landed rights could be made in five years. A guarantee against any possible loss of rights to individuals can be permanently given by the expedient of an insurance fund. The commissioners and the insurance fund together would cost a good deal less than £4,000,000 a year. Why, after all, if a record of rights good enough for purposes of taxation can be made cannot it be used as a record of title ? Such a record once established, the impetus given to industry and social reform is incalculable. Land in small parcels becomes transferable as easily and rapidly as shares.

In 1910 an able commission was sent to Australia by the Scottish agricultural societies and chambers of commerce

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to see what openings could be found there for Scottish settlers. The people of Scotland as such, be it noted, had no machinery for appointing such a body. The commissioners spoke of the reforms they needed in Scotland. The reforms in question depended on the easy, rapid and cheap transfer of land in small parcels, and the commissioners after examining the Australian land-records, agreed that, given such a system in Scotland, the question of land reform would definitely enter a new phase. But they saw no chance of Parliament giving them such a system. Yet the moment they began to picture Scotland in the same position as Queensland, they saw the possibility of reforms such as would enable Scotland to keep on her own soil a large proportion of the agriculturalists, homes for whom this commission were seeking on the other side of the world.

The registration of land is just one of those matters in which the most advanced province will set the pace to all the rest, as has happened with liquor reform in Canada. It is also the necessary basis for a whole range of social reforms. In the Transvaal, for instance, the Town Planning Law is automatic, because it is based upon land registration. The registrar will not register sub-divisions of building lots until the proposed plan has been approved by the local body, or else by a board appointed to control town planning outside municipal areas.

The frustration of this essential reform in the British Isles is but one instance of the practical power of veto which small minorities wield in a legislature which is over-charged. The real menace to freedom is not the tyranny of majorities, but the tyranny of minorities. There is the disease under which we are languishing, and it is directly due to congestion of business—to the fact that the public opinion of 45,000,000 people cannot be educated and expressed through a single organ.

The all-important question of amending the law must not be forgotten. Some years ago the chairman of the

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educational committee of a county council admitted that most of his difficulties arose, not from the features of the Education Act over which controversy had raged, but from one technical defect. But, although a Bill amending this defect would not in itself be contentious, it might open the floodgates on the whole contentious question of education, and therefore ministers would not face an amending Bill. In contentious matters ministers have to legislate knowing they will have no adequate facilities for amendment. But measures dealing with new subjects like old age pensions or national insurance are, as we have said, instruments in the literal meaning of the term. A practicable aircraft would never have been designed by mechanical draftsmen, without the aid of pilots willing to risk their necks. The best project which can be elaborated in the drawing room will reveal defects when actually flown, which no effort of the human mind could foresee, but which can be corrected when they are seen. And so it is with laws framed to cover new administrative spheres of action. No skill in the draftsmen, no amount of discussion by members of Parliament will render them practicable till their latent defects are revealed by trial and corrected by amendment. The only safe course when dealing with a new subject upon which administrative experience has yet to be made is to fly the machine—that is to say, to get the measure into operation, to amend it as experience brings out the defects, and finally to consolidate the original and amending Acts. This in the oversea Dominions is the recognised process of constructive legislation, which is rendered possible by the fact that their legislatures have time in which to do their work. Knowledge that defects can be afterwards amended abbreviates debate. The House of Commons tries to discover in advance by interminable talk what can only be proved by actual trial.

It is often urged that the present system protects us from the evil of too many laws. As a matter of fact

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Parliament has already inflicted that evil upon us in its worst form, because it simply cannot face the work of statute law consolidation. Witness the fate of the drafts produced by the Commission on Statute Law Revision, as told in Ilbert's *Legislative Methods and Forms*. To clear and shorten its own statute book is one of the most important duties of a legislature, and Parliament has no time to face it. As to the quality of the legislation, the comments made by the writer quoted above will suffice. Legislation by reference and deliberate obscurity are increasingly used by the Executive to mask contentious points and avoid Parliamentary discussion.

The world has so praised our institutions that we have forgotten to judge them by results, or even to ask whether they are still instinct with the spirit for which they are praised. The naked fact is that this country, the mother of free institutions, was four years ago on the brink of civil war. And, if the Germans had not saved us, the struggle might well have raged, not only between Catholic and Protestant Ireland, but throughout Great Britain between class and class. The Irish difficulty would have been, not the cause, but only the occasion of conflict. Now a system of government under which men capable of freedom are in danger of civil strife stands self-condemned. The nation from which the seeds of freedom have spread to all the world is itself a pot-bound tree, which must either burst the vessel in which it has grown or wither at the roots. Our needs have grown and changed. But our system has failed to give us a corresponding growth and change in our law and system of administration. And if it failed in years of peace, how great must that failure be if we look to that system to give us reform after the war! The need of reform is avowed by the mere institution of a separate Ministry of Reconstruction with a large staff of officials. But what end is served by drawing projects of social reform unless we first see that machinery exists whereby public opinion can grasp

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their meaning and also carry them into effect? Until that is done the Ministry of Reconstruction will simply be adding fresh Bills to those which already choke the pigeon-holes of Departments with no prospect of being looked at by Parliament or even by the Cabinet. Busy and practical men are tired of sitting on advisory committees and are asking for results.

But the Ministry of Reconstruction only deals with one division of the subjects which demand the attention of Parliament after this war. When our Government has done its best to win this war and to save the liberties of the world, the question will still remain why it did so little to prevent the war. How was it that public opinion failed so utterly to grasp the conditions in Europe which led to this war, or to take measures to neutralise their growth? There are several reasons beyond the scope of this article, but one at least was the fact that the time of Parliament was so absorbed in domestic affairs that an adequate discussion of external affairs was out of the question. In the light of this awful experience external affairs must and will exercise a primary claim on the time of Parliament after the war. So far from being able to grapple with social reform, the arrears in this field will accumulate more rapidly than ever. While Government is busy with the fences, the thistles which choke this unweeded garden will ripen and shed new seed.

A central authority too jealous to devolve powers cripples itself. Members of popular assemblies and of their executives are just as prone to this vice as aristocracies and kings. In 1898 some members of the Select Committee on the Scottish Private Bill Procedure Bill talked as though the heavens would fall if "this House" forwent its right to discuss the merest details. The Bill had already been discussed for several years and was not passed till a later session, a good instance of the time wasted in talking over measures which really can only be tested by trial and amendment. The point is that popular legisla-

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tures, like autocrats, are apt to disable themselves by keeping too much in their own hands. The main problem in commonwealths is to secure that the central organ shall have time in which to discharge its all-important functions. Onus of proof should always be taken to rest on the man who wishes to centralise or to preserve centralisation. The discredit into which Parliament has fallen is due not to any decline in the several capacity of its members but to the inevitable decline in their joint capacity to deal with the needs of a growing community. Those needs must increase. Their time, so long as they remain one body, does not increase. It is restricted by immutable limits which have been reached long ago. So-called improvements in procedure can only now operate to destroy public discussion which is the actuating principle of the whole system.

No measure of civil service reform will of itself meet the need. However perfect the machine, it will quickly come to a standstill and relapse into fresh confusion unless Government can supply decisions. One Government cannot do so for want of time, and the principle of the remedy is commonplace and obvious. This one Government must devolve what business it can on other governments empowered to make decisions. To obtain the maximum devolution (and nothing less will do if we are to have strong government at the centre) such devolution must avail itself of geography as well as of the subject dealt with. The administrative mechanism of the British Isles is so vast and complex that no one assembly can possibly control it. The remedy dictated by common sense is to relieve it of all matters capable of being localised, and to make such matters amenable to decisions by local executives, legislatures and electorates.

The extent to which, however, this can be done will depend upon the areas chosen. As things are there is a tendency, it is said, to devolve on existing local authorities, which are purely municipal in character, duties they are

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quite unfit to discharge. There is, however, a wide range of all-important functions which cannot be delegated even to a county council. Consider, for instance, the area known as the Black Country, which includes Birmingham and Wolverhampton. It is in fact one large urban area, and its present condition results from a chaos of obsolete local authorities. The Local Government Board and Parliament have proved unequal to the task of dealing with this and dozens of similar problems. But on whom can the task of grappling with it be devolved? Not on a county council, for it covers the area of at least three counties. In America, Canada or Australia there exist provincial governments competent to deal with such matters. In the British Isles there is nothing but municipal devolution. In America, Canada and Australia there is wide political devolution, without which popular control in any great community will be largely paralysed. Without such devolution a scheme of administrative reconstruction can only become effective by reverting to the political principles of Prussia, which here we cannot and will not do. It is only by means of provincial devolution that efficiency can be reconciled with democratic control. Contrast the conditions of the United Kingdom, France and Italy with those of America, Switzerland, Canada or Australia, and you will see that, wherever the country or population is of certain dimensions, the province and provincial government are organs essential to an effective democracy. Its threatened breakdown in this country is mainly due to failure to develop these necessary organs. It is the fundamental reason why popular appetite rather than public need is taken as the main criterion of policy. In urging this case one is often met by the argument that there is no popular demand for it. The public need of scientific reform goes quite unheeded, and so far Parliament has proved itself incapable of the discussions which alone can make that need understood.

We are singularly given to taking what has been done

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as the only criterion of what ought to be done. The worship of graven precedents with human sacrifice has always prevailed in these Islands. The past cannot be studied too carefully, but when every lesson it has to teach has been learned, the one true guide to reform is a clear appreciation of the need to be met. And the greatest of all our needs is a government through which public opinion can really govern. It is bad enough that many things which provincial organs might do are neglected. It is far worse that the central Government is so crushed and paralysed by its burdens that it cannot discharge the functions which none but a central Government can perform. To strengthen the central organ is the greatest of all needs and obviously this can only be done by relieving it of everything which provincial organs can handle. The guiding principle should be the largest possible measure of devolution. But if we are resolved to relieve the central organ of every function which some provincial authority can discharge, we shall not then scruple to devolve on one province duties which cannot be devolved on some other. The idea that exactly equal powers must be granted to every province is deduced from a study of existing constitutions, more especially those of America and Australia without remembering the conditions under which they were framed. In these cases the federal system resulted from the union of separate units already equipped as States. To take the case of the American States, their legal sovereignty was in fact limited by their provincial character. While in law they were able to legislate on customs, in actual fact the thirteen original States were severally incapable of controlling their economic conditions. The need was so great that in spite of their mutual jealousies they managed to form a common government for common affairs. Yet because of their jealousies the arrangement which had to be recorded in writing took a contractual form. The only possible basis was equality even between a unit so small as Rhode Island and one so large as Virginia. The powers

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retained to each State were exactly the same. The symmetry in this and the other cases of federalism was a matter of history, the natural result of uniting distinct and separate communities.

But, even so, in Canada symmetry was sacrificed in the case of the Prairie Provinces, carved out of the federal territory after the union. In these provinces the Federal Government retained the control of the public lands, just because they represented an interest of the utmost importance. In the German Empire, Bavaria and other South German States enjoy powers denied to the rest.

The case of the United Kingdom is unique. Cavour did not live to fulfil his intention of dividing Italy into self-governing "regions." The project of restoring the old provincial legislatures of New Zealand, to relieve the strain on the Dominion Government, has never got beyond the framing of a Bill. Our task is exactly the opposite of that accomplished in the case of the federal countries. In this over-centralised country our problem is to equip provinces with governments and to relieve the central Government by devolving on the new provincial authorities everything which each of them can take. If this motive be kept in view, we shall give to each province the powers it can exercise, just as we do not scruple to give the London County Council powers which could not be given to the County Council of Huntingdon, or for quite different reasons to withhold from London the control of police, which is given to all similar authorities. In "federalising" the United Kingdom (the term is a misnomer, of course) we are travelling in a direction opposite to that followed when other federal constitutions were made. We must therefore expect to keep on the other side of the road. We have no reason to insist on contractual equality in a measure of devolution. We have every reason to devolve everything capable of devolution.

The difficult question of how the powers delegated to provincial governments are to be distinguished from

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those reserved to the central Government remains to be examined. The broad principle must, of course, be to enable each authority, whether central or provincial, to deal with the public needs which each is best qualified to handle. Scotland, for instance, is clearly qualified to deal with its own education and its own churches. It is equally clear that it is not qualified to deal with its railways, which are part of a system common to the whole United Kingdom. The first two clearly belong to the field of provincial law and administration, the last to central law and administration, and the question is how these two fields are to be distinguished.

The problem is that of dividing the whole field of government between the central authority on the one hand and the provincial authorities on the other. At the outset this problem can be narrowed and simplified by marking off, at one end of the field, functions which must in any case and always be reserved to the central Government; and also by marking off, at the other end of the field, functions which are obviously proper to provincial authorities. Without further discussion we can say that the central authorities must always deal with a number of matters like foreign affairs, defence, navigation and customs. With equal certainty we can say that if provincial governments are to be created they must deal with a number of subjects like local government and primary education. When spheres obviously proper to the central and provincial authorities have been marked off at the opposite ends of the whole field of government, between them will remain a large intermediate sphere. The method of apportioning this intermediate sphere between the central and provincial authorities is the crux of the whole problem. Its difficulty is greatly enhanced by the fact that this intermediate sphere is indefinite. We cannot say in advance what it contains, and still less what it will contain, because each generation has new needs which no human foresight can predict. All we can say is that any division of the field now made which

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purports to be hard, fast and final, will in a few years be out of relation to the facts, because the facts will have changed.

In Bills which have been drawn for conferring "home rule" on Scotland and Wales an attempt has been made to evade this problem. At one end of the field of government certain matters are reserved which the provincial authority may not touch. Over the whole of the rest of the field the provincial and central authorities are left to roam at will. The attempt to mark off the matters which the provincial authorities may handle from those which should be left to the central authority is abandoned. Save and except for the few matters reserved to the central authority the whole field of government is left to the concurrent jurisdiction of the central and provincial authorities. The intention is doubtless to prevent litigants from questioning the validity of provincial acts in the courts. The attempt will fail. Where concurrent jurisdiction exists the Acts of the central authority will in common law override the Acts of the provincial authority, wherever the two conflict. Nothing can prevent litigants raising the point in the courts. Of all the causes of costly litigation a conflict of laws may become the most fertile. To set two legislatures to legislate over the whole of one and the same field of government is simply to invite a conflict of laws which the courts must unravel as best they can.

The political consequence will be easier to trace if we have in mind a few typical cases which might in practice arise. A Welsh legislature might easily promote legislation seriously affecting the water supplies of Birmingham and Liverpool, which lie within its area. In seeking to protect life on their heavy gradients a Scottish legislature might well be moved to enact that all rolling stock on Scottish railways must be equipped with vacuum brakes. But such an enactment would impose an expenditure amounting to millions of pounds on the English and Welsh companies

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whose trucks run over Scottish lines. These difficulties are simple in comparison with those which would arise in the vast and varied field of commercial and industrial legislation. The case of company law in the United States is to be remembered. There New Jersey went out of its way to attract companies by the flagrant laxity it afforded to companies domiciled in that particular State. A salmon canning company operating on the Pacific Coast has its headquarters in New Jersey, because the laws of that State practically allow promoters to do as they please. The evil is not unknown in this part of the world, where for similar reasons companies have sought domicile in the Channel Isles. One province might copy New Jersey by attracting a number of companies by the laxity of its laws in order to tax them later on. It passes the wit of man to foresee the cases which will arise.

Now if a provincial government were empowered generally to legislate for the better government of Wales on any matter not specifically reserved to the central Government such legislation would be good in law. It could only be challenged in a court on the plea that it dealt with matters reserved to the central Government, or else was in conflict with some Act of Parliament. In the courts it could not be challenged on the plea that the legislation did in fact deal with interests outside Wales. An Act of the Welsh legislature affecting the water supplies of English towns would be valid in law. Unless provincial legislation trenched on the few powers reserved to central legislation no remedy could be sought in the courts. When once the Act had received Royal Assent it could only be overridden by an Act of Parliament. The passing of such an over-riding Act would be a most contentious matter. It would involve a serious rebuff to the Welsh Ministry and majority. The necessity for many such Acts would largely destroy the value of devolution by imposing a heavy strain on the time of Parliament. Inevitably a demand would be raised

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by the English interests affected for the Royal Assent to be withheld. Public opinion would look to the veto as the remedy.

The veto, however, is a matter for decision by the central Cabinet, which normally consists of one party only. The Cabinet of the United Kingdom would have exactly the same, or else exactly the opposite political colour to the Welsh Government and majority. In either case its decision would be suspect, would lead to long acrimonious debates in the House and waste the time of the central Parliament.

There will, of course, in any case, be friction between the central and provincial Governments, as there is in all federal systems. It is merely a question of reducing the friction to a minimum. But to cancel the measures of a provincial Government after they have accomplished the laborious task of passing them through their own legislature, and when their prestige is staked on them, is to create the maximum of friction. It also means wasting the time of provincial Governments. When any question arises whether in the public interest a thing can be properly done by the provincial Government, surely that question should be set at rest before, not after, the measure in question has been framed and passed. And this can be done by a well-recognised and thoroughly tested procedure. Suppose the Welsh Government desire to pass legislation which might conceivably affect the water sources of Liverpool and Birmingham, and the necessary powers are not included in the minimum list of things which under their original constitution they are authorised to do, they have only to promote a short enabling Bill in the central Parliament, or put a clause into an annual General Powers Bill, such as that promoted every year by the London County Council. The clause would then come before a select committee of Parliament. The evidence and counsel of Birmingham and Liverpool would be heard, and Parliament would see that the clause was so framed that the

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Welsh legislature would be empowered to pass any water legislation provided that nothing therein affected the catchment areas of English supplies. Everyone would then know exactly where they were before the legislation was enacted by the Welsh Government. There would be no need to call the veto into play, nor for overriding legislation, because if the Welsh Act when passed were used to interfere with English supplies the English corporations would find their remedy in the courts. There is room for hope that the vast majority of cases would, as in the case of municipal powers Bills, be left for decision to the select committee. But if by reason of their greater importance the House itself in some cases took cognizance of such measures and divided upon them on party lines, the time spent and the heat generated would still be far less than if overriding legislation or the veto had to be called into play to cancel measures laboriously framed and passed by provincial Governments. As in the case of municipal corporations, powers so obtained in detail and proved by experiment to be proper to the provinces would be generalised by public Acts of Parliament from time to time and made applicable to all provinces alike. By this procedure the powers to be exercised by the central and provincial Governments would be distinguished with perfect accuracy. There would be no overlapping and none of the infinite confusion and litigation occasioned by concurrent jurisdiction and legislation.

Everyone is agreed that the power of Parliament to legislate for every part of the United Kingdom must be preserved intact. This power will be properly used in time to come to devolve fresh powers on the provincial Governments, as the need for fresh devolution may arise. But if so, it naturally follows that provincial Governments must have the power to request a further devolution of any power which actual experience and local demands may suggest. And such request would naturally take the form of a petition to Parliament, or in other words

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a Bill promoted by the provincial Government and dealt with by Parliament in the ordinary way. The well-tried methods of the Constitution provide the solution of the standing difficulty. Let the functions obviously proper to each be appropriated to the central and provincial Governments at the outset. Let the central Government by public enactments from time to time devolve such further powers as are seen to be suitable for provincial treatment. For the rest, let provincial Governments seek, by promoting enabling Bills, such further powers as they find that in practice they need and are able to exercise.

The reform should be treated from the outset as a reorganisation of means and men to meet particular needs. It involves the creation of new organs of government. But if carried out as the necessary condition of administrative reforms it is likely to give efficient results without further taxing our human or financial resources. The provincial assemblies should be kept small. The present inflated size of the House of Commons becomes unnecessary for representative reasons if provincial interests are represented in provincial assemblies. Seven hundred members will suffice to man the central as well as the provincial legislatures. The simplest way is to halve the number who sit at Westminster. The same constituencies will then serve for both purposes, and the present historic chamber will hold the members elected to sit in it.

Entrust the reform of local authorities to provincial legislatures really competent to undertake it and a volume of superfluous man-power will be saved in the process. The same considerations apply to officials, who must be transferred from the central to provincial Governments in numbers corresponding to the duties devolved. The redistribution of resources in revenue as well as in men is simply a question of reorganisation, which if properly effected must result in economy, in making existing means yield larger results. So long as a scheme of political or administrative reorganisation can be justified on its merits,

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the consequential adjustments in the financial system can always be effected. Great play was made with the financial difficulties by the opponents of Union in Australia and South Africa. But these difficulties did not in practice prove insuperable. They can always be overcome if study, backed with courage, is brought to bear on them.

And the same applies to the all-important question of areas. In this article no attempt will be made to deal with aspects of the problem which can only be elucidated by public enquiry. Its main purpose is to emphasise the fact that the people of this country in numbers and the complexity of their organisation have long outgrown the machinery through which alone public opinion can control public affairs. When peace returns the evil will be vastly enhanced. Large and far-reaching programmes of social reform are so much dust in the eyes of the new electorate, if they are allowed to suppose that such schemes can be realised through the agency of one over centralised government. The question of political reform is prior to all questions of social and departmental reform, and until it is dealt with little or nothing will come of the schemes and programmes which are showered on the public. The first problem to consider and solve is how public opinion can be equipped with organs which will make it possible to bring social reforms into operation. The road to social reform is political reform. The one stands to the other in the relation of tactics to strategy, and the main obstacle to progress is that so little thought and research has been brought to bear on the subject. Amongst all the multifarious activities of the Ministry of Reconstruction has any work been done upon this strategic problem? Of war it has been said that if your strategic conceptions are sound you can afford to make many mistakes in your tactics. But if you have no strategic conceptions, or if they are wrong, no amount of tactical skill will save you. The remark is of universal application to all human activities, and is as true of industry and statesmanship as of war.

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On the question of Indian reform public opinion is now visibly in motion. With respect to the reform of our own institutions, which is equally pressing, public opinion is no less evidently stagnant. The reason surely is that in Indian reform the public now have before them a concrete scheme based on a treatment of the problem in all its aspects. The treatment may not be entirely adequate, the scheme in all its details is certainly not final, but none the less the issues have all been raised and examined: there is something upon which public opinion can fasten and grow. In the case of the United Kingdom the same need has got to be met. The breakdown of Parliament is freely and publicly acknowledged by men of Cabinet rank. The problem is admitted, but its solution requires a comprehensive survey of the mechanism which has broken down. The alternative courses have to be traced and the reasons for and against each of them have to be examined and weighed. In the light of this survey, a project of reform has then to be drawn, the details of which public opinion can consider. The information for all this is not to be found in the text books and public papers: it must be elicited by inquiry which cannot proceed except with the authority of Government itself. But a mere fraction of the labour now being spent on elaborating projects of social reform would suffice to show what political changes must be made before those projects can in fact be realised. It is worse than useless to hoodwink the electorate with promises of reform without first enunciating the conditions upon which they can be carried. No mere extension of the franchise will enable the people to control their own affairs until they are also given the machinery through which to control them. Nor can public opinion be now further developed until definite plans of the new machinery required are available. This article has been limited to that plain proposition. No appeal has been made to the sentiment which has prompted distinctive races to desire institutions corresponding to their several histories and characters through which they

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can manage on their own lines things which strictly belong to themselves. Fulfilment of that desire will increase their organic unity with each other. The greater the diversity of the parts, the higher the vital unity of the whole. Such is the law of life in obedience to which this Commonwealth of Nations has flourished and grown. In one-cell organisms the structure of every section resembles that of every other and each can exist cut off from the rest ; and so from the Russian Empire split separate fragments aimless, helpless, formless as the parent mass. With the peoples of this Commonwealth it is otherwise. Interdependent because richly varied and developed they combine to resist a blow aimed at the principle of life which unites yet preserves the distinctive characters they prize, knowing full well that the part must perish with the whole.

THE MONTAGU-CHELMSFORD REPORT

EARLY in July were published the proposals for constitutional advance in India, which Mr. Montagu had brought home as the result of his recent mission to that country. They take the form of a report covering 300 closely printed octavo pages, signed by Mr. Montagu and Lord Chelmsford, and presented by them to His Majesty's Government. This document issues without any imprimatur from the Government, and thus without any indication whether they accept it either in principle or in detail; but it would have been clearly unreasonable to expect the Cabinet at present, with their crushing burden of daily toils and anxieties, to find time to study a scheme of great complexity and to mature decisions of the gravest moment to the future well-being of India. It is also natural that they should await the informed opinion which the report will evoke both in England and in India, and without which a project of this magnitude would be as salt without savour. That much criticism will be forthcoming is inevitable and proper. The authors of the report themselves are careful to invite full and public discussion of their conclusions. Mr. Montagu in his speech at Cambridge and again in Parliament on August 6 extended the same invitation, and made it clear that he regarded the report as a draft for consideration and in no sense a final constitution. In letters published with the report, the Secretary of State's Council in London and the Governor-General in Council in India, while declaring their adherence

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to the broad lines of the project, both reserve liberty of judgment upon its details. Criticisms are already pouring in from India, and the debate in the House of Lords last month gave some index of the wide divergence among competent opinion in this country.

No good purpose, however, will be served by criticism which fails to recognise either the gravity of the occasion or the manner in which Mr. Montagu and his colleague have dealt with it. Their position as the two men with supreme responsibility to England for the wise ordering of India's future invested their task with a seriousness to which they fully responded. They surrounded themselves with the most capable staff; they toiled incessantly, as all our information from India testifies; they listened with unruffled patience to evidence of every complexion and of immense volume; and they utilised to the full the experience of the "man on the spot" in analysing the political situation in India, its tendencies, its strength and its weakness. The report which resulted is worthy of the occasion; and the authors pay a well-merited tribute to their draftsman, Mr. W. S. Marris. Dignified in language, singularly lucid in argument, and inspired by a transparent earnestness of purpose, it will take its place among the great State papers which have laid down the lines of constitutional progress in other regions of the British Commonwealth. It was written in an atmosphere of much political excitement and some racial irritation, but it reflects no shadow of either. On the contrary, it ignores whatever was ignoble or transitory in recent polemics; the writers, in their own words, had no desire "to pronounce judgment on the past, or to condemn individuals or classes or communities." As a consequence they have carried the issues into calmer air, where they can be disentangled from passion and prejudice. It is sincerely to be hoped that critics will follow their example and imitate their moderation of statement.

Before examining the proposals of the report in detail,

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let us recall briefly the circumstances in which they originate. Thirty years of Nationalist organisation in India, stimulated in the end by the war and its ideals, had culminated in a widespread demand among educated Indians for greater political freedom. British officials in the country had long realised the need for modifying the old paternal system of administration, and of setting up a more human standard of achievement alongside of and in addition to mere efficiency. The present Viceroy's predecessor was known to have been at work on some measure of advance, and Lord Chelmsford, in less than a year after his assumption of office, had made proposals and asked for a policy. An unfortunate delay followed ; but on August 20, 1917, a momentous pronouncement was made in Parliament. It defined the goal of British rule in India, and directed the Secretary of State to proceed to the spot and concert with the Viceroy the first substantial steps to be taken towards that goal. Our policy was announced as being :—

The increasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration, and

The gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire.

These, then, were the terms of reference for the inquiry, and the instruction was to propose a definite and substantial beginning for the second process in the formula.

The first part of the formula is disposed of in a few pages towards the close of the report. The enrolment of more Indians in the public services is urged as necessary to the success of the political changes. An arbitrary ratio is laid down for immediate introduction, regardless of fitness, into the administrative corps known as the Indian Civil Service proper. No recommendations are attempted for the other important agencies of public business—the medical service, engineers, police and education officers,

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and the rest. The labours of the Royal Commission which reported on the whole subject so recently as 1914 are dismissed as having been "wholly disappointing" to Indian opinion. Finally, extra pay and amenities are suggested for the gradually dwindling number of European employes. In its summary handling of those topics the report is not seen at its best. At the credit of the Royal Commission which it cold-shoulders stands a scheme, logical and complete but yet untried, for increasing the Indian element in the public services. That it was not ungenerous to Indian ambitions is guaranteed by the fact that Lord Islington was chairman, and that he had among his colleagues men like Mr. Ramsay Macdonald and the late Mr. Gokhale. If the scheme has fallen flat, the only reason is the inordinate delay of the Government in taking action upon it. Introduce it now, rely on its ascertained basis of facts and possibilities, and you have a safer recipe for an efficient public service than the hasty formulæ of the report. Nor is the view for a moment tenable that progress towards responsible government must be largely dependent upon the rapid substitution of Indians for Englishmen in the public offices. A hierarchy of Indian officials is not in the least likely to be more helpful in developing the democratic idea than Englishmen in the same position; and in any case it is not by official training that Indians will gain experience of self-governing institutions. There is everything to be said for bringing the best type of young Indians more and more into the civil and military services of their own country. But let that proposition stand on its own merits; and let the rate of increase be determined by the quality of the material that offers. Never have fair-mindedness, directness and patience been more needed in the public services than they will be during the coming years. It would be a grave disservice to India if we replaced these qualities by a mere counting of heads. It will not be advisable for the Government, in its consideration of this important subject, to be influenced by the

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obiter dicta in the report, and in truth they are hardly in accord with the balance and weight of the other proposals.

We may now turn to the main body of the report, the endeavour to find those first substantial steps which can immediately be taken on the road to responsible government. For this problem the nationalist party had a solution ready in their home-rule scheme. That other solutions were forthcoming may be judged from the report, but none of them had the same popular backing as the nationalist programme. The defects of that manifesto have already been set out in **THE ROUND TABLE**. Briefly, what it demands is not home-rule at all, but an irresponsible legislature imposing its will upon an executive which it cannot remove. The British administration in India, while remaining accountable to the British Parliament, would be unable to make laws or procure supply; and the inevitable upshot would be deadlock and chaos. This scheme is subjected in the report to the most careful and courteous analysis. The verdict is that it would be bound to fail in practice: its inherent defects would make it unworkable; and even if by any miracle it succeeded it would not lead to responsible government. None of the alternate schemes which were presented to Mr. Montagu are released from anonymity, except the joint address from a group of Indians and Europeans in Calcutta, alluded to in the June number of this magazine. Its suggestions also, like those of the National Congress, are decisively set aside. Objection is taken to their naked dualism, and the time is judged inopportune for revising the political geography of the country. To summarise the proposals of the report in their wealth of detail would be difficult. The bare machinery which they advise is catalogued in an appendix to the report; and a handy abridgment of the whole document has been published.* But the report itself must be read to be fully understood;

* *Indian Constitutional Reforms—The Montagu-Chelmsford Proposals.* John Murray. Price 6d.

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and in this article no attempt will be made to do more than state the guiding principles of the scheme and examine them in the light of certain tests of the widest applicability.

The advance which Mr. Montagu and Lord Chelmsford outline is to take place in four different zones—local, provincial, central, and parliamentary. Changes in the India Office are also adumbrated, and an organisation of the Indian Princes is lightly sketched ; but these are not of the essence of the plan and need not be further considered.

A. In the *local* sphere, the late Lord Ripon's policy of complete popular control in municipal and rural councils is to be made absolute. Considerable progress had already been made by some provinces in this direction, and the Government of India have now enjoined a general advance ; so that this section of the proposals needs no further comment.

B. It is in the *provincial* sphere that the scheme is most far-reaching. Burma and the North-West Frontier stand out of it for good reasons given. For the other eight chief provinces the future system of government will be a Governor with an executive council and ministers. The executive council will consist of two members, an Englishman who need not be an official, and an Indian. The ministers will be few at first—probably not more than two—but will grow in number as their duties are enlarged. The whole field of provincial administration will be divided into one group of subjects (the “ reserved ” subjects) which the Governor-in-Council will control, and another group (the “ transferred ” subjects) which will be in the hands of the ministers—or, to be more technically correct, of the Governor with the advice of his ministers. For legislation and the voting of supplies there will be a legislative council, largely elective in character ; and from its members the Governor will choose his ministers. If for the work which is reserved for the Governor-in-Council the legislature refuses either

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the money or the laws which he considers essential, he has certain exceptional powers of procuring both. Whether these powers are adequate will be considered below. The essence of the scheme is that direct responsibility, legislative and executive, is imposed upon representatives of the people, who will be accountable to an electorate for their acts. Their field of duties, it is true, is limited ; but it gives a beginning in that practical training in administration which is the only sure pathway to full responsibility.

C. In the *central* sphere the Viceroy's executive council is to be enlarged ; more Indian members are to be appointed ; and previous service in India is not to be regarded as a qualification for any of the seats. In place of the present highly officialised legislature a bicameral system is to be set up. The lower house will be a legislative assembly of about 100 members, of whom 22 will be officials, 11 nominated non-officials, and 67 elected. In the upper house, or Council of State, at least one half of its 50 members will be non-officials, of whom 4 will be nominated and the rest elected ; the other half may be officials. The budget will not be voted upon ; and Bills which the Governor-General regards as essential may be withdrawn by his certificate from the purview of the lower house and dealt with exclusively in the Council of State. The underlying principle is that the Government of India should remain the executive agent of Parliament and should, for that purpose, retain full and undiminished power in all essentials ; but that it should afford a wider surface for being influenced by Indian opinion.

D. In the *parliamentary* sphere it is proposed that the House of Commons should resume the surveillance over India's well-being which was one of its great traditions in the days of John Company. To this end it will be asked to appoint each session a select committee on Indian affairs, who will examine current business and report before the annual debate on the Indian budget. What is

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of even greater importance is that Parliament will be moved to commit itself to periodical commissions of enquiry. These bodies, it is intended, should visit India at intervals of not more than twelve years, review the progress of self-governing institutions, and advise on their development, particularly on the transfer of more functions from official to popular control in the provinces.

Further details of this complex and ingenious scheme must be left to the reader of the report for his own appraisal. The provisions for provincial autonomy—to employ an expression which has been greatly misused—would alone require lengthy analysis ; and the finance of the new policy furnishes food for much reflection. Our concern at present must be the dominant idea of the project ; and that idea may be unhesitatingly welcomed as wholly admirable. It steers with skill between the fatal rocks of the nationalist scheme and the equally deadly shallows of immutable conservatism. It recognises that a spirit of genuine patriotism is abroad. It designs an orderly progress towards the fulfilment of the vision of national unity and freedom. It calls for co-operation between the best minds in India and all Englishmen who are grateful for what India has given either to them or to the British Commonwealth. It establishes the principle of responsibility as the only vitalising power in political education. It looks for the growth of an electorate which will learn to make the responsibility real. And it invokes the supreme arbitrament of Parliament on the success of the great experiment and on its future extensions. No clearer or more convincing plan of campaign could have been formulated ; and if it had done no more than establish those broad and generous conceptions, the report would have fully justified itself.

Whether the actual machinery which the report advises is the best that could be invented for putting its principles into practice is the issue to which all who wish India well must now devote their minds. In an impressive passage

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the writers of the report emphasise the difficulties of their constructive work. It is planned for a period of transition from a paternal government by aliens to a government by the people for the people, and not for any set or faction. During that period the alien officials must remain ; they must share their work with the representatives of the people ; and the share of the latter must increase with the fitness they show in the actual daily handling of their task. For the administrative mechanism which such conditions require, precedent need not be searched : there are no precedents for such a process in a world where popular rights have too often been reached by revolution. The plan must be *à priori* : it must contain, as the report admits, much that is hybrid, illogical, " charged with potentialities of friction." Criticism must be correspondingly cautious. There are, however, four conditions which the scheme must obviously fulfil if it can hope for success ; and by these it is reasonable that the main details of the project should be tested. *First*, the plan must contain in itself the germs of orderly and continuous development ; the path must not lead to a precipice from which we shall have to recoil and start afresh. *Second*, there must be clarity of responsibility and no confusion of duties ; so that the acts of ministers may be readily judged both by the electorate and by the periodical commissions of enquiry. *Third*, there must be the most cordial co-operation possible between the old governmental agencies and the new ; and to this end every point of friction must be eliminated or averted so far as ordinary prudence can foresee. *Fourth*, there must be strong, prompt and effective control in the hands of those ultimately responsible for peace and order ; so that mistakes may be quickly rectified, and the experiment may run its course under favourable conditions of internal quiet and contentment.

Now, with these elementary criteria there are certain proposals in the report which can in no way be made to square. The chief offender is unfortunately that part of

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the scheme which will be most canvassed in England, the future constitution of the Government of India. The rôle of that central body is to be materially altered. Its controlling functions are to be restricted to what are frequently called the imperial interests of the country—defence, railways, customs, the public debt, Native States, etc.—and its intervention in provincial interests will be narrowed down to a general oversight of the acts of the different Governors in their reserved duties. But the central government cannot be divested of a wide responsibility for moulding and directing the political advance, for advising and supporting the Governors, and for upholding the probity and efficiency of the public services. It must, in words which the report treats as axiomatic, “remain wholly responsible to Parliament and, saving such responsibility, its authority in essential matters must remain indisputable.” To secure this authority and to equip the Government of India for this responsibility, what does the report propose? It enlarges the Viceroy’s executive council, it refuses to reserve any seats (three being so reserved at present) for civil servants, and it erects a complicated bicameral system of legislature in which the Government can never be sure of carrying a Bill except in the upper house. Taken as a whole, these measures would make neither for strength nor for smoothness of work. The enlargement of the executive council, big enough already for its diminished volume of work in the future, may indeed be justified by the need for appointing more Indians to it, and must be understood as justifiable on that ground alone. The probable exclusion from the council, however, of Englishmen with any knowledge of India cannot be vindicated at a time when the Viceroy will require the best available experience in handling the many thorny problems of transition. Incidentally, it would be regrettable if the public services read this proposal as a slur upon their capacity at the instance of the home-rulers, with whom it originated. But far more dangerous will be the weakness of the execu-

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tive in presence of its legislature. The Government will be in a permanent minority in the legislative assembly, and will thus be always liable to a vote of censure for any unpopular action which it may have to take or to defend in any province. It will also be unable to pass a measure which the assembly dislikes, except by the device of a special certificate from the Governor-General, invoking the aid of the upper house and shutting out the jurisdiction of the lower. A sensitive horse is not to be ridden on the curb; and this exceptional procedure obviously cannot be employed with any freedom without engendering acute friction between the popular assembly on the one side and both the Viceroy and the upper house on the other. The whole of this part of the scheme calls for reconsideration. The Viceroy, as the King's representative, must be kept more out of the arena of conflict. A simpler and more secure method should be devised for attaining that "indisputable authority in essentials" and that freedom from harassment which the Government of India has a right to claim so long as it remains "wholly responsible to Parliament" for the proper administration of the country.

In the provincial sphere a preliminary doubt arises as to the need for one rigid plan of executive government, with the same elaborate paraphernalia in every province, large or small, backward or advanced. After this the wisdom must be seriously questioned of removing the qualification of previous service in India from the one seat allotted to an Englishman among the colleagues of a Governor who may himself be an entire stranger to the country. Next come certain difficulties in visualising the standard plan for a provincial executive as a whole. It is to consist of two parts, the Governor and his executive councillors on the one side and the Governor with one or more ministers on the other. The former will administer the departments reserved from popular control, the latter those specifically transferred to that control. These two governing committees are, says the report, to discharge their duties "as

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one government ” ; as a general rule, they are to “ deliberate as a whole ” ; and it is essential that they “ should present a united front to the outside.” There is something wrong in this conception of a façade screening differences of authority and differences of responsibility, but ineffective to conceal the sounds of conflict behind it. From the familiar methods of Cabinet government nothing but misleading analogies can be drawn. Dualism with all its want of symmetry is inherent in these new arrangements ; and all attempts to disguise it will be futile. What will happen in practice will be quite different from the picture in the report. There will be frequent conference between the two halves of the government, but no joint or majority decisions. The Governor and his executive council will remain invested with full power over and responsibility for the reserved departments. Of the transferred departments each minister will be clearly responsible for those in his own portfolio, and will control them subject only to the general guidance, and in exceptional cases the direct intervention, of the Governor. Ministers will form the habit of corporate action, and *vis-à-vis* the Governor they will be held to corporate responsibility ; but their responsibility will in no sense merge in that of the executive council. They will, if they are wise and if he secures their confidence, constantly seek the advice of the Governor, informally as well as at their regular meetings with him ; and it may be hoped that they will find colleagues and friendly consultants in the members of the executive council. But the executive council and the ministers will be two separate and self-contained agencies for the conduct of their respective business, and not one joint agency. It is only the Governor who can bring them together, and then only with their mutual consent. The Governor and his executive council will remain accountable to Parliament ; ministers to the assembly and the electorate ; and there can be no compulsory blending of the two.

Thus far the provincial scheme, as set out in the report,

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could easily be adjusted to facts. But when our tests are applied to its legislative and financial aspects graver defects emerge. The legislative power, it will be remembered, is to vest in an assembly in which at least two-thirds of the members will be elected; the rest being composed of a handful of officials and a number of members nominated to represent special interests. In this body the ministers will have to secure control in the ordinary constitutional manner; and, having done so, they will carry whatever measures or taxes they require. With the other half of the provincial government the position will be very different. The Governor and his executive council will have no party and no majority, and no assurance of getting through any Bill or procuring any supplies for the departments which they are responsible for governing. The protection which the report gives in these circumstances is a Grand Committee. When the Governor finds that his legislature is hostile to a measure or a taxation proposal which he considers essential to the discharge of his responsibility, he certifies it for removal from the assembly and appoints a special Grand Committee for its consideration. The assembly may protest against this to the Government of India, who may thereupon overrule the Governor and cancel his certificate. If, however, all goes well, the Governor takes his measure to the Grand Committee and endeavours to pass it. But his troubles are by no means at an end. It might naturally be supposed that, when the Governor has decided upon this exceptional procedure, when he has run the gauntlet of an appeal to the central Government, when the normal course of legislation has been deliberately suspended,—that then no uncertainty would remain about the safety of the measure at stake. Not so; for in the Grand Committee one-half of the members will be elected *ad hoc* by the members of the legislative council, and only one-third will be officials, the remainder being nominated non-officials. A body thus constituted may quite conceivably vote down the Governor in any

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matter which has deeply stirred the assembly and may refuse what he has declared to be essential to the proper discharge of his duties. The report suggests that in such an event no great harm will follow. On the contrary, very serious mischief may be done. It is not, of course, suggested that his nominated members will always fail the Governor, though the mere fact that he has shown mistrust of the legislative assembly will tend to consolidate non-official opinion against him. But now and again the emergency will arise—an urgent police measure, an agrarian crisis, an acute sectarian issue—when the Governor will need a prompt and unquestioning power of passing a measure, unpopular it may be, but essential for peace and good government; and it is just in such an emergency that he would find himself defeated in his own Grand Committee. The position is impossible, and there is no justification for it. Responsibility and power must go together. The legislative assembly is given wide powers in the subjects transferred to its control. The Governor-in-Council must have an equally unambiguous authority over his reserved duties. His Grand Committee, on the special occasions when he has to invoke its aid, must have a majority on which he can implicitly count.

The procedure for supply is open to similar objections. Out of the estimated revenue in each year, the report proposes that the Government should first allot whatever funds are required for the reserved subjects, and then leave the balance for ministers to distribute among their transferred departments. The proposals for supply will thereupon go as a whole to the assembly; and if that body reduces the provision for reserved expenditure the Governor has power to restore it without their consent. This procedure and its inevitable consequences cannot but generate friction, which may become so serious as to stop the whole machinery. Suppose that, without any abnormal increase in the requirements of the reserved departments, the allotments left to ministers are inadequate

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for some popular policy on which the legislative council is determined, how is a deadlock to be avoided? Ministers, let us say, are set upon a costly scheme of rural sanitation, and ask the Governor to put them in funds by cutting down police expenses. He refuses to economise below the margin of safety, and advises ministers to impose some new tax for their sanitary scheme. They decline and induce the assembly to cut down the police vote; the Governor restores it; and in the end the assembly rejects the whole budget. The report does not tell us what is to happen then. Yet this is far from an improbable case. It is likely indeed to be so frequent that the Governor's position will become untenable except at the sacrifice of his responsibility for the proper conduct of the reserved branches of government. The only remedy is once more a clearer demarcation of duties and powers. Let ministers have their own sources of revenue, determined for a period of years, and so adjusted as to grow with their normal needs. Let their supply votes and those of the Governor-in-Council be kept entirely separate, and let the latter, if necessary, be dealt with by the Grand Committee.

Another financial proposition behind which lurks discontent, if not actual trouble, is the levy which the central Government will make upon the provinces. The resources which the Government of India keeps in its own hands will fall short by about £10,000,000 a year of its outgoings. What it needs at present it takes from the provinces in the form of an arbitrary fraction of certain of the revenues which they collect; and the arrangement is so technical that hitherto complaints of inequality have received but little attention. Now, however, that the provinces are to retain their own revenues, their contributions to the central Government are to be converted into annual subsidies, calculated at a uniform ratio of the surplus revenues in each province. Injustice leaps at once to the eye. Madras, though its own needs are as great as Bombay's, is to pay a subsidy nearly five times as great as

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that province. Similarly, the United Provinces will pay nearly five times as much as Bengal, though the two areas are very similar in size, population, and the normal requirements of provincial expenditure. The roots of these discrepancies lie deep in the economic history of the different areas. But the fact that the injustice has historical reasons will not reconcile the plundered provinces to its being perpetuated. Why should Bombay flourish at the expense of Madras? Why should wealthy Bengal get off so much cheaper than the United Provinces, with their recurring liability to devastating drought? There is no answering those questions; and the new regime will not start well without some prospect of gradually equating the scale of payments made to the central exchequer.

With one exception, which will be referred to later, the catalogue is now complete of those flaws which threaten to clog and warp the machinery of progress. There are, it is true, several other matters of which one doubts the expediency rather than challenges the wisdom. The necessity for a privy council in India, for example, and the purpose it will serve are far from clear. It may be questioned whether the creation of parliamentary under-secretaries in the legislative assemblies will strengthen the executive government in the absence of party ties. Standing committees, though a useful agency for administrative training in the provinces, would be premature, as well as ineffective, in the imperial departments. And, finally, there will probably be some dissent from the proposal that the parliamentary committee for Indian affairs should be selected exclusively from the House of Commons without drawing upon the wealth of administrative experience which is available in "another place." These, however, are relatively small matters, and no sympathetic student of the report would wish to extend the list of major defects.

To some ardent friends of change the list may indeed

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seem already too long. Much of the above, they would urge, is hypercriticism based on unworthy suspicion; show a little more friendly trust in the Indian politician, and spend less care in building up safeguards which a nobler policy of confidence would disdain. This is the sort of appeal which it is always difficult to resist; the doctrine of trust has worked wonders in the earlier history of our Dominions, and in no country is the response to generous confidence prompter than in India. But there is another form of confidence,—that haphazard neglect of ordinary business methods which is fruitful only in confusion and misunderstanding. Against this we cannot be too rigidly on our guard in any system of dual control. The two authorities—the old-fashioned official executive and the new amateur executive—must know precisely their places and relations. Neither should have any occasion to obstruct the other or to shield behind the other. The more clearly defined their duties, the more spontaneous and cordial is likely to be their co-operation. To illustrate this it is permissible to refer to certain passages in the report which touch on the power of intervention by the official Government in the doings of ministers. The writers explain in one place (par. 219) that ministers are to be entrusted, in regard to transferred departments, with a final power of decision, “subject only to the Governor’s advice and control. We do not contemplate that from the outset the Governor should occupy the position of a purely constitutional Governor who is bound to accept the decisions of his ministers. . . . We reserve to him a power of control, because we regard him as generally responsible for his administration.” In a subsequent passage (par. 240) they write: “We must, even in the case of matters ordinarily made over to non-official control, secure the right of re-entry to the official executive government of the province. . . . The Governor in executive council must have power to intervene with full effect in matters which concern law and order, or

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which raise religious or racial issues, or to protect the interests of existing services." Disappointment will probably be felt in some quarters at what may seem a whittling away of the independence of the popular assembly and its ministers. It would avoid much possible awkwardness, therefore, if the power of intervention or re-entry were more precisely described when the new powers are conferred.

The plain truth is that in this respect an Indian province will be, during the transitory and educative stage, in a similar position to that of Canada from the date of the Durham report down to 1847. There will not be complete responsible government, and the Governor in person (for the duty is not one that can properly be laid on his executive council) will have an ultimate reserve power to intervene if the exercise by a minister of his delegated powers seems likely to be seriously prejudicial to the interests of the governed. In his illuminating "Letters to the People of India," Mr. Lionel Curtis lays stress on the suffering which electorates may have to endure until they learn their own power to remedy it. To this theory in its application to the conditions of India to-day exception must be taken. For years to come we cannot look for electorates with any real power to protect the humble masses, and it is unthinkable that we should be complaisant towards indefinite suffering while real electorates are slowly coming into existence. Against such suffering and the mistakes from which it arises it will be the prime duty of the Governor to be vigilant. In nine cases out of ten errors will be avoided by mutual consultation and the give-and-take which is the essence of political life. But in the tenth case the Governor may have to refuse a minister's decision in the interests of his own wider responsibility for the well-being of his charge. This is interference which no reasonable political community would resent ; but the possibility of it should not be overlooked or disguised. Re-entry would be a rarer and extreme case. It would arise in this way. Suppose the Governor found a department seriously

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and consistently mismanaged in spite of his advice and intervention. He would be left no choice but to dismiss the responsible minister and find a successor who would put matters to rights. If he failed in this, or if the assembly supported the dismissed minister's acts against him, the Governor would then in the last resort convert the department into a reserved subject and remove it from his ministers' portfolios. Some such power ought clearly to be available in the rare event of serious maladministration ; and it would be vastly better to have it on record now than to leave it to ambiguous practice hereafter.

Before the proposals in the report can be submitted to their final recension much preliminary work has to be got through. The time at Mr. Montagu's disposal made it impossible to cover the whole ground ; and two supplementary committees will start at once to fill in the gaps. One of these will advise on the all-important question of the departments which are to be transferred to popular control in the provinces. An appendix to the report suggests a number of departments for the purpose ; but it is purely an illustrative list which in no way fetters the coming inquiry. In one respect at least we may hope that it is less than authoritative, for it indicates the whole field of education outside the universities as fit for transfer to ministers. It will certainly be advisable to wait for the report of Dr. Sadler's commission into higher education in Bengal before any decision is taken on this point ; and there are the strongest *prima facie* objections to imposing on ministers, before they have acquired any administrative experience whatsoever, matters of such supreme importance as our systems of secondary and technical instruction—matters, moreover, on which we ourselves are only beginning to see light after much painful experience and in which the consequences of error may be incalculable mischief for a generation. For the rest, the list of transferred subjects will vary with the provinces, being longer in the more advanced areas and shorter in those parts of India where the choice of competent administrators will be

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narrower. The responsibility of the committee which has to prepare these lists can hardly be overrated ; for subject to the wholly abnormal power of re-entry, which we may hope will very rarely be called into exercise, it is inconceivable that the jurisdiction of ministers, once it is established, can be altered except by special decree of Parliament. There is indeed an unfortunate proposal in the report that, after five years of the new dispensation, the Government of India should revise the lists if asked to do so. An intermediate inquiry of this type would simply be an invitation to preparatory local agitation for increased popular control ; and the consequences would be **unsettlement** and wrangling, which would disturb the whole of the opening years of the new regime, at a time when every nerve should be strained to secure good feeling and co-operation. There ought to be no tampering with the lists until their extension or otherwise is formally advised by a statutory commission, on a full review of the working of each instalment of ministerial responsibility.

The function of the second committee which will be at work in India this winter is the determination of franchises and electorates. The importance of their labours, great though it is, will lie in the future rather than in the present. Democratic institutions must be founded on a generous franchise ; but it has to be frankly recognised that democratic institutions are being started in India on faith, and not on any substantial basis either in an existing electorate or in the qualities (which, of course, experience alone can teach) required for self-government. Unless communal electorates are to be largely extended, which the report rightly discourages, the problem will be to devise a franchise low enough and elastic enough to bring in the prominent race and class and sectional interests of the country in adequate strength. If this is successfully accomplished, it must inevitably flood the electoral rolls with masses of voters who have no conception of a vote and as yet no wish for it. This is said in no disparagement of the great experiment, which must go forward undismayed ; it is

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merely a statement of patent facts and a caution. But the lesson is obvious ; the only possible condition on which the prospect can be tolerated is the immediate inception of a true national system of elementary education. Without it, and the hope of better things which it bears for the coming generation, our free institutions will be " as sounding brass and tinkling cymbal." Instruction which will fit our future citizens to become intelligent voters is just as urgent and momentous a call upon us as the constitutional advance itself, and our response must be equally prompt. The preliminary steps can be taken at once—the better organisation of existing primary education, the establishment of training schools for a vast number of new teachers, the creation of a fund for paying schoolmasters a living wage and providing against their old age, and some moderate measure of local compulsion, particularly for the depressed classes. It will all be very costly ; and measures cannot be too quickly instituted for accumulating the necessary funds, central and provincial, for the initial outlay.

When the two committees bring back their reports it should be possible to place before Parliament a draft of the necessary legislation for the new constitution of India. What is to happen then ? Is the measure to be a short Bill making the minimum change in the existing law, and hurried through like an ordinary item of public business ? Or is Parliament to have a real opportunity of studying the new charter which it will in effect be granting to India ? There is growing strength in the feeling, expressed in both Houses during the recent debate, that special treatment will have to be accorded to the statutory proposals when they are ready. There are the most convincing reasons in support of this. In the first place, Parliament must see the entire scheme, in whatever form it is matured, whether in one great Charter Act, or as a mere amending Bill with a maze of subsidiary rules and instructions. For on the accuracy of the mechanism as a whole hang issues of life and death to the good government of India, to the growth of a true democracy among its citizens, and to its retention as a willing partner

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in the British Commonwealth. Secondly, the scheme and the arguments for it will yet require much patient examination. It is full of delicate problems, and the evidence will be voluminous, contradictory, laden with technicalities in strange tongues. Thirdly, it will be of immense advantage if both experts and representative critics of all shades of opinion can be actually heard on all important suggestions for amendment; oral testimony can be sifted and tested by cross-examination until it acquires a value rarely attained by documentary evidence. Now for all this it is fantastic to imagine that either House could ever find time in the course of its ordinary sittings; the congestion of parliamentary work will reach its zenith between now and the close of the war, and in the busy years of reconstruction thereafter. Yet, if Parliament cannot undertake this task, it will fail in the plainest and most solemn duty that destiny ever laid upon one nation on behalf of another. There is in reality no difficulty in the matter. It will be for the Government at its leisure—for legislation obviously cannot be undertaken until the two impending committees bring home their recommendations next spring—to decide on the general lines of the policy by which it will stand, and then to get a Bill prepared accordingly. When the Bill and all the subsidiary regulations to be framed under it are presented, Parliament should be moved to appoint a special commission or committee, preferably of both Houses, to scrutinise the complete project, to call for any evidence it requires, to make any amendments, and to report in full to the House of Commons. This was virtually the suggestion made by Lord Selborne in the debate of August 6, and its acceptance would enormously facilitate the task and lighten the responsibilities of the Government. The procedure has excellent precedent; it will invest the course of the legislation with the semi-judicial authority which its importance deserves; it will allay all reasonable criticisms and apprehensions; and it will be in full accord with the policy of closer supervision over Indian affairs which Parliament is to be asked to adopt.

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In conclusion we turn again to the report itself. We have tried to show that in several important details it is capable of improvement ; but these do not obscure or detract from its admirable generosity of spirit or breadth of outlook. Its main principles are unassailable, and it is earnestly to be hoped that no encroachment upon them will be tolerated. Attacks there will certainly be, both from critics who, blind to the spirit of the time, dissent from the declaration of August 20, 1917, and from impatient reformers who would hasten the millennium. We need not heed the small group of irreconcilables in India, whose attitude of hostility to the report has put them finally outside the pale of serious political forces. But there are others both in India and in England who argue, and in some cases have persuaded themselves to believe, that full self-government is practicable in the immediate future. They will press for a speeding up of the orderly progress which the report advises, for the removal of safeguards and checks, for the omission of intermediate stages and enquiries. To them can only be given again the answer which they consistently ignore. On its practical side it is that the necessary machinery of India's administration is too vast and complex to be abruptly deflected in this manner without a smash that would bring great misery to the people. On its theoretical side it is an invitation to define, in terms of the Indian life of to-day, the essentials of a free community—liberty, nationality and democracy. The poet Tagore, in one of his American addresses, speaks of his nationalist countrymen as trying "to build a political miracle of freedom upon the quicksands of social slavery." In another passage in the same essay : "The thing," he writes, "we in India have to think of is this—to remove those social customs and ideals which have generated a want of self-respect and a complete dependence on those above us—a state of affairs which has been brought about entirely by the domination in India of the caste system, and the blind and lazy habit of relying upon the authority of traditions that are incongruous anachronisms in the

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present age." This is pessimism, but there is much truth underlying it. It is difficult for India's sincerest friend to conceive of liberty as consonant with the seclusion of women, or of nationality as real until religious feuds are suppressed in public life, or of democracy as consistent with the caste system and communal representation. It may be that the dilemma is exaggerated by Western prejudice, and that the ideals of freedom are capable of being dressed in Indian raiment without any loss of their indwelling spirit. But at present this spirit is undeveloped, and without it there is no real motive power for the duties of a free community. Give us, says the ardent patriot, however, the management of our own affairs, and all these other gifts will be added unto us. To which we can only reply that, while we do not doubt the reformer's will, we have no confidence in his power to move forthwith the mountains of ignorance and diversity and ossified social systems which still stand in the way of true freedom. Political power will not in itself accomplish the task. Unsupported by any basis of political sense among the people, it may end in revolution; or the reformer may abandon the struggle and fall into the inertia of the multitude like a spark of fire into a pool of water. The people and those who aspire to lead them must be trained together. The former have to learn their power and how to use it wisely; the latter have to learn their limitations. It is a gradual business, and the blame for undue haste will be ours. None of us wishes to see India in the wilderness for a year longer than is necessary; but the promised land is not to be taken by storm.

On the opposite wing of criticism from this are those who see nothing but danger in what the report proposes, and nothing but dereliction of duty in handing over any real power to the people. Our trusteeship for India is the argument against all change; and by a curious straining of the metaphor we are told that as trustees we may not relax any of our surveillance until all our wards have grown up to man's estate. This school of criticism is generally barren of constructive alternatives for carrying

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out a policy which in its heart it dislikes. Its favourite suggestion is full self-government in one selected province, the rest of India marking time. The proposal cannot be seriously considered. If the experiment succeeded, it would enormously strengthen the hands of those who demand complete autonomy for the whole of India at once. If it failed, it would leave us exactly where we are now, after inflicting much needless hardship on defenceless millions. No, if the announcement of a year ago is regarded—and no honourable Englishman can refuse to regard it—as a sacred pledge by the British nation, it must be fulfilled by a definite and generous advance along the road which demonstrably leads to the declared goal. The report depicts such an advance, and in its broad lines the picture is convincing. Risks there unquestionably are; and any scheme, however carefully considered, may possibly prove to contain mistakes which will have to be remedied in the light of experience: but we must not be frightened by such anticipations into making the one mistake which cannot be remedied—the postponement of any advance at all until confidence in our intentions and in our ability to fulfil them is destroyed. It was not by running away from risks that the British Commonwealth grew to greatness. At almost every stage in the wide extension of the principle of self-government which has been made in various fields of the Commonwealth during the last century critics have prophesied evil and declared that the British Government of the day was not only dangerously impairing its own authority but also betraying the true interests of the people concerned. Experience has proved beyond question that we were right in those days not to yield to the forces of timidity and scepticism; and, fortified by that experience, we must not yield to them now. Duties as trustees for the Indian people undeniably rest upon us; but the greatest of all those duties is to enable them to fit themselves for the blessing which we ourselves most cherish. We must have the courage and the faith to do so, and India must have the courage and the faith to help.

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The Crisis in the West

AT the opening of the last quarter the Allied nations were awaiting the culmination of the great Austro-German offensive. For the people of this country, protected by the sea from the special horrors and anxieties of invasion, the strain on the national *morale* was not so severe as for the peoples of France and Italy, but they fully recognised the gravity of the menace to the common fortunes of the whole Alliance, and they faced it in the same serious and resolute temper as their Allies. The general feeling in those weeks of suspense was that, whatever the result of the campaign might be and whatever further sacrifices might be needed, there could be no question of coming to terms with victorious Prussianism. If the long delay in the launching of the final attack aggravated the suspense, it also strengthened the belief that the Allies would be able to keep their defensive line unbroken till the close of the campaigning season; and by the end of June this confidence had been greatly increased by the Austrian defeat on the Piave, by the news of disappointment and divided counsels in Germany, of growing scarcity and depression in Austria, and of gathering difficulties for the Central Powers in Russia, and, above all, by the swift arrival in Europe of the American reinforcements, the figures of which were published on the eve of Inde-

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pendence Day. And then, at last, in the middle of July, came the Allies' counter-stroke on the Marne, followed some three weeks later by their attack on the Somme. So the quarter closes with the Germans in retreat, with the initiative once more in the hands of the Allies, and the numerical inferiority of their forces almost if not entirely redressed. These dramatic developments have naturally been received with intense relief and satisfaction in this country, but without any noisy or boastful jubilation. The turn of the tide in France has not lessened the strain of war work and personal anxiety on the average man and woman; and, though in some quarters the Allies' successes have provoked an exaggerated optimism, the wiser heads are well aware that the crisis is not yet over, that the Germans are fighting with desperate courage, and that, whatever may happen in the autumn, it is idle to count on a rapid ending of the war.

The readiness with which the Dominions responded to the needs of the crisis was not the less gratifying to the people of the Home country because it was expected. And it was a fortunate chance that the period of the crisis should have coincided with the second sessions of the Imperial War Cabinet and Conference. It was felt to be supremely fitting that at the moment when the fortunes of the whole Commonwealth were at stake the representatives of all the Dominions and of India should have been able to discuss and to decide in common with the British Government the measures to be taken to meet the emergency. The inconvenience which must necessarily be caused to the Dominions through the absence of their leading statesmen is fully recognised in this country; and it is hoped that the peoples of the Dominions realise how much their presence has been appreciated here, not only as reflecting at the common council-board the vigorous spirit of the younger nations but as a symbol and assurance of the strength and unity of the Commonwealth in the hour of its trial. There is general satisfaction at the recent

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decision that the Dominions should have the right to nominate ministers to remain permanently in London as members of the Imperial War Cabinet, which will thus be able to meet constantly. It is of the greatest advantage that direct consultation between the representatives of the United Kingdom, the Dominions and India should be continuous and not broken off as heretofore for the greater part of the year. It was also announced that the Dominion Prime Ministers, who will continue to be members of the Imperial War Cabinet, will in future communicate direct with the British Prime Minister on the business with which the Cabinet deals.

The common ordeal has also strengthened the sense of comradeship between the British peoples and their Allies, especially the American Republic. Nothing in this critical period has stirred popular emotion more deeply than the energy and speed with which the American troops, in numbers far beyond the general expectation, have crossed the Atlantic to the aid of the Allies. Their transport to Europe at a rate rising to more than a quarter of a million a month will go down in history as one of the finest achievements of the war. It has given practical proof of the smoothness and efficiency with which the naval and shipping authorities of the two countries are co-operating. More than that, it has immeasurably strengthened in the hearts of Englishmen the feeling of kinship with the descendants of those whose home was once in England, and the conviction that not only in this war but in the new age beyond it they are destined to work side by side for the ideals of liberty and law they hold in common. The enthusiastic public celebration in this country of the Fourth of July, when the Union Jack and the Stars and Stripes flew together above the Houses of Parliament, was a striking manifestation of the final healing of the old breach between the two great branches of the English-speaking family.

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The Defeat of the Submarine

The arrival of more than a million American soldiers in Europe with the loss of only 291 at sea has afforded the crowning proof that the German submarine campaign as a decisive factor in the war has failed. It may be assumed that the efficacy of the Allies' naval counter-measures has steadily increased since the Admiralty announced towards the end of May that more submarines had been sunk since the beginning of the year than had been built. But, if the submarines are now rather the hunted than the hunters, they still succeed in causing a considerable though a diminishing loss of Allied shipping, and it is disappointing to have to record that the monthly output of new mercantile shipping in this country does not yet equal the amount destroyed, and is still far below the estimate fixed by the Admiralty last January.

The principal cause has been the general dearth of labour. In his statement in Committee of Supply on July 30 Sir Eric Geddes declared that of the 80,000 additional men demanded a year ago for shipbuilding and its accessory industries only 35,000 had been obtained owing to military exigencies and especially to the requirements of the technical staffs of the Air Force and the Army. To this cause also has been mainly due the delay in the production of "fabricated" ships in the new national shipyards. The fact that the cost of preparing those yards was estimated at nearly £4,000,000, and that not a single ship had yet been launched from them, provoked strong criticism in Parliament; and it was even urged that the Government should cut their losses and abandon the experiment. But Sir Eric Geddes announced that the Government intended to persevere, that the labour difficulties could be overcome "without in any way touching the normal supply of the private yards," and that

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the first keel would be laid in a month's time and one every three weeks thereafter. He concluded his statement by quoting the opinion of Lord Pirrie, Controller-General of Merchant Shipbuilding, that "the undertaking on its present basis is a wise and prudent undertaking which will be of immense benefit to the country in the continuance of the war." The effect of these official declarations was not altogether reassuring. It remained doubtful whether the Admiralty fully appreciates and is determined to grapple with the essential difficulty—the shortage of skilled labour. Whether the creation of the new yards is wise and prudent or not, it would seem to be impossible to staff them without taking men from the existing yards, whose requirements are by no means "normal" under present conditions, and whose output, as it is, stands far below the estimated need. The unsatisfactory conditions in the old yards in fact demand more attention from the Government than the organisation of the new. In the munitions industry the measures taken for speeding up production, though they have occasioned friction and occasional crises, have at any rate succeeded in meeting the nation's needs. In shipbuilding such measures have been relatively neglected. There has been comparatively little dilution, no adequate organisation for the training of "dilutees," no general adoption, save in one area, of piece-work rates, and little if any improvement in mechanical time-saving devices. Meanwhile time-keeping has been admittedly bad and in many cases increases of wages have only resulted in decrease of production. It is a very serious fact that the output per head of workers, so far from improving, has steadily declined; and it is scarcely to the credit of this country that the total production of new ships is kept ahead of the total sinkings only by the remarkable achievements of the American shipyards. There is no insuperable obstacle to the speeding-up of the British yards. No more in the ship-building than in the munitions industry will employers or men refuse to adopt

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the necessary measures if only in the one case as in the other the Government will pursue a firm, effective and consistent policy.

On the other side of the policy adopted for frustrating the submarine campaign—the production and distribution of food supplies—the record has been more satisfactory. At the end of May the Director-General of Food Production for England and Wales published an interim report on the result of the year's campaign for increasing home-grown supplies. It estimated that the area of land under corn crops this year in the United Kingdom would be more than four million acres greater than that of 1916, and that the acreage under potatoes in England and Wales alone would be 50 per cent. larger than in 1916. Both these figures would constitute a record in the history of British agriculture, and they do not take into account the produce of allotments and private gardens, of which the former have increased in England and Wales by not less than 800,000 since 1916. Equally encouraging was Mr. Clynes's statement in the House of Commons on June 6 as to the imports of meat, and especially of bacon, the condition of the home flocks and herds, the abundance of milk, and the home production of margarine, which was already sufficient to make foreign imports unnecessary. He also promised an improvement in the quality of bread as the result of the coming harvests in this country, in the United States, and in Canada.

As regards the United States this promise was confirmed by Mr. Hoover, the United States Commissioner of Food Administration, when he paid a welcome visit to London at the end of July to confer with his colleagues on the joint Allied control of food supplies. But some apprehension was aroused as to the prospects of the British harvest by Mr. Prothero's frank confession in the House of Commons on July 1 that the War Cabinet's decision, owing to "the predominant overmastering need for men for military service," to take 30,000 agricultural workers from the land into the

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Army meant "the imperilling of the work he had tried to do for the last eighteen months" and the possible loss of part of this year's harvest. It led also, as Mr. Prothero explained on July 18, to a Government decision not to proceed further with the programme for the ploughing-up of grass land—a decision which involved the resignation of Lord Lee, the Director-General of the Food Production Department.

If, then, the home production of corn may not come up to the expectations framed before the German offensive so drastically modified the man-power situation, the country has all the more reason to congratulate itself on the complete success of the rationing system, ensuring as it does that whatever supplies may be available will be distributed with the minimum of friction and the maximum of fairness. The British people recognise the debt they owe to the man who put the system into operation, and the news of Lord Rhondda's death on July 3 aroused among all classes an almost personal emotion. It was recognised that, in refusing to leave his work unfinished in face of the growing danger to his health, he gave his life for his country as directly as a soldier in the field.

As the quarter advanced it was the supply of coal rather than that of food which caused anxiety. The needs of France, whose coalfields have been so largely occupied by the invading Germans, and still more of Italy, are severely taxing our resources; and new regulations are shortly to be enforced reducing to a minimum the amount to be allocated to British householders during the coming winter. It is hoped that the situation may be improved by greater efforts on the part of the coal-miners; and early in August a strong appeal was issued by the Executive of the Miners' Federation stating that "the Coal Controller . . . is of opinion that, if unnecessary absenteeism were abolished and if the mine-workers, on whom the nation depends at the present time for the life-blood of its industries, were producing to their utmost capacity,

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the nation would be able to tide over its present difficulties."

The Labour Conference

It was a foregone conclusion that Mr. Clynes, Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food, should succeed the chief with whom he had worked in such close accord. His administrative record and his lucid, candid speeches have secured for Mr. Clynes a Parliamentary position which is recognised by all parties in the House of Commons; and that he possesses the full confidence of Labour in the country at large was shown by his election by the Labour Party Conference at the head of the Trade Union representatives for the Party Executive under its new constitution.

The meeting of this Conference (June 26-28) excited considerable public interest. Its main business was the passing of a series of resolutions on reconstruction constituting the Party's domestic programme.

The keynote of the programme was sounded in the first resolution, which ran as follows:

That, in the opinion of the Conference, the task of social reconstruction to be organised and undertaken by the Government, in conjunction with the local authorities, ought to be regarded as involving, not any patchwork jerrymandering of the anarchic individualism and profiteering of the competitive capitalism of pre-war time—the breakdown of which, even from the standpoint of productive efficiency, the war has so glaringly revealed—but the gradual building up of a new social order, based, not on internecine conflict, inequality of riches, and dominion over subject classes, subject races, or a subject sex, but on the deliberately planned co-operation in production and distribution, the systematic approach to a healthy equality, the widest possible participation in power, both economic and political, and the general consciousness of consent which characterise a true democracy.

The second resolution declared:

That it is vital for any genuine social reconstruction to increase the nation's aggregate annual production not necessarily of profit

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or dividend, but of useful commodities and services; that this increased productivity is obviously not to be sought in reducing the means of subsistence of the workers, whether by hand or by brain, nor yet in lengthening their hours of work, for neither "sweating" nor "driving" can be made the basis of lasting prosperity, but in (a) the elimination of every kind of inefficiency and waste; (b) the application both of more honest determination to produce the very best, and of more science and intelligence to every branch of the nation's work; together with (c) an improvement in social, political and industrial organisation; and (d) the indispensable marshalling of the nation's resources so that each need is met in the order of, and in proportion to, its real national importance.

An amendment to this resolution was carried declaring that increased production must be secured by the socialisation of industry.

The third resolution urged that the standard of life among the workers should be preserved after the war by the maintenance of the customary rates of wages relatively to the cost of living, by the rigorous observance of the "fair wages clause" in public contracts, and especially by the extension of the principle of the Minimum Wage. Further resolutions dealt with the need of systematic provision for soldiers and sailors on their demobilisation and for civilian war-workers on their discharge; reminded the Government that it is pledged "unreservedly and unconditionally" to the restoration of Trade Union conditions at the end of the war; and demanded that the Government should accept responsibility after the war for the prevention of unemployment and should secure it by "a sensible distribution of public works and services."

In the political field the leading features of the programme were the prompt removal after the war of all restrictions on personal liberty involved in the Military Service and Defence of the Realm Acts; the establishment of entire equality between women and men in politics as in industry and professional life; full adult suffrage, shorter Parliaments, and "the complete abandonment of any attempt to control the people's representatives by a House of

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Lords." A resolution demanding the immediate enactment of "a wide and generous measure of Home Rule on the lines indicated by the proceedings of the Irish Convention" was succeeded by a resolution advocating further constitutional reforms in the following terms :

That the Conference regards as extremely grave the proved incapacity of the War Cabinet and the House of Commons to get through even the most urgently needed work ; it considers that some early devolution from Westminster of both legislation and administration is imperatively called for ; it suggests that, along with the grant of Home Rule to Ireland, there should be constituted separate statutory legislative assemblies for Scotland, Wales, and even England, with autonomous administration in matters of local concern ; and that the Parliament at Westminster should be retained in the form of a Federal Assembly for the United Kingdom, controlling the Ministers responsible for the Departments of the Federal Government, who would form also, together with Ministers representing the Dominions and India whenever these can be brought in, the Cabinet for Commonwealth affairs for the Britannic Commonwealth as a whole.

The programme also advocated further reforms in education, Mr. Fisher's Bill being welcomed as a valuable instalment ; the building of a million cottages at the public expense during the first two or three years of peace ; the establishment of a Ministry of Health and the abolition of the existing Poor-Law system ; the expropriation of private interests in the trade in liquor together with the institution of local option as to the prohibition or regulation of its sale ; State provision of electrical power stations for the supply of the whole kingdom, and permanent State control of iron and coal mines ; State control also of agricultural land and its utilisation "solely with a view to the production of the largest possible proportion of the foodstuffs required by the population of these islands under conditions allowing of a good life to the rural population and at a price not exceeding that for which foodstuffs can be brought from other lands." Finally a resolution on national finance demanded "that an equitable system of conscription of accumulated wealth should be put into

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operation forthwith, with exemption for fortunes below £1,000, and a graduated scale of rates for larger totals."

This fighting programme for the new national Labour Party, bold and comprehensive as it is, did not excite so much interest either inside or outside the Conference as the discussion on a separate resolution, brought forward by the Party Executive :

That this Conference of the Labour Party accepts the recommendation of the Party Executive that the existence of the political truce should be no longer recognised.

The raising of this thorny question was sooner or later inevitable. For some time past the truce as affecting other Parties as well as Labour had been becoming more and more indefinite and unsubstantial. For the more ardent spirits among the Labour Party, conscious of its growing power in the country and anxious to recover a free hand in domestic if not in foreign policy before the close of the war, this ambiguous position was unsatisfactory ; and at the recent by-elections at Keighley and Wansbeck the local organisations had supported Labour candidates against the nominees of the Coalition. This action had not meant a breach of faith on their part, since the Party Executive's formal agreement to observe the truce had expired at the end of 1916 ; but it had meant their rejection of the recommendation of the Executive which had desired that the truce should still be observed in spirit apart from any formal pledge. The Executive, therefore, decided to reverse its policy so as to conform with this strong current of independence in the constituencies, and accordingly proposed to the Conference the resolution quoted above. It was carried by a majority of nearly 2 to 1.

Mr. Henderson, the Secretary, explained that the breaking of the truce was not to be regarded as a prelude to an attack upon the Government, at any rate for the time being. "The last thing the Labour Party ought to do," he said, "is to make itself responsible for putting

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one Government out without knowing what the Government was that would replace it." None the less the passing of the resolution was bound to embarrass the eight Labour members of the Government. In a manifesto issued on the eve of the Conference they had protested that their position was already being "rendered very difficult by incessant sniping on the part of anti-national factionalists" and had appealed to Labour "to do nothing which will tend to destroy national unity during the war or to destroy the prospect of Labour unity after it." And at the Conference Mr. Barnes and Mr. Clynes pleaded urgently for the continuance of the policy of co-operation and mutual concession between all Parties. The passing of the resolution against their advice was not, however, intended to involve and did not involve the resignation of the Labour Ministers. But, if it brought about no immediate outward change in the political situation, it revealed a definite division of opinion in the Labour Party on an issue which a contested by-election or still more a General Election is bound to force to the front. For it is manifest that Party independence and coalition government are incompatible, and that no member of a Party in open opposition can share in the government of the country and the conduct of the war.

The Labour Party and War Aims

Nor can the Labour Party escape a similar dilemma as to its attitude to the war, with which indeed the question of the truce was closely connected. As Mr. Henderson explained, the truce had either to be abandoned or to be kept by "everybody in the Labour Party, *whether pro-war or anti-war*." Clearly its abandonment was in some degree a concession to the "anti-war" group; but how little its opinions were shared by the great majority of the Congress was shown by the enthusiasm with which

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they greeted the dramatic appearance of M. Kerensky and his declaration that Russia would fight again for the common cause of the Allies. Further evidence of the desire not to split the Party on the war issue is afforded by the fact that among the 400 official candidates who are to contest seats at the General Election are several of the so-called "Pacifists" on the left wing of the Party. The policy of preserving unity at all costs is likely to be severely strained when voters desiring to support the declared policy of the Party as regards both the war and domestic affairs are asked to send as their representatives to Parliament men who have at almost every stage opposed and hampered the action which this country has taken in the war. A strong and united Labour Party is generally regarded as a valuable asset to the political life of the country both now and for the future; but it may well be doubted whether real strength or lasting unity can be attained by a policy which aims at keeping in the Party ranks men who are diametrically opposed on what is, and must remain till peace is signed, the supreme political question.

The same tendency to blur the lines which divide opinion on this issue is observable in Mr. Henderson's attempt to obtain a basis for the discussion of war aims between the Socialist Parties in the various belligerent countries. The attitude of the German Majority Socialists at the time of the Western offensive was described in the last number of **THE ROUND TABLE**,* and in the light of their own acts and words it then seemed that there was no possibility of real agreement between their point of view and that of Allied Labour as officially defined in the Inter-Allied Labour and Socialist Memorandum of last February. Nor was the breach substantially lessened by the replies which the Socialist Parties in the enemy countries made to this Memorandum in June. Once more they protested

* **ROUND TABLE**, No. 31, "The Ordeal," pp. 449-452.

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their adherence to the principle of "peace by agreement without annexations or indemnities and on the lines of the right of self-determination of the peoples"; but as regards the application of these principles the German Majority Socialists maintained the position taken up by their delegation to Stockholm in 1917 and confirmed by the Party Congress in August, 1917. Nevertheless, in a speech at Northampton on July 13 and in a letter to the *Times* on July 27 Mr. Henderson welcomed these replies as proof that the German Majority Socialists had "adopted a new position" and that "an international conversation between representatives of the workers in the Central Empires and those of the Allied countries was not only possible but necessary."

This sanguine attitude seems to have been based, in great part at any rate, on a misunderstanding. Mr. Henderson's belief, for example, that the German Majority Socialists no longer refused to discuss the question of "the reunion of any part of Alsace-Lorraine with France" was inconsistent with the published declarations of their leaders.* Nor is Mr. Henderson's interpretation of the Allied Socialist position above question. In his letter to the *Times* he wrote as follows :

It must not be forgotten that the Allied memorandum described the maximum possibilities of a democratic peace, and I should have been both hypocritical and foolish if I had held out any expectations that the German Socialists would have accepted the specific solutions embodied in a memorandum put forward by the Socialists in one group of the belligerent countries.†

This is the first intimation that the Allied Socialist programme is intended to be not so much a definition of war aims which Allied Labour means to attain as material for negotiation and compromise with Herr Scheidemann

* See statements by Herr Scheidemann and Herr Müller, quoted by "Verax" in *Times*, July 29.

† *The Times*, July 27, 1918.

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and his colleagues ; and it may be hoped that in so interpreting it Mr. Henderson speaks only for himself. If he holds to this position he must, at any rate, part company with President Wilson, and the acceptance of President Wilson's war policy is one of the chief planks in the Labour Party platform. An appeal indeed has been made to residents in the United States to subscribe to its election fund on the very ground that "it is the Labour Party which is President Wilson's firmest ally," and that "in all Europe the policy of the United States in this war has found its most cordial, most whole-hearted and least equivocating support, not in the Governments, but (at the instigation and largely through the influence of the British Labour Party) in the Labour movements of the Allied nations."*

The Coventry Strike

While the Labour Party has been engaged in laying its plans for the future, the unsatisfactory character of the present working of the industrial machine has been once more revealed by a grave though happily transient crisis. The workers, especially in the great war industries, have felt the strain and fatigue of the last few years at least as severely as other classes. There are doubtless individuals among them—as the output in the shipyards and the coal-mines, for example, seems to show—who have been tempted by the ease with which high wages can be earned to be content to work with less than their maximum energy ; but similar cases of slackness and selfishness, equally unpatriotic if less conspicuous, could be found in wealthier and better educated sections of the community. Apart from an extremist minority who frankly put their quarrel with society above the quarrel of all free peoples

* Mr. Sidney Webb, in the *New Republic*, June 29.

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with Prussianism and appeal to their fellows to take advantage like the Bolsheviks of the national crisis to establish the ascendancy of their class, the great mass of British working men and women are determined to win the war and will never deliberately and knowingly jeopardise the success of the Allied cause. There is a possibility, however, that an over-sanguine belief in an early victory and a false assumption that the development of American war-power relieves this country of the necessity of continuing for yet another season to toil and endure to the utmost of its power may lead to a premature and dangerous relaxation of effort. The beginnings of such a tendency may perhaps be detected in the action of those munition workers who kept the industrial truce throughout the anxious period of the successive German offensives, and then, at the moment when the crisis seemed over, came out on strike.

The ultimate cause of the dispute lay in the absence of any system for maintaining piece-rates for skilled munition workers at a uniform level throughout a single industrial area. Employers have been and still are allowed to fix whatever piece-rates they please, provided only that, in accordance with an old-standing Government pledge, rates once fixed are not afterwards lowered. Enterprising employers have therefore been free to increase and improve their output by attracting additional skilled workers from other firms through the offer of higher rates. Owing to the great shortage of skilled labour the operation thus unchecked of the law of supply and demand was obviously to the advantage of the workers; but for the same reason it was as obviously to the disadvantage of the country. The concentration of a disproportionate number of skilled men in a few firms and the consequent unevenness in the dilution of skilled with unskilled labour throughout the industry were bound most seriously to impair both in quality and in quantity the national output of munitions. The obvious remedy would seem to have been the fixing of piece-rates

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not by each employer at his own level but by an impartial authority at a uniform level for each area. Such an arrangement would certainly have been unpopular, for the reasons stated above, both with many of the skilled workers and with a section of the employers, and presumably on this ground the Ministry of Munitions has hitherto shrunk from adopting it. The only other practical course was for the Government to prohibit individual firms from absorbing an excessive share of the available labour. The weakness of this alternative was not only that it would leave untouched the anomalies arising from discordant rates, but also that such direct interference on the part of the Ministry of Munitions, which is unfortunately regarded with a great deal of suspicion in Labour circles, would inevitably be interpreted as an instalment of "industrial conscription." It was this course, however, which Mr. Churchill adopted. To quote his own statement: "The Ministry of Munitions, after a full explanation had been given to the responsible Trade Union leaders, issued instructions under its legal powers limiting for the present the right of employers in about 100 firms to add to the number of men on their staffs." It was apparently not Mr. Churchill's intention that this action should be publicly known: one firm at Coventry, however, notified its receipt of the embargo to its employees, unfortunately in somewhat misleading terms. As the immediate result, a few days after the successful Allied counter-attack on the Marne, several thousand Coventry munition workers handed in strike notices.

Mr. Churchill at once published a statement declaring that the embargo had not deprived the workman of his "right to leave his employment and to obtain work of national importance" and that there was no question of reimposing the leaving certificate, but that the output of munitions could not be maintained unless Government had the power "to regulate to some extent the appor-

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tionment of the available labour between the different firms." A further statement defining the intentions of the Government in the same sense was issued, after a conference with the Ministry, by the Executive of the Trade Union primarily concerned—the Amalgamated Society of Engineers. A few days later (July 23), the Government having refused to remove or suspend the embargo, some 12,000 men ceased work at Coventry. Their example was promptly followed at Birmingham and a decision to strike the following week was taken at Leeds and Woolwich. The strikers frankly admitted that it was not a trade dispute, since their quarrel was not with their employers but only with the Government. They denounced the "secret embargo" as an intolerable interference with their freedom, arbitrarily decided on without the previous consent of their Trade Union representatives, and as a "back-door" approach to "industrial conscription."

The steady extension of military service has accustomed the community to the necessity of making some sacrifice of personal liberty to the supreme needs of the State in war-time, and by ceasing work the men deprived themselves of any public sympathy they might otherwise have won. Nor did they obtain support from other classes of Labour. On July 25 the Trade Union Advisory Committee passed and published resolutions stating that the Government had acceded to its proposal that a committee of inquiry composed of representatives of the Government, of the employers, and of the Trade Unions concerned, should be set up to inquire into the causes of the dispute if the strike were ended forthwith and strongly urging the strikers to return to work immediately. These appeals were rejected; and on July 27 the following announcement, issued by the Prime Minister on behalf of the Government, appeared in the Press:

Certain men in the munitions workshops have ceased work in disregard to their duly accredited leaders, and have remained idle against the advice of the Trade Union Advisory Committee. They

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have ceased work not in pursuance of a trade dispute but in an endeavour to force the Government to change the national policy essential to the prosecution of the war. Whilst millions of their fellow-countrymen are hourly facing danger and death for their country, the men now on strike have been granted exemption from these perils only because their services were considered of more value to the State in the workshops than in the army.

It is now necessary for the Government to declare that all men wilfully absent from their work on or after Monday, July 29, will be deemed to have voluntarily placed themselves outside the area of munitions industries. Their protection certificates will cease to have effect from that date, and they will become liable to the provisions of the Military Service Acts.

Confronted by this firm decision and aware that in resisting it they would obtain no support from the leaders or the rank and file of Labour as a whole, the strikers yielded, and work was resumed on July 29.

The storm thus passed quickly, but it caused the gravest anxiety while it lasted; and, if it illustrated the steadiness and patriotism of the mass of Labour, it showed also the delicacy and instability of the position in this particular industrial field. It is earnestly to be hoped that the committee of enquiry will lay bare the real root of the trouble, and that the Government will boldly deal with it; for, unless the question of piece-rates is settled once for all on the obvious lines of collective local agreement, it will prove in the future as in the past a constant source of friction and unrest.

Trade Boards and Whitley Councils

Shortly after the occurrence of these disturbances in one of the most highly organised industries in the country an important Government measure for improving the conditions of labour in ill-organised industries was placed on the statute book. The main object of the new Trade

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Boards Act is to amend the Act of 1909 so as to extend the principle of the Minimum Wage and to accelerate the machinery for its application. Hitherto the Trade Board system could only be introduced into a new trade by a *provisional* order requiring confirmation by a specific Act of Parliament. The Minister of Labour is now enabled to bring a new trade under the Act by *special* order which takes effect without further Parliamentary confirmation, unless negatived by resolution of either House within 40 days. The procedure of the old Act is amended so that the fixing of a minimum rate of wages by a Trade Board can be brought into full operation within three months instead of nine.

Some confusion having arisen as to the respective character and scope of these Trade Boards and the Whitley Councils, a memorandum has been issued by the Minister of Reconstruction and the Minister of Labour which explains the "fundamental differences" between them. A Joint Industrial Council, it points out, is a voluntary, autonomous, and financially self-supporting institution, created by agreement between the organisations of employees and workpeople in the particular industry, composed exclusively of their nominees, varying in structure and methods according to the needs and experience of the industry concerned, determining its own functions, which will include many other matters besides wages, and obtaining results by agreement unsupported by any legal sanction unless it is specially applied for and obtained. A Trade Board, on the other hand, is a statutory body, constituted by the Minister of Labour in pursuance of the Trade Boards Act, supported from public funds, containing members unconnected with the industry in addition to the employees' and workpeople's representatives, and dealing primarily with wages, as to which its decisions, when confirmed by the Minister of Labour, are enforceable by law.

Where both a Trade Board and a Whitley Council

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exist for the same industry, the relations between them are thus defined :

(1) Where Government Departments wish to consult the industry, the Joint Industrial Council, and not the Trade Board, will be recognised as the body to be consulted.

(2) In order to make use of the experience of the Trade Board, the constitution of the Industrial Council should be so drawn as to make full provision for consultation between the Council and Trade Board on matters referred to the former by a Government Department, and to allow of the representation of the Trade Board on any Sub-Committee of the Council dealing with questions with which the Trade Board is concerned.

(3) The Joint Industrial Council clearly cannot under any circumstances override the statutory powers conferred upon the Trade Board, and if the Government at any future time adopted the suggestion contained in Section 21 of the First Report that the sanction of law should be given on the application of an Industrial Council to agreements made by the Council, such agreements could not be made binding on any part of a trade governed by a Trade Board, so far as the statutory powers of the Trade Board are concerned.

Meanwhile some progress has been made in the establishment of Whitley Councils in minor industries. The following answer to a question addressed to the Minister of Labour was given in Parliament on July 4 :

Two joint industrial councils for the pottery and building industries, respectively, have already held their first meetings. Joint industrial councils have also been constituted for the heavy chemicals, gold, silver and kindred trades, rubber and silk industries, and the first meetings of these councils will be held during July. As a result of conferences, called as a rule by the Minister, considerable progress has been made in the following eight industries : Baking, cable making, commercial road transport, electrical contracting, furniture manufacture, leather goods and belting, matches and vehicle building. Provisional committees have been appointed, and have drafted constitutions which have been sent out to the various associations concerned for their approval. A constitution for the printing industry has been drafted, but not yet sent out to the associations concerned for approval. As soon as the constitutions have been approved by the various associations, the first meetings of the councils will be arranged. In the case of the following five industries conferences have already taken place, and have approved of

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the drafting of constitutions : Bobbin manufacture, boot and shoe manufacture, electricity (power and supply), roller engraving, and woollen and worsted. In the case of some twenty other industries the associations concerned are giving careful consideration to the question of the formation of a joint industrial council, and in some of them arrangements have been made for summoning joint conferences.

In the debate on Supply the Government was pressed to adopt the Council system in the Post Office. It was stated in reply that the matter did not concern the Post Office alone and would shortly be considered by the War Cabinet. On July 4 its decision was announced by Mr. Bonar Law in the following terms :

The War Cabinet has considered this question and has decided to adopt in principle the application of the recommendations of the Whitley Report with any necessary adaptations to Government establishments where the conditions are sufficiently analogous to those existing in outside industries. It has also been decided that an Inter-Departmental Committee composed of representatives of the Departments concerned should be set up to consider what modifications are necessary. The Committee will be presided over by the Minister of Labour.

He added that the Committee, as it was to consider the matter from the Government point of view, would not contain representatives of the workers in the Departments.

The principle of the Report has also been approved by the Association of Municipal Corporations, and the establishment of Joint Councils is under consideration for the gas, electricity, tramways, water and non-trading municipal services.

Recognising that further machinery is required for settling disputes besides the Joint Councils, the Whitley Committee issued in June a Report on Conciliation and Arbitration. Its conclusions were :

(a) Whilst we are opposed to any system of compulsory arbitration, we are in favour of an extension of voluntary machinery for the adjustment of disputes. Where the parties are unable to adjust

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their differences, we think that there should be means by which an independent inquiry may be made into the facts and circumstances of a dispute, and an authoritative pronouncement made thereon, though we do not think that there should be any compulsory power of delaying strikes and lock-outs.

(b) We further recommend that there should be established a Standing Arbitration Council for cases where the parties wish to refer any dispute to arbitration, though it is desirable that suitable single arbitrators should be available, where the parties so desire.

The Work of the Session

In the weeks preceding the adjournment of Parliament on August 8 the Government made rapid progress with its legislative programme. Of the Bills which received the Royal assent on the eve of the recess the most important was the Education Bill. The neglect in past years of a subject so essential both for the welfare of the individual and for the life of a democratic state is an old and discreditable story. As regards education Governments have invariably been timid and miserly, politicians narrow and factious, and the country apathetic. All the more striking by contrast has been the proposal by the present Government, amidst the distractions of war, of a bold and costly measure of reform, its relatively easy passage through Parliament, and the interest and approval it has elicited throughout the country. The most important provisions of the Bill, it will be remembered, are those which protect any child under twelve from industrial employment, keep every child at school till he is fourteen, and save part of his day for education till he is eighteen. Some anxiety was felt at the strength of the attack, made principally by the representatives of the Lancashire cotton-spinning industry, on the last of these proposals; and Mr. Fisher's decision to postpone for seven years the enforcement of continuation-school teaching between the ages of 16 and 18 was strongly criticised as an excessive concession to

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the interests affected. But, as Mr. Fisher argued, some years will be required in any case to set the new continuation system on an efficient footing and especially to procure and train the requisite teachers; and he could claim that this compromise disarmed hostility without making any sacrifice of principle or prejudicing its actual working out in practice. The enactment of the Bill is greatly to the credit of the Government and of Parliament; above all, it is by universal consent a personal triumph for Mr. Fisher, who has proved to a public, encouraged nowadays to believe that only business men are "practical," that scholarship and statesmanship are by no means incompatible. The new measure is far from providing the fullness of educational opportunity which the democratic ideal demands; but "Mr. Fisher's Act" will long be remembered as a landmark in the progress of the country.

A less pleasant aspect of the reaction of the war on public feeling was revealed by the agitation for a more drastic treatment of the enemy alien question which has been carried on persistently in a section of the Press and reached its climax this summer. The campaign was actively taken up by a group of Members of Parliament who in the middle of July secured a promise from the Prime Minister that he would give his personal attention to the matter. As a result the Home Secretary, who was suddenly recalled from his work on the Anglo-German conference on the exchange of prisoners at The Hague, brought forward in the House of Commons on July 11 in a moderate speech a series of Government measures which, if they did not satisfy the extremists, were generally considered adequate to meet any real danger that may exist. The more important of these measures were the revision by strengthened committees of all claims to exemption on the part of enemy aliens—exemption from internment in the case of men and from repatriation in the case of women; the appointment of a committee to review all certificates of naturalisation granted to enemy

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aliens during the war ; the establishment of a rule that no person shall be employed in a Government office during the war whose parents are not natural born subjects of this or an Allied country, exceptions to this rule to be made only on the ground of the national interest and to be decided by a committee independent of any Department ; the prompt winding-up of German Banks and the prohibition of their establishment in this country for a period of years after the end of the war. Executive and legislative effect was rapidly given to these proposals. It is to be regretted that the Government did not find time to take such measures, necessary as it declared them to be for the safety of the country, before the public agitation had become so violent and widespread. It is also to be wished that Mr. Lloyd George, when he declared that the attitude of the Press was a reflection of real anxiety in the country, should have vigorously protested against the use in some newspapers of language calculated to play upon and still further to inflame the bitter feelings provoked by the inhumanity of the German Government in its conduct of the war, to foster hysterical rumours and indiscriminate suspicions, and to encourage an insular distrust and dislike of all foreigners as such. In view, moreover, of the reckless attacks on British citizens of enemy origin, however vaguely defined, the Prime Minister would have done well to pay a tribute of respect to those of them who have proved their devotion to the country of their own or their fathers' adoption by their death on the battlefield.

Meanwhile the Irish question has fallen somewhat into the background. The joint repudiation of conscription by the Nationalists, the Sinn Feiners and the Irish Roman Catholic Church, followed by the discovery of a new phase in the German plot to incite a rebellion in Ireland, so weakened the case for a prompt establishment of Home Rule and so strengthened the opposition of Ulster to it that the Government determined to "go slow" with both sides of its twofold policy. It was decided to follow the methods

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adopted in Great Britain and to postpone the introduction of conscription pending the result of an appeal for the voluntary enlistment of a fixed quota of men. On June 3rd Lord French issued a proclamation making an "offer, which, if successful, will ensure that Ireland will play her part fully and freely in the world struggle for liberty." The proposal was that "Ireland should voluntarily furnish the number of men required to establish an equitable ratio when compared with all other parts of the Empire." The number was fixed at 50,000 before October 1 and 2,000 to 3,000 a month after that date. After declaring that the appeal was directed primarily to the younger men and to those in the towns rather than in the country, the proclamation continued :

We recognise that men who come forward and fight for their Motherland are entitled to share in all that their Motherland can offer. Steps are therefore being taken to ensure as far as possible that land shall be available for men who have fought for their country, and the necessary legislative measure is now under consideration.

Though the appeal was thus accompanied by a promise which was never made to volunteers in Britain, it awakened little response. Three days later a Sinn Fein Anti-Conscription Conference in Dublin issued a statement warning Irishmen in view of the proclamation "against the false confidence that conscription is at an end," and the Sinn Fein propaganda continued so "dangerously seditious" that on July 3 it was "proclaimed," together with the Gaelic League, the Irish Volunteers, and other organisations.

Meanwhile the Nationalist members, who had seceded in a body from Westminster, made no movement in support of voluntary recruitment ; and on their return to Parliament at the beginning of August they delivered a violent attack upon the whole policy of the Government. Mr. Dillon opened it with a resolution and a speech based on the assumption that the position of the Irish people resembled

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that of the oppressed nationalities of the Hapsburg Empire. Mr. Shortt replied with a vigorous criticism of the Nationalist attitude. They had done nothing, he declared, to help the Government either in its effort to avoid conscription by obtaining volunteers or to restore such a state of feeling in Ireland as would make possible the introduction of Home Rule ; and he appealed once more for their assistance. On August 8, just before the recess, Mr. Shortt repeated his assertion that the Government had not abandoned the Home Rule side of its Irish policy and stated that the Cabinet Committee set up to frame a measure was still at work and that he was going to assist its deliberations in person during the recess.

A few days after the adjournment the Chancellor of the Exchequer published the gratifying announcement that the subscriptions for National War Bonds had reached "the stupendous figure of One Thousand Million Pounds."

"No previous loan in any country," the statement continued, "has ever placed so enormous a sum of actual new money at the disposal of the State. . . . Even more remarkable is the fact that this great result has been achieved by regular, continuous, week-by-week investment. There has been no sudden huge transfer of capital, such as is inevitable when hundreds of millions are borrowed in a short time. Consequently, we have avoided the dislocation of the money market and the upheaval of credit which, after a great loan, render it impossible for the Government to issue another loan for many months. . . . We made our appeal to the patriotism of the British nation and the response has exceeded our most sanguine expectations. . . . Now we know that the financial effort of the country will not only be sustained but surpassed, and that we shall be able to finance the war through to victory."

The Prospect of a General Election

It is generally expected that the new register will be completed this autumn and that a General Election will be held before the close of the year. The arguments

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against a war-time election are obvious and it would doubtless be possible to extend the six months' lease of life for which the present Parliament passed a Bill in July. But there is a widespread feeling that a House of Commons which was elected four years before the war can no longer adequately fulfil the object of its being—to represent and to carry into effect the will of the people. Apart from the immense extension in its numbers by the recent Reform Act, the electorate is morally quite different from what it was in 1910: men's minds have everywhere been radically changed by the experiences of these terrible years; and it is imperative that the conclusion of the war and the settlement of the terms of peace—a settlement which will be no less than the foundations of a new era in the life of the world—should be controlled, as far as this country is concerned, by a body which truly represents the new spirit and the new purpose of its people.

A war-time election will present a great danger and a great opportunity. The danger will be the temptation to all parties concerned, to Ministers and their critics, to candidates and electors, to political organisations official and unofficial, to resort to the violent and vulgar methods which have so often poisoned the atmosphere of political conflicts in peace-time. If the election provides an outburst of bitter animosity between the various sections of opinion and of reckless personal recrimination, it will show to all the world a picture of democracy failing even at so great a crisis, even when we are fighting for our faith in it, to overcome one of its most insidious weaknesses, and will strengthen the arguments and influence of those among our enemies who repudiate and deride it. It is in avoiding this danger and in the possibility of producing just the opposite effect, both among our Allies and our enemies, that our opportunity lies. Differences of opinion there must be; but if the conflict between them can be fought out in a spirit worthy of the occasion, if the combatants strive to set aside all personal or sectional interests

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and to think only how, by what they say and how they vote, they can best serve according to their lights the welfare of the supreme cause to which the country is committed, then the British people will prove that they mean not only to make the world safe for democracy but also to save democracy from itself.

This is not the place to prophesy results ; but the general opinion at the moment is that in the event of an early election Mr. Lloyd George will still command a majority in the House of Commons. If that be so, his position will be very greatly strengthened and the country will expect him to take advantage of it. To those who have criticised his recent administration on the ground that he has shown himself too amenable to influences outside Parliament, he might have argued that the existing House of Commons was not sufficiently in touch with the electorate to give him the consciousness of strength and security which is indispensable for the conduct of a war by any Government. The removal of this weakness in the present working of the constitutional machine would be one of the chief advantages of an election. A Government which enjoys the confidence of a newly-elected House of Commons will not need to seek support in any quarter except in the body which is the only authoritative exponent of the people's will and to which alone it is responsible.

London. August, 1918.

CANADA

I. CANADA AND THE IMPERIAL PROBLEM.

PRESENTLY, and perhaps sooner than they expect, one question will demand an answer from the Canadian people—What are we going to do about the government of the Empire? Not many months ago a large proportion of Canadians would have replied unhesitatingly: "We have been getting along very well as we are. Why disturb things? They will get done in the old British fashion, by which the need becoming insistent brings with it the necessary action." No community was ever more deeply impregnated with the mid-Victorian doctrine of *laissez-faire* than Canada. Nowhere was there a larger number of thoughtful people who were in fact, without perhaps realising it, political fatalists. They denied the duty of foresight in only one department of life, and that perhaps the most important of all—the sphere of national politics.

It would now be difficult to get anybody to take seriously a warning against being drawn into the "vortex of European militarism." In defence of liberty we have not been drawn, but we have walked willingly, cheerfully, and even eagerly into the vortex, and in the vortex we shall stay until the matter is decided. In the remoteness and the irresponsibility of the colonial status the voice of duty in world affairs sounded very faint. Now, many voices are calling us, and all that Canada is waiting for is to find the true answer.

The election of December, 1917, represented more than

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the assertion of union in defence of British ideals. It was equally the defeat of a whole legion of phrases and ideas that had for many years acted as a soporific to our national conscience. Many earnest and thoughtful people who up to the outbreak of the war had a sincere belief in the formulæ of *laissez-faire* Liberalism are now still fervent Liberals in the best sense of the word, but full of belief in what organised, continuous human thought can do to effect the best purposes in national life. This is a mental revolution, a complete change of direction, and it fits us to face the problems of reconstruction in a large and courageous way.

To say that this change of feeling was universal or that it was absolutely unqualified would be to exaggerate the situation. Behind the willingness and anxiety of a large majority of the Canadian people to take part in an effective organisation of the British Commonwealth lie certain misgivings and certain fairly definite reservations. There is a feeling of irritation at any insistence on rigid and inflexible alternatives. It has been said that there is no British Commonwealth, or at least there is no real state that can properly be described as the British Commonwealth, because the will of the various parts of the Commonwealth is not expressed by a direct method through a representative body upon the model of the British Parliament. The Canadian would deny this, and he would say that there is such a state. It may not be perfect, it may need various changes, but he would deny that there is not room in the world for the formation of a genuine state based on something different and more flexible than anything that can be expressed in a written constitution embodying an Imperial Parliament. Rightly or wrongly, there is an instinctive feeling among probably a large majority of Canadians that the possibilities of an effective government of the Empire are not exhausted by the single category of parliamentary representation.

To state precisely what is the Canadian point of view

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in regard to a solution of the Imperial problem is difficult, if not impossible. Many facts contribute to this. The population of Canada is geographically scattered, and includes imperfectly assimilated elements of various races. A hundred years of peace have given time and opportunity for economic development, but have brought none of the stern external pressure that welds nations into one. *Laissez-faire* Liberalism, which has been our dominant political philosophy, is in itself a social solvent, and since the accomplishment of Confederation there has been no great internal question to bind together the elements of Canadian national life. So far as the political history of Canada has been concerned with exterior affairs, we have been engaged mainly in extracting from the Imperial Government instalment after instalment of constitutional powers, until there remains practically nothing to obtain other than the responsibilities that belong to the Indian, Colonial, and Foreign Offices. Although through the period during which this process was proceeding there was a constant decrease and final disappearance of any bitterness in the controversies involved, the residuary deposit of it all is a certain sense of implied opposition to Downing Street and a sheaf of phrases which, like mummies, adorn our historic museum.

Since bitterness vanished, and the sting departed from the relations between the Colonial Office and the Dominion Government, there remained little consciousness in most people's minds that inter-Imperial relations presented any problem worth discussing. So it has come about that there is very little material in the way of newspaper articles and speeches to document an inquiry into Canadian opinion on the subject.

It is not true that the groups of opinion on this great subject are divided horizontally or by class, but undoubtedly a great deal of earnest opposition to all that a misleading historic nomenclature styled "Imperialistic" plans has come with the immigration of British labour. This

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influence is considerable and is reinforced by an economic view of human development, mainly imported from British University circles. This particular form of criticism regards Imperialism as a capitalistic ambition that leaves out of account the value of human souls. Also it is conceived of as a plan associated with the constant expectation of, and preparation for, wars. Curiously enough, the people who hold these views will readily admit that even after this present conspiracy against human liberty is disposed of, it cannot be expected that we shall immediately come into a millennium of peace.

Amongst other influences, more or less indirect, there is underlying all this a very intricate piece of continental history. North American pacificism, associated in the United States with the Monroe Doctrine, has been a curious mixture of the theory of the hermit state with an almost exaggerated sense of separation from the rest of the world and a vague cosmopolitanism that refused to recognise differences between other peoples so long as they wore more or less the same clothes. Followed to its logical conclusion, this cosmopolitanism meant that to right the wrongs of the world, help the oppressed, and see justice done a thousand weak voices should be raised, but not one strong arm.

It may be taken for granted that we in Canada wish with our whole hearts, first, to remain an integral part of the Empire, and through it to take our share in maintaining right and justice in the world; second, we wish to be and remain strong enough to maintain right; third, we wish to do nothing that by over-assimilation with the other elements of the Empire will disintegrate the thing that we have come to regard as Canadianism.

The argument that in order to carry out the first two of these three conditions the organisation of the British Commonwealth must be brought to the point of a common Parliament for limited specific purposes is difficult to meet. Logically considered there seems to be no reason why, as

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the result of this war, some such complete remaking of the constitutional relations of the Commonwealth should not be consummated at once. It is difficult to think of any permanent resting-place between the present position of Canada and her sister Dominions in the British Commonwealth and the establishment of a genuine federation. But in spite of logic the achievement of such an ideal is even yet considered by probably the majority of Canadians as either improbable or at least likely to be reached only by slow stages of development. There is a general feeling of suspicion of any scheme of organisation laid down in great detail, and the insistence on rigid alternatives between some fully developed plan of federation or ultimate separation is resented. The creation of the Imperial War Cabinet including representatives of the Dominions and of India has been generally looked upon with favour, perhaps because the Canadians who represent their country are the Prime Minister and those appointed by him. It may be difficult, for the present at least, to have any more direct Canadian representation in the central councils of the Commonwealth.

There are dangers attached to the use of all labels. Co-operation is too vague a term to use as a definite classification. Necessarily federation involves and includes co-operation, but it is co-operation of a defined and organised description. Inversely what is popularly described as co-operation may under favourable conditions gradually take on the more intimate and defined characteristics of federation. Those conditions can hardly be present as between communities not associated by a long common history. The "like-mindedness" that can only grow out of a common history supplies just that element of permanence in human relations qualitatively different from anything that comes under the category of alliance. Those who think of the British Commonwealth as a kind of Britannic Alliance confuse a contractual relation between separate states and a natural organic development such

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as the slow evolution of the British Empire into a commonwealth of nations.

The great war has brought about an alliance of democratic peoples, and an earnest desire for its permanence, so that for the future predatory wars may become impossible or at least difficult. We all wish for such a consummation, but in the meantime a quarter of the world's population, already bound together by ties that lie deep in history, awaits only the exercise of adequate political wisdom in order to become a permanent guarantee of international amity. It constitutes in itself a vast and successful experiment in liberal internationalism.

An alliance with the United States, and possibly with France and Italy, for the preservation of the world's peace would be not more but much less difficult for the British Commonwealth as a coherent whole than for its parts. Still there remain the hesitation and doubts that centre round the word co-operation. They have not been expressed in any very orderly fashion. Nor is it easy to collate the fragments available and put down in plain words what is in many cases instinctive and vague as well as modified by a feeling on the part of many that they do not wish to argue in set terms against what they are willing to admit is a fine conception of Imperial destiny.

We feel, for example, that the analogies of Scotland and Ireland and of the United States are incomplete and not convincing. One asks whether there are not such things as essential geographical unities. Looking back upon history, was it not inevitable that the British Isles should become one state in the most complete sense of the word? Was it not equally certain that the colonies of South Africa should unite under one government? And difficult as the project that lay before Alexander Hamilton may have seemed at the time, the North American Colonies in their revolt were nearly sure to come together as they did. There were obvious historical reasons why Canada should not then have been included in this combination, and

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these reasons remained adequate for the establishment of a completely separate existence. The problem of uniting a number of communities widely scattered over the world that have already proceeded far on the path to nationhood is not only bigger and more difficult but different.

There seem to be two vital requirements in any plan for adequate unification. One is the elimination of possible opposition between two loyalties. The other is the organisation for defence, a defence ready to meet not slow-moving forces, but rapid, violent attacks such as that with which this present war was begun, and one in which we may say that the world was saved by the readiness of the British navy, the French conscript and the small British army.

It has been suggested that in dealing with foreign Powers it is of the utmost importance that those representing the state should know accurately and certainly what forces are at the disposal of the state for immediate action, and that for this purpose under present conditions all that can be immediately considered as available are the army and navy of the British Isles. A Canadian is disposed to say that the action of the Dominions in this war deprives that argument of validity. In any just war he would say the Dominions would immediately and automatically give all they had or all that was required. If he was met by the question—Who is to decide whether the war is just?—he would probably say that this presents no practical difficulty, and that the British Government of the day would be given the benefit of the doubt. Over and above all this there is the hope that an intensive organisation of future wars is the less necessary because, in the first place, such Powers as may be left under an autocratic form of government after this war will hesitate a long time before embarking on a predatory war.

There is a significance in the slowness of the United States in coming into this war apart from the Monroe Doctrine or any other political explanation. It may be

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that when the world is in the main occupied by great democratic states, the unwillingness of all of them to make war will bring about much the same slowness in military preparations as marked the position of the United States in the first years of the great war which now convulses the nations. But we cannot yet rely upon any such deliberation in the warlike decisions of aggrieved nations.

In the meantime, for nearly four years we of this old British Empire have been "doing things together." It cannot count for nothing in the future of Canada that all this while her young men have fought and died in Flanders, France, and many another still more remote battlefield for a great principle and as brothers in arms with men from every part of the Empire, or that at home thousands of Canadian men and women have given themselves to the self-sacrificing work of the British and Canadian Red Cross, the Patriotic Fund, and a dozen other arduous activities. These are the great secular processes by which barriers are beaten down, misunderstandings removed, and the lessons of a common service learned. The war has not taught us unity of purpose, but has demonstrated its existence. Our security against the dangers of dual and conflicting loyalties must rest upon an essential like-mindedness. No constitution can in itself protect a federation absolutely from the defection of one of its members. But it may by wisely facilitating the carrying out of common purposes make such a defection inconceivable.

II. MILITARY SERVICE AND THE FARMER.

UNTIL the spring of 1918 the supply of recruits under the Military Service Act seemed adequate to the demand. By the time Parliament assembled, however, it was evident that the 100,000 men authorised by this statute could not be produced by the machinery which it set up. The shortage was due to the excessive number of

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exemptions granted by the tribunals. Of those exempted the great majority were engaged in agriculture, and had been given assurance that while they were *bona fide* farmers or farm labourers they would not be called up. The demand for increased production, in the absence of official advice to the contrary, led most of the men in the agricultural class of military age to take advantage of the opportunity afforded them to remain at their regular employment.

The situation already was becoming difficult when the great German offensive placed an entirely different complexion on the matter. Under the pressure of events the reinforcement of the army became of urgent and paramount importance. In consequence the Government prepared an Order in Council cancelling all exemptions, except for physical disability, which had been granted to men of the ages of 20, 21, and 22 years. This Order was presented to both Houses of Parliament. After a secret session, at which the gravity of the emergency was explained, it passed, not without a division in which the Opposition based its objection on technical grounds, and was signed on April 20, 1918.

The burden of this measure fell chiefly on the farming class, which hitherto had occupied a privileged position. The contention was at once raised by the farmers that if "food will win the war" men must be left to produce it. Canada as a great wheat-producing country has, of course, obvious responsibilities to discharge in victualling the Allied forces, but the Dominion has also undertaken a military obligation in the war which, although bound by no agreement or undertaking, she is determined never to forswear. It can be regarded as unthinkable that Canada should ever abandon her four divisions now in Belgium and France.

After the passage of the Order in Council of April 20 the farmers commenced an agitation for the repeal of the measure. This began with a deputation, chiefly from the

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farms of Ontario and Quebec, which met the Prime Minister at Ottawa in a delegation 5,000^{men} strong, apparently hoping that numbers would reinforce argument. Their efforts, however, were unavailing, and the protests of the farmers have since been confined to agricultural conventions and to certain periodicals which espouse the agricultural interest.

The farmers' contention is twofold. Apart from the charge against the Government of breach of faith, which in the light of the emergency which caused its action has no force, they claim, in the first place, that the cancellation of the exemptions will materially lessen production, and, secondly, that the measure in cases where the "draftee" is the only able-bodied man on a farm will cause undue hardship. There is no answer to the first contention. The output of the farms will unquestionably be lessened, but in this crisis the vital issue is being decided in the line in Belgium and France, and the need of increased man-power, for the present, outweighs that of increased production. The second point has a greater validity, and to meet it an Order in Council has been passed whereby provision is made for extended leave of absence for men who are the sole support of helpless dependents.

The position of the farmers in relation to military service raises certain questions of general interest. The agricultural community in Canada has by tradition been a privileged class. The farmer for generations has been regarded as the "backbone of the country." This is not without a certain economic justification. Before the war the quantity of farm products exported measured more than half of the total national exports. We are still in Canada chiefly a rural community, and the last census shows that over half the population of Canada live either in the country or in villages with a population of under 500. The price of wheat, the staple product of the Dominion, can be said to set the standard for all prices in the country. Impressed by such facts, one school of thought, strongest

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in the West, holds that Canada is destined to be primarily an agricultural country.

The farmer, therefore, has some ground for a sense of special importance. Unfortunately this feeling has not led to the breadth of outlook which might be expected of him. This may be accounted for in various ways. The Canadian farmer leads an isolated life, although the rural telephone and rural postal delivery have of late years brought him much nearer to the outside world. The movement for good roads, stimulated by the inexpensive motor car, tends too to confer social as well as economic advantages, but the Northern winter and the great area of the farms, especially in the West, will continue to give rural life a remoteness from the centres of thought and activity, and in consequence the farmer is likely to continue to concentrate unduly on his own affairs and to think of the world in terms of his local requirements. It is remarkable, in view of the parochialism that has thus almost been thrust upon the farmers, that they have been so ready to grasp the significance of the dominant issue of the day and that their sons have been willing to volunteer—as they have in many thousands—to risk their lives in the defence of a principle. As a matter of fact, the farmers as a class are fundamentally loyal and have always proved their loyalty when the issue has been clearly placed before them.

The farmer in Canada has developed a distinct class consciousness. His is a scattered community; but he occupies it alone, and as yet the country is not invaded by city folk, except as transient visitors. Nor, as in the case of the old world, are there residents in the rural districts whose position lends them a broad outlook on affairs. Between the town and country in Canada there is as yet a considerable gulf of interest. The farmer, whose mind does not easily grasp abstract facts, finds it difficult to believe that the bankers and merchants are not getting the better of every business transaction in which he is concerned.

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Again, the farmer, like all men who learn their trade empirically, regard it as an arcanum. This element tends to complicate the agricultural position of the moment. There are men and women in plenty who are anxious to assist as amateurs in the work of agricultural production, but the farmer cannot realise that without a laborious apprenticeship such assistance can be of use to him. If he were more alive to the value of instruction the conscripted hired man could be more easily replaced.

The new National Register has revealed that a large percentage of those who are familiar with farm work are willing in this crisis to employ their knowledge. Efforts are being made in various parts of the country to give adequate emergency training to temporary farm workers. Before long we shall, no doubt, see many such war workers on the land. This movement, if widespread, will, of course, provide a solution to the problem of effecting a balance between military effort and increased production. It will have a further advantage of bringing city and country closer together in a common cause. The consequent exchange of ideas should have the permanent effect of giving each a wider outlook.

III. FURTHER NOTES ON TITLES.

REFERENCE has already been made in THE ROUND TABLE to the Parliamentary debate on titles which occurred during the last Session. The discussions on this subject, both in the House of Commons and in the Press, are perhaps significant enough in their implications to merit further attention; otherwise many persons in the Dominion may seem to have shown little sense of proportion by engaging in a controversy on the award of decorative distinctions at a time when the future of civilisation itself is at stake.

Perhaps we are a little self-conscious in the matter. It

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might be urged that, if we had both a keener sense of humour and a more robust faith in the real democracy of this country, we should be less concerned with the titular embellishments of a few of its citizens. But such externals are, after all, not without consequence to the future of the Dominion. It is wise to be over-anxious that title and merit should be closely related. We have no historical justification for the establishment in Canada of principles which should remain peculiar to Debrett.

Two important points in relation to the subject of titles will doubtless be settled in accordance with the Order in Council which early in the Session was laid on the table of the House. It is unlikely that the Prime Minister will meet with any difficulty in his effort to establish the principle by which honours in Canada shall be bestowed on the recommendation of the Ministry of the day, although it was revealed during the course of the debate that a similar request made of Mr. Chamberlain, when he was Secretary for the Colonies, was not successful. Such a step involves the extinction of almost the last prerogative of the Crown in the Dominion; but nevertheless it does no more than place the Government of Canada with regard to titles of honour on the same footing as that of the United Kingdom, where few distinctions are granted save on the recommendation of the Ministry. The status of "mistress in one's own house," long since unreservedly granted to the Dominions as much more than a privilege, should imply the right of determining who should occupy the posts of honour in the household.

The settlement of the second question, that of the bestowal of hereditary honours, is bound up with the decision which in all probability will be made in reference to the first. If recommendations in such matters rest with the responsible Government, it is extremely unlikely that peerages or baronetcies will ever again be conferred on Canadian citizens.

The status of the heirs of existing titles presents a more

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difficult problem. The Order in Council of March 25, 1918, announces in this connection that "appropriate action" will be taken to provide that "no title of honour held by a subject of His Majesty, now or hereafter ordinarily resident in Canada, shall be recognised as having hereditary effect." The question involves legal intricacies connected with the status under the Crown of a peer or baronet, which would complicate any legislative remedy. It is more than likely that such a statement of Government policy as has already been made in Canada, supported by a widespread public opinion, will lead the inheritors of honours to take hold of the problem themselves and settle it by their own good sense. This would offer a more dignified and effective remedy than that of a levelling ordinance imposed by statute.

Had not the Government already been committed to a wisely moderated policy in the matter of honours, the effort of an ultra-Radical wing in the House to carry a measure prohibiting the award of any titles in Canada would undoubtedly have been successful, in the Commons at least. The vote on this question, however, was regarded by the Government as one of want of confidence, and the 'root and branch' movement was therefore stayed. The Prime Minister has been criticised in some quarters for his action in thus curbing the iconoclastic zeal of certain members of the Unionist party. It is not to be doubted, however, that his policy is a true interpretation of the sober opinion of the electorate both overseas and at home.

It is impossible to say what will be the future development of public opinion on the question of titles. One thing is certain, that the over-generous distribution of honours which the action of the Government was meant to check would have quickly evoked a very radical sentiment with regard to the question. The recent Dominion honours lists have upset our sense of values. Most Canadians until recently—perhaps rather naïvely—asso-

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ciated the honour of knighthood with distinguished public service. Almost the first men in this country to be thus honoured were the statesmen to whom we owe Confederation. The dignity, used then only as a reward for genuine merit, can still be reserved for the same lofty purpose. When thus conferred, irrespective of wealth or poverty, it would act as a wholesome corrective of that point of view which seems to regard the possession of mere riches as an honourable distinction in itself. But if honours are to cease to be honourable, and distinctions from their very number can no longer "distinguish," then let us have done with such a travesty of chivalry.

If the award of titles and honours in Canada be allowed to rest on the advice of the Dominion Government, and if the Governments of the future fall heir to the policy of the present Ministry, it may be assumed that titles, honestly and sparingly awarded, will remain an innocuous, and even a useful, element in our national life. Knightly honours, when borne by knightly figures, make a very proper appeal to the historical imagination, and symbolise the tradition and the unity of the British Commonwealth. But it should be remembered that the reception into orders of chivalry of Canadians whose armour is not regarded at home as entirely unsullied has a disintegrating effect on opinion at large. The Crown as the theoretical fountain of honours cannot be entirely dissociated in the public mind from what is done vicariously on its behalf. Canadians have very general affection for the monarchy as a splendid and irreplaceable symbol of British tradition. They are the more jealous, therefore, of its prestige.

IV. THE WOMAN'S MOVEMENT IN CANADA.

IT cannot be said that there has hitherto been a Woman's Movement, as such, in Canada. This is due partly to the advantages of woman's position in Canadian social

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life and partly to her disadvantages. The provincial educational systems are, with some exceptions in the Province of Quebec, based almost entirely on co-education. For many years the universities have been open equally to both sexes, as have also the professions. In the general social life of the Dominion women mix much more freely with men than in Great Britain.

On the other hand, women have been much more occupied with their homes, and much more wholly absorbed than in Great Britain in the domestic life of the community. There has been no economic injustice to women as such, giving, as in Great Britain, a sting to the suffrage agitation. If, for example, the life of the Canadian farmer's wife has been a hard one, so also has that of her husband. As teachers and stenographers, as clerks and workers in large business establishments, women have on the whole been paid an adequate wage, little, if at all, inferior to that of men. If in some cases women have been sweated, these have neither been numerous enough nor gross enough to provoke widespread comment. Even in war time women have not as yet been used to anything like the extent that they have in Great Britain. Nevertheless, with very little dislocation we suddenly find both the Provincial and Federal Governments enfranchising practically all women.

Though there has been no widespread agitation for the suffrage, there have been organisations which have kept it before the public. The movement in its favour in Great Britain has been followed with increasing interest. A greater cause of this is, however, that social and political life in Canada is in a much less formulated state than in Great Britain, and in this there is at least the advantage that change does not have to strive against the terrible inertia of organised respectability. There is much less of this inertia in Canadian life than in British. The suddenness and ease of the change is also another evidence that political movements in Canada are practical,

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not theoretical, based on practical needs, not on deep principles.

Thus women have been till recently almost entirely outside politics in Canada, nor have they been used, as they have in Great Britain, as part of the party machine. Canada has no Primrose League. Indeed, there has been a very deep-rooted objection to women taking any part in political life, and even the candidates' wives have hitherto played a very minor part in elections. A strong subconscious political influence they may be said to have had. They have been for years the backbone of the Prohibition Party, and it does not seem far-fetched to associate the wave of prohibition feeling and legislation with the movement in favour of women's suffrage.

Women's activities there have, of course, been. The woman worker is a very noted feature in the religious life of the community. The National Council of Women has for twenty-two years been a consultative body of women. Moreover, in the new West that has been created, women have organised themselves along parallel lines with the men's associations in Farmers' Associations and Grain Growers' Associations; they have worked with the men in close co-operation in creating the political and economic life of the community and they have developed leaders whose advice and help are sought by the Provincial Cabinets and legislators. Since the war women have been enfranchised in British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba and Ontario, and in all these Provinces the legislation has been passed without a struggle. A measure in favour of women's suffrage is now before the Federal House, and, in spite of some rather academic objections from Quebec, seems certain to pass. In British Columbia and Alberta women are eligible as members of the Legislature. There is at present one woman representative in the British Columbia Legislature and two in that of Alberta, of whom one was elected by the soldiers' vote as the soldiers' representative when she was serving Overseas as a nursing sister.

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In making the special legislation to govern the federal war election the Conservative Government gave votes to the wives, mothers and sisters of members of the C.E.F. There were obvious objections to this as class enfranchisement or indeed as a political dodge, but when Union Government was decided on it confirmed the measure, which could only be justified on the principle *salus reipublicae suprema lex*.

So for the first time in a federal election women worked and voted, and the great majority of this vote was cast for Union Government. Though it is true that Union Government would have been carried without the women's vote, yet these new voters, coming into the fight free from old party friendships, showing an unprejudiced conviction in favour of a strong war policy, had a marked influence on public opinion.

In the lull that followed the election, when the new Government was formulating its policy before meeting Parliament, the War Committee of the Cabinet, realising that women had come permanently into the political life of the country, and acting, it is said, on the initiative of Mr. Rowell, summoned at short notice a Conference of women to meet them at Ottawa, just as they had previously summoned the Provincial Premiers and the representatives of organised labour. This was evidently done not to please or to reward the new voters, but with a genuine desire to get the women's point of view. At about the same time they appointed a woman as one of eight Commissioners to deal with registration.

The Conference was not large—75 in all—and was made up of the heads of such nationally organised women's societies as the National Council, the W.C.T.U., the Y.W.C.A., the Victorian Order of Nurses, the Association of Trained Nurses, la Fédération de St. Jean Baptiste; of teachers and social workers, of farmers' wives and women's institute leaders and of a certain number of other women known for their ability or influence, chosen with a due

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regard to ensuring at least a rough equality of provincial representation. The Conference was asked primarily to discuss problems connected with the more efficient prosecution of the war, more especially national registration, the substitution of women for men in industry and agriculture, measures of thrift and conservation, but no restrictions were set, and in addition to these subjects the Conference discussed and passed resolutions on questions of public health, of prohibition, and of the whole position of women in public service.

The War Committee of the Cabinet not only held joint sessions with the Conference at the opening to lay the problems before them with the greatest frankness and at the end to receive the resolutions, but each Minister was available at any time to give information to the Conference or to its various sections. Every member of the Conference was much impressed and encouraged by the personal and official accessibility and helpfulness of the Ministers.

Certain fundamental differences in women's political ideals were revealed. These were crystallised in a resolution moved by a member from the senior Province of Quebec thanking the Government for calling the Conference and expressing the hope that women would again be called into consultation. Opposition to the resolution at once developed, led by the Westerners, and the view triumphed that henceforward women must play their part in politics as citizens with a vote, not merely as advisers called in at the discretion of the other sex.

There is no doubt that there is in Canada to-day a large body of very intelligent women, naturally quick and adaptable, keen-minded politically, willing to adopt new ideas on their merits, anxious for further political education, and equally little doubt that these will make their influence felt in federal politics, as they have already done in the Western Provinces. There was a warm response to Sir George Foster's eloquent plea at the final session of the

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Conference that women should not form a woman's party, but should make their special contribution to Canadian politics by a resolute and continued effort to deepen the issues and to help eliminate petty party unrealities, more especially the abuse of patronage, from which so many curses have come into Canadian life.

Canada. July, 1918.

AUSTRALIA

I. THE POLITICAL RECORD.

THE chronicle of Commonwealth history in the last ROUND TABLE described the extraordinary moral and political complications with which Australia was faced as a result of the Second Referendum. More than a million out of the 2,200,000 who went to the poll had voted in favour of conscription. Even among those who voted "No" were a large number who could not be fairly accused of desiring that Australia should repudiate her obligations to the Empire. In the result, however, the desire of half, or more than half, the population that this country should do its share was denied the most obvious means of practical and effective expression—that of maintaining our depleted divisions. The increased "No" majority left us stunned and bewildered, and there was nothing for it but to await, in impotent impatience, some lead from the Government which had landed us in this *impasse*.

The action of Mr. Hughes and the members of his Cabinet in resuming office notwithstanding their precise and solemn undertaking that without the power to introduce compulsion they could not and would not continue to govern the country added greatly to the general bewilderment and depression. At a time when the efficiency of the Government for war purposes depended almost entirely upon its ability to promote national unity and induce people to accept voluntary sacrifices, it deprived itself of that moral authority without which all appeals

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for sacrifice and unity were necessarily fruitless. The Prime Minister's most solemn and deliberate statements of fact about the military situation were received with incredulity by his political opponents. The hearts of the people were hardened, and any common action on the part of the whole community to help in the war seemed out of the question.

This distrust of the Prime Minister, which, it cannot be denied, has some justification in recent happenings, is more lamentable because few, even among Mr. Hughes's enemies, will question the genuineness of his patriotism or his burning anxiety that Australia should do her share. His great oratorical gifts, his inexhaustible energy, his wide experience of affairs, should have made him an ideal leader at such a time as this. But with all his gifts he lacks the essential quality of leadership—the power to unite men and to make them trust him. It is distasteful to have to record such a judgment on one who undoubtedly has many qualities that compel admiration. It is necessary, however, if English readers are to understand recent Australian politics, because in the personal character and conduct of Mr. Hughes there lies to a great extent the explanation of Australia's failure in the first great crisis of her history to prove equal to the demands made upon her.

The problem before this country after the second referendum was indeed a difficult one. A substantial majority of the people were determined that Australia should not draw out of the struggle and leave the rest of the Empire and its Allies to pay the price of maintaining her safety and her liberty. But their purpose had to be effected within the limits—the narrow limits—imposed by her reiterated rejection of compulsory service. It could only be effected by an appeal by the Government to the very classes who had the best reason for regarding the Government with distrust and dislike. In addition to this, opposition to conscription and to the Government

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which had tried to introduce it had tended, naturally enough, though quite illogically, to develop into opposition, or at any rate indifference, to voluntary recruiting.

Under these unpromising circumstances the Government, after a delay which caused much impatience, launched a new scheme for raising recruits by voluntary enlistment. This was intended to raise a minimum number of 5,400 recruits per month. This number was declared to be necessary by Sir Samuel Griffith, Chief Justice of Australia, who had been appointed a Royal Commissioner to determine, after all the contradictions and confusion of the Referendum Campaign, the monthly contribution required to reinforce the Australian divisions at the front. The appointment of Sir Samuel Griffith for the purpose was in itself a somewhat startling admission by the Government of the existence of general reluctance on the part of the community to accept its statements of fact. This, however, is by the way. A new Minister, Mr. Orchard, already known for the active interest he had taken in the welfare of soldiers, was appointed as Minister for Recruiting. Additional attractions, in the shape of increased allowances to wives and children, were offered, and a strong effort made to encourage the scheme, initiated by private individuals, of insuring the lives of all recruits with dependents. It was recognised all through, however, that without the whole-hearted co-operation of the leaders of the Labour Party and of the trade union organisations behind them, any real success was unattainable. The problem was to obtain this co-operation in the face of the bitter party division which had been aroused by the Referendum and the trickery which followed it.

At this point the Governor-General, following the precedent set by His Majesty the King in connection with Home Rule, convened a Conference of representative men, politicians, employers, trade unionists, and others, in order to endeavour to secure that united effort in support of voluntary recruiting which every other method had failed

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to obtain. The suggestion is commonly supposed to have come in the first place from Captain Carmichael, an ex-Labour Minister from New South Wales, who had returned wounded from the front and had thrown himself at once with splendid energy into the recruiting campaign. The invitations were accepted by all except the Trades Hall leaders in Victoria, and the Conference met in Melbourne on April 12. Its deliberations occupied seven days, and as its proceedings epitomise with peculiar fidelity the political situation existing in Australia to-day, it is worth while to give it more than a passing mention.

The Recruiting Conference.

Very soon after the Conference met, definite differences of opinion became manifest, and the Conference split into two well-defined parties. On the one side were the members of the Federal Government, the non-Labour State Governments, and the representatives of employers. On the other Mr. Tudor, leader of the Federal Opposition party, Mr. Ryan, the Labour Premier of Queensland, and the representatives of State Labour parties and trades unions. On the second day Mr. Tudor, who with his colleagues strongly disclaims any feeling of hostility to recruiting or any intention of bargaining over the terms upon which their personal support to a recruiting effort could be secured, produced a statement of what he called "some of the conditions which I think it is necessary should be fulfilled if there is to be any hope of restoring harmony in the community." In other words he said (without admitting that they affected his personal attitude): "These are the things which, in fact, are at present preventing people from enlisting, and until they are removed I give it as my opinion they will not respond to the appeal for recruits."

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The conditions were as follows :

1. That there should be a definite pronouncement by the Government that conscription has been finally abandoned.

2. That there should be no "economic conscription" in public or private employ.

(The phrase "economic conscription" apparently meant the policy, adopted by some employers of labour, of discharging eligible men in order to encourage their enlistment.)

3. Re-registration of unions de-registered and restoration to unions of their former status, restoration to their employment of victimised unionists, abolition of bogus unions and bureaux set up in connection therewith.

(This referred almost exclusively to New South Wales, where in consequence of the recent strike, described in *THE ROUND TABLE* for March, many striking unions had lost their registration, and a considerable number of their members had found themselves out of employment. In some cases new unions—the so-called "bogus unions" of Mr. Tudor—had been formed in the industries affected. The practical meaning of this condition was that all the penalties and other misfortunes brought upon trades unionism by this disastrous strike should be wiped out.)

4. (a) Repeal of all War Precautions Regulations not vital to the conduct of the war and a Government guarantee against their re-enactment.

(b) Abolition of Press censorship and limitations upon free speech, except as relating to military news of advantage to the enemy.

(c) Cessation of political and industrial prosecutions under the War Precautions Act.

(d) The immediate release of all persons—not guilty of criminal offences—imprisoned in connection with conscription, peace propaganda, recruiting, and the recent industrial troubles.

(e) Refund of fines and costs in connection with all industrial and political prosecutions during the war period.

(This somewhat formidable list practically involved the cancellation of the whole policy of the Federal Government since the first conscription referendum.)

5. That immediate and effective steps be taken to protect soldiers' dependents and the public generally against profiteering.

This list has been given in full because it is a considered opinion formed by men competent to judge as to the reasons that have caused Australia to play a somewhat sorry part during the last two years. It will be at once observed, of course, that they are all political or industrial

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grievances, some of them, it must be admitted, of a substantial character, which are wholly irrelevant to the conclusion which they are supposed to support. No reasonable or truly patriotic man could possibly regard a grievance against the Government or against his employer as a reason why he should refuse to fight for the freedom of his country or to reinforce those who are voluntarily fighting for it. To that extent this catalogue of grievances in such a connection is unworthy and even discreditable. There is, however, solid ground for satisfaction in the fact that there is nothing in it which attributes the want of recruits to war-weariness, or to a lack of belief in the cause of the Empire and its Allies, or to any flagging in the desire to see a complete victory over the Central Powers. There is every reason to believe that, in this negative way, Mr. Tudor's list correctly represents the solid body of working class feeling in Australia. Subsequent happenings in New South Wales, which will be referred to later, confirm this view.

The history of the Conference need not detain us. It was thoroughly unsatisfactory. Many of the Labour representatives, in spite of their asseverations that they did not present these grievances by way of bargaining to obtain a price for their support of recruiting, managed to furnish such a good imitation of the bargaining spirit that outsiders may be forgiven for mistaking it for the real thing. In spite of the readiness shown by the members of the Federal and State Governments, and by representatives of employers, to go as far as they reasonably could in removing the causes of stumbling, no definite undertaking could be obtained from the majority of Labour representatives that, if these obstacles were removed, they would personally use their best influence with the organisations they represented to secure support for recruiting. In the end, after days of desultory debate, a resolution moved by Mr. Hughes—"That the delegates present, in the face of the imminent peril now besetting the Allied cause,

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and in view of the expressed willingness of the Federal and State Governments to join in the removal of grievances which those representing Labour say have been regarded as obstacles to recruiting, pledge first their full personal co-operation, and, secondly, the most strenuous exertion possible of their influence with the Governments and organisations they represent, to secure an immediate and continuing increase in Australian recruiting on a voluntary basis"—had to be withdrawn, owing to the strong opposition of the Labour members to its terms; and the Conference ended with a colourless resolution, suggested by the Premier of Victoria, as a compromise, "That this Conference, meeting at a time of unparalleled emergency, resolves to make all possible efforts to avert defeat at the hands of German militarism, and urges the people of Australia to unite in a whole-hearted effort to secure the necessary reinforcements under the voluntary system."

Even this modest result was only secured by an assurance from Mr. Hughes that, as far as his Government was concerned, conscription was abandoned, and by the most liberal concessions by Mr. Hughes and Mr. Holman, the Nationalist Premier of New South Wales, in connection with the other matters mentioned.

If this resolution, and the spirit in which the Conference debates were conducted, really represented the spirit of the working classes of Australia, those Australians who care about the Empire and about the honour of their own country might well despair. There is good ground for the view, however, that the Labour representatives did justice neither to themselves nor to the majority of the classes they represent. So far as the general body of trade unionists are concerned, it is quite clear that the Labour delegates at the Conference were wrong in their positive statements that the removal of the "grievances" enumerated by them was an essential condition of a revival of voluntary enlistment. Quite independently of the results of the Conference, and, indeed, even before it

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terminated, there began a strong upward movement in the recruiting figures. The average weekly number of voluntary recruits actually accepted—a large proportion of whom came from trades unionist classes—had fallen, in February and March, as low as 400. In the first week of April, as the seriousness of the war situation was realised, the number rose to 450. Every succeeding week saw a big increase, until in the week ending May 18 it reached 1,491, or substantially more than enough to make the required monthly quota.

This result appears to be attributable partly to an increasing appreciation of the gravity of the war situation, partly to the energy thrown into the campaign for recruits conducted by Captain Carmichael and others, including the very men who had played such a disappointing part in the Governor-General's Conference. When the Conference was over, without waiting for the complete fulfilment of the undertakings that had been given by Mr. Hughes, Mr. Holman and others, many, though not all, of the Labour leaders embarked at once upon a recruiting campaign. In New South Wales, the President of the Labour Council, faithfully honouring the undertaking he had given at the Conference, endeavoured to secure the assent of his Council to the resolution passed at the Conference, which, colourless as it was, was interpreted as a definite appeal for enlistments. He recognised the readiness of the State Government, led by Mr. Holman, to make every possible effort to remove the obstacles peculiar to his State, and asked his colleagues to honour their part of the undertaking. In his effort he was defeated by a vote of 79 to 75. The opposition was led by men who are well known anti-war, anti-recruiting apostles. Their success in the Labour Council, however, promises to be a Pyrrhic victory. Already there are strong signs of a rebellion against the dominance which these undesirables have secured in the ranks of Labour. The more reasonable men in the Party have begun a vigorous protest against

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a war policy which they claim utterly misrepresents the feeling of the majority of the rank and file of trade unionists. At the time of writing there appears to be every prospect that this protest will result in a serious split in the ranks of Labour. If this happens, the lamentable influence of a handful of openly revolutionary, anti-war demagogues, which ever since the first referendum has been steadily increasing, will suffer a severe check, and the latent feeling of the majority of the trade unionists, who for all their lethargy are as a body thoroughly loyal and not prepared to repudiate their obligation to help in the struggle, will find clear expression.

In Victoria Mr. Tudor has already taken the platform with Federal Ministers to urge the necessity for recruits. But for illness, which has ended in his lamentable death, Mr. Elmslie, the State Labour leader, would also have done so. In Western Australia the Labour leaders have already begun a vigorous campaign, and in Queensland Mr. Ryan, the Premier, has taken a leading part in endeavouring to give a fresh stimulus to voluntary enlistment.

All this encourages the hope that the seriousness of the war situation is beginning to place our local industrial and political quarrels in their true perspective, and to restore some of that harmony which existed in Australia before the tragic blunder of the conscription referenda. The methods adopted for inducing enlistment, sometimes vulgar and sensational, always repellent to those who stop to think of the fundamental injustice of the voluntary system, are part of the price we pay for our refusal to adopt compulsion. It is hardly to be expected that we shall be able to maintain the high rate of enlistment reached in the last week for which the figures were quoted. In fact, the figures for the succeeding week (ending May 25) show a substantial falling off. But the mere fact of the revival, even if temporary, shows that the possibilities of the voluntary system are not altogether exhausted, and if we can manage to keep the rate of voluntary enlistment at

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anything near the average of the last four weeks, we shall be doing, though not enough, still much more than most of us thought possible a few months ago.

This record would not be complete without reference to the retirement from federal politics of Sir William Irvine, who has been appointed Chief Justice of Victoria. Despite a certain inability to understand the point of view of the ordinary man, or to gauge the strength and direction of the currents of popular feeling, his place in Australian politics will be very hard to fill. His high standards of political and personal honour, his wide constitutional knowledge, his frank indifference to mere party interests where matters of principle were involved, made him a healthy and ennobling influence in the public life of Australia. In the strenuous and difficult days ahead of us he will be greatly missed.

Shipbuilding.

Our war efforts have not been wholly confined to raising recruits. After delays that seemed almost interminable, a start has at length been made with a shipbuilding programme. The trouble has been due to difficulties experienced by Mr. Hughes in coming to agreements with the unions concerned which would secure a reasonable prospect of continuity in the work. Piece-work rates and dilution of labour were the chief obstacles. These have at length been overcome, and final agreements have been signed with all the unions except the Amalgamated Society of Engineers, most of whose members, however, have signed individually. This has enabled the Federal Government to take over the Victorian State Shipbuilding Yards, in which two ships of 5,500 tons are now being constructed and six others, of similar or greater tonnage, are to follow. A contract has also been entered into with the State Government in New South Wales for six similar ships, and four more are to be built in private yards in South Australia

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and Tasmania. All the material and engines for these vessels are being manufactured in Australia except the steel plates for the first six ships, which have been ordered from the United States. Fourteen wooden ships, two of which have already been launched, are being built for us in the United States. All of these are to arrive here during this year.

Meantime we have diverted from our own coastal trade, for oversea service, nearly every available ship. The better organisation of inter-State shipping has enabled us to hand over to the British Government twenty-six vessels hitherto engaged in our coastal and eastern trade, and eight which have been trading between here and New Zealand.

The South Australian Elections.

The General Election in South Australia took place on April 6. At the previous Election, in the first year of the war, the Labour Party had come into power. Then came the first conscription referendum. All the Ministers declared for conscription, as did every member but five in the Lower House and two in the Upper. In spite of this, the majority against conscription was relatively greater than almost anywhere in the Commonwealth. The Labour bodies began to stone their former prophets, who then came out and formed a National Party. Soon by-elections put the Liberal Party in power. After much acrimony it admitted three members of the National Party to the Cabinet; and, after more unpleasant manoeuvring, it was arranged that the two Parties should support one another at the polls. The former Labour Premier, Mr. Crawford Vaughan, declined Liberal support, and stood as an independent. Naturally enough he was defeated. There fell also every member of the previous Labour Government. Mr. Verran, a former Labour Premier, was also defeated.

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They are a loss both to Labour and to Parliament. A new Country Party, the Farmers' and Settlers' Association, put up seven candidates ; there were many independents, and together they imperilled many seats otherwise certain for the Liberal-National Coalition. Two women had trifling support. In the result, the Coalition secured a majority of 19 in the Legislative Assembly and 15 in the Council. The National Party retains its identity as a separate political organisation, although it has two members in the Government. Those of its members who retained their seats did so through the Liberal vote, and there appears to be small probability of their being re-absorbed, for the period of the war at any rate, by the Labour Party. Consequently the Government would appear to have a fairly secure tenure of office.

The Labour Party, although it has substantially increased its numbers, suffered seriously for want of good leadership, and hardly polled its full strength. Far from regretting the loss of its former leaders, it glories in the fall of those who were defeated, as a victory for solidarity and a warning to others. One of its former heroes whom it succeeded in defeating was Mr. J. H. Vaughan, a man universally respected, who on getting office as Attorney-General went into camp as a private and is now at the front. Captain Blackburn, V.C., who stood as a Nationalist, and Lieutenant Denny, M.C., who stuck to the Labour Party, headed the poll in their respective districts.

II. THE QUEENSLAND STATE ELECTIONS

THE Queensland State Elections were held on March 16, and resulted in a decisive victory for the Labour Government, the figures being, Labour 48, Nationalists 24—a gain of three seats as compared with the position in the last Parliament. The sweeping nature of this success came as a surprise to both parties. At the beginning of

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the campaign, the Nationalists encountered misfortune in the sudden and serious illness of their leader, Mr. Tolmie, which compelled him to resign. His place was filled by Mr. E. H. Macartney, who represented a suburban constituency, and had held Cabinet rank for some time in the Liberal Ministry of Mr. Denham. In all the circumstances, the choice was probably the best that could have been made. Mr. Macartney is a man of undoubted ability, energy and personal integrity, though somewhat lacking in the emotional qualities requisite in an ideal leader.

The policy put forward by the Government promised a programme of progress and development ; but this, on analysis, proved to be little more than an extension of the experimental legislation and administration of a more or less Socialistic type which had characterised the three years of its term of office. That is to say, there would be more State incursions into the fields of trade and industry, more State shops, insurance offices, stations, mines, saw-mills and the like ; together with further increases in the powers and privileges of the industrial unions, more restrictions upon employers, and further taxation upon the propertied classes. Mr. Ryan, in his opening speech, made a brief reference to the war and to the necessity for everyone to do his part to ensure victory, but taking the campaign as a whole this subject, and also the desirability of the most careful and economical management of the financial resources of the State, occupied a secondary position. From one influential quarter, however, there came an appeal to the workers to cultivate a greater " class-consciousness " among themselves, and warning them against the dangers of " militarism," " imperialism " and " capitalism." " The fond hope which some of them (*i.e.* the workers) have that they may become employers and exploiters of labour in due course must be dispelled, and the fact that there can be no possible identity of interest between employer and employees must be driven into their minds."

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The Nationalist programme, on the other hand, laid particular stress upon the necessity of the State's "most loyal co-operation with the Commonwealth in doing all that is possible to secure complete victory for Britain and the Allies ; and also in dealing with the great problems which must follow the conclusion of peace." It also declared it to be vital "that a rehabilitation of the finances should be brought about, and a proper balance secured between revenue and expenditure." Continuing, the policy promised the encouragement of settlement by a further liberalisation of the laws relating to Crown lands—including a return to the system of allowing new settlers to acquire a freehold tenure, which had been discouraged by the late Administration—provision for water conservation and irrigation, wider facilities for agricultural education, and more generous financial assistance to the man on the land. An attempt would be made to "co-ordinate and define the future railway policy of the State," and the appointment was foreshadowed of a permanent non-political commission to deal with public works. "State Industries," except in cases where their maintenance might be considered as essential to the welfare of the community, would be discouraged, together with any unnecessary interference with or attack upon private enterprise, and every effort would be made to create and preserve harmonious relations between employer and employed, to check any improper operations of trusts, monopolies, or combines, and to ensure real co-operation between capital and labour.

It may be remembered that on May 5, 1917, the Ryan Government took a referendum of the electors of Queensland upon its proposal to abolish the Legislative Council. The proposal was overwhelmingly defeated by a majority of nearly 63,000 out of a total of 295,200 votes. Although it was not made a definite plank in the Party platform during the campaign, it was stated by several prominent speakers that should the Government be again returned to

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power the question would be revived, and steps taken, if not actually to do away with the Council, at least to render it powerless further to oppose the will of the Administration. How this was to be accomplished, by means of another referendum or by "packing" the House—which, by the way, at present contains the highest number of members in its history—so as to make it merely an obedient echo of the popular Chamber, even to the extent of voting, if required, for its own extinction, has not yet been officially divulged. The Nationalist leaders, on their part, accepting the vote of May 5 last as expressing the desire of the electors for the continuance of the bi-cameral system, but at the same time recognising certain disadvantages and anomalies in the present constitution of the Council, proposed to place it upon an elective basis.

Much bitterness was imported into the contest, but this now appears to be inseparable from Australian politics. Speaking generally, the charges levelled against the Government by the Opposition may be said to fall under four main heads, namely, undue subservience to the wishes of a narrow class organisation to the detriment of the larger interests of the whole community ; gross and reckless extravagance in the management of the public finances at a time when care and economy were absolutely imperative ; the introduction into the public service of the American political system of "spoils to the victors," and the extension of that system to the judicial bench ; and last, but by no means least, practical if not open and avowed disloyalty to the Empire and the Allied cause. As to the fourth of these charges, it will be as well to state at once that "disloyalty" does not mean—except perhaps as regards one particular individual—that Mr. Ryan and his colleagues were accused of being actually hostile to the Empire or its Allies or in sympathy with their enemies. There are a few such traitors, no doubt, in Australia as elsewhere. But the main body of those to whom the term "disloyalist" is usually applied in this country may be said to fall into

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two classes. First there are those who, either from religious or other motives or because they profess to believe that all international conflicts are brought about by capitalists and politicians to serve their own ends at the expense of the workers, are opposed to all war, and if they had the power would prevent the nation from taking any further part in the present struggle. The second and much larger section comprises those who place their own class, party, or individual interests before those of either the Commonwealth or the Empire, and though as a rule quite willing, in theory at all events, that the Allies should "win the war," yet insist that during the process none of their own particular privileges or advantages must be assailed. And since, in the present condition of things, this is often impossible, they show their resentment by refusing, as far as lies within their power, to assist the Government in its task of defending the nation.

The Ryan Government is at present the only Labour Administration in the Commonwealth, and it is naturally supposed to be in accord with the views of the Party to which it must look for support. Nor have definite utterances, either of official members of the State branch of the Party or of individual Ministers, been wanting to give colour to the supposition.

No useful purpose would be served by repeating any number of these in detail. By way of illustration, however, one example may be given. On January 28, 1918, at the annual "Labour-in-Politics Convention"—the real Labour Parliament—held in the Trades Hall, Brisbane, the Hon. W. H. Demaine, M.L.C., President of the Central Political Executive and Chairman of the Convention, delivered an address, in the course of which he said, referring to the war: "This bloody madness must cease. . . . The root of the war seems to me to be Imperialism, and whether it be German, British, or any other brand of Imperialism, it is always and everywhere the arch-enemy of democracy. . . . Australia must stand firmly against this Imperialism ;

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we must keep her free to work out her destiny unfettered by old-world shackles, politico-social traditions, and darkening superstitions."

The Premier, Mr. Ryan, was present at the Convention, and expressed his appreciation of Mr. Demaine's speech. It may be as well to call to mind, also, that the Queensland Labour Government includes in its ranks a Minister who has publicly referred to England as "a land of cant, humbug and hypocrisy," described the murder of Nurse Cavell and Captain Fryatt as insignificant compared with the crimes committed in Ireland by the Imperial Government during the unhappy disturbance in 1916, and declared that, in the opinion of many persons in this State, every Irish Australian who enlisted for the war was merely helping England to oppress the Irish people. Another Minister sat by while these remarks were being delivered and made no protest. Considerable indignation was excited when the speech became known to the general public, but Mr. Ryan and his Ministers stood by their colleague, who has since been promoted to a more important place in the Cabinet.

Mention was made in the March number of *THE ROUND TABLE* (p. 401) of a conflict which had arisen between the Commonwealth and the State of Queensland with regard to the publication of anti-conscription matter in the State *Hansard*. The facts of this case may now be briefly set down. During the Conscription campaign certain literature was barred by the censors on account of some objectionable matter which it was alleged to contain. Thereupon it was arranged to have the question brought up in Parliament. In the debate which followed the whole of the prohibited matter was repeated at length, and thus found its way into *Hansard*. A number of extra copies were to be printed and distributed throughout the State, thus rendering the censors' prohibition null and void. The Federal authorities, however, got wind of this move, and promptly countered it by raiding the State Printing Office,

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and seizing all the copies of the objectionable number they could find. Legal proceedings were begun by both sides, by the Federal Government against Mr. Ryan and others for conspiracy to defeat the censorship, and by the State Government against the Federal authorities for an infringement of State rights ; but by mutual consent these have since been discontinued. The Queensland Premier's share in this incident perhaps cannot be called actual disloyalty, but it certainly shows no very strong desire on his part to assist the Central Government in its work of enabling Australia to help in winning the war.

No review of this sort would be complete without taking into account the personality of the Labour leader. The Hon. T. J. Ryan, Premier of Queensland, is an Irish Australian, of between forty and forty-five years of age, a barrister by profession, and a graduate of the University of Melbourne. He can hardly be described from any point of view as a high or inspiring type of politician ; nevertheless it must be admitted that he possesses not a few of the essential qualities of leadership, especially of a Party the majority of the adherents of which are not accustomed to look below the surface. He is big, burly and genial—though he can show quite the reverse of the last-named characteristic to those who oppose him—a fluent if not a very intellectual speaker, with a ready command of all the current Labour catch-phrases and shibboleths ; and one who does not allow himself to be cramped, in his public utterances, by any undue regard to the exigencies of either logic or facts. A clever political strategist, he has displayed, during his term of office, an almost uncanny astuteness, not only in evading unpleasant issues, but in getting himself and his Ministry out of some very awkward and compromising situations. There can be little doubt that his presence at the head of affairs counted for a great deal during the late contest.

A regrettable influence which made itself felt during the elections was that of sectarianism. Mr. Ryan is a Roman

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Catholic, and two at least of his ministers profess the same faith. There are, of course, many members of this Church in the Nationalist ranks, some of them men of high standing in the community. But there is also to be found, among the poorest and most ignorant classes of the population, a large Irish Catholic element, and this, naturally enough, was greatly elated to see in office a Government at the head of which stood a man, by descent at least, of its own nationality and creed. In some electorates the very name of the Premier was in itself worth hundreds of votes.

To all appearances the Labour Government is firmly seated in the saddle for another three years. Nevertheless, its task, even with the best of good fortune, will not be easy. There is the possibility of a split in its own ranks, should the extremists, whose influence seems to be growing in Queensland as elsewhere in Australia, make the pace too hot. There is the ever-widening gap between revenue and expenditure, which must be filled. There is the quarrel with the Legislative Council, which is in no way disposed to surrender or minimise its constitutional rights, buttressed as they are by the overwhelming popular vote of a year ago. There are the continually increasing demands of organised trade unionism, to which it must listen, and which it must endeavour to satisfy. On the whole, the lot of the Ryan Administration, for the next two or three years, is not one to be envied.

Australia. May, 1918.

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THE SESSION

THE third session of the second Parliament of the Union of South Africa differed very little in its general characteristics from its predecessors since the outbreak of the war. There was the usual outburst of protest on the part of General Hertzog and his Nationalist followers against the part the Union is playing in the struggle ; the oft-repeated display of personal animosity against the Prime Minister and General Smuts ; the constantly reiterated protest against the methods of recruiting committees, and against the policy of interning enemy civilians ; the inevitable motion in favour of complete amnesty for those who took part in the rebellion of 1914. These things have become the bread-and-butter lines of our sessions. It is not necessary to enlarge upon them again. Most of them have been dealt with in previous numbers of THE ROUND TABLE, and no amount of Parliamentary discussion can ever hope to throw any fresh light on their dismal intricacies. But apart from these topics the time of the session was perhaps less taken up with business directly connected with the war than in previous sessions. A great deal of useful legislation was passed, including a Factory Act and a Regulation of Wages Act on the model of the English Trade Board Act of 1909. Both these measures assume an added importance in view of the astonishing increase in locally manufactured articles, caused by the impossibility of importing goods which previous to the war no one ever dreamed of producing in the Union.

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Then opportunity was taken to consolidate our electoral laws, the laws relating to the registration of deeds and the appointment of Justices of the Peace. Acts were also passed regulating the dairy industry and laying down the terms on which the Government may dispose of its mineral rights in the Far East Rand. All these involve questions of considerable interest, but in this article only the Government's war measures and mining legislation will be dealt with.

The war measures numbered three: an Act for the conservation of our wheat supplies, an amending Act to the War Special Pensions Act passed last session, and an Act to amend further the Public Welfare and Moratorium Act which was passed in September, 1914, after the outbreak of the war. Of these the first two were passed; the last foundered under circumstances which are described later on. It is not necessary to say much on war pensions. In this important matter the Union is closely following on the example of Great Britain. We have taken over the system instituted by the Royal Warrant of March 29, 1917, and adapted it to our local conditions. No doubt it will require constant detailed adjustment, as experience is accumulated; and it seems likely, therefore, that amending Acts will form a regular feature of sessions yet to come. But it is necessary to give some attention to the other two Bills.

South Africa, like the rest of the world, has had to grapple with the problem of the increasing cost of living. This first became acute in May, 1916, and to inquire into it the Government appointed a special Commissioner. He reported in August, 1916, that the increase in articles of necessity, including rent, up to July, 1916, averaged over the principal towns of the Union, amounted to 15 per cent. Thereupon the Government appointed a permanent cost of living Commission of three members and endowed them with the powers possessed by a judge of the Supreme Court as regards calling evidence and ordering the production of documents. This Commission fulfils two functions. In

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the first place, it publishes monthly in the *Gazette* a statement showing the percentage of increase in certain standard articles, including rent, in each of the principal towns. The latest figure shows an average increase of 23 per cent. In the second place, it acts as adviser to the Government on what steps should be taken as far as possible to keep the cost down. One of its first actions was to advise the fixing of the price of sugar, and this was done with satisfactory results. The Commissioners then found it necessary to turn their attention to wheat. South Africa, though a wheat-producing country, has never been able to grow her full requirements, and has been in the habit of making up any deficit by importations from Australia. This happy state of affairs continued until the end of 1917, when shortage of freight made it apparent that henceforth the Union would be thrown on her own resources. Her requirements are estimated at $3\frac{3}{4}$ million bags, her production at 3 million, a quantity which, it is obvious, if properly husbanded, should be sufficient for her needs. Therefore the Commission recommended firstly that a maximum price be fixed for wheat of 16s. per 100 lb. to the farmer f.o.r. at the nearest station, and secondly that no flour should be sold except either flour containing not less than 90 per cent. of the wheat berry or a mixture in the proportion of 83 lb. of the above with 17 lb. of either barley flour, rye flour or maize meal. The Government adopted the second but not the first recommendation. Mr. Burton, in explaining the reasons for this departure from the Commission's advice, claimed that the production of wheat in the future is likely to be less satisfactory owing to the impossibility of procuring the essential fertilisers, and that if, in addition to this drawback, a maximum price were fixed production would be still more discouraged. The Commissioners themselves had reported against the fixing of a minimum price for a term of years, on the ground that if imported wheat at any time during the period were obtainable at a lower price all sorts of complications would arise. No doubt there is much

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to be said for the Government's contention ; but, on the other hand, it has added force to the impression, which is unhappily so characteristic of South African politics, that no Government can bring itself to impose any real disability or sacrifice on the farming community. This impression keeps alive the tendency of parties to divide on the somewhat vicious line of town against country—a division which in the end must be mainly racial.

The Government's attitude on its own Bill to amend the Public Welfare and Moratorium Act also received severe condemnation from the representatives of urban constituencies. This Bill had two objects in view. Firstly, to give the Government power to regulate rents for the period of the war and six months after ; and, secondly, power to control and regulate for the same period (1) the extent of development work which may be carried out on any mine, (2) the distribution to the mines of native labourers and stores, and (3) any supplies and stores necessary for the maintenance of any industry essential to the public welfare. We need not here discuss the regulation of rents. The necessity for this, if the cost of living is to be controlled, is obvious, though it met with a good deal of opposition. But the justification for the other proposals of the Bill is less clear, and these certainly gave rise to some curious episodes during their passage through the House. Before dealing with this something must be said as to certain other aspects of the mining question and other legislation concerned with it.

The Acts giving compensation for the victims of miners' phthisis unfortunately still provide every year a subject for Parliamentary inquiry and usually for legislation and will probably continue to do so for some time to come. The progress of preventive measures of recent years has been remarkable and conditions underground in regard to the prevalence of dust and the general well-being of the employees have greatly improved. But the disease is not yet eradicated, and until it is we must

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expect an annual demand on the attention of Parliament so as to deal with the numerous cases of hardship and difficulty which arise under the scheme of compensation provided by the various Acts in force. A Select Committee of the House of Assembly sat on this matter, and in the result an Act was passed suspending the operation of certain provisions in the existing law pending the report of a Commission which is to sit in the recess.

The most controversial section of the mining legislation of the session was that dealing with the leasing of the mineral rights in what is known as the Far East Rand Area. In order to appreciate the questions at issue it is necessary to go some way back into the history of the mining law (or, as it is generally called, the Gold Law) of the Transvaal. From the time when the importance of the gold-bearing deposits of the Transvaal began to be realised the principle was laid down that the right of mining for and disposing of precious metals belonged to the State. The owner of the land in which they were found retained in law a bare ownership in them, but in respect of mining for or disposing of them he had only such rights as were actually given him by statute. These consisted chiefly in the right to select a portion of the mineral area which he could exploit himself or sell to others. After his selection was made the rest of the mineral area was thrown open to be pegged out in claims by anyone who chose to take out a licence from the Government.

Before the end of the republican regime it was recognised that this system of disposing of the public share of mineral areas was wasteful and even dangerous. After the war the Crown Colony Government stopped the throwing open of areas for pegging, so that the responsible Government of the future, when it came to deal with the new goldfields which were known to exist on the east of the Witwatersrand, might be free to apply to them a more rational policy, which had already been developed and was only waiting to be put into application.

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The Gold Law of 1908 gave effect to this new policy. It empowered the Government either to mine on its own account the mineral areas remaining after the owner of the land had taken his share or to lease the mining rights over these areas by public tender. This system enables the Government to lay out the mineralised land into areas large enough to constitute a workable mine, to enforce conditions as to the raising of capital where the mining rights are given out by tender, and to secure the greatest possible advantage to the public Treasury. The first mine leased under this system has just come into full production, after about seven years of preliminary work in shaft-sinking, development and erection of plant. The Government share of the profits is based on a sliding scale determined by the ratio between profits and gold recovery. It is estimated that the mine will have a working life of something between 20 and 30 years and that the share of profits accruing to the State from its operations will fall somewhere between £12,000,000 and £17,000,000. Six areas in all have been given out by tender. With the exception of the one just mentioned they are yet some time short of the producing stage, and, as their operations disclose more information as to the reefs underlying this extensive area, other leases will be applied for.

The law passed during the past session was not in itself of great interest. It was intended to provide for the amendment of the existing law in certain respects in which experience has shown it to be cumbrous or inadequate. But it was made the occasion for a vigorous demonstration by those members who urge that the State should itself carry on mining operations instead of leasing its mineral rights to private enterprise. This policy is, of course, advocated by the Labour Party. It is also a prominent plank in the platform of the Nationalist Party. In their eyes the payment of some millions of pounds in dividends every year by the mining companies to shareholders outside the country is only another illustration of the exploitation of

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South Africa by alien interests. It is indeed often put forward by them as one of the evils arising from our present state of dependence on an outside Power. If only the State would dig up all this gold for itself, so much more money would be "kept in the country" and the threatening shadow of a land tax would no longer hang over the head of the South African farmer. Such arguments for State mining fit in alike with the demand for political independence and with the cry against the domination of the foreign capitalist, and on both these grounds commend themselves to the Nationalist Party. A Commission which was appointed to inquire into the matter reported by a majority against State exploitation, but its report cannot be regarded as a final pronouncement on the question; and, though Parliament last session rejected the arguments of the advocates of State mining, and passed the law facilitating the giving out of mineral areas by lease to private enterprise, it is certain that we have not heard the last of so seductive an idea.

The debates on the passing of the Act acquired an additional interest because of a long and somewhat acrimonious discussion earlier in the session on an agreement between the Government and the lessees of the area first given out by public tender. A minimum scale had been laid down by the Government for determining the share of profits to be taken by the State and the lease was given to the tenderer offering the largest advance on the minimum scale. As soon as the mine reached the producing stage the Company found that the scale, as increased by their tender, was unexpectedly onerous, largely because the mine was turning out to be richer than had been anticipated. They were faced with the prospect that the ratio of their profits to the value of the gold recovered would, in all probability, fall just at that point in the scale where the proportion of profit accruing to the Government, under the graduation offered by them, rises by a large step. The result in practice would be that all inducement to them to work over that particular rate of profit would be withdrawn,

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because for some distance above that point in the scale the whole of any increase of profit, or even more, would go to the Government. They therefore approached the Government for an alteration of the scale such as, while still giving a larger share in profits than would have come to the Government under the scale which had been offered by any of the unsuccessful tenderers, would also be more scientifically graduated in the higher ratios.

The technical advisers of the Government recommended an amended agreement which the Company was willing to accept, and the Government provisionally entered into the new agreement, but, in view of the very large extent to which the public revenues would be affected, stipulated for the approval of both Houses of Parliament to the alteration. The House of Assembly referred the proposal for consideration to the Select Committee on Public Accounts, which, much to the surprise of the Government, reported by a small majority against ratification. The Government, however, regarded itself as committed to the alteration, and succeeded in carrying it through Parliament after a long and somewhat bitter debate.

Another matter affecting the mining industry which came before Parliament during the past session was the question of the possible closing down of a number of so-called low-grade mines, that is mines where the gold content of the reef is so low that they can only be worked in normal times with a very small margin of profit. The rise in the price of stores of all sorts since the war and the increased wages that have to be paid owing to the greater cost of living have had a most serious effect on mines of this class, and they are faced with the necessity of working at a loss or closing down. Many of them if once closed would not be reopened, even if costs returned to the pre-war level. In that case the large amount of gold which is contained in these low-grade reefs would be left unworked and permanently lost. Besides this the closing of a number of mines which are at present employing large numbers

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of men and using large quantities of stores, could not fail to have an adverse effect on the prosperity of the country, especially on those towns and communities which have grown up round them. And, finally, many men who have enlisted on the guarantee of their jobs being kept open for them, and of their being paid by these mines, while on active service, a third of their civil pay in the case of single men and a half in the case of married men, would lose both this guaranteed pay and their jobs. On these grounds the Government was urged to come to the assistance of these mines, by means of a subsidy or otherwise, so as to enable them to keep open till working costs return to a normal figure. Another proposal was that a certain number of these low-grade mines which have still considerable ore reserves should be selected by agreement between the Government and the Chamber of Mines for closing. The others would then be materially helped by having the native labour which would be released from the closed mines distributed among them and by the diminished demand for explosives. The output of gold would not suffer, because the labour and stores thus made available would largely be used by richer mines, which are now unable to work at their full capacity, in crushing rock with a greater gold content. The Government would then be asked to provide the funds necessary to keep the closed mines free from water and in a condition to resume when conditions became more favourable.

These proposals were considered by a Select Committee of the House of Assembly, which reported against any financial assistance from public funds to mining companies. The evidence placed before the Committee tended to show that the causes making against profitable working were too uncertain in their nature and operation to enable the Government to calculate with any confidence on mines which might be subsidised during the war period being able to carry on without the subsidy afterwards; that several of the mines concerned, including some of

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the largest, would in all probability have been in any case threatened with closing owing either to the exhaustion of their ore or to a progressive decline in its gold values. No doubt the rise in costs due to war conditions and a scarcity of native labour had very seriously aggravated the difficulties of those mines which in normal times were only able to earn a very low rate of profit, but it was quite uncertain how long these conditions might continue even after the cessation of hostilities, and, if once the Government were committed to the precedent of keeping mines open, which for one reason or another were not able to operate at a profit, it would be undertaking a liability to which there would be no limit. On these grounds the Committee reported against any financial assistance from public funds, but recommended that the Government should if necessary control the distribution of stores, explosives and native labour among the mining companies so as to secure that no producing mine should be placed at an unfair disadvantage owing to the shortage of necessary materials or labour.

This recommendation the Government attempted, as stated above, to put into force; but it soon found itself confronted by many obstacles. In the first place, the diamond mines contrived to get themselves excluded. Then some of the farmers started protesting against the wide latitude of the power to control supplies and stores necessary for the maintenance of any industry essential to the public welfare. This might be construed to mean the complete control of farm products! So impressed was Mr. Orr, the Finance Minister in charge of the Bill, with this protest, that he accepted an amendment deleting this provision, but on a division he was defeated, three of his colleagues in the Cabinet voting against him. But the opponents of the Bill were not satisfied with this reverse, and returned to the charge on the report stage, moving that the Bill be recommitted. To everyone's astonishment, this motion had as its seconder the chief Government whip, who explained that he did so in his per-

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sonal capacity only. It was, however, defeated, and the Bill passed its third reading on the morning of Wednesday, May 8. That it did not achieve a quicker passage was also due to the blocking tactics adopted by one member of the Nationalist persuasion, who persistently prevented more than one stage being taken on each day. The day following was Ascension Day—a public holiday in South Africa—and one on which the House will not sit. Added to this members were straining at the leash to get home. The House was already reduced in numbers to 62 out of 131, and the Government made no secret that it despaired of keeping a quorum over Ascension Day. It was, therefore, essential that the Senate should pass this very contentious measure in one sitting on the Wednesday. This was at once rendered impossible by the ruling of the President that a day's notice had to be given for the necessary suspension of the standing rules and orders, and they thereupon adjourned over Ascension Day to the Friday following. The responsibility was thus thrown back upon the Lower House. If the Bill was to be passed members must be prepared to remain in session until after the public holiday. The opinion of the House on this was taken on the motion for the adjournment which was moved as soon as it became known that the Senate had adjourned. On a division the actual numbers were exactly equal; but the tellers by an oversight omitted the name of Col. Creswell, the leader of the Labour party, from amongst the Noes and returned a majority of one for the Ayes. Therefore the Speaker was not called on to exercise his casting vote on this delicate question, and the House adjourned without passing this very necessary bit of war legislation. The whole episode has somewhat impaired the prestige of the Government.

There was an absence of leadership, a lack of cohesion even in the ranks of the Cabinet, and apparently no clear idea as to whether the Bill was really necessary or not. To some people it appeared as if the whole proceedings were merely a manœuvre to make it appear that the Government

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had done its best to pass the Bill while throwing the responsibility for its massacre upon the Senate. However this may be, the failure to endow the Government with power to control rents has already had a bad effect on working-class opinion, and has added force to a wave of industrial unrest from which the country is at the present moment suffering ; while nothing has been done to ease the critical situation of the low-grade mines.

There is no doubt that the position of a number of these mines is very serious and that the closing of them will cause considerable dislocation in employment and in business which it would be desirable if possible to avoid at the present time. It would probably not cause any reduction in the present output of gold, as the stores and native labour, and a considerable portion at least of the European labour, would be absorbed by the mines which are working richer ore, and which are at present not working at full capacity. It may be that if these mines close now a large quantity of gold contained in these low-grade reefs may be abandoned which otherwise would have been worked, but it is impossible to say with any certainty how much of it would have been worked and how much of it will be finally abandoned.

However that may be, it does not seem at all likely that the Government will see its way to subsidise mining companies from public funds to enable them to keep open unpayable mines. If the Government should be convinced that it was necessary in the public interest that some or all of these mines should be kept going, it would probably find it preferable to take over the management into its own hands rather than to subsidise private companies over whose working it could exercise no real control. That, however, is a contingency which the Select Committee did not apparently feel called upon to face.

South Africa. June, 1918.

NEW ZEALAND

I. THE SPECIAL SESSION

THE New Zealand Parliament met in special session on April 9. The Governor-General's speech stated that the session had been convened to consider the proposal that the Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance should represent New Zealand at the forthcoming Imperial Conference and meeting of the Imperial War Cabinet in London, and to make provision for the financial requirements of the Dominion during their absence. A second session would be convened later in the year for the transaction of general business, and during the present session legislation to be proposed would be "limited to the financial exigencies of the Dominion, and such other matters as demanded immediate attention consequent on war conditions." The assembling of Parliament took place at the time of the first lull in the gigantic German offensive. War news was being watched with profound and painful interest, and it needed no elaboration to drive home the truth of His Excellency's statement that "the present moment probably marks the crisis of the war in which the Empire has so long been engaged." There was, therefore, little risk of protracted debate or of serious opposition to the Government proposals.

The speeches on the Address-in-reply were few and brief. An amendment to the effect that the administration of the Defence Department was unsatisfactory and called for an immediate change was defeated by

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47 to 4, while a further amendment expressing want of confidence in the Ministry found only 5 supporters.

A conference of the House—virtually a secret session—was then held, at which it was resolved “that this conference of members of the New Zealand Parliament approves of the representation of New Zealand at the Imperial War Conference and War Cabinet by the Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance, and agrees to do everything possible to facilitate their departure so as to enable them to reach London by the date appointed.”

The House then settled down to consideration of the one measure proposed, which, while covering a number of matters, was introduced under the short title of “the Finance Bill.” The debate, both on the second reading and in committee, was not lengthy, although sharp criticism was directed against some of the Government proposals, and at one stage Mr. Massey found it necessary to appeal to the House to remember the crisis in which it was acting, and not to delay the passage of the Bill.

The measure was passed with only slight modifications, and Parliament rose after being in session for just a week. The main provisions of the Act have some general interest and may be very shortly summarised. Land tax and income-tax (including special war tax) were imposed at the same rates as last year, the large surplus, referred to later, rendering any increase unnecessary. Authority was given to borrow £20,000,000, which, except as to certain certificates and stock available in limited quantities for small investors, was to be free of income-tax (as in the case of the 1917 loans). It was around this provision that a good deal of the discussion centred, but although vigorous criticism was directed from many quarters against the policy of borrowing at $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. free of income-tax the Government declined to give way, and the clause was eventually carried by 40 votes to 18.

Stringent provision was made to compel taxpayers to contribute in due proportion to the war purposes loan—

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which term included the unissued balance of the loan authorised in 1917. The existing provisions dealing with this matter were repealed, and it was enacted that if the Commissioner of Taxes has reason to believe that any person (including a Company) has not subscribed to the war loan in due proportion to his means he may call upon such person to subscribe an amount specified in the notice, but not exceeding six times the yearly average for the past three years of the land tax and income-tax paid by the taxpayer. A right of appeal from the Commissioner's requisition is given, the appeal lying in the first instance to a special Board of Appeal composed entirely of Government officers, and from that body to a judge of the Supreme Court sitting in chambers. Failure to comply with the notice, as originally given or as modified on appeal, renders the taxpayer liable to a penalty equivalent to double his land and income-tax, and upon any moneys which he is compelled to lend he is to receive interest at 3 per cent. only.

Here again sharp criticism was drawn in the House, and has been repeated with emphasis in newspapers and throughout the country. No one objects to the principle of compulsory loans, but the method proposed is open to serious objections. In the first place a man does not know how much he ought to invest. True, he knows the compulsory limit, but if everyone invested up to that limit the loan would be very much oversubscribed, and it is only when the time for voluntary subscriptions has expired that the deficit, if any, is ascertained. In the next place, the power given to the Commissioner—although it is subject to the right of appeal—is a very wide one, and there is strong objection to a man having the burden forced upon him of resisting a demand made at the discretion of the Commissioner and with no guiding principle or measure furnished by the Legislature. Lastly, the Act does not discriminate between men who have subscribed well to previous loans and those who have not.

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No statutory provision is made for taking into account the previous contributions, and the Minister expressly stated that he regretted this could not be done. In a statement made since Parliament rose he qualified this to some extent by pointing out that no doubt the matter will be considered when the Commissioner, or the Board of Appeal, is investigating the grounds of any objection to lend, while it has since been announced that, in cases where previous contributions have been made, the Commissioner's formal requisition will not issue at once, but that an opportunity will first be given for negotiation between the Commissioner and the taxpayer as to what amount the latter should in fairness be called upon to lend.

These considerations, however, have not removed the objections or stifled the criticism levelled at the scheme, and the provision is another instance of the tendency under National Government to take short but dangerous cuts. Legislation is hastily framed, loyalty to the National Ministry is relied on to restrain members from opposing on matters of detail, and war exigencies are made an excuse for slipshod legislation which has not been fully worked out and the defects of which are left to be overcome in the course of administration by officials. A striking illustration of this method of legislation was furnished in the Finance Act of 1916, which, after providing in most sweeping and ill-considered fashion for taxation of "excess profits," gave the Commissioner express power to make a reduction where he considered undue hardship would be caused. War exigencies demand war methods and justify machinery unknown in peace, but they do not destroy the responsibility of Parliament or the Cabinet to consider all measures fully and to leave as little as possible to the discretion of officials who are called upon to administer the law.

The tendency to slackness and indifference on the part of members who support a National Ministry is illustrated by the fact that, although during the debate on the Bill the foregoing objections were pointed out, no member

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took the trouble to suggest an amendment which would be free from them. The most the Minister would do in committee was to insert a clause giving the right (already mentioned) to appeal from the Board to a judge of the Supreme Court, and although on the second reading there had been some outspoken criticism of the measure, this concession was accepted in committee without any attempt being made to deal with the fundamental objections which had been raised.

Judging from the utterances of the Minister it would appear that the stringent provisions of the Act were deliberately drawn with the intention of alarming people into lending to the Government, and with little idea that they would be put into operation except in very gross cases of "shirking" by wealthy men. The laudable desire, however, to assist the war loan does not justify crudeness in framing or failure to make the provisions equitable, clear and reasonably certain.

A most important clause in the Act is one extending the life of the present Parliament until December, 1919, unless a dissolution takes place earlier. This met with fairly general approval in Parliament, where the clause was carried by 43 votes to 19, and has not been seriously objected to by the constituencies.

Local bodies' loans are protected by a moratorium until the end of the war, and for twelve months thereafter, and local authorities are authorised to borrow upon overdraft for the purpose of investing in any war loan.

The Mortgages Extension Act (which allows a moratorium in the case of principal moneys secured by mortgages) is amended in important respects. Except in the case of "trade mortgages" (defined as mortgages to any bank, trading company, or merchant, securing the balance of the account current of a customer) no covenant excluding the moratorium is to have any force or effect, *whether entered into before or after the passing of the Act*, and whether the document containing the covenant constitutes a new

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mortgage or an extension of the term of an existing mortgage. The power of the Supreme Court to impose upon the mortgagor the obligation to pay an increased rate of interest as one of the terms upon which the benefit of the moratorium should be granted is fettered by a provision that the rate shall not exceed such maximum rate (if any) as may for the time being have been fixed by the Governor-General in Council under the authority of any law in that behalf enabling, and the Minister stated during the debate that the intention was to limit such interest to 6 per cent. Here again it is obvious that the object of the measure is to divert investments to the war loan. It is, however, difficult to find any justification for destroying existing covenants whereby under direct statutory authority the operation of the principal Act is expressly waived and excluded. In many cases hardship will undoubtedly be caused to lenders by this drastic provision, and there does not appear to have been any serious suggestion, either in Parliament or outside, that cases of real hardship to borrowers had been caused by the prolongation of the war sufficient to justify the interference of Parliament with contracts already made.

The final clauses of the Act authorise the Government to make regulations for the following purposes :

(a) Procuring, exacting, enforcing, controlling and regulating National Service during the war.

(b) Prohibiting or restricting any service, employment, occupation, business, work, or industry.

(c) Regulating the remuneration for National Service, subject, however, to the Arbitration Act and any awards or industrial agreements for the time being in force.

The expression "National Service" is defined as meaning all service, employment, etc., whether under the Crown or under any other employer, or independent of any employer, which is deemed by the Governor-in-Council, or any authority appointed under regulations, to be essential to the public welfare, and it includes not merely personal

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service but the use of any factory, premises, machinery or the like.

It was over these provisions that the debate waxed hottest, and at one time threatened to develop into obstruction by the Labour members. These last were profoundly suspicious of the proposal, expressing the fear that under it workers might be compelled to work for the private gain of others. One member bluntly put it that the real purpose of the clause was that workers "should be taken by the scruff of the neck and used for private gain." An amendment was moved adding a proviso to the effect that in any regulations made under the clause there should be an express statement that no labour should be transferred from any trade industry or occupation to any other for the purpose of private gain. Sir Joseph Ward, while disclaiming the intention imputed to the Government, said that the insertion of such a provision would neutralise the Bill, but that the Government had decided to introduce a safeguard by the addition of the following clause :

All regulations made under this section shall be laid before Parliament within 14 days after the making thereof, if Parliament is then in session ; and if not, within 14 days after the commencement of the next ensuing session. If the House should by resolution declare that it does not assent to any such regulations, such regulations shall cease to have any force or effect as from the date of passing such resolution, or as from such later date as may be specified in the resolution.

He also promised that Labour representatives would be consulted when the regulations were being drawn.

These concessions failed to satisfy the dissentients, but opposition was powerless to prevent the passage of the measure with the addition of the clause quoted. So far the only application of the powers given to the Government has been a set of regulations restricting development works, and the raising of new capital by companies, the

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prime object of such regulations being obviously to stimulate the investment of capital in the war loans.

II. WAR LOAN AND FINANCE

OF the loan authorised last session, £9,500,000 had been kept in reserve. This was offered for subscription in April, and at the moment of writing there is still a million of it to be taken up. If this is not immediately forthcoming the compulsory powers given by the Finance Act will be applied. The further loan of £20,000,000 just authorised will probably not be put on the market until near the end of the year.

When Parliament met the precise figures for the financial year ending March 31 were not available, but in a provisional statement made by the Minister of Finance it was announced that the approximate surplus on the year's workings was 4½ millions. This, added to the accumulated surplus at March 31, 1917, gave an aggregate of about 10½ millions, out of which there was invested in London in Government securities a total sum of £8,728,817. It was also stated that the total amount raised by New Zealand for war purposes was £46,304,860, of which practically £41,000,000 had been expended. The revenue receipts were approximately two millions in excess of the estimate.

The financial condition of the country continues to be very satisfactory under the burden necessarily thrust upon it by the war. Individuals have suffered, the general cost of living has increased a great deal, and shortage of shipping facilities has disturbed trade and occasioned at times a scarcity of imported commodities. As a whole, however, the country is prosperous, and the heavy taxation has been easily borne. The problem of securing sufficient shipping to get our produce away is the one that causes most anxiety.

The Call and the Response

III. THE CALL AND THE RESPONSE

BY the beginning of April there was becoming discernible a slight tendency on the part of the people of this country to underestimate the weight of the burden which lay upon the Allies, and of which we were bound to bear our part. We were not blind to the extreme probability of a German offensive, assisted by the transference of men in large numbers from the Eastern front, but behind the words in which we discussed and admitted the probability there was a strong general conviction—perhaps it would be more correct to say assumption—that a serious driving back of the Allies was a very remote contingency, and that they would be able without grave difficulty to repulse any attack upon their well-established line. We had strong warrant for this opinion in the public and official utterances cabled from time to time from England, and it was the opinion not only of the man in the street and the clubs, but also—if we may judge from their acts—of our responsible Ministers. The calling up of the men of the Second Division had been so often postponed—always, so we were informed, because the necessary reinforcements were being kept up in accordance with the advice of the Home authorities—that many began to wonder in a more or less vague fashion whether the married men of New Zealand would be drawn upon, and to slide half-unconsciously into the opinion that, while of course the New Zealand force must be maintained at all cost until the end of the war, this could be done by an effort which would gradually diminish in strength. Such a temper was even reflected in the proceedings of the Military Service Boards, before which it was undoubtedly becoming easier to obtain long periods of extension in the case of men called up in the ballots. There was a widespread, if seldom expressed, feeling that owing to the large expense

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involved the Government was likely to delay as long as possible the sending of fathers from New Zealand, and that in view of the outlook on the Western front such a policy was not likely to prejudice seriously the maintenance of our expeditionary force. The first bad news of the German thrust came therefore as a painful shock, and as word came through day by day of hard-won position after position being lost, New Zealand was aroused to an appreciation of the supreme gravity of the situation.

The appeal by Mr. Lloyd George to the Dominions was published and swept away any delusions we had been cherishing. It was (as Mr. Massey informed the House later) supplemented by a secret message to the Government, giving further particulars and details and a forecast of what might be expected during the next three months. To this the following reply was immediately sent :

New Zealand has pledged herself to maintain her present establishment of Expeditionary Forces in the field whatever the sacrifice. New Zealand has invariably supplied to the full every man required at the rate of reinforcement indicated from time to time by the Imperial Government. His Majesty's Government has now only to indicate to the New Zealand Government if increased reinforcements are required, and they will be supplied. It is requested that an early reply be sent giving details of new estimates of monthly reinforcements as the result of the present fighting.

A reply was received that the necessary information would be supplied at an early date, and in the meantime it was suggested that a Tank Battalion should be formed out of accumulated reinforcements in England. This was at once agreed to, and it was further stated that the New Zealand Government was willing that any surplus of reserves in England might be used at the front, if in the opinion of the military authorities, including the general in command of the Army Corps, they were required, regard being had to the fact that the scarcity of shipping might make it difficult for reinforcements to be forwarded regularly from here. A few days later the information

The Call and the Response

asked for came to hand, and the Minister of Defence on April 15 announced in the House the steps which it was intended to take. The Imperial Government, he stated, had asked for a material increase in infantry reinforcements, but as the percentage of reinforcements for the past few months had not been disclosed at the express wish of the Imperial Government, he did not think it desirable to say exactly what the increase was. It was asked only for five months. "We all hope," he added, "that at the end of five months no further reinforcements will be required. If that does not prove to be the case, then presumably the percentage will be reduced to that which has obtained during the last few months." The increase demanded for the five months was intended to keep the division up to its full strength during the time when a continuance of the newly launched offensive might be expected. It was hoped that during April, May and June we should be able to send some 1,700 more infantrymen than would have been sent under arrangements recently existing, and to enable this to be done all the drafts were being accelerated and further opportunities given for voluntary enlistments from the Second Division. The Minister further pointed out that our ability to send more men depends largely on shipping facilities, but apparently he can see his way ahead for some time to come. As a result of putting forward the reinforcement drafts the first batch of married men has gone into camp and the whole of Class B—which embraces married men with one child—has been called up. Ten thousand were drawn by ballot in April, and the balance of the class (about 8,000) was called up *en bloc* three weeks later. The list of the names drawn on the ballot was, by a coincidence, published on the anniversary of the Anzac landing. Many First Division cases which have been adjourned *sine die* by the Military Service Boards are to be reviewed, and Classes C and D of the Second Division are thrown open for voluntary enlistments. Strong efforts are being made by the Second Division Leagues throughout

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the Dominion to secure better payment to wives and children left behind, and to ensure more vigorous combing out of the single men still left, but while they are fighting tenaciously on these points the married men as a body are going into camp cheerfully. An unfortunately worded resolution passed at one public meeting, when feeling was running high on the question of pay and allowances, formed the subject of proceedings under the War Regulations, while a disturbance took place in the same town when the first lot of married men was being dispatched to camp. The men themselves, however, were in no way responsible for this disturbance, and the resolution—even if it meant all that it implied—was repudiated by the Executive of the League, and by other similar organisations throughout New Zealand, and cannot be taken as any indication of disloyalty or a desire to shirk on the part of the general body of married men.*

* The incident may be briefly described, not to emphasise its importance, but to prevent too much importance being attached to it. At a public meeting in Christchurch on April 28, convened by the Second Division League, the following resolution was proposed: "That this meeting of representative citizens of Christchurch, being prepared to meet its share of financial responsibility, insists that the Government immediately grant the demands of the Second Division League." An amendment was moved: "That this meeting of Christchurch citizens is of opinion that no Second Division man should leave for camp until the demands of the Second Division League are conceded by the Government, and also demands that a general election be held immediately." The amendment was put and carried notwithstanding the protest of the President and some members of the Executive of the League. Later the framer, proposer and seconder of the amendment were prosecuted for breach of War Regulations, the contention being that the amendment had a tendency to interfere with discipline, and to incite opposition to the enforcement of the law relating to military service. Convictions were recorded: the proposer and seconder were sentenced to six months' imprisonment, and the person who drew and read the amendment to three months. Representations were immediately made to the Cabinet to intervene, on the ground that the seditious nature of the amendment had not been realised at the time, and that punishment by imprisonment was too severe. After a short delay the Cabinet decided to release the defendants conditionally on their finding security against any future breaches of the law, and the security being forthcoming they are now at liberty.

The Call and the Response

New Zealand has thus renewed, and is proceeding to fulfil, her pledge to maintain at its proper strength the division which she has put into the field. To some people the terms of the pledge appear to be too cold and business-like, suggesting a limit to our responsibility. Yet, having regard to the virtual exhaustion of our First Division, and the probability that a long time has yet to elapse during which the manhood of the Empire must continue to be sacrificed in the cause of humanity and a lasting peace, the promise to keep our own body of men reinforced to the full is more practical, and of greater service, than any vague repetitions of the overworked phrase about the "last man and the last shilling."

By the time these words appear in print our representatives, who are fully accredited to speak for the general body of citizens, will have visited England and in all probability have left again. Great developments may have taken place on the Western front, and it may be that the end of the war, if not actually in sight, will be within the range of reasonably certain calculation. But, whether this is so or not, New Zealand, at whatever cost of men and money, will continue in sober willingness and without grudging or complaint to do the work which she has undertaken. The idea of acquiescing in a mockery of peace is as abhorrent to our minds as we believe it to be to the minds of our kinsmen and Allies, who have suffered immeasurably more than we have, and we should count as vain the sacrifice of so many of our best and brightest spirits unless a peace is won sufficiently stable, so far as human prudence and courage can make anything sure, to save our children from the agonies which this generation has endured.

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IV. DEFENCE ADMINISTRATION

CRITICISM of the Defence Department on matters of detail has, naturally, not been wanting, nor has it been without foundation, but the critics are apt to forget the enormous amount of work that has been done in creating and working a system under which from a total population of a million, a hundred thousand men have been called to arms, equipped, trained, and sent to the other side of the world. A Commission under the chairmanship of Sir Robert Anderson of Australia is now engaged in investigating the working of the Department, and although numerous blunders, anomalies and instances of bad business methods have been brought to light, the Chairman was able to remark the other day that this appeared to be the only country in the world where no cases of fraud had been discovered. A tribute to the personal character of Sir James Allen was the Chairman's further remark that in no case had the Commission been able to trace the exercise of any influence by the Minister in the matter of appointments.

In connection with the question of conscription, a brief reference may be made to the case of Mr. Webb, M.P. Mr. Webb, who is a single man of military age, represented the Grey electorate, a constituency on the West Coast of the South Island embracing a considerable number of coal miners. A staunch member of the Labour Party, he vigorously opposed the Military Service Act when it was before Parliament in 1916, and on his being recently drawn in the ballot an appeal for his exemption was lodged. This was dismissed by the Military Service Board, and Mr. Webb was accordingly liable to go into camp. There he refused to obey orders, was court-martialled and sentenced to two years' imprisonment, which term he is at present serving in a prison camp. The Crown Law

Defence Administration

Office advised that as his offence was not a "crime" within the meaning of the Legislature Act his seat in the House was not forfeited by reason of his conviction, but under the provisions of the Act a forfeiture occurred if, without leave, he should be absent during a session. Shortly after the House assembled a deputation representing Labour organizations waited upon the Prime Minister and several of his colleagues, and urged that Mr. Webb should be released. The grounds of this request were that this was a democratic country, that the only way in which the people could give expression to their political views was through members of Parliament whom they chose at the election, that when the present Parliament was elected the question of conscription was not before the country, and that Mr. Webb was needed by his constituents to represent them in Parliament. One of the speakers went further and maintained that no person should be imprisoned for objecting to military service. The Prime Minister's reply was clear and uncompromising. Parliament had not seen fit to exempt members from service and Mr. Webb had broken the law. He had been fairly tried by the proper tribunal, and the fact that he was a member of Parliament could not make any difference to the result. As head of the Government, whose duty it was to administer the law faithfully and impartially, he himself had no sympathy for any symptom of disloyalty on the part of any member of the community, and he was not prepared to intervene.

During the session leave of absence for Mr. Webb was moved, but the motion was lost on the voices and no division was asked for. The seat accordingly became vacant, and a by-election was held on May 29. There were two candidates, Mr. Holland (Labour and anti-conscription) and Mr. Coates (Independent and win-the-war advocate) and it was generally realised that the first named had a very strong chance of success. The electorate had long been a stronghold of the Labour party, and owing

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to the policy of exempting coal miners from service the ranks of Labour had not been reduced to the same extent as other classes had by the absence of men at the front. In the result anticipation was justified and Mr. Holland was elected, but only by the narrow margin of 148 votes, which is less than a sixth of that secured by Mr. Webb at the last General Election.

New Zealand. June, 1918.

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
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